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ABSTRACT

THE TECHNOLOGICAL IMAGINARIES OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS: THE
DISCURSIVE DIMENSION OF COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY AND THE
FIGHT FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE
Elisabetta Ferrari
Guobin Yang

This dissertation examines how social movements envision technology in a political way.
Building on constructivist, cultural theories of social movements, literature from media
history, and insights from Science and Technology Studies, I offer a discursive approach
to technology, based on the notion of “technological imaginaries”: sets of practice-based
beliefs, individual and collective, implicit and explicit, about the role of technology in
social life and social change. First, I identify a current dominant technological imaginary,
arising from Silicon Valley, which is based on the equation of digital technologies with
freedom and democracy, the reliance on technologies for the solution of social problems,
and an alignment with neoliberalism. I then examine how three contemporary leftist
social movements – the Hungarian internet tax protests of 2014, the Italian occupied
social center LUMe, and the American Philly Socialists – construct their own
technological imaginaries in response to Silicon Valley’s. I explore these three cases
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through semi-structured interviews and visual focus groups, an innovative method based
on a collective drawing task.
I propose a typology of social movements’ technological imaginaries, based on how they
respond to Silicon Valley’s dominant imaginary. Imaginaries of appropriation, such as
that of the Hungarian internet tax protests, accept both the dominant technological
imaginary and the technologies of Silicon Valley. Imaginaries of negotiation, such as
those of LUMe and the Philly Socialists, reject the dominant imaginary, but allow for the
use of Silicon Valley’s technologies. Imaginaries of challenge reject both the imaginary
and the technologies of Silicon Valley. I also argue that appropriation, negotiation, and
challenge are shaped by three political factors: the ideology of the social movement, the
political context, and the presence of other prominent technological imaginaries. I
suggest that movements’ different technological imaginaries point to the existence of
multiple, situated, political internets: even if activists all use the same digital
technologies, these technologies hold different political meanings for them. This
dissertation thus contributes to the literature by reconceptualizing the relationship
between technology and social movements, providing a framework and an empirical
qualitative approach to account for how movements are already imagining and
experiencing technologies as political.
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Introduction

It is night time and the sky over central Hong Kong is dark. Thousands of people
are gathering in one of Hong Kong’s central areas, in front of the headquarters of the
Hong Kong Government. They are holding their cell phones towards the dark sky,
illuminating the night with their screen lights. It is September 2014 and protesters are
occupying this central square in opposition to the Chinese government’s proposed
reforms to Hong Kong’s political system. These images were immediately picked up and
circulated by both mainstream media and social network sites. CNN described the image,
saying: “Photographed from above, the glowing screens of mobile phones held aloft by
the sea of protesters have created an enduring image of the demonstrators' solidarity”
(Hume & Park, 2014). Quartz echoed this sentiment: “It was an image that fascinated the
world—a sea of lights coming from thousands of Hong Kong protesters waving their lit
up mobile phones in the darkness” (Lih, 2014). The iconic image of protesters raising
their phones to the sky survived the demise of the Umbrella Revolution and travelled far
away.
When thousands of people, led by student activists, started mobilizing in Hong
Kong, footage and images from these pro-democracy protests spread across the world in
mainstream media and online. It seemed to many as though the revolts, uprisings, and
occupations that shook the Middle East, Europe and United States in 2010-2011 were
about to make a forceful come-back – and in such an unlikely place as Hong Kong. The
police’s decision to use tear gas on the occupation backfired, as powerful images – of

1

protesters trying to protect themselves with umbrellas (Lee, 2015) –, circulated online.
These images gave the movement its name: the Umbrella Movement. And yet, as iconic
as the umbrellas became, it was another image – of phones lifted to the sky – that would
be taken up by other social movements, in very different countries, in the following
years.
This image first reappeared in Hungary, a month after the Hong Kong protests,
when thousands of people mobilized to publicly protest a tax on internet consumption
that was proposed by the conservative government. Lit phones were raised in the first
demonstration that drew around 10,000 people to the center of Budapest, Hungary’s
capital. However, it was the second demonstration in which protesters staged the most
impactful version of the iconic image: a photograph captured 100,000 people crossing the
Danube River on the massive Elizabeth Bridge in an aerial shot, as they lifted their
illuminated phones towards the night. These protests and images of thousands made it
clear to the world that there was great public support for the movement, and eventually
the government withdrew the tax proposal.
Fast forward to spring 2017. Hungarian activists gathered in front of the
Parliament at the end of a demonstration against Viktor Orbán’s government and its
legislation that targeted civil society organizations and academic institutions. Protesters
once again took out their phones and raised them to the sky (Csekö, 2017). After that, in
2017 and 2018, images of protesters raising their glowing cell phones circulated
throughout the Central Eastern European region: first, during the Romanian anticorruption protests (Gillet, 2017), then in the Slovakian demonstrations that led to the
resignation of the Prime Minister (Santora, 2018). And, once again, in Hungary, where
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the re-election of Orbán in 2018 led protesters to take to the streets and to lift their
illuminated smartphones in the air. In contexts as different as Hong Kong, Hungary,
Romania and Slovakia, the image of lit cell phone screens was taken up by protesters and
featured in mainstream media reports.
Tracing this iconic protest action as it travelled around the world could help us tell
a story about an interconnected mediated globe, in which the diffusion of protest tactics
knows no boundaries. It could also tell us a story about spectacle, news values and media
coverage of social movements. But I would like to suggest that this is less of a story
about protest diffusion or media coverage as it is a story about the power of discourses,
whether in textual or visual form, that connect technologies to social change. In other
words, the key question that we should be asking about this iconic action is not why it
travelled so far away from a square in central Hong Kong. Rather, we should be asking
why that iconic protest action was (and still is) immediately legible as a political demand.
What makes that action a political one? What underlying ideas about technology does
that action reveal? And would it make sense in other political contexts?
This dissertation situates the legibility of the images of lit up cell phones lifted
towards the sky within a broader discursive environment that has linked technologies
(especially digital ones) with political and social processes. I argue that such protest
actions become legible as a political demand because they follow the script of what this
dissertation describes as a dominant “technological imaginary”, in which social change
has been often and powerfully connected to the use of technologies.
Recent scholarship on social movements and activism has given us an important
number of (sometimes contradictory) insights into the relationship between social
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movements and digital technologies. But it has not yet extensively confronted
technologies from a discursive perspective or investigated their symbolic role in
mobilization processes, both present and past. It has yet to shed light on how activists
discursively envision technology and its role in social life and social change; how they
relate to technology in a political way, and not just as an instrument for action. This is the
gap that my dissertation aims to fill.
In this introductory chapter, I first review the most recent literature on social
movements and technologies, identifying the need for research that also takes into
consideration how activists approach technology politically, and not solely
instrumentally. Second, I present my theoretical framework, based on three building
blocks: cultural approaches to social movements as exemplified by the work of Alberto
Melucci; historical accounts of technologies that highlight the importance of discourses;
and the notion of “technological imaginary” that I repurpose from Flichy (2007a) and
Jasanoff (2015). I then extend and qualify the concept of technological imaginary by
drawing out its political elements. Furthermore, I highlight the three contributions that
this theoretical framework makes to social movements research. I explain my research
design, introduce the cases I will examine and describe my multi-method qualitative
approach. I then address the limitations of my research project. In closing, I offer a
preview of my argument and an outline of the chapters that follow.

Digital Technologies And The Changing “Logics” Of Social Movements

A vibrant scholarship on social movements and digital media technologies
emerged in the mid-2010s (e.g. Barassi, 2015; Bennett & Segerberg, 2013; Castells,
4

2012; Gerbaudo, 2012; Juris, 2012; Treré, 2018; Tufekci, 2017; Wolfson, 2014; Zayani,
2015), in order to explain the wave of movements that surprised the world in 2011: from
the Arab Uprisings to the Spanish Indignados to Occupy Wall Street. Although many
other recent movements have been investigated, these three cases have greatly shaped the
scholarship in this area.
In general, this scholarship has pointed out the scarcity of convincing
theorizations about the role of media or technologies in the sociological traditions of
social movement studies (see Bennett & Segerberg, 2013, pp. 31–32), such as resource
mobilization theory (McCarthy & Zald, 2001) and the contentious politics approach
(McAdam, Tarrow, & Tilly, 1996). When the role of media technologies was examined,
it was usually solely through analyses of the impact of mainstream media coverage on the
success or failure of movements (see Gitlin, 1980). This lack of attention to media and
technology had already been noticed by a previous generation of studies on movements
that tried to make sense of the opportunities offered by the internet in the late 1990s and
early 2000s, in conjunction with the rise of the global justice movement.
However, the recent scholarship has also been invested in reexamining the two
sets of approaches that became prominent in the 2000s: an organizational perspective that
highlighted how internet technologies reduced the barriers for collective action and a
focus on the creation of alternative media platforms. On the one hand, works from the
2000s looked at the affordances of the internet – of emails, listservs, websites, and
forums – and argued that these new tools helped movements to reduce coordination costs,
making collective organizing more affordable and increasingly effective across borders
(e.g. Bennett, 2003; Della Porta & Tarrow, 2005; McCaughey & Ayers, 2003; Van de
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Donk, Loader, Nixon, & Rucht, 2004). This was fundamentally an Olsonian argument
(Olson, 1971) that put the issue of coordination at the center of explanations of the
function of media technologies. On the other hand, other works from the 2000s placed the
need for expression at the core of movements’ technological practices and thus
emphasized how the internet allowed for the creation of alternative media outlets that
could talk back to mainstream media coverage of movements (e.g. Atton, 2002; Couldry
& Curran, 2003; Coyer, Dowmunt, & Fountain, 2007; De Jong, Shaw, & Stammers,
2005; Downing, 2008; Juris, 2005). The most important and widely analyzed example in
this respect is the network of the Independent Media Center, also known as Indymedia,
that was one of the backbones of the global justice movement. The radical politics of
Indymedia and its open publishing practices allowed the network to become the voice of
the movement (Giraud, 2014; Pickard, 2006b, 2006a); it was a corrective and a
counterpoint to the mainstream coverage that seemed to only report on the violence that
happened at counter-summits, and never address the reasons behind the protests.
Looked at from the 2010s, both of these lines of reasoning seemed excessively
dependent on the idiosyncrasies of the global justice movement and scarcely applicable to
the movements of 2011 and beyond. The global justice movement, in fact, was
characterized by the need to coordinate different social movement organizations in
different countries; the reliance on mass demonstrations against international summits,
such as G8 and NATO meetings; and the outsized influence of Indymedia. While the
legacy of the global justice movement is still present in today’s movements (see Wolfson,
2014), the academic explanations that followed that movement proved of limited use in

6

interpreting events like the occupations of Tahrir Square, Puerta del Sol and Zuccotti
Park.
First, the recent wave of studies highlighted the need to break free of the Olsonian
paradigm, recognizing that while lowering coordination costs for social movements was a
significant contribution of internet technologies, this was just one of the changes that
could be observed in the movements of 2011. Second, it shifted the focus from alternative
media to the mainstream, corporate-owned social network sites (boyd & Ellison, 2007),
e.g. Facebook, Twitter, Youtube that were used by the newer movements, thus looking
more at the impact of social media services on the movements than to the autonomous
production of media (or technologies) by activists.
In an effort to go beyond the perceived shortcomings of older theorizations, the
recent scholarship, although offering different and often contradictory takes on the
relationship between movements and media technologies, has coalesced around the need
for better explaining the changing “logics” of social movements that the 2010s seem to
have brought about. In practice, this was translated into an overwhelming focus on how
different movements have used corporate social network sites – Facebook and Twitter in
particular – and how the use of these digital media might be changing how movements
come to exist and operate.
In what has become one of the most influential works of this recent scholarship,
Bennett and Segerberg (2013) argued that we have witnessed the emergence of a new
type of mobilization, defined by the logic of connective action, which they contrasted
with traditional collective action models. While in their opinion the logic of collective
action – starting with the Olsonian tradition – emphasized the need for organizations to
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exercise a coordination role that encourages individuals to contribute to a common goal,
connective action assumes that individuals are already crafting highly personalized
contributions, through their personal sharing networks developed via digital media. Thus,
if collective action grappled with the problem of getting individuals to contribute,
connective action is predicated upon the idea that individuals are, in fact, already
contributing (Bennett & Segerberg, 2013, p. 36). Furthermore, digital technologies are
thought to play a very different role in collective and in connective action: in collective
action networks, technology is an instrument, used by established actors to amplify their
preexisting modes of engagement; in connective action, it becomes an agent, which
organizes and structures relations (Bennett & Segerberg, 2013, p. 196). In their words:
In the model defined by the logic of connective action, however, digital
media do change the dynamics of the action: these networks operate
through the organizational processes of social media, and their logic does
not require strong organizational control or the symbolic construction of a
united “we”. (Bennett & Segerberg, 2013, p. 28)
Bennett and Segerberg read the movements of 2011 as characterized by this new
logic of connective action, enabled and shaped by the personalized messages that
circulate through social network sites.
Castells (2012) made similar claims. He identified a synergy between the
development of “internet networks” and “networked social movements” (p. 233). In line
with Bennett and Segerberg (2013), he argued that the ways in which digital networks are
structured is mirrored in how movements structured themselves:
In our time, multimodal, digital networks of horizontal communication are
the fastest and most autonomous, interactive, reprogrammable and selfexpanding means of communication in history. The characteristics of
communication processes between individuals engaged in the social
movement determine the organizational characteristics of the social
movement itself: the more interactive and self-configurable
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communication is, the less hierarchical is the organization and the more
participatory is the movement. (Castells, 2012, p. 15)
Castells thus suggested that there is a correspondence between the supposed
characteristics of digital technologies and the logics of movement organizing; not in the
sense that the way movements organize themselves impacts the way they use digital
technologies, but rather the opposite – that the shape of technology is reflected in the
shape of the movements.
Juris (2012) also weighed in by differentiating between a “logic of networking”,
that characterized the global justice movement, and a “logic of aggregation” that emerged
with Occupy Wall Street and the other movements of 2011. According to Juris (2012),
the
logic of aggregation is an alternative cultural framework that is shaped by
our interactions with social media and generates particular patterns of
social and political interaction that involve the viral flow of information
and subsequent aggregations of large numbers of individuals in concrete
physical spaces. (p. 266)
This different logic of organizing also has drawbacks. Juris argued that the
aggregation of individuals, through digital media and through the occupation of physical
spaces, is always threatened by fragmentation (Juris, 2012, p. 266). This risk is
exacerbated by the way in which aggregation on social media works.
The focus on the different “logics” characterizing the movements of 2011 and
beyond has been very productive in highlighting the significance of digital technologies
for the life of contemporary social movements. However, scholars have overall neglected
to investigate how social movement actors relate to these new technologies and what they
think of them. They considered the use of technologies, but not necessarily the discursive
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context in which this use has taken place. And, as I showed above, they have often
implied that the structural properties of technology have an impact on movements, but
have not looked at the impact of how technology is constructed discursively. Even the
excellent body of work that has sought to challenge and add nuance the idea of an
emerging new logic of organizing (e.g. Barassi, 2015; Gerbaudo, 2012; Gerbaudo &
Treré, 2015; Kavada, 2015; Terranova & Donovan, 2013; Zayani, 2015) has yet to fully
address this issue.
The focus on the changed “logics” of organizing has obscured the relevance of
three other issues, whose analysis could move the discussion from a mere focus on the
use of digital media towards a more comprehensive understanding of the relationship
between movements and technologies. First, this scholarship has not yet talked about how
activists, while using digital technologies, are also surrounded by and embedded into
different kinds of discourses about technologies, their proper place in society and their
expected uses. Second, this body of work has not fully addressed how movements might
think about technology as a political phenomenon, i.e. confront it from an ideological
perspective. Third, this field has barely considered the symbolic role that technology can
come to play in political events and social processes, including during protests. These
three issues are at the core of my theoretical framework, which builds on the concept of
“technological imaginary” to make sense of how social movements think about
technology and its role in political and social change.

Theoretical Framework
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Summary
In the following sections, I lay out my theoretical framework, centered on the
notion of “technological imaginary”, through which I suggest we can productively
investigate how social movements relate to technologies and envision them in their
struggles for social change. My framework puts three different bodies of literature in
conversation with each other. First, I situate my framework within the cultural
approaches to the study of social movements. Theoretically and methodologically, my
work is inspired by Melucci’s (1989) invitation to study movements as processes; for me,
this means investigating how movements construct the environment around them through
discourses – including discourses about technology. As highlighted above, the literature
on social movements has not thoroughly considered how activists think about technology
and how discourses about technology come to be relevant to protest and mobilization. I
thus turn to two literatures that have addressed the relevance of discourses about
technology to society and social change, albeit not paying great attention to social
movements. I incorporate key lessons on the discursive dimension of technologies from
the work of media historians (e.g. Marvin, 1988; Marx, 1964; Nye, 1996; Turner, 2006;
R. Williams, 1975), who have pointed out the social and political significance of how
technology is conceptualized. I then move to discussing the notion of technological
imaginary, as articulated by Flichy (2007b, 2007a) and Jasanoff (2015).
I put forward my theoretical contribution by providing my own definition of the
concept of technological imaginary: a set of practice-based beliefs, individual and
collective, implicit and explicit, about the role of technology in social life and social
change. Further, I discuss the political significance of this definition: technological
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imaginaries are not only relevant because they influence how technology is designed,
adopted and utilized, they are also important because they envision specific social,
political and economic relationships to technology. In particular, I argue that
technological imaginaries include visions of social change that need to be critically
investigated. I also suggest that technological imaginaries are multiple and potentially
conflicting and that it should always be possible to identify a dominant one.
Lastly, I make the case for using this theoretical framework to investigate movements and
technology. I argue that social movements construct their own technological imaginaries,
but are also constantly confronted with dominant mainstream imaginaries, which have
specific political connotations. I suggest that using the concept of technological
imaginary can help us systematize recent research on social movements and technology;
furthermore, it can contribute to social movement studies by addressing three interrelated
aspects: the symbolic role of technology for mobilization, the political valence of
activists’ technological practices, and the role of social movements in the debate over the
politics of technology.

Movements as processes
In broad terms, my work is situated among constructivist, culture-based
approaches to social movements and draws inspiration from the work of Alberto Melucci
(1989, 1996). Melucci’s framework for the study of social movements is fundamental to
my research in two ways: for its focus on the discourses and practices that define social
movements as processes and for its insistence on discovering the invisible aspects of
social movements.
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First of all, following Melucci (1989), I think about social movements as a
process. This means that I consider the ways in which activists construct their systems of
beliefs, negotiate meanings and make decisions to be the core elements of any analysis of
social movements. For Melucci (1989), in fact, discursive practices are the foundations of
collective action. Such discursive practices are directed at constructing the collective
identity of a movement, understood as a “sense of we” (Melucci, 1989, p. 65) that
enables action. I find Melucci’s emphasis on discourses very productive as a way of
thinking about technology not just as a tool, but also as a set of discourses and practices.
But where do technologies fit in Melucci’s constructivist approach? Melucci
(1989) argued that the process of collective identity formation structures how movements
perceive themselves and the world around them:
Individuals contribute to the formation of a more or less stable ‘we’ by
rendering common and laboriously negotiating and adjusting at least three
orientations: the goals of their action, the means to be utilized and the
environment within which their action takes place. (p. 27)
I suggest that how movements imagine technology comes into play precisely in
this process of construction of means, goals and environments – what Melucci called an
action system (Melucci, 1989, p. 27). Technological discourses can influence how
movements think about technology as a means (a tool), how goals are set and measured
(for instance through quantitative aggregative measures) and how the political and social
environment is perceived. For Melucci this definitional process is characterized by
“interaction, negotiation and conflict” (Melucci, 1989, p. 26); this is evident also in the
case of technologies, since – as I will argue below – the visions we hold about them are
also conflicting and constructed in relation to different actors, including mainstream ones.
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However, I also add to Melucci’s argument by suggesting that the process of
definition of the action system is not only shaped by discourses, but also by practices.
The role of practices remains undertheorized in Melucci’s work, but others, inspired by
the cultural approach to social movements and Melucci’s theories, have filled this gap
(e.g. Gerbaudo & Treré, 2015; Juris, 2008b; Yang, 2005).
Secondly, one of Melucci’s remarkable contributions to the study of social
movements lies in his denunciation of a certain “myopia of the visible” (Melucci, 1989,
p. 44), which leads scholars to only consider highly visible moments of mobilization and
ignore the invisible foundational processes that sustain social movements during periods
of “latency”. Inspired by this criticism, I also focus my study of activists on invisible and
taken-for-granted beliefs and practices concerning technology. While most of the recent
scholarship on social movements and technology has focused on very visible uses of
technology, e.g. Facebook pages, hashtag campaigns and websites, my work is concerned
with the latent discourses and beliefs that shape and enable the uses that become visible
during peaks of mobilizations.
Keeping in mind the need to think about movements’ definitional processes and to
undercover less visible phenomena, I now turn to the second building block of my
theoretical framework: the long history of technologies.

The importance of discourses about technology: lessons from media history
A variety of cultural and social approaches have made important contributions
over the years to our understanding of the relationship of technologies – and
communication technologies in particular – to society (among others, Flichy, 1995,
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2007b; Mansell, 2012; Marvin, 1988; Marx, 1964; Mosco, 2004; Nye, 1996; Turner,
2006; R. Williams, 1975; Winner, 1986). This distinguished body of literature sits at the
intersection of media history, cultural studies, and sociological approaches in Science and
Technology Studies (STS). From the telegraph to electricity to the internet, these scholars
showed how discourses about technology can be considered a part of technology itself
and how such discourses tend to give new meaning to existing social struggles, anxieties
and hopes. They also considered how discourses about technology tend to recur in almost
identical ways for each “new technology” and have thus demystified the hype
surrounding the introduction of new technologies. Furthermore, they pointed out how this
discursive construction of technology is profoundly political. I explore these important
lessons in this section.
This scholarship has shown that societal discourses are as integral a component of
technology as its technical design (Flichy, 1995; Marvin, 1988; Mosco, 2004; Winner,
1986). This contention stands in stark opposition to technologically deterministic
approaches (see Wyatt, 2008), but also challenges its opposite, the “symptomatic
technology” view, as Williams (1975) called it, which regards technology as wholly
predetermined by extant socio-economic processes. In contrast, what this heterogeneous
group of scholars has pointed to is the fact that the decisions that happen in the course of
technological development (and adoption) “occur within a discursive framework” (Lister,
Dovey, Giddings, Grant, & Kelly, 2009, p. 2009). According to Williams (1975), the
development of technology, in fact, is “not only a matter of some autonomous process
directed by remote engineers”, but also “a matter of social and cultural definition” (p.
137).
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Discourses about technologies – especially recently introduced ones – are
conflicting and non-linear (Flichy, 1995). They are not only conflicting because they can
be divergent, but also because they are usually the expression of interests and ambitions
that might be difficult to reconcile. As Williams (1975) reminded us, speaking about
television, changes in technologies do not depend “on the fixed properties of the medium
nor the necessary character of its institutions, but on a continually renewable social action
and struggle” (p. 138). And in fact, the discursive and nondiscursive struggles
surrounding the meaning of technologies have been at the core of this body of literature
on the relationship between society and technology.
Lister et. al (2009) suggested that “new technologies are taken up within a culture
and are hooked into, or have projected onto them, its wider social and psychological
desires and fears” (p. 70). On the one hand, new technologies provide a different,
renewed avenue for the unfolding of pre-existing struggles of power between societal
groups. As Marvin (1988) explained with her analysis of electricity: “old habits of
transacting between groups are projected onto new technologies that alter, or seem to
alter, critical social distance” (p. 5). But new technologies are also looked at through the
lenses of existing societal anxieties and aspirations. New technologies can thus come to
be seen as “a solution to social and cultural ills” (Lister et al., 2009, p. 429) or as the
materialization of fears and instabilities.
The moments in which technologies are introduced have been at the center of
these investigations, precisely because it is around these initial moments that conflicts
and anxieties unfold. This focus also makes it clear that, to borrow Marvin’s (1988) book
title, all old technologies have been new at some point. This is not just a temporal
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realization, but rather stands to highlight how newness is also a discursive construction,
accompanied by promises of “a new cultural, and even existential, order to come”
(Robins, 1996, p. 11). Discourses around the newness of technology reassert the power of
technology to change (for better or worse) societal processes. But as Mosco (2004)
argued: “practically every substantial technological change has been accompanied by
similar claims. The chant goes on: This changes everything. Nothing will ever be the
same again” (p. 119). Discourses of newness are nothing new: they have already been
around for other technologies, such as the telegraph, electricity, radio, and TV.
These discourses of newness perform a political function. For instance, in his
analysis of the relationship between the pastoral idea and the image of the machine in
American culture, Leo Marx (1964) unearthed the rhetoric of progress surrounding new
technologies: “to see a powerful, efficient machine in the landscape is to know the
superiority of the present to the past” (p. 192). This association between progress and
new technologies is pervasive and difficult to question: “it is the obviousness and
simplicity of the machine as a symbol of progress that accounts for its astonishing power”
(Marx, 1964, p. 192).
These powerful discourses of technological newness can also take on an even
more explicitly political character. Mosco (2004) highlighted how one of the historically
recurring promises of new technologies is that of transforming politics, by bringing
“power closer to the people” (p. 98). Winner (1986) stated that the railroad and the
telegraph were "greeted as the very essence of democratic freedom" (p. 45). Speaking of
the same technologies, Leo Marx (1964) contended that American public figures saw
them as "a token of possibility for democracy" (p. 190), which later turned technology
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into "a transcendent symbol: a physical object invested with political and metaphysical
identity" (Marx, 1964, p. 206). Nye (1996) agreed and explained how man-made
technologies came to be tied with American democracy: "the citizen who contemplated
such public improvements became aware of the power of democracy and saw himself as
part of the moral vanguard, leading the world towards universal democracy. These manmade objects became national symbols" (p. 36).
Though coming to different conclusions, Turner (2006) and Mosco (2004) also
argued that computer-mediated communication and the internet have taken on a symbolic
political valence, shaped by discourses produced by a heterogeneous group of actors that
brought together countercultural sensibilities and market libertarianism. Turner (2006)
highlighted how by the 1990s the internet had become both a symbol of political
liberation through collaborative, non-hierarchical processes and a tool for making
liberation happen; internet technologies thus came to be seen as an emblem of the
countercultural revolution (Turner, 2006, p. 238). In critiquing the mythical discourses
surrounding the early internet – "myths of cyberspace" – Mosco (2004) also talked about
the 1990s as a turning point in our symbolic conception of the internet. In particular, he
highlighted the political valence of these mythical discourses of technology, which,
among other things, suggest that the internet has brought about "the end of politics" (p.
105). This is a discourse about the replacement of old political relations with new
practices based on technology, under the understanding that "the internet is not just a
corrective to democracy; it is democracy" (Mosco, 2004, p. 115). The myths that Mosco
(2004) deconstructed cast the internet as a symbol of a different type of political
relations. If we think about them in the long historical trajectory of technological
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developments, these myths do not make entirely new claims. And yet, they are powerful
claims, that although repeated throughout history, can exert a symbolic power, shaping
conversations not just about technologies, but also about political and social processes
and how they should adapt to new technologies.
In examining this heterogeneous body of literature, I have emphasized the
importance of identifying discourses related to technology. When talking about the
internet, Mosco (2004) argued that we need to uncover what are the underlying visions of
society and politics embedded in celebratory discourses regarding the internet. I follow
Mosco’s invitation to dig deeper and to consider how different political actors construct
and deploy specific visions of technology; I do that through the notion of “technological
imaginary”, to which I now turn.

The “technological imaginary” in Science and Technology Studies
The term “technological imaginary” was introduced to the field of Science and
Technology Studies (STS) by two authors: Flichy (1995, 2007a) and Jasanoff (2015),
who spoke of “sociotechnical imaginaries”. For Flichy the technological imaginary is a
key component in the process of innovation, both for the development and the diffusion
of a technology. In his words:
When we leave “the short-term dimension” of technical development, that
is, a specific project, and consider a more long-term dimension such as
electrical light and power, high-speed trains, Internet, and so forth, we
encounter more than simply a project or common intention; what we
witness is a collective vision or imaginaire. This vision is common to an
entire profession or sector, rather than to a team or work collective. It
concerns not only designers but also users, which is one of the strong
points linking these two types of actors of technical activity. (Flichy,
2007a, p. 4)
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In recognizing the role of “collective visions” in the process of shaping and
adopting technologies, Flichy (2007a) rejected teleological approaches to technology; he
embraced the messiness and conflict that can arise with technological inventions and used
the concept of technological imaginary to account for their non-linear development.
Flichy’s technological imaginary is a discursive space that can “mobilize both designers
and users” (Flichy, 2007a, p. 6). Furthermore, different technological imaginaries can
always coexist; in so doing, they “produce contrasting visions of the future” (Flichy,
2007b, p. 133). While Flichy mostly thought about diverging visions of the future of
technology, we should probably acknowledge that the technological imaginary is
attached to different visions of social and political futures, as Jasanoff (2015) explicitly
stated.
As mentioned above, Flichy examined the technological imaginaries surrounding
different communication technologies: the telegraph, telephone, gramophone, radio,
televisions and computers (Flichy, 1995)1 and the internet (Flichy, 2007a). For instance,
he analyzed the emergence of the semaphore telegraph in the context of the French
Revolution (Flichy, 1995). In 1792, the French revolutionary state decided to develop a
national infrastructure for the telegraph, mostly for military use. Building a national
infrastructure meant that the telegraph could be used to reconfigure the French space into
a unitary nation – one of the aims of the Revolution. The semaphore telegraph was thus
part of the same desire for universality, rooted in the Enlightenment, which led the
revolutionaries to reform the calendar and introduce the metric system. This particular
1

In his 1995 book, Dynamics of modern communication, Flichy is not yet using the term “technological
imaginary” but what he is describing is precisely the discursive environment surrounding the emergence
and diffusion of different communication technologies.
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technological innovation was thus embedded in preexisting revolutionary discourses that
gave it a specific meaning. The telegraph became a tangible symbol of the revolution:
installed on a tower in the National Palace of Tuileries, it was meant to substitute the
religious bell tower, following the idea that “the scientific works of the Enlightenment
were to replace the symbols of royal and religious power” (Flichy, 1995, p. 11). In
chronicling the intense political debate on the liberalization of the telegraphic
infrastructure for commercial purposes, Flichy also gave us an account of what we can
consider two conflicting technological imaginaries. When the July Monarchy ultimately
voted to sanction state monopoly in the 1830s, one of the reasons for that decision was
that they feared the telegraph could be used for “political agitation” (Flichy, 1995, p. 23).
While for the revolutionaries the telegraph was a practical and symbolic tool in the
service of their idea of uniting France, for the July Monarchy it was a threat to a newly
acquired political stability. In short, the semaphore telegraph was at the center of
contestation – of different technological imaginaries that framed the same technology
within different visions of the political and social future.
While Flichy’s work mainly focused on the inventors, adopters or funders of
technologies, Jasanoff (2015) used the term “sociotechnical imaginary” to include “the
imaginative work of varied social actors” (p. 11). Her definition is fairly detailed:
We redefine sociotechnical imaginaries in this book as collectively held,
institutionally stabilized, and publicly performed visions of desirable
futures, animated by shared understandings of forms of social life and
social order attainable through, and supportive of, advances in science and
technology. (Jasanoff, 2015, p. 4)
There are a number of noteworthy and productive components in Jasanoff’s
definition. The collective, public and performed character of the sociotechnical imaginary
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makes it an appealing concept to be applied to the study of social movements – which
Jasanoff acknowledged, too. She also contended that multiple sociotechnical imaginaries
can coexist and compete in a different society. Futhermore, the ways in which
individuals, collectives, societies and nation states think about technologies have clear
political implications, because these sociotechnical imaginaries link technology (and
science) to social change, to “visions of the collective good” (Jasanoff, 2015, p. 11). She
also highlighted the legitimating role that science and technology can still play today and
the difference between the imaginaries developed in different national contexts (Jasanoff,
2015, p. 13).
There are, however, two elements of this definition that I believe are too
restrictive, especially if we intend to apply it to social movements. First, Jasanoff spoke
of imaginaries as “institutionally stabilized”. Even if we loosen up the meaning of
“institution”, I think that Jasanoff ended up retracing the original formulation of the
concept of sociotechnical imaginary (Jasanoff & Kim, 2009), which she centered
exclusively on nation states and their political institutions. While she was right in
pointing to the imaginary as having to be relatively stabilized, the reference to institutions
is not entirely appropriate. In fact, an analysis of technological imaginaries might be even
more urgent when different, conflicting imaginaries are still up for grabs, and not yet
“institutionally stabilized”. Secondly, Jasanoff put the sociotechnical imaginaries
squarely in the context of modern ambitions concerning the role of science and
technology, and linked the imaginaries specifically to “advances” in such domains. She
later acknowledged that we also need to consider the reverse:
It goes without saying that imaginations of desirable and desired futures
correlate, tacitly or explicitly, with the obverse – shared fears of harms that
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might be incurred through invention and innovation, or of course the
failure to innovate. The interplay between positive and negative
imaginings – between utopia and dystopia – is a connecting theme
throughout this volume. (Jasanoff, 2015, p. 5)
I am critical of her language of positive and negative imaginaries: it conveys an
implicit judgment and uncritically perpetrates a faith in the advancement of technology as
ultimate mark of progress – a discourse, that, although widespread, needs to be
questioned, and can be questioned precisely through the study of the technological
imaginary.

Towards a political definition of technological imaginaries
My definition conceptualizes a technological imaginary as a set of practice-based
beliefs, individual and collective, implicit and explicit, about the role of technology in
social life and social change. This definition should be extended and qualified by drawing
on the three bodies of literature considered above: Melucci’s (1989) work on social
movements, histories of technology, and Flichy (1995, 2007b, 2007a) and Jasanoff
(2015). In what follows, I elaborate on the characteristics of the technological imaginaries
as I envision them.
First, technological imaginaries are profoundly political. They are connected to
different visions of social change (Jasanoff, 2015); they can be contentious and publicly
performed. They are normative visions about society (Jasanoff, 2015). They are also, as
Flichy (1995) showed, connected to political culture, like in the case of the semaphore
telegraph that I have highlighted above. But drawing on the lessons from media historians
that I have sketched out above, we can also see that technological imaginaries are
political because they can be deployed for political purposes by a variety of social actors.
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Think, for instance, of the ways in which “the machine” (Marx, 1964), the “technological
sublime” (Nye, 1996) and the “digital sublime” (Mosco, 2004) are implicated in the
construction of a national American identity, but also specific political and economic
interests. While the political nature of the technological imaginaries is not the central
element in Flichy (2007a) and Jasanoff (2015), I suggest that highlighting its political
component is key to deconstructing and critically interrogating the ways in which
imaginaries about technologies become enmeshed in how we think about social change.
One of the questions that this framework helps us interrogate is the relationship between
technological imaginaries and ideologies (or political orientations).
Second, technological imaginaries have material consequences. Speaking of the
ways in which technologies are political, Winner (1986) argued:
The things we call "technologies" are ways of building order in our world.
Many technical devices and systems important in everyday life contain
possibilities for many different ways of ordering human activity.
Consciously or unconsciously, deliberately or inadvertently, societies
choose structures for technologies that influence how people are going to
work, communicate, travel, consume, and so forth over a very long time.
(p. 28)
To keep with Winner, the ways in which we choose structures for technologies,
including their regulation, are clearly influenced by the discourses and imaginaries that
surround said technologies. In this sense, imaginaries have very material consequences
that need to be investigated. At the same time, imaginaries are also embedded in material
arrangements: technological imaginaries have a political-economic dimension to them, as
Mosco (2004) showed.
Third, a technological imaginary, as I conceptualize it, is constructed by both
practices and discourses. I incorporate this vision of the relationship between practices
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and discourse from Taylor’s (2004) theorization of the “social imaginary”. As highlighted
in his definition, practices are crucial to the imaginary: “if the understanding makes the
practice possible, it is also true that it is the practice that largely carries the
understanding” (p. 25). Applying this insight to the technological imaginary means
recognizing that technological practices give actors a sense of what could be done with
the affordances of technology, what technology’s role could be; yet, actors also put into
practice the visions of technology that they have developed. Methodologically, this
attention to practices means departing from interpretive methods that rely only on the
analysis of documents (which is how the technological imaginaries have been so far
studied), to embrace a multi-method qualitative approach that allows for the investigation
of practices.
Fourth, I also rely on Taylor (2004) in highlighting that technological imaginaries
should be held by ordinary people, and not only by certain actors that have the power to
directly influence technology. In fact, Taylor (2004) argued that the social imaginary is
“shared by large groups of people, if not the whole society” (p. 23). In arguing for this, I
diverge from both Flichy (1995, 2007a) and Jasanoff (2015), who tend to consider those
who either create or regulate technologies, but do not really acknowledge that the
technological imaginary of ordinary people should also be studied.
Fifth, there is no simple correspondence between technological imaginaries and
social imaginaries. Beyond the two previous contributions that I incorporate from Taylor
(2004), the notion of social imaginary should also be put in conversation with that of
technological imaginary through empirical research. It would be tempting to associate the
modern social imaginaries identified by Taylor (2004) with corresponding technological
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imaginaries. In fact, it is evident that the three main social imaginaries identified by
Taylor (2004) – economy, public sphere, self-governing people – have become three
ways of talking about digital technologies, and the internet in particular: the internet as an
enormous market, based on exchanges of data; the internet as the public sphere; the
internet as direct democracy. It would thus seem that the technological imaginary is an
applied, circumscribed version of the social imaginaries. However, I suggest that the
relationship is more complicated than that. Different technological imaginaries can
produce different visions of technology while aligning themselves to the same social
imaginary. Thus, there is no necessary theoretical correspondence between technological
and social imaginary.
It is worth noting that Taylor (2004) develops the social imaginaries to theorize
the emergence of modern nation states. In his formulation, modern social imaginaries
coexist within modernity, but each of them is also dominant within a national polity
(although he mainly considers the United States, France and Britain) during the
establishment and consolidation of that polity into a modern nation state. Taylor’s is not a
theory that accounts for changes in the modern social imaginaries. They thus appear a bit
static: they do not leave room for challenges and are all dominant – never oppositional.
The sixth component of my notion of technological imaginaries is thus that, in contrast to
Taylor (2004), who forecloses the possibility of alternative and conflictual social
imaginaries, I envision technological imaginaries to be plural and conflicting within a
certain society. The notion of technological imaginary must allow room for multiple and
conflicting imaginaries to coexist. Yet, we can assume that we should always be able to
identify a mainstream, dominant technological imaginary, which I discuss in Chapter 1.
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But it need not be the only one, and we should be able to find that alternative imaginaries
are being developed. Flichy (2007a) and Jasanoff (2015) both recognized that imaginaries
can be multiple, but I think we should also ask what role divergent imaginaries can play
during political confrontations and mobilizations. Going back to the iconic image of
protesters lifting their phones to the sky, in Hong Kong, Hungary, Romania, and
Slovakia, we can argue that these protesters relied on a technological imaginary that
connected mobile phones to political freedom – an imaginary they thought expressed
their opposition to their national governments.
Last, while technological imaginaries are a vision of the future, they are also
constructed in implicit or explicit opposition to a more or less accurate image of the past.
Since the technological imaginary is related to political culture, it has a historical
dimension related to political history. But it is also related to history because, as we learn
from the scholars who have sought to demystify the hype surrounding new technologies
(e.g. Marvin, 1988; Mosco, 2004), discourses about technology emphasize technology in
relation and in opposition to the past. This history, implicated in the way we speak of new
technologies, can also be inaccurate – it can lead us to erase certain technological
advancements in favor of others. In other words, considering the ways in which different
technological imaginaries have been constructed and used over time allows us to not only
chart the changes in society’s political relationship to technology, but also interrogate the
ways in which visions of the past inform discourses about the future.
As is evident from the framework that I have laid out in this Introduction,
technological imaginaries can be constructed and deployed by different actors. In this
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research, however, I employ the concept to investigate specifically how social
movements relate to technology in a political way.

Technological imaginaries and social movement research
My theoretical framework, based on a political definition of technological
imaginaries, is a conceptual tool that contributes to the study of social movements by
helping us make sense of the relationship between technology and activism, in a way that
accounts for both practical uses and symbolic power. It can help us go beyond
technologically deterministic approaches to technology and social change, but also
acknowledge that such technological determinism is a powerful discourse with which
social movements (and their observers) are confronted. For instance, scholarship has now
mostly moved away from celebratory language that saw in the Arab Spring a “Facebook
revolution” or a “Twitter revolution”; we have seen more nuanced assessments of the
relationship between digital technologies and the Arab uprisings (e.g. Gerbaudo, 2012;
Kraidy, 2016; Tufekci, 2017; Zayani, 2015). But we cannot neglect that there were
protester signs during the occupation of Tahrir, for instance, that praised Facebook and
Twitter, and that used the language of “Facebook revolution”. With the concept of
technological imaginary we can begin to fully account for the multifaceted relationship
between technology and protest: we can say that, while Facebook has not – in brutal
terms – caused the Arab Spring, the use of digital technologies during those uprisings has
been understood, by journalists and commentators, within a discursive context that
connects the digital to freedom and democracy; we should also recognize that some of the
protesters have drawn on those connections to further legitimize their protests.
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A recent set of scholarly works (Barassi, 2015; Treré, 2018; Treré, Jeppesen, &
Mattoni, 2017) has gone in the direction of interrogating imaginaries in the context of
social movements research, although through the different anthropological notion of
“media imaginary”. In Activism on the Web, Barassi (2015) talked about the “media
imaginary” of the different social movement organizations she analyzed. Her concept of
media imaginary is less comprehensive than the technological imaginary I sketch above:
it refers mainly to what activists want to do with media technology; it addresses the role
of technology, but at a practical and non-symbolic level; it is shaped by the political
culture of the movement – but it is unclear how it is embedded within the broader
political culture and the broader media/technological imaginary. Nevertheless, Barassi’s
(2015) work is important because it linked media practices to the media imaginary of
different movements; the concept of imaginary allowed her to argue that different
movements “often develop ‘different understandings’ of what they wanted to achieve
from media technologies, which was largely inspired by their political projects and which
determined the way that their media practices were organized” (Barassi, 2015, p. 41).
In conversation with Barassi (2015), Treré, Jeppesen and Mattoni (2017) sought
out to identify the different media imaginaries of recent anti-austerity movements in Italy,
Spain and Greece, finding that they have three different “digital protest media
imaginaries” (p. 416), which they suggested are largely based on different national
activist cultures. They also argued that these “digital protest media imaginaries” could
influence whether social movements are able to achieve their goals (Treré et al., 2017, p.
417). I do not necessarily share the authors’ concern for the efficacy of different media
imaginaries, partially because I think that conceptualizing digital media imaginaries as a
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key to movement success (however defined) is already an expression of a mainstream
technological imaginary that sees digital media as central to activism.
Treré (2018) positioned media imaginaries as one of the theoretical lenses,
alongside “media ecologies” and algorithmic power, for the study of contemporary digital
activism. He then examined in detail the media imaginary of the Italian Five Star
Movement, which he defined as “authoritarian sublime” and of the Spanish Indignados,
which he called “technopolitical sublime” (Treré, 2018).
While acknowledging the contributions of the concept of “media imaginary”
(Barassi, 2015; Treré, 2018; Treré et al., 2017), I prefer to employ the notion of
“technological imaginary”. I choose to do that in order to connect to the literature on
Science and Technology Studies, which has already been exploring some of the questions
that guide my research. I also prefer to center technology, and not media, in order to
explicitly deploy my theoretical framework to critique and denormalize the
technologically deterministic assumptions that are so often embedded in how we think
about technology. Lastly, while this dissertation is concerned with contemporary
technological imaginaries and digital technologies, my theoretical framework could also
be deployed to examine how technologies are imagined by actors in different eras. For
instance, without the ambition to fully sketch out its meaning, it is worth mentioning that
Lenin’s proclamation of communism as equivalent to “Soviet power and electrification”
(Lenin, 1964) is a technological imaginary – one that is certainly not concerned with
digital media, but also not with media. Thus I choose to speak of technological
imaginaries and not media ones to explicitly signal that this framework could have a
broader application. However, it is evident that communication technologies play a
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crucial role, not just in my theoretical framework, but also in the life of historical and
contemporary social movements. So, while my use of “technological imaginary” is
theoretically strategic, to allow for the inclusion of different types of technologies and to
gesture towards STS, my analysis is, in practice, focused on communication technologies
– and specifically digital ones2.
My work on “technological imaginaries” can make a threefold contribution to
social movement research: 1) by addressing the undertheorized symbolic power of
technologies for protest 2) by systematizing the research on the political valence of
activists’ technological practices, including media activism and 3) by bringing social
movements into the longstanding scholarly debate on the politics of technology.
The first important contribution of the technological imaginary framework is to
the investigation of the symbolic power of technology for mobilization. Technologies, in
fact, cannot just be understood in terms of their materiality or their affordances, but also
need to be studied as political symbols. With the concept of technological imaginary we
can investigate how technology is associated with certain concepts – e.g. freedom,
democracy, but conversely also domination and surveillance – that make it a powerful
symbol, which movements can use to mobilize. Although several recent works on social
movements have touched upon these issues, the technological imaginary can provide a
more comprehensive framework for their analysis, as I seek to show in the following
paragraphs.
2

It is also important to underline that the conflation between “technology writ large” and “digital
communication technologies” is not only present in my theorization, but it is also a product of historical
contingency. In other words, saying technology today conjures up images of digital communication
technologies, perhaps because they are the ones that feature so prominently in the dominant technological
imaginary, which I explore in Chapter 1.
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Reflecting on Occupy Wall Street, the Indignados movement and the Arab
Spring, as well as new protest parties like the Five Star Movement in Italy and Partido X
in Spain, Gerbaudo (2015) argued that we are witnessing the emergence of a distinct
“populism 2.0”. This renewed populist approach to politics binds together the use of
digital technologies with a specific discourse about the digital. Gerbaudo (2015)
contended that these populist actors appeal to a “generic Internet user” which supplants
the traditional populist notion of the “common man”:
In this context, the very experience of online connectivity becomes itself
an element of “commonality” to be invoked when searching for the
“common” of the contemporary common man. This situation leads to a
transfiguration of the populist “common man,” into the imaginary figure
of the “generic internet user.” In this context, people, or better citizens, are
not appealed to only based on their grievances, but also on the assumption
that their possession of online connectivity and the experience of everyday
interactivity afforded by it predisposes them to active political
participation. (Gerbaudo, 2015, p. 79)
Gerbaudo (2015) thus suggested that a specific discourse about the emancipatory
potential of the web 2.0 is deployed by these parties as a way to mobilize support. Their
celebration of web technologies comes to stand in for a series of political values. In this
sense, we could argue that the technological imaginary of these movements and parties is
one which sees web technologies as a unifying experience, through which “the people”,
as populist subject, can come together and recognize each other as sharing the same
technological practices, and thus the same political values.
Looking at Tunisia, Zayani (2015) also offered an interesting take on the
symbolic role that censorship and surveillance of internet communications acquired for
Tunisian youth ahead of the Arab Spring. First, he suggested that “the battle against
internet censorship developed into a battle against constraints on free speech, which in
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turn became inextricably linked with the broader issue of freedom” (Zayani, 2015, p.
155), then explained in detail:
Making the fight against censorship everybody’s battle turned it from a
question of whether an individual could access a particular website to that
of the people’s entitlement to exercise their rights as citizens and the
state’s duty to act in accordance with the law. As it evolved, the anticensorship movement started to question the terms under which the statesociety relationship was conceived in a country that spared no effort to
flaunt its democratic pretentions. (Zayani, 2015, p. 159)
In his analysis, Zayani kept returning to the tension between the bloggers’ idea of
Internet use and the government’s idea of internet use – what I think could be termed two
conflicting technological imaginaries. Not only are these two imaginaries conflicting, but
their terrain of contestation is around the meaning of “liberal democracy”, online and
offline: while for the Tunisian government that meant minimal rights and an emphasis on
economic development, for the bloggers it amounted to full citizenship rights. Crucially,
this conflict over different visions of the future of Tunisia also came to be played out over
the regulation of the Internet – and Zayani aptly called his chapter “The battle over
Internet control”. However, the battle was not just over the internet, it was also about the
visions – the imaginary – attached to the use of the internet for social change – and
ultimately regime change.
The second aspect of the relationship between movements and technology, which
can be addressed through the concept of technological imaginary, pertains to the political
valence of specific technological practices, for instance those at the core of media
activism. This is a topic that the literature on alternative media and social movements
(e.g. Juris, 2008a; Lievrouw, 2011; Milan, 2013; Pickard, 2006a) has covered in depth, in
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contrast to other areas; nevertheless, the technological imaginary can help us systematize
it.
For instance, in her analysis of radio activists in Philadelphia, Dunbar-Hester
(2009) contrasted the attitudes that activists held towards radio and towards internet
technologies (e.g. community wifi). She found that, while not ignoring the internet,
“radio activists did not believe that webcasting met the same conditions that had led them
to favor FM, including access and localism or community-orientation” (Dunbar-Hester,
2009, p. 226) and thus they found it more difficult to include in their activism. DunbarHester explained these different attitudes toward radio and the internet as the product of
political, practical and aesthetic considerations; she concluded that “for the activists,
LPFM [low power FM radio] is a technical choice that is held to be compatible with
localism, democracy and ‘community’, whereas wi-fi networks are less obviously
compatible with these values” (Dunbar-Hester, 2009, p. 233). I suggest that what DunbarHester was trying to describe is the technological imaginary of the radio activists: one in
which low power FM, but not necessarily wifi, is associated with specific political
orientations towards localism, democracy and community. At the same time, we can also
recognize that the radio activists saw themselves in contrast to a more mainstream
technological imaginary attached to the internet: “the radio activists’ stance represents
resistance to what they perceive as unbridled and uncritical belief in and enthusiasm for
the inherently emancipatory properties of computers and the internet held by such
groups” (Dunbar-Hester, 2009, p. 234). By using the framework of technological
imaginaries, we can take a more comprehensive look at how movements view different
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technological practices through a political lens – one of the key ideas behind the creation
of activist media.
Lastly, I also suggest that we can productively employ the notion of technological
imaginary to intervene in a longstanding tension around the political nature of
technology. Winner (1986), for instance, attended to the politics of technology by
recognizing that a technology can be political in two different ways: firstly, technology
can become the avenue through which the issues faced by a community can be addressed;
secondly, that certain technologies either require or are strongly compatible with
particular kinds of political relationships. The technological imaginary can help us make
sense of both aspects. On the one hand, it can account for the fact that technology can be
envisioned, by its creators and users, as the solution to specific social and political
problems. On the other hand, it can help us move beyond the now obvious notion that
technology is not neutral, and acknowledge that those who create and control technology
can infuse it with a specific technological imaginary (see Flichy, 2007a). Such imaginary
can be challenged by using technologies in ways that were not envisioned or endorsed by
its creators; yet the “original” imaginary attached to them is one that is powerful and
should be reckoned with. Technology is political because it is envisioned within
technological imaginaries that connect it to visions of social and political futures.
Applying the concept of technological imaginary to the study of social
movements also raises other questions, which are likely to only be answered through
empirical investigations. One area of questioning certainly pertains to variation, over time
and among different movements: how do technological imaginaries change over time?
How do they differ among movements in different countries? Can we speak of global
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technological imaginaries, or local ones? Secondly, another area of inquiry is focused on
the relationship between dominant, mainstream technological imaginaries and
imaginaries developed by social movements. Lastly, when attending to the technological
imaginaries of specific movements, we might ask what is the relationship between
practices and discourses, and whether (and how) they might contradict each other.

Research questions
This dissertation uses the concept of “technological imaginary”, as defined above,
to investigate how different social movements in different countries relate to technology
from a political standpoint. This project examines how each movement constructs its own
technological imaginary; it also parses out which political factors might contribute to the
construction of different technological imaginaries.
The research questions are as follows:
1) What are the technological imaginaries of social movements?
2) How are they constructed?
a. How do social movements’ technological imaginaries relate to dominant
technological imaginaries?
b. What is the role of political orientations and national political contexts in
the construction of a movement’s technological imaginary?
c. How do past imaginaries inform current imaginaries?
3) What role do technological imaginaries play in the life of a social movement?
a. How do technological imaginaries inform the technological practices of a
movement?
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b. What is the effect of the technological imaginaries on the organizational and
political choices of a movement?
c. What is the role of the technological imaginaries in mobilization and
protest?

Research Design
The dissertation project looks at the technological imaginaries of contemporary
leftist social movements in three countries – United States, Italy and Hungary – through a
multi-method qualitative approach. In this section I present my research design. First, I
sketch out how I examine the contemporary dominant technological imaginary through
textual analysis. Then I provide some information on the three case studies that I consider
– the internet tax protests of 2014 in Hungary, the Italian student movement LUMe, the
US-based Philly Socialists. I then articulate my multi-method approach to studying social
movements’ technological imaginaries, which is based on qualitative interviews and
visual focus groups. I also supplemented this qualitative data collection with the
observation of meetings and events and the analysis of documents. Further, I discuss my
approach to data analysis. Lastly, I address some of the ethical considerations that played
a role in my research.

Studying dominant technological imaginaries
In Chapter 1 I turn to the current dominant technological imaginary, which I
identify as an evolution of the Californian Ideology (Barbrook & Cameron, 1996). I
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provide two illustrations of the ways in which this presumed universal technological
imaginary is actually limited and biased. To reconstruct this imaginary, I rely on an
interpretive analysis of textual sources. Textual analysis has been the primary way in
which scholars have tried to investigate the role of technology in society, by relying on
literary works, media reports and cultural representations (Marvin, 1988; Marx, 1964;
Mosco, 2004; Nye, 1996); textual analysis is also what Jasanoff (2015) recommends for
the study of sociotechnical imaginaries.
In this vein, my first illustration of the biases of the dominant technological
imaginary explores the role of race and gender in the representations offered in the first
five years of Wired magazine, a publication that was crucial for the development and
popularization of the current dominant technological imaginary. I relied on a textual
analysis of the cover pages and the corresponding cover stories of 54 issues of Wired,
released in its first five years, between 1993 and 1997. The analysis combined visual and
textual elements. Images and texts were coded for emergent themes (Corbin & Strauss,
2008) and grouped in macro-categories; connections were drawn between the macrocategories. Particular attention was given to the connections between the representation
of different bodies and the themes emerging from the text. The analysis followed three
iterative steps: first, it focused on the cover images; second, it considered the cover
images in conjunction with the cover titles; third, it turned to an in-depth analysis of the
images and text of two cover stories, which featured a white woman (April 1996) and a
black man (December 1994). These cover stories were chosen because they were
dedicated to non-normative Wired bodies, i.e. they were among the few not dedicated to
white men. The December 1994 issue is the only one to feature a man of color on the
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cover; the April 1996 cover story was chosen because it was the lengthiest of the stories
about women.
The second illustration of the biases of Silicon Valley is based on an in-depth
textual analysis of a document published by Facebook’s founder and CEO, Mark
Zuckerberg, in 2017, which was coded for emergent themes (Corbin & Strauss, 2008).
While textual analysis is useful to reconstruct technological imaginaries as they
are expressed through essays, articles, and documents, I turn to empirical qualitative
methods to examine the technological imaginaries of the three social movements
included in this dissertation.

The cases: the Hungarian internet tax protests, LUMe, and the Philly Socialists

Three contemporary cases will be examined in the dissertation: the Hungarian
internet tax protests of 2014, the Italian student collective LUMe (Laboratorio
Universitario Metropolitano, i.e. Metropolitan University Laboratory) and the American
Philly Socialists. These three case studies present similarities and differences that can
help us understand how technological imaginaries might vary in different political
contexts.
First, in terms of their similarities, these three social movements can be
considered as part of the same wave of social movements that have mobilized in
opposition to the growth of right-wing populist forces in Europe and North America. All
of these movements are presently confronting right-wing populist governments: Viktor
Orbán’s Fidesz in Hungary, Donald Trump in the United States, and the government
alliance between the Matteo Salvini’s League (Lega) and the Five Star Movement
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(Movimento Cinque Stelle) in Italy. If these right-wing leaders can be broadly understood
as part of the same right-wing populist moment, then it is important that we also consider
the movements that oppose them as part of the same category, even if these movements
are obviously different from one another. My selection of these cases thus encourages a
conceptualization of these movements as part of the same cohort of movements opposing
right-wing populism.
Second, the Hungarian internet tax protests, LUMe and the Philly Socialists are
also similarly situated to the left of the mainstream center-left in each of their respective
countries. They all eschew parliamentary representation and are critical of parliamentary
politics. In Hungary, the activists that organized the Hungarian internet tax protests are
part of a left-liberal activist area, that occupies the most leftist position in the truncated
Hungarian political spectrum; these activists are not only opposed to Orbán’s
authoritarian fantasies but are also culturally progressive and generally critical of
neoliberal policies. LUMe’s politics and political practices firmly place the collective
within the Italian “radical leftist” area, commonly considered to the left of the
institutional left in Italy; LUMe opposes neoliberalism, but also racism, sexism and
fascism/populism. As a socialist organization committed to revolutionary politics, the
Philly Socialists are also far to the left of the mainstream left in the United States; their
opposition to neoliberal capitalism goes hand in hand with a critique of the party system
and of sexism and racism. Lastly, these movements all employ similar protest repertoires,
such as nonviolent demonstrations and protest actions, and value participatory
mechanisms in their organization.
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The movements also present important differences in respect to their political
orientations and the political contexts in which they are embedded. This dissertation
examines in detail how the political orientations of these movements vary, while still
placing them in a general leftist camp and to the left of the mainstream left in their
respective countries; these differing political orientations play a role in the construction
of these movements’ technological imaginaries. My research also charts how the different
political contexts in which these movements operate influence the shape of their
technological imaginaries. Hungary’s socialist legacy and the consequences of the
transition to democracy chart a complicated relation to Western democracy, which is
likely to affect how movements interpret Western technologies, as well as the dominant
technological imaginary, which, as I will explain in Chapter 1, is specific, biased, and
deeply American. Italy’s political instability and its history of heightened political
conflict contributed to the development of a lively leftist social movement scene, where
movements are able to learn from each other and build on shared political repertoires, for
instance in relation to technologies. Looking at cases of social movements in Hungary
and Italy is also likely to bring into stark relief the peculiarities of the American political
system, for instance its marginalization and repression of radical and socialist forces. In
the U.S. context, it is also important to assess how radical social movements’ imaginaries
fare in a country which has long embraced a fascination with technologies. The different
political orientations and political contexts of the Hungarian internet tax protests, LUMe
and the Philly Socialists thus play a crucial role in my analysis of their technological
imaginaries.
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As is evident from this description of the cases, this dissertation does not intend to
offer a strictly comparative design. Indeed, as Barassi (2015) underlined, it might be
impossible to neatly compare different cultures, nations, and activist groups; however, as
she argued, it is useful to juxtapose different case studies, with the understanding that
highlighting the differences and similarities between the cases can help us make sense of
how the specificities of each individual case can follow more general patterns. It is in this
spirit that I conducted my analysis of the three cases, which I now present.
The Hungarian internet tax protests were organized in October 2014 to oppose the
Hungarian government’s decision to impose a tax on internet consumption. A group of
left-liberal activists, previously involved in different movements, organized two
successful demonstrations in Hungary’s capital. As mentioned in the introduction, the
first one drew 10,000 people to the streets of Budapest; the second one gave rise to the
largest demonstration that the country had seen post-1989, with 100,000 people marching
in the city. After this mobilization, the internet tax was withdrawn indefinitely. The core
group of organizers decided to refrain from creating a new political organization, and
continued to be active in different causes through other collectives. These activists selfidentify as different kinds of liberals and leftists. They are part of a broad civil society
mobilization that has emerged to oppose the government after the election of Viktor
Orbán as Prime Minister in 2010, who is leading Hungary towards an “illiberal
democracy”, as he himself has defined it (Orbán, 2014).
The Metropolitan University Laboratory (Laboratorio Universitario
MEtropolitano or LUMe) is based in Milan, Italy. The collective was founded in April
2015 during the occupation of an empty building, located next to the University of Milan.
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The occupied building gave them a venue for jazz concerts, poetry readings, theater
performances, and other activities, which led to the inclusion of students from the
numerous art schools of Milan. They were evicted from that building in the summer of
2017. In October 2017, they conducted a brief occupation of a foreclosed cinema in the
city center, re-opening it for the local population. They subsequently left the cinema and
occupied a municipality-owned maintenance deposit, where they are currently carrying
out their activities. LUMe is made of different working groups (“tavoli”), which are
concerned with: politics, music, cinema, theater, writing, art. In the introduction to their
activities, they identify as antifascist, antiracist, antisexist; they say their activities are
aimed at showing the social and political value of artistic production.
The Philly Socialists are a self-described “working class political organization”
(Philly Socialists, n.d.-b) based in Philadelphia, USA. They were founded in 2011; in
January 2019 they had a dues-paying membership of 170. They are active in city-wide
protests – for instance about net neutrality (Parent, 2018) or against President Trump’s
immigration policies (Orso & Feliciano Reyes, 2018) – and grassroots organizing. They
have been particularly involved with the fight for better housing conditions: in 2016 they
created the Philadelphia Tenants Union. Other actions that they have promoted include
the development of a Community Garden and ESL classes. In 2017, they started
publishing an alternative magazine, online and in print, called The Philadelphia Partisan.
Their short presentation on their website states that they are “a political organization
committed to creating a just and sustainable future for ourselves and our planet” (Philly
Socialists, n.d.-a).
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Methods
My methodological choices are informed by my theoretical orientation towards
studying “movements as processes” (Melucci, 1989) and exploring the discursive
constructions that enable the action of social movements. Furthermore, as explained in
my assessment of Melucci’s (1989) contribution to the study of social movements, one of
the challenges for studying movements is related to the invisibility of certain fundamental
processes that define them. Studying the technological imaginaries of social movements
is challenging exactly because they are invisible and thus difficult to reconstruct directly.
In many ways, the widespread technologies that we use every day may seem trivial and
commonsensical, hardly something that can be approached directly in an academic
interview. The challenge is thus to find methods that can interrogate the commonsensical,
taken-for-granted aspect of technology, engender a reflection in the research participants,
and create a conversation between researcher and participants about the meaning of
everyday technologies and their symbolic power. I have chosen to explore my cases
through a multi-method qualitative approach.
The three cases – the internet tax protests in Hungary, LUMe in Italy, and the
Philly Socialists in Philadelphia – will be approached through a combination of in-depth
individual interviews and visual focus groups. Given the predominance of internet-based
technologies in our present day, the internet will be the main (although not the only)
focus of the empirical research on the contemporary cases.

Interviews
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I conducted in-depth, semi-structured interviews with activists from the
Hungarian internet tax protests, LUMe and the Philly Socialists. The interview guides
that I used are available in Appendix A.
Interviewees were asked general questions about their activist biographies and
about their relationship with technology. Following Star (1999), who wrote that
infrastructures become visible upon breakdown, and Bucher (2016), who studied how
people react to the perceived faults of algorithms, I incorporated questions that guided
interviewees towards discussing moments in which they have become aware of the role
of technology in their activist lives or in which they have perceived digital technologies
to have caused problems in their personal lives or within the movements they are
involved with.
Interviewees of LUMe and the Philly Socialists were also guided towards
discussing the symbolic role of digital technologies; as can be seen in Appendix A, they
were shown two pictures in which protesters raised illuminated smartphones in the air:
one from the Umbrella Movement in Hong Kong and one from the Hungarian internet tax
protests. They were asked whether they had seen these pictures. If they did not recall
these pictures, they were asked to describe what was happening in the picture and what
the meaning of that protest action might be. The pictures informed a discussion between
me and the interviewees about the possibility of using digital technologies as a symbol
for political mobilization.
I conducted interviews with the core organizers of the Hungarian internet tax
protests in January – February 2017, either in person in Budapest or via Skype. I
interviewed seven men and two women, whose pseudonyms and ages are listed in Table
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1. The interviews were conducted in English. On average, each interview lasted 58
minutes.
Table 1. Pseudonyms, age and gender of the Hungarian internet tax activists who participated in the
individual interviews.

Pseudonym

Age

Gender

Adam

32

Male

Bálint

32

Male

Daniel

35

Male

David

45§

Male

Eszter

33

Female

Lászlo

33

Male

Péter

37

Male

Petra

-

Female

45§

Male

Tamás

Note: the ages indicated with § are an estimate based on publicly available information.

These nine interviewees represent the core organizers of a group that reached 20
people at most; each interviewee confirmed that my sample represented the most relevant
individuals who were involved in the organization of the protests.
I conducted interviews with eight activists from LUMe, four men and four
women, between June 2018 and February 2019. Their ages and occupations are listed in
Table 2. The interviews were conducted either in person in Milan or via video chat
services (Skype and Facebook Messenger). The interviews were conducted in Italian and
their average length was 78 minutes.
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Table 2. Pseudonyms, age and gender of the LUMe activists who participated in the individual interviews.

Pseudonym

Age

Gender

Occupation

Boris

21

Male

Assistant director of photography

Ilaria

24

Female

Social media manager

Jessica

27

Female

Museum staff

Maria

26

Female

Actress

Mario

25

Male

Sociology student

Paolo

24

Male

Political Science student

Stefano

25

Male

Philosophy student

Valeria

22

Female

Political Science student

The eight interviewees that took part in my research represent different working
groups in the collective; they also vary in the amount of time they have spent with
LUMe: while some of the interviewees were involved in founding the collective, others
joined at different points in time, and one interviewee had just recently begun getting
involved with LUMe when I interviewed him. This sample of activists thus captures a
range of experiences in LUMe; the interviewees themselves discussed my sample with
me and found it be representative of the collective.
I conducted five interviews with the Philly Socialists; their ages, occupation and
preferred pronouns are listed in Table 3. The interviews took place between August 2018
and February 2019. The interviews took place in person, in Philadelphia; they were
conducted in English. Their average length was 70 minutes.
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Table 3. Pseudonyms, age and gender of the Philly Socialists who participated in the individual interviews.

Pseudonym

Age

Pronouns

Occupation

Alexander

43

He/him

Web developer

Donna

26

They/them Non-profit worker

Lisa

29

She/her

Medical interpreter

Michael

24

He/him

Research assistant

Tyler

36

He/him

Librarian

As I detail below, when describing the limitations of my project, the Philly
Socialists were more reluctant to participate in my research, compared to the Italian and
Hungarian activists; this accounts for the limited number of individual interviews that I
was able to conduct. The five interviews nevertheless offer the perspectives of organizers
that have varying previous experiences of activism, that work on different projects within
the Philly Socialists, and that have been members of the organization for different
amounts of time.

Visual focus groups
I used focus groups to create group discussions about the meaning of technology
for the activists. Given the difficulty to talk about this seemingly mundane and taken-forgranted issue, taking inspiration from the literature on graphic elicitation tasks (Bagnoli,
2009; Gieseking, 2013), I developed a new method: the visual focus group. In the visual
focus groups, participants were asked to collectively draw what they thought the internet
was like. The process of collectively agreeing on a picture of the internet helped to
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uncover some of the unspoken assumptions about digital technologies that participants
held, thus allowing them to reflect on these assumptions collectively. In my analysis, I
examined the drawings in conjunction with the discussions that generated them. I provide
more details on the visual focus groups in Appendix B.
Although I planned to conduct focus groups with both LUMe and the Philly
Socialists, only those with LUMe were held, due to problems of access with the Philly
Socialists, which I detail when describing the limitations of this research. I conducted two
visual focus groups with LUMe activists: the first, which took place on November 8th
2018, lasted one hour and 36 minutes and included 5 activists (4 men, 1 woman); the
second, on January 7th 2019, was one hour and 52 minutes long and included 4 activists
(3 men, 1 woman). Their pseudonyms and ages are listed in Table 4. The visual focus
groups with LUMe were conducted in Italian.

Table 4. Pseudonyms, age and gender of the LUMe activists who participated in the visual focus groups.

Pseudonym

Age

Gender

Focus Group

Emanuele*

29

Male

Focus Group 1

Maria

26

Female

Focus Group 1

Mario

25

Male

Focus Group 1

Paolo

24

Male

Focus Group 1

Vittorio*

21

Male

Focus Group 1

Alessio*

26

Male

Focus Group 2

Giulio*

24

Male

Focus Group 2
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Stefano

25

Male

Focus Group 2

Viola*

20

Female

Focus Group 2

Note: the participants indicated with * did not take part in individual interviews.

Supplementary data: documents and observation

While semi-structured interviews and visual focus groups are the core of my
multi-method qualitative approach, I also supplemented these two methods with the
analysis of different textual sources produced by the three movements and by the
observation of some of their meetings and public events. In particular, I analyzed social
media posts and the website produced by LUMe; this content supplement the interviews
and was used to reconstruct the history of LUMe, its different working groups and its
political stances. I also analyzed the social media posts and the content of the Philly
Socialists’ website; this content also included the Constitution of the Philly Socialists and
their Anti-Harassment Policy (available on the website) and internal documents produced
by the organization and shared on social media. I used these materials to integrate
interviewees’ accounts of the history of the group and of their many projects, as well as
to provide an explanation of their political positions and their organizational structures. I
also collected and analyzed written materials published by members of the Philly
Socialists, which aimed to present the organization and/or explain its political stances, for
instance the notion of base-building. I also collected and examined 5 issues of the
magazine published by the Philly Socialists, the Philadelphia Partisan.
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Further, I observed meetings and public events hosted by LUMe and the Philly
Socialists. I observed two open assemblies held by LUMe (in December 2017 and
December 2018), one organizational assembly (in June 2018) and a working group
meeting (June 2018). I also observed four public or semi-public meetings or events of the
Philly Socialists: one open assembly (in July 2018), a public assembly of the Philadelphia
Tenants Union (in August 2018), a General Assembly (January 2019), and a book
presentation held at a local bookstore (September 2018). Additionally, I also visited the
Occupy ICE Philadelphia encampments, which the Philly Socialists co-promoted, and
observed a general assembly of this movement (July 2018). I took notes and collected
any written materials that were available in these meetings and events. My observation of
the movements complemented the data collected through the interviews and the visual
focus group; it was especially useful in providing insights into the dynamics of discussion
and organization that characterize the Philly Socialists and LUMe.

Data analysis
The data created through interviews and focus groups were coded through
thematic (Braun & Clarke, 2006) and open (Corbin & Strauss, 2008) coding. In
particular, a first round of descriptive thematic coding of the transcripts was conducted
through the qualitative analysis software MaxQDA. Subsequently, a second round of
open coding, directed at extrapolating more theoretically relevant codes from the existing
descriptive thematic coding, was conducted on paper. Because the analysis was directed
at reconstructing the specific technological imaginary of each movement, the transcripts
pertaining to each case were analyzed separately – one movement at a time.
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The drawings produced in the visual focus groups – both the final collective
drawings and the sketches produced by different individuals – were analyzed in
conjunction with the transcript of the group discussion that produced them. The themes
raised in the drawings and in the group discussions were constantly compared to those
emerging from the individual interviews. As I highlight in Appendix B, the drawings that
emerge from the visual focus groups cannot be analyzed or presented without accounting
for the discussions that generated them.

Ethics

Throughout my research, I followed the ethics guidelines of the Association of
Internet Researchers (AoIR Ethics Working Committee, 2012). My data collection and
retention, as well as my consenting procedures, also complied with the European General
Data Protection Regulation. I sought the informed consent of the activists I interviewed
or included in the visual focus groups3. Hungarian activists gave their consent orally,
after I presented my project to them; interviewees of LUMe and the Philly Socialists were
asked to sign consent forms. All the participants received a copy of the consent form (or
script, in the case of the Hungarian activists), which included detailed information on my
project, my data collection procedure, my contact details and the contact information of
the Institutional Review Board of the University of Pennsylvania, to which they could
report problems with my research. The Philly Socialists and the Hungarian activists
received a consent form/script in English, LUMe received an Italian version.
3

This research is the object of two different Institutional Review Board (IRB) protocols, one concerning
the interviews conducted with the Hungarian activists and one concerning the interviews and focus groups
conducted with LUMe and the Philly Socialists. In both cases, the IRB of the University of Pennsylvania
determined that the protocols met the criteria for a review exemption (category 2).
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Since this project is concerned with activists, who are often in a rather vulnerable
position, my research process and my presentation of the data attempt to minimize the
collection of personally identifiable information. I used pseudonyms for all the
participants involved in the study; with two exceptions, in which activists chose their own
pseudonyms, I assigned pseudonyms to participants based on common Hungarian,
Italian, and American names, respectively. Activists were often curious about the need to
be assigned pseudonyms: because they did not always feel the need to be anonymized,
this generated interesting discussions about the use of research participants’ data and the
availability of personal information online. None of the activists requested to be
identified by their names. While using pseudonyms for individual activists, I identify
LUMe and the Philly Socialists with their real names4. The two movements were asked if
they consented to my use of their names in my research and they both agreed. In the
Philly Socialists, this consent was provided by the Central Committee; in LUMe, it was
the organizational assembly that agreed, after hosting me to discuss my research project.
Further, I also offered activists of LUMe and the Philly Socialists the possibility to get in
touch with me via encrypted platforms (Signal and an encrypted email address), in
addition to my institutional email address and regular texting services.
Activists of LUMe and the Philly Socialists were offered a modest compensation
for their participation in the interviews and/or the focus groups; activists all elected to
give that compensation to their organizations.
I planned to build member checks into my research, but I was not yet able to
conduct them. The Hungarian interviewees received a summary of the main findings

4

The Hungarian activists never formed a stable collective or organization, so they are simply identified as
activists or organizers of the Hungarian internet tax protests.
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pertaining to their case, written in plain language. I plan to offer a similar summary to the
Philly Socialists and to LUMe (in Italian, in their case). I have also discussed the
possibility of presenting the findings of the dissertation to LUMe in person, since the
activists showed interest in learning what I would discover about them, but especially to
hear about what movements in other countries think about digital technologies. The
visual focus groups and the interviews also offered a space for me to talk to the
participants about my (preliminary) takes on the data I was collecting. Visual focus
groups had debriefing moments at the end of them, after activists had settled on their final
drawings. At the beginning, as well as at the end, of the individual interviews, I asked
participants if they had any questions for me. These moments, especially at the end of the
interviews, offered activists an opportunity to inquire about my positionality as a
researcher and about my research. I often discussed with them my motivations for doing
this research and my tentative takes on my research findings; this often led to more
discussions about contemporary activism and the meaning of digital technology. Further
insights collected from the member checks that I plan to conduct will be incorporated in
subsequent iterations of this project.
Limitations
Before providing an outline of my overall argument and of the chapters of the
dissertation, it is necessary to spell out the limitations of my project.
The first one has to do with the limited participation of one of the social
movements considered in the dissertation: the Philly Socialists. In fact, although I
discussed my interest in researching the Philly Socialists with the two co-chairs of the
organization, and the Philly Socialists’ Central Committee agreed to my use of the name
54

of the organization, the organization never fully endorsed my project. One of the cochairs sent an internal email and posted a message in their internal Facebook discussion
group on my behalf, but neither the co-chair nor other organizers were interested in
helping me recruit participants. I can only speculate as to why my research was received
differently by the Philly Socialist than by LUMe or the Hungarian activists. I had hoped
to be able to mitigate eventual surveillance concerns by offering encrypted means of
communication and by explicitly mentioning that I would not disclose any of their
personal information. I had also hoped to work around any biases against my academic
institution by presenting myself as a former student activist and as a researcher
committed to social justice. As far as I could ascertain, all the interviews that I conducted
with the Philly Socialists were a positive experience for the participants, who talked to
me at length and seemed to enjoy the possibility to talk about their organization.
Interviewees also expressed a potential interest in taking part in a visual focus group.
However, given the difficulty of even finding a small number of interviewees, I could not
attempt to schedule a visual focus group. Regardless of its real reasons, about which I can
only speculate, the limited number of interviews conducted with the Philly Socialists, as
well as the unfeasibility of the visual focus groups, remain a limitation of this study. For
that reason, I tried to supplement my analysis of the interviews with the examination of
other written sources and by observing events and public and semi-public meetings of the
Philly Socialists.
The second limitation lies in the nature of the qualitative methods that I chose to
employ. While I maintain that the multi-method qualitative approach that I laid out
provides important insights about the technological imaginaries of the social movements
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I studied, it nevertheless only produces indirect data, i.e. participants’ post-hoc
rationalizations of their attitudes and practices. In this sense, the data I work with is
different from what I could collect through an ethnographic engagement with these
movements, which could allow me to observe how the technological imaginaries of these
activists unfold in practice. For example, while LUMe activists told me that their use of
Facebook “sponsored” posts was discussed at length within the movement, I was not able
to directly observe any of those discussions. Of course, choosing an ethnographic
approach does not guarantee that one will be able to observe all the relevant
conversations, but an ethnographic engagement could nevertheless provide more
occasions to be present should those discussions occur.
The third limitation concerns the generalizability of my findings. With my choice
of three case studies from different countries, I have sought to examine how the different
characteristics of the political environments in which social movements are embedded
come into play in these movements’ construction of technological imaginaries, and in
how these imaginaries respond to the dominant technological imaginary of Silicon
Valley. In so doing, I have developed a typology of social movements’ technological
imaginaries, which I introduce below. This typology, however, is not meant to offer
predictions about what the technological imaginaries of other movements will look like.
In other words, while my research identifies a few political factors that play a role in how
LUMe, the Philly Socialists, and the Hungarian activists construct their imaginaries, it
should not be used to infer the technological imaginaries of other movements that are
confronted with similar political conditions. It cannot be used to say, for instance, that all
contemporary American socialist organizations will develop technological imaginaries
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that look like the one constructed by the Philly Socialists. Rather, this typology of
imaginaries is meant to be an analytical tool that can uncover the specificities of each
movements’ relationship to technology.
Lastly, this dissertation is limited in its applicability beyond Europe and North
America, in that it only includes cases of social movements located in these developed
regions and it is predicated on the dominance of a distinctly American, Western,
technological imaginary. The theoretical framework deployed in this dissertation could
also be used as a starting point to analyze the technological imaginaries of movements
located in other parts of the world, but we should expect movements outside of Europe
and North America to be faced with different threats and opportunities and to have
different experiences of Silicon Valley’s technologies. Most importantly, in order to use
this framework in other contexts, we should pay particular attention to identifying what is
the dominant technological imaginary in a given location. While the technological
imaginary of Silicon Valley is increasingly global in its reach, because of its ambitions
and because of the global spread of its technologies, it might not have the same dominant
position in all areas of the world. While the dominance of Silicon Valley’s imaginary can
be readily ascertained in Europe and North America, it remains an open question in the
rest of the world. For instance, we could hypothesize that the technological imaginary of
the Chinese government might be the dominant one to consider when analyzing how
Chinese activists construct their own technological imaginaries. This would then likely
require a reconceptualization of the typology of social movements’ imaginaries
developed in the dissertation – but one that could still be guided by the theoretical
framework laid out in this project. The geographical limitations of the dominant
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technological imaginary, and of the cases examined here, do not minimize the findings of
my dissertation, but rather serve to underline how social movements’ relations to
technology must be studied in the specific political context in which movements are
embedded.

Outline of the dissertation
Based on my theoretical framework and my empirical examination of the
technological imaginaries of the Hungarian internet tax protests, the Italian LUMe and
the U.S.-based Philly Socialists, I develop a typology of social movements’ technological
imaginaries. This typology presents three different categories of imaginaries, based on
how they respond to the dominant technological imaginary that I describe in Chapter 1
and that stems from Silicon Valley. The typology considers whether social movements’
technological imaginaries accept or dismiss the dominant technological imaginary and
whether they choose to employ Silicon Valley’s digital technologies in their activism, or
not. This results in three categories, which I named appropriation, negotiation, and
challenge. Technological imaginaries of appropriation embrace the dominant
technological imaginary and endorse the use of Silicon Valley’s digital technologies; the
Hungarian internet tax protests constructed such an imaginary of appropriation.
Technological imaginaries of negotiation reject the dominant technological imaginary of
Silicon Valley, yet they allow for the use of Silicon Valley’s digital technologies. Both
LUMe and the Philly Socialists construct imaginaries of negotiation, although different
ones. Lastly, technological imaginaries of challenge reject both the dominant
technological imaginary of Silicon Valley and Silicon Valley’s digital technologies.

58

Although no empirical cases of challenge are present in the dissertation, drawing on the
literature I further distinguish between imaginaries of challenge that are based on the
refusal to use Silicon Valley’s technologies and imaginaries of challenge that envision the
development of alternative activist technologies.
Further, my empirical analysis identifies three crucial political factors that shape
how social movements’ construct their technological imaginaries in response to Silicon
Valley’s dominant imaginary: the social movement’s ideology, the political context in
which the social movement is embedded, and the presence of other prominent
technological imaginaries, to which the movement also responds. I explain how the
combination of these factors comes into play in how the Hungarian internet tax protests,
LUMe and the Philly Socialists develop their technological imaginaries.
Before examining the three case studies, in Chapter 1 I describe the current
dominant technological imaginary, arising from Silicon Valley; I identify its three key
tenets: the belief in the free and democratic nature of digital technologies,
technosolutionism, and its embeddedness in neoliberal capitalism. I highlight how this
imaginary, which is profoundly American, has dreams of universality. The chapter offers
two illustrations of the biases of this dominant technological imaginary, which push back
on the universalistic dreams of Silicon Valley. First, I looked at one of the privileged loci
for the construction of the dominant technological imaginary in the 1990s – Wired
magazine. Through an analysis of Wired’s covers between 1993 and 1997 and an indepth examination of two of its cover stories, I show how the exclusion of people of color
and white women sustains the dreams of universality of Silicon Valley through a
discourse I call “selective disembodiment”. This discourse celebrated “cyberspace” for
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offering white women and people of color a chance to leave their bodies behind. In so
doing, it affirmed the idea that technology could take care of any gender and race
inequalities. In practice, this discourse allowed Silicon Valley to construct its digital
utopias by projecting the limited point of view of the white men that rule it. Secondly, I
show how Silicon Valley’s technological imaginary blends technocratic ambitions and
populist justifications by analyzing how these emerge from an open letter written by
Facebook CEO and founder Mark Zuckerberg in 2017. Zuckerberg’s manifesto
highlights the complexities of the dominant technological imaginary and the biases of the
politics that it pitches as universal.
Chapter 2 examines the Hungarian internet tax protests. I first explain how the
government of Viktor Orbán tried to introduce a tax on internet consumption in October
2014 and describe the protests that were organized in Budapest by a group of left-liberal
activists. I contextualize the internet tax within Hungary’s recent turn to “illiberal
democracy” (Orbán, 2014) and I provide an overview of the social movements that have
opposed Orbán since 2010. I argue that the protests were successful in pushing the
government to withdraw the tax proposal because they drew on a powerful technological
imaginary, that I term “mundane modernity”: this imaginary blends the typical tropes
associated with Western modernity with the mundanity of internet practices. This
technological imaginary is one of appropriation, because it embraces both the dominant
technological imaginary of Silicon Valley and Silicon Valley’s technologies. I argue that
this appropriation is influenced by the Hungarian political context, which has seen a
resurgence of the political cleavage of modernity vs. tradition; appropriation is also
shaped by the Hungarian activists’ opposition to Orbán’s illiberal democracy, which has
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its own technological imaginary – exemplified by the internet tax itself. I then show how
the imaginary of mundane modernity was performed by the protesters through the iconic
action of raising smartphones to the sky and by the thrashing of the building that hosts
Orbán’s party, Fidesz. As mentioned at the beginning of this Introduction, the iconic
action involving smartphones was repeated in other protests in Hungary and in the region,
clearly showing how this performance of mundane modernity can have a strong symbolic
power. In closing, however, I show how this symbolic power has its limits: for the
activists of LUMe and the Philly Socialists, mundane modernity, as performed through
the action of raising illuminated smartphones, does not really make sense.
In Chapters 3 and 4 I examine two technological imaginaries of negotiation. In
Chapter 3, I present the Italian leftist collective LUMe, by chronicling their political
occupation of empty buildings in the city of Milan. I contextualize their activities within
the longer trajectory of Italian social centers, i.e. social movements that have relied on the
occupation of buildings as their primary tactic; I also focus on two of the areas in which
LUMe activists have been particularly active: creating grassroots cultural spaces
accessible to all and mobilizing against state racism. I then provide a description of
LUMe’s horizontal organizational structures. I examine their technological practices for
both internal and external communication, underlining their reliance on commercial
digital platforms, particularly Facebook and Whatsapp. I call their technological
imaginary “using the tools of the system against the system” to highlight that LUMe
activists simultaneously regard digital technologies as flawed and indispensable for social
change. Their imaginary is one of negotiation: while they fiercely criticize the key tenets
of the dominant technological imaginary, they rely extensively on the technologies of
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Silicon Valley. In their negotiation, they draw on two resources that they use to make
sense of their relationship to corporate digital platforms: offline occupied spaces and the
notion of consapevolezza, roughly translatable as “awareness”. I thus argue that their
negotiation is shaped by three political factors: their general Marxist anti-capitalist
ideological orientation; the context of the Italian occupied social centers, to which LUMe
belongs; and LUMe’s opposition to another prominent technological imaginary in Italian
politics, that of the Five Star Movement.
Chapter 4 is dedicated to the American socialist organization, the Philly Socialists
(PS). I chronicle their history since their foundation in 2011 and present their many
projects, which they see as “serve the people” work. I situate the Philly Socialists in the
context of a recent surge in interest in socialist organizations in the United States. In
describing the politics of the Philly Socialists, I highlight that they are a multitendency
socialist organization committed to “base-building”, i.e. to build a power base for
socialist politics outside of the electoral system; they are also actively involved in
creating a national network of socialist organizations that subscribe to “base-building”,
the Marxist Center. I then explain the complex organizational structure of the Philly
Socialists, which I argue brings together socialist centralized structures and anarchist
horizontal processes. In mapping their internal and external technological practices, I
highlight the importance of the process of recruitment and retention to how the Philly
Socialists employ technologies. I define their technological imaginary as “organizing
where people are”: the Philly Socialists do not regard digital technologies as an ideal
space, but one that is good enough – for now – to recruit people into the socialist cause. It
is also an imaginary of negotiation, in that the Philly Socialists reject the core principles
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of Silicon Valley’s dominant technological imaginary, but extensively rely on its digital
technology. Their negotiation is supported by the idea of “organizing”, through which
they effectively downplay and justify their use of corporate technologies – by thinking
about their technological practices within a broader “organizing” strategy. I thus suggest
that their technological imaginary of negotiation is shaped by an appeal to the heritage of
socialist organizing, from which the PS take away the need to rely on whatever
mainstream media technologies are most efficient, as well as by the PS’ critique of the
technological imaginary of “activist networking”, which they see as prevalent in the
American Left and that we might better define as lifestyle politics (Portwood-Stacer,
2013a).
In the Conclusion, I review what the imaginary of appropriation of the Hungarian
internet tax protests and the imaginaries of negotiation of LUMe and the Philly Socialists
tell us about the relationship between contemporary movements and digital technologies.
I also draw on the literature to explain the third category of technological imaginary that I
identified in my typology: challenge. I explain that challenge can further be divided into
imaginaries of challenge that envision the abstention from Silicon Valley technologies
and imaginaries of challenge that promote the development of alternative digital
technologies. I offer examples of both. I then offer a few theoretical and methodological
implications of my dissertation to the literatures on media and social movements, digital
technologies, and media and communication in general. In closing, I reflect on the need
for activists and academics to start imagining better technologies for better futures.
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Chapter 1 – The dominant technological imaginary of Silicon Valley
The dominant technological imaginary
In conceptualizing technological imaginaries as a theoretical lens for the
examination of the relationship between movements and technologies, I have argued that,
although imaginaries are plural and conflicting, there should be a clearly identifiable
technological imaginary that is dominant in a particular place and time. While social
movements might dislike, criticize and oppose the dominant technological imaginary,
they are nevertheless immersed in it, like the rest of society.
But what is the current dominant technological imaginary? It is a set of practicebased beliefs and discourses that have been popularized by U.S. technology companies –
a group of actors that are commonly called “Silicon Valley”, due to the location of most
of them in that area of Northern California. The current dominant technological
imaginary is an evolution of what Barbrook and Cameron (1996) already called the
“Californian ideology”, which, they said, “simultaneously reflects the disciplines of
market economics and the freedoms of hippie artisanship. This bizarre hybrid is only
made possible through a nearly universal belief in technological determinism” (p. 50). In
turn, this belief is based on “a profound faith in the emancipatory potential of the new
information technologies” (Barbrook & Cameron, 1996, p. 45). Turner (2006) traced the
emergence of this discourse back to the Californian countercultural movements of the
1960s; Mosco (2004), Fisher (2008) and Streeter (2005) all highlighted the importance of
the 1990s as a critical juncture for the consolidation and mainstreaming of these ideas, in
conjunction with the rise to prominence of new forms of right wing libertarianism in the
United States. They also highlighted the relevance of the tech magazine Wired in making
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these discourses about technology both popular and glamorous (Barbrook & Cameron,
1996; Fisher, 2008; Flichy, 2007a; Streeter, 2005; Turner, 2006).
The key tenets of this imaginary are powerful. First, this imaginary connects the
digital to freedom, personal autonomy and democracy, which are imagined to be
accessible to everyone through the use of technologies (Barbrook & Cameron, 1996;
Streeter, 2005; Turner, 2006). Digital technologies are thought to be inherently free,
democratic and supportive of personal autonomy. Second, this imaginary suggests that
people’s problems and challenges can and should be addressed through the development
and deployment of technologies, as opposed to, say, through the implementation of
different policies (Fisher, 2008; Morozov, 2013; Robins, 1996). Digital technologies are
thus portrayed as being inevitable and integral to human life. Third, despite being a
discourse that celebrates the revolutionary power of technological innovation, this
imaginary is fully embedded into and functional to dominant political-economic
arrangements, i.e. neoliberalism. This means that there is a political-economic dimension
to the dominant technological imaginary (Dean, 2005; Fisher, 2010; Mansell, 2012;
McChesney, 2013; but mostly Mosco, 2004). In fact, we can argue that this imaginary
helps legitimize neoliberal capitalism: it portrays society as classless and free of socioeconomic struggles (Fisher, 2008) and promotes the idea that the market, with its endless
supply of technology, is the place for the resolution of problems and the improvement of
people’s lives – not government (Mosco, 2004). Turner (2006) and Mosco (2004)
convincingly explained how this affinity between Silicon Valley and neoliberal ideas
came into being during the 1990s and how it was naturalized by Wired magazine.
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This dominant technological imaginary is also deeply American, in two ways: it
arose out of the peculiarities of Silicon Valley and of the American political scene of the
1990s and it also feeds on past imaginaries of technology and its role in constructing
“America” (Marx, 1964; Nye, 1996). On the one hand, as Barbrook and Cameron (1996)
eloquently argued:
The Californian Ideology was developed by a group of people living
within one specific country with a particular mix of socio-economic and
technological choices. Its eclectic and contradictory blend of conservative
economics and hippie radicalism reflects the history of the West Coast –
and not the inevitable future of the rest of the world. (p. 63)
On the other hand, this dominant vision of technology should also be understood
within a long American history of fascination with “new technologies”, which I briefly
discussed in the Introduction when presenting the insights of media historians on the role
of discourses about technology. Building on L. Marx (1964), Nye (1996) argued that this
fascination with technological developments – the “technological sublime” – is “a
defining ideal for American society” (p. xiii-xiv) and “one of America’s central ‘ideas
about itself’” (p. xiv)5.
Recognizing that this dominant technological imaginary is shaped by political,
social, and historical conditions can help us demystify its power and pinpoint its effects.
This is important also because this technological imaginary, arising out of the
peculiarities of Silicon Valley and of the American political scene of the 1990s, has long
been characterized by dreams of universality. This imaginary, in fact, is a projection of a

5

As I will highlight in Chapter 2, when talking about how the Hungarian internet tax protests appropriate
Silicon Valley’s dominant technological imaginary, there is a continuity between the visions of technology
articulated in Western modernity and the key tenets of the dominant technological imaginary. Technology
and modernity are, in fact, co-constitutive (Misa, 2003); Silicon Valley thus “inherits” some of the modern
ways of looking at technology, in particular its association with a promise of progress and liberation.
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biased, bounded, regional set of ideas embedded in a specific political-economic
arrangement, which is envisioned to have the same meaning and relevance everywhere in
the world. It posits its universality by presenting its tenets as if they were global,
unbiased and equally suitable for everyone. We can observe how this technological
imaginary is no longer confined to the United States, but it has made its way, through
mass media, pop cultural representations and even digital technologies themselves
(Flichy, 2007a), to other areas of the world. The power of this US-influenced
technological imaginary to reach the rest of the world was particularly evident during the
coverage and early commentary of the movements of 2011, especially the Arab Spring.
Emblematic of that period was the debate that unfolded between (and around)
Clay Shirky and Malcom Gladwell (Gladwell, 2010; Gladwell & Shirky, 2011; Shirky,
2011; Wasik, 2011) over the role played by internet technologies in social movements,
which oriented the entire mainstream discussion on the movements of 2011 around a
techno-utopian (Shirky) vs. techno-skeptic (Gladwell) binary. Regardless of the different
positions expressed, the sheer existence of that specific debate only reinforced a central
feature of the dominant technological imaginary: that digital technologies are the natural,
central and inevitable lens through which social movements should be discussed; the
debate over the use of technologies is the only one worth having, because technology is
how social change can be achieved.
While we might be tempted to dismiss the terms of this debate – and the
scholarship certainly has moved on from this polarizing dichotomy – we nevertheless
need to acknowledge that it reflects a discursive environment in which movements are
immersed. In other words, while activists might construct their own technological
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imaginaries, they are nevertheless confronted with a very powerful mainstream
imaginary, that sees technology as the ultimate avenue for social change. How they make
sense of this imaginary is the fundamental question addressed in research.
But before turning to how contemporary social movements construct their own
technological imaginaries in response to Silicon Valley’s, this chapter provides two
illustrations that help us identify what is at stake when we talk about technological
imaginaries. Despite its dreams of universality, the dominant technological imaginary is
in fact biased, in the sense that it is the expression of the social, economic and political
arrangements in which it was created. First, then, I show that the utopian dreams of
universality that animate the dominant technological imaginary of Silicon Valley are
actually predicated on exclusion; this proclaimed universality is the projection of the
interests of one specific demographic – the white American men that dominate Silicon
Valley. To do so, I turn to one of the most important moments for the development and
popularization of Silicon Valley’s technological imaginary – the 1990s – and to one of its
most important vehicles: Wired magazine. Through a textual analysis of the cover images
and the cover titles of the first five years of Wired magazine (1993-1997), as well as the
in-depth analysis of two cover stories, I argue that the myth of disembodiment that is
crucial to the digital utopianism of Silicon Valley is based on the exclusion of raced and
gendered bodies, which is facilitated by a discourse that I call “selective disembodiment”.
Selective disembodiment refers to the idea that the myth of disembodiment in cyberspace
does not apply equally to all types of bodies; it is, in fact, a white male fantasy that sees
cyberspace as highly beneficial for white women and people of color, who are expected
to use it to lose their embodied characteristics. According to this discourse of selective
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disembodiment, white women and people of color matter only when they are
disembodied in cyberspace, and only as disembodied entities: the voice and recognition
they acquire by inhabiting cyberspace does not carry over in their embodied lives. At the
same time, white men matter offline too – they are the ones who can build cyberspace for
everyone else. As is evident even from this brief description, selective disembodiment is
inherently political, in that it stipulates a distinction between bodies that matter and
bodies that don’t. It allowed Silicon Valley to conveniently forget about disparities of
class, gender, and race, by assuming that technology will take care of them. Second, I
show how the dominant technological imaginary has its own politics that it pitches as
universal. I do this by highlighting how the dominant technological imaginary is
deployed by Facebook’s founder and CEO Mark Zuckerberg. Through an analysis of
what has been called Zuckerberg’s manifesto, an open letter titled “Building Global
Community” and released in 2017, I argue that the dominant technological imaginary of
Silicon Valley, which Zuckerberg draws upon, is sustained by a blend of technocratic
ambitions and populist justifications. I suggest that Zuckerberg’s manifesto is an
illustration of the complexity and power of the dominant technological imaginary that we
are confronted with.
After providing these two illustrations of the political shortcomings of the
dominant technological imaginary of Silicon Valley, I briefly address how this imaginary
has fared in the past couple of years. It is reasonable to argue that the Cambridge
Analytica scandal, which generated a wave of scrutiny directed not only at Facebook, but
technology companies more generally, could be the beginning of the end of the current
dominant technological imaginary. Only time will tell if this is the case. At the moment,

69

it seems that the criticism that is being moved against Facebook and the other tech giants
does not fundamentally question the dominant technological imaginary.

The bodies of Wired magazine: selective disembodiment and Silicon Valley

The first illustration that can help us highlight the political biases of the dominant
technological imaginary of Silicon Valley considers how the universalist dreams of this
imaginary are based on a celebration of technologically-enabled disembodiment, that has
its roots in the 1990s and that is predicated on the neglect of race and gender disparities.
The idea of disembodiment was central to early utopian and critical views of
cyberspace6 and internet culture. Utopian views celebrated the possibility of overcoming
or abandoning one’s body to partake in cyberspace as a disembodied entity, free to
choose its shape and identity. Such debates still reverberate on how we think about the
relationship between self, society and technology today. On the one hand, in the early
theories and representations of the Internet there was a strong utopian view that saw in
cyberspace a form of liberation, based on the freedom to choose how one would appear
online. On the other hand, a lot of scholarship was subsequently devoted to exploring all
the ways in which gender and race differences went lost in the utopian view.
Disembodiment is one of the sources of tension between these two positions.
In her writing about legal theory and the relationship between self and
technology, Cohen (2012) powerfully highlighted how utopian views of cyberspace
included “a vision of networked technologies as enabling freedom from bodily

6

In this part of the chapter I consistently use the word “cyberspace” to denote the fact that I am
reconstructing conversations about race, gender, and technology that took place in the 1990s, when that
term was widely used.
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constraints” (p. 34). She then explained how disembodiment was central to different
theoretical and political projects:
for many thinkers about “cyberspace” and information policy, the advent
of the Internet seems to seal the body’s ultimate irrelevance to questions of
social theory and social ordering, although different groups read that
irrelevance differently. Thus, libertarian social critics see in cyberspace the
eventual apotheosis of enlightened social and economic individualism (…)
(Cohen, 2012, p. 35)
As Mosco (2004) suggested, this libertarian trend took even more explicitly
political tones, configuring what he called the “myth of the end of geography”, according
to which social beings “are disembodied into the shifting identities of aliases, monikers,
and personas” (p. 92). Consider, for instance, a classic document of this time, John Perry
Barlow’s A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace, issued in 1996 in response to
the approval of the U. S. Telecommunications Act. The document proclaimed cyberspace
to be beyond the reach of governments, due to its lack of both materiality and
embodiment: “your legal concepts of property, expression, identity, movement, and
context do not apply to us. They are all based on matter, and there is no matter here. Our
identities have no bodies, so, unlike you, we cannot obtain order by physical coercion”
(Barlow, 1996). The disappearance of bodies in cyberspace is cast as one of the
fundamental properties of cyberspace, which made it unreachable by and unavailable to
traditional forms of political sovereignty.
According to this utopian and libertarian vision, disembodiment was thus key to
the experience of cyberspace and it was considered a form of liberation. For Flichy
(2007a), this is the idea “that one can put one’s body on hold, that computer technology
can create bodiless human relations, disconnected from any engagement of the body in
space and time” (p. 153). Writing about virtual sex, McRae (1996) underscored this
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sense of freedom: “In virtual reality, mind and body, female and male, gay and straight,
don’t seem to be such natural oppositions anymore, or even natural categories to assign to
people. (…) In virtual realty, you are whoever you say you are” (p. 245).
The limitations of this utopian view, however, were made apparent by more
nuanced analyses that sought to re-center issues pertaining to gender, race and sexuality
in cyberspace. Here I will merely refer to Nakamura’s work (Kolko, Nakamura, &
Rodman, 2000; Nakamura, 1995), as it is representative of a broader scholarship (e.g.
Lupton, 1995; Stone, 1991) that sought to stir the discussion towards the recognition of
the meaning of embodiment and disembodiment in relation to cyberspace.
Nakamura’s (1995) work on “identity tourism” in text-based communities on
LambdaMOO addressed the racist implications of (white) users’ attempts to pass as nonwhite, both appropriating and objectifying others’ identities. While white users’ forms of
racial passing were allowed, because they didn’t threaten the overwhelming whiteness of
these spaces, those who disclosed their non-whiteness were often accused of trying to be
divisive by bringing race into a raceless space (Nakamura, 1995). The possibilities of
experiencing disembodiment in cyberspace clearly looked different for people of color,
women and other minorities compared to the “default” white male users. Race and gender
still matter in cyberspace, said Nakamura, and race and gender are not erased by
cyberspace:
While the mediated nature of cyberspace renders invisible many, (and in
some instances, all) of the visual and aural cues that serve to mark
people’s identities IRL, that invisibility doesn’t carry back over into “the
real world” in ways that allow people to log in and simply shrug off a
lifetime of experiencing the world from specific identity-related
perspectives. You may be able to go online and not have anyone know
your race or gender – you may even be able to take cyberspace’s potential
for anonymity a step further and masquerade as a race or gender that
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doesn't’ reflect the real, offline you – but neither the invisibility nor the
mutability of online identity make it possible for you to escape your “real
world” identity completely (Kolko et al., 2000).
As evidenced by Kolko, Nakamura and Rodman (2000), cyberspace does not
erase differences in real life – differences that are often connected to different types of
bodies and that are ignored in the popular utopian views of new technologies that
characterized early Internet culture. To borrow Mosco’s (2004) language, the myths of
cyberspace are supported by a powerful “myth of disembodiment”, which erases the
political and social implications of difference.

Gender and race on the cover of Wired
To further reconstruct how disembodiment was talked about in the 1990s, I look
at how a crucial actor in the construction of the dominant technological imaginary related
to bodies and disembodiment: Wired magazine. I focus on what kinds of discourses
about bodies and disembodiment were present in the first five years of the magazine,
which are thought to be its most influential (Turner, 2006, p. 208). I thus analyzed the
cover images, the cover titles and the cover articles of the first five years of Wired (19931997), to understand the discourse on bodies and cyberspace that is produced by the
magazine. Given the overwhelming whiteness and maleness of the cover images, I then
focused in depth on two covers and cover articles that describe other kinds of bodies: a
white woman (April 1996) and a black man (December 1994).
The importance of Wired to early computer culture and to debates over
cyberspace cannot be understated. Founded in 1993 in San Francisco, Wired rapidly rose
to popularity nationally and internationally, as the “hottest, coolest, trendiest new
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magazine of the 1990s” (Borsook, 1996, p. 24) – a sort of Rolling Stone for the tech
scene. Imagined as the mouthpiece of the “Digital Generation” by its founder (Rossetto,
1993), Wired has become the most popular expression of the “culture of contemporary
technocapitalism” (Fisher, 2008, p. 181). I focus on Wired because of its importance in
reflecting and shaping the early technological imaginary of Silicon Valley, especially in
its most utopian characteristics: several of its key contributors, like John Perry Barlow
and Nicholas Negroponte, have been crucial to the development and popularization of
utopian discourses of cyberspace.
Wired is one of Turner’s (2006) key cases for tracing the relationship between the
countercultural movements on the 1960s and the libertarian ethos of cyberculture. He
argued that the magazine was a crucial space for the construction of a technological
imaginary that brought together, in the 1990s, three constituencies: the burgeoning
Californian tech scene, the libertarian politicians of the New Right, and the
countercultural community of the 1960s (Turner, 2006, p. 217). According to Turner
(2006), Wired set out to create, legitimize and model the “Digital Generation” as “a new
kind of elite, born out of the antihierarchical ethos of the 1960s and powerful in a manner
that matched that ethos” (p. 220). In a short time, Wired’s discourse became “the
governing myth of the Internet, the stock market, and great swaths of the New Economy”
(Turner, 2006, p. 209); although the crash of the dot-com economy in 2001 temporarily
curbed the more utopian visions of the Internet, they are still embedded in the dominant
technological imaginary. The relevance of Wired’s early discourse for understanding our
contemporary approaches to technology was also highlighted by Karpf’s (2018) recent
commentary for the magazine’s 25th anniversary.
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As explained in the Introduction, this investigation of Wired magazine relied on a
multi-stage textual analysis: first, it focused on the cover images; second, it considered
the cover images in conjunction with the cover titles; third, it turned to an in-depth
analysis of the images and text of two cover stories. Images and texts were coded for
emergent themes (Corbin & Strauss, 2008) and grouped in macro-categories; connections
were drawn between the macro-categories. Particular attention was given to the
connections between the representation of different bodies and the themes emerging from
the text.
The first step of the analysis focused on the cover images. Despite the enthusiasm
about disembodiment, the covers of Wired magazine overwhelmingly showcased bodies
or bodily elements (e.g. hands, eye). Only four out of 54 covers published between 1993
and 1997 do not feature bodies or body parts: a computer (January 1997), Apple’s logo
(June 1997), a smiling cartoonish representation of the Earth (July 1997), a blank page
(January 1995). Seven covers feature some bodily elements: cartoon characters with
anthropomorphic features (December 1993, June 1994, December 1995, April 1997), a
hand (March 1997), eyeballs (October 1997) 7, ans a mosaic-looking collage representing
Nicholas Negroponte’s face (November 1995). However, the majority of covers rely on
images of whole bodies – mostly white and male bodies. In fact, 25 covers portray an
individual white man and 10 portray two or more white men8. Women appear

7

A white man in a light blue shirt also appears at the bottom of the cover, but he is not the main subject of
the cover.
8 It is worth underlying that the cover of the September 1995 issue presents a photoshopped image of O.J.
Simpson, retouched to appear Caucasian. Although such shocking design would suggest an articulated
discussion of racial issues, the article mostly highlights “how Simpson's trial has revealed that our public
institutions - especially the media - are guilty of making it impossible to resolve the most important issues
facing our society” (Katz, 1995). In 2008, a brief piece on Wired sought to retroactively recast the meaning
of the cover as an attempt to “make readers examine their assumptions about race” (Honan, 2008).
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(individually) on four covers (one of them is a child, one a black woman). Three covers
feature mixed-gender groups (one of which includes a black male). One cover is
dedicated to a black man.
Overall, it is evident that white males – young, middle-aged or old, in casual or
formal attire – are the key demographic represented on Wired’s covers between 1993 and
1997. The bodies of the Digital Generation are overwhelmingly white, both in print and
in real life. According to Turner (2006), the readers of Wired in 1996 “were 87.9 percent
male, 37 years old on average, with an average household income of more than $122,000
per year. In a reader survey, more than 90 percent of subscribers identified themselves as
either ‘Professional/Managerial’ or ‘Top Management’” (p. 218). White male bodies on
the cover of Wired promoted themselves to other equally white and male bodies. In the
process, they also marginalized women who were interested not only in reading the
magazine, but also in writing it (see Borsook, 1996).
The second step in this analysis focused on the cover titles, their themes and their
association with the different kinds of bodies represented on the covers. The most
prevalent themes associated with white males (alone or with other white males) are those
of success, future, war/violence and transformation – rather conventional tropes asserting
men’s social dominance.
Firstly, as remarked by Turner (2006), Wired attempted to promote – sell – an
idea of financial and social success through cover stories that praised entrepreneurs,
geeks and libertarian politicians. Through its stories and covers, Wired seemed to suggest
that its readers, too, could be part of this successful Digital Generation – if only they
adopted the right technologies and the right mindset. As Streeter (2005) neatly
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summarized, the promise was to: “change the world, overthrow hierarchy, express
yourself, and get rich” (p. 777). The covers communicated this idea of success in
different ways; for instance, they spoke of “world domination” (June 1993), “first cd-rom
superstars” (August 1994), “the first digital supergroup” (November 1994), a “winner”
(October 1995), the next “insanely great thing!” (with exclamation mark,
clearly)(February 1996), “the most popular computer game of all time” (August 1996),
“the most powerful banker in the world” (October 1996), and “the world’s most
influential online community” (May 1997). This almost hyperbolic language projects an
image of extreme success and power onto the white males it describes, while at the same
time legitimizing Wired as the powerful and successful mouthpiece of such powerful and
successful men. Secondly, this aura of power and success is tied to the idea that the
Digital Generation portrayed and supported by Wired both represents and shapes the
future of the world. Four covers depicting white men explicitly use the word “future”, as
a noun and as an adjective; several others use related expressions such as “new” and
“next”. This discourse constructed the men featured on Wired’s covers as those who have
either already seen the future – such as Bruce Sterling, on the inaugural issue, who “has
seen the future of war”, or William Gibson and “his latest report on the future” – or are
actively involved in shaping it. Thirdly, a good number of expressions used in the cover
titles have to do with combat, war or violence. References to the death penalty appear
twice, and war is specifically mentioned in five covers. Overall, there is a language of
“fighting” and “slaying” that relies on warring metaphors to describe business
competition and innovation.
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White women and people of color are largely excluded from this hyperbolic
language of success, future and war. In fact, the most prominent theme associated with
bodies that are not white and male is that of transformation. White men are also
associated with transformation, but it is mostly some type of change – a revolution! –
they are driving. For women and people of color, it is either a personal transformation or
a transformation they are part of, but not in charge of. For instance, the March 1994 cover
dedicated to artist Laurie Anderson is titled: “Laurie Anderson reinvents herself —
again”; the emphasis is on her journey of personal transformation, not on its impact on
the art scene or on the artist’s success.
Similar themes emerged also in Stewart Millar’s (1998) analysis of Wired.
Through an examination of cover images and stories in the magazine, she also described
how Wired was both sexist and racist. In particular, she underlined how women were
stereotyped and excluded from the magazine, while its design and content were focused
on constructing an “image of a hypermacho man who uses new forms of technology to
reassert power” (Stewart Millar, 1998, p. 113). She argued that Wired portrayed digital
culture as the stomping ground of white men, while “minority figures are of interest to
Wired only as tokens and stereotypes that reinforce assumptions of racial inequality”
(Stewart Millar, 1998, p. 107). While I agree with Stewart Millar’s characterization, I
argue that there is more to Wired’s sexist and racist portrayals of cyberspace: there is an
attempt at claiming universality for a vision of digital technologies that is determined by
the interest of a specific demographic – white American men.

Gendered and raced bodies in cyberspace
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The third step in my analysis focused on the discourse that emerged from two
cover articles that are centered on non-normative Wired bodies: a white woman (April
1996) and a black man (December 1994)9. Analyzing how Wired approached non-whiteand-male individuals can help us highlight the limits of the discourse of success and
future promoted by the magazine. The two articles give us clues to understand Wired’s
peculiar vision of the relationship between cyberspace and bodies, which I call selective
disembodiment.
Sherry Turkle, the MIT professor who is on the cover of the April 1996 issue, is
presented under the title: “Sex, Lies and Avatars: Sherry Turkle knows what role-playing
in cyberspace really means”. Although the long and insightful interview with Turkle only
briefly refers to sex, among the many topics that she discusses, sex becomes the central
concept for the cover title. As Stewart Millar (1998) remarked: “the article, entitled ‘Sex,
Lies and Avatars,’ subverts gender issues in favor of a discussion of cybersex. Like
Anderson, Turkle is sexualized, with innuendo that suggests “she knows a lot about
cybersex (…)” (Stewart Millar, 1998, p. 99).
Besides the obvious reference to sex, there are also other features of Turkle’s
interview that reassert stereotypical representations of women. For instance, Turkle’s
interview is framed through the lens of personal transformation – which I identified as
one of the major themes emerging from the sample of Wired covers. Such personal
transformation, in Turkle’s case, is expressed in two different ways: one, the connection
between the personal circumstances of her life to her research; two, an emphasis on her
multiplicity. The former, instead of legitimizing Turkle’s work, actually implicitly
9

The December 1994 cover story was chosen because it is the only one that features a black man. The
April 1996 cover story was chosen because it is the longest of the stories that focuses primarily on a
woman.
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diminishes her academic accomplishments, attributing them merely to her personal
experiences. Speaking of Turkle’s stay in Paris in 1968 and the opportunities for
intellectual growth that she encountered there, the article’s author, Pamela McCorduck,
wrote:
Her friends were students and political activists. In Life on the Screen [one
of Turkle’s books], she describes a shy, English-speaking Sherry, who, to
her astonishment, is replaced in Paris by a much more assertive and self
confident French-speaking Sherry. This self-transformation was happening
inside language, what she would later learn psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan
calls the construction materials of the mind. And it was language –
slippery, ambiguous, elusive, potent – that would be the construction
materials of the Internet, too. Many years later, this self transformation
growing out of language would illuminate for her how personae can
willfully or unconsciously change from context to context, an idea that
would come to preoccupy her. (McCurdock, 1996)
That personal circumstances influence greatly our academic interests is something
we can relate to, but here McCorduck turned Turkle’s decades of academic research into
a Bildungsroman, thus implicitly downplaying Turkle’s authority. Turkle is not portrayed
as someone who can speak authoritatively about identity, roleplaying and cyberspace
because of her rigorous academic research, but rather because she has had experiences
with negotiating multiple identities. This is the second frame that is employed to talk
about Turkle – and as we shall see, it extends to all women. The two images that
accompany the text of the interview superimpose three different pictures of Turkle’s face,
each fading into the other. Such imagery is meant to convey the idea of multiplicity that
emerges from the article. This is, first of all, attached to Turkle’s own life and
experiences:
She continues thoughtfully: "The goal of healthy personality development
is not to become a One, not to become a unitary core, it's to have a flexible
ability to negotiate the many – cycle through multiple identities." She'd
experienced it in her own life again and again, found it articulated in
80

Lacan's musings, watched it grow out of the data she's gathered in her own
work. Now Turkle proposes it as a thesis for further thinking, future work
– a key to living in our postmodern times. (McCurdock, 1996)
But importantly, this idea of multiplicity is extended to all women and is cast as a
precursor to women’s ability to inhabit cyberspace:
Men's lives, especially, have been socially constructed along unitary lines,
which, she speculates, may be why so many of them are having a hard
time just now. But women today are trained and have already had
experience in negotiating multiple roles. (McCurdock, 1996)
In this key excerpt – with the notable absence of direct quotes from Turkle – the
article casts women as those who are ready to take on the multiplicity of roles required by
cyberspace, because they have been trained (by men? By market imperatives? By gender
inequality?) to do so even offline. It is this training in precarity and identity negotiation
that makes women meaningful for Wired: women matter because they have been trained
to experience cyberspace as a disembodied multiplicity. The permanent inequality and
precarity of women’s lives here becomes a template for fully being able to experience
what cyberspace has to offer. While the inequality that originates multiplicity offline is
experience by tangible, gendered bodies, attempting to juggle multiple roles,
temporalities and spaces, multiplicity in cyberspace is implicitly cast as liberatory and
disembodied. While embodied multiplicity is inevitably tied to the burdens of inequality
that affect women’s life, the disembodied multiplicity of cyberspace is a playful
interchange of roles.
The other cover story selected for this analysis is the only one10 dedicated to a
man of color between 1993 and 1997: John Lee, a New York hacker with the Masters of
Deception hacker “gang”. Lee’s image is accompanied by the following title and subtitle:
10

Another black man appears towards the back of a group picture on the cover of the January 1994 issue.
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“Hacker Showdown: A member of a rival phreaker gang called John Lee a ‘nigger’ – and
in the hacker underground nothing was the same again”. Yes, the only black male body
on the cover of Wired in its first five years of existence is associated with a racial slur,
which is integral part of the cover title. The slur itself appears twice in the text of the
story and once in the subtitle hosted in the internal pages. But to fully appreciate the
discourse surrounding race and cyberspace that emerges from this cover story, let me
briefly sketch the contours of the controversy it retells – known as the Great Hacker War
of 1990-91.
The article is an excerpt from a book by authors Michelle Slatalla and Joshua
Quittner, titled “Masters of Deception: the Gang that ruled Cyberspace”, which came out
in 1995. In the text, the authors chronicled the emergence of two very different rival
hacker groups: Legion of Doom (LOD), based in Texas, and Masters of Deception
(MOD), based in New York City. Both of these groups were prevalently engaged in
phreaking, i.e. tinkering and hacking phones and phone lines. John Lee became a member
of MOD in 1990, under the screen name “Corrupt”. The other crucial hacker figure in
this story is Chris Goggans, a white Texas-based member of LOD, by the nickname “Eric
Bloodaxe”. The two individuals, and their respective groups, gave rise to a set of pranks
and conflicts, which was triggered by the use of racial slurs and that escalated to a
“hacker war”. Although probably unrelated to the conflict between these rival “gangs”,
MOD members were indicted in 1992 on charges of computer intrusion and served time
in federal prisons.
In this Wired article, John Lee of MOD is associated with different discourses
compared to those that are used to describe other hackers, in particular “rival” Chris
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Goggans. When introducing Lee, the article describes him as very capable, but also
dwells on his personal life:
Now, there's plenty that Eli [another member of MOD] doesn't know about
Corrupt. He doesn't know, for instance, that he lives with his mom in a
third-floor walk-up apartment in Bedford-Stuyvesant (that's Bed-Stuy;
you've heard of it as surely as you've heard of Cabrini Green and East LA),
one of New York's toughest neighborhoods. Eli doesn't know that Corrupt
will need no introduction whatsoever to the concept of MOD, because
Corrupt is intimately acquainted with gangs. Out in the real world, out on
the streets where you measure distance with your feet instead of your
modem, Corrupt used to belong to a gang called the Decepticons. (Slatalla
& Quittner, 1994)
Lee’s background features prominently in his portrayal; in addition to the
noteworthy repetition of the racial slur present on the cover, the racist tones of the article
are further reinforced by the framing of this conflict between hackers as a war between
rival gangs and the description of Lee’s prior engagements in a street gang. At the same
time, Goggans is described as business-oriented, a hacker who wants to put his skills to
good use by creating a computer security firm. Although they are engaged in similar
activities, Lee is portrayed as a potential criminal, Goggans as a potential entrepreneur.
This undoubtedly racist framing becomes even more interesting when it unfolds
around the main controversy between Lee and Goggans. The main incident, as Wired
recounted it, happened during a conference call – one of the most popular forms of
phreaking – between LOD members, which was suddenly joined by a member of MOD
(not John Lee). In the authors’ words:
Suddenly, another voice calls in to the conference, joins the group in
midsentence. The unknown newcomer does not have an accent common to
these parts.
"Yo, dis is Dope Fiend from MOD," the newcomer says in distinctly nonwhite, non-middle class, non-Texan inflection.
One of the Texans (who knows who?) takes umbrage.
"Get that nigger off the line!"
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The newcomer is silent.
In fact, the whole conference bridge is suddenly silent, all the chattering
boys brought up hard and cold against the implacable word. You might as
well have slapped their faces. Interminable seconds pass. Who wants to fill
that void?
That's it. As simple as uttering one ugly word. The racial epithet
instantaneously moves northward over hundreds of miles of cable, ringing
in the ear of John Lee, who sits at his Commie 64 in his Brooklyn
bedroom way at the other end of the line. (Slatalla & Quittner, 1994)
This episode then escalated into a conflict between Lee and Goggans, whom Lee
assumed uttered the “racial epithet”. The two engaged in a conflict that ultimately ended
only with the indictment of MOD members. But interestingly, Wired framed the offenses
that these two exchange in a quite different manner. Notice how, in the following, Lee’s
pestering technique – constant phone calls – is cast as a form of harassment towards
Goggans:
Sometimes John uses his street accent to harass Chris [Goggangs]. The
phone calls are constant. It doesn't help to hang up. The receiver is barely
down before the phone rings again. And again. And again. Chris has to
take it off the hook, and leave it off the hook for hours. (...) In Chris's
mind, this type of harassment definitely falls into the category of Behavior
That Is Unacceptable. It's the kind of harassment he could help prevent, in
fact, if he were to open his own computer security firm. (Slatalla &
Quittner, 1994)
Goggans decided to respond to Lee’s “harassment” by creating a racist parody of
MOD’s manifesto “The History of MOD”. As Wired put it, Goggans decided to “pull a
little mischief” (Slatalla & Quittner, 1994) through a program that turned English into
“jive” – a parody of African American vernacular speech:
Chris has an old computer program that will translate any file into a new
"language." When he feeds The History of MOD to the program, out pops
a "jived" version of the document. (...) Using the jive program is the
electronic equivalent of appearing in blackface – a crude, minstrel show in
cyberspace: "Some nigga' name Co'rupt, havin' been real active befo'e,
duzn't gots' some so'kin' computa' anymo'e and so … sheeit, duh." (Slatalla
& Quittner, 1994)
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The fate of the jived version of MOD’s document is to circulate back to Lee. But
notice how Goggans’ racially charged acts against Lee are characterized by Slatalla and
Quittner as “crude, minstrel show in cyberspace” and as “a little mischief”. Lee’s actions
are harassment, Goggans’ are not – they are pranks. This is certainly a racist framing, but
it also points to how Wired looks at the relationship between online and offline,
embodiment and disembodiment. What emerges from this article is that white people also
live offline, while black people only live online. The constant calls that Goggans had to
fend off had an impact on his offline life – and his economic success! – and therefore
they were harassment. But the racist offenses that Goggans threw at Lee were immaterial,
lost in cyberspace, and thus simple pranks that did not result in tangible harm. White
people also matter offline, black people don’t. For Wired, if something happens to people
of color in cyberspace, it remains confined to that disembodied space; it does not have
“real life” repercussions. It is only through their actions in cyberspace that people of
color come to be recognized by Wired, but they are also confined to that disembodied
space, which is thought to not have repercussions on their offline lives. This discourse
further entrenched racism into cyberspace, by establishing that the symbolic violence
perpetrated against people of color is inconsequential and ultimately acceptable. But it
also forecloses spaces of existence and resistance for the racialized others: their offline
lives, struggles, successes do not matter at all; their online lives are meaningful only as
far as they effectively conceal race and the effects of racism.

Selective disembodiment
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White women and people of color have a place in the discourse of the white-male
dominated Wired as long as they are part of cyberspace. It’s Turkle’s expertise on roleplaying and John Lee’s ability to hack that puts them on Wired’s radar. They matter
because they inhabit cyberspace, and specifically because they have learned to use
cyberspace to “lose” their bodily characteristics – to disembody themselves, to become
the default internet user: a white man.
In the 1990s, as we have seen, Wired asserted the centrality of white males to the
future (of technology and society) and to success. Yet, the magazine also constructed
white women and people of color as the subjects that can benefit the most from
cyberspace, precisely because cyberspace allows them to experience disembodiment – to
leave their “different” bodies behind. Because these categories have historically been
considered embodied, they need cyberspace to have access to abstraction and
disembodiment. And it is precisely in this process of disembodiment that they come to
matter for Wired. But once they’ve reached this disembodied state in cyberspace, and
they have been recognized as disembodied subjects, their embodied, offline lives are not
Wired’s concern. All inequalities due to race and gender discrimination simply vanish in
the disembodiment of cyberspace (for a similar argument, see Tal, 1996).
Furthermore, the “builders of computers and telecommunications networks” and
“libertarian pundits and politicians” (Turner, 2006, p. 208) – the white men – in Wired
are significant (also) for their offline achievements and are portrayed as those who can
act in service of cyberspace. In contrast, others matter only for what they do online, for
what they do within a cyberspace that is built and maintained by white men.
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Disembodiment in cyberspace is only needed by and only meaningful for those
who are not white male bodies. White women and people of color are embodied; their
bodies get in the way of their recognition as part of the “Digital Generation”. They need
cyberspace to give them access to disembodiment, and thus make them relevant. White
men do not need disembodiment at all, they are already full-fledged citizens of
cyberspace – they are creating it. The cyberspace built by white men can allow others to
leave their bodies behind and become worthy of attention, but white men do not need
disembodiment to matter.
The discourse constructed by Wired is thus one of selective disembodiment. The
magazine’s discourse of cyberspace is not just a fantasy of white men who can afford to
ignore how race and gender still shape online experiences; it’s also an arrogant projection
that pretends to assign meaning to other people’s experiences of cyberspace. It implies
that disembodiment is what truly counts in minorities’ use of digital technologies. It also
suggests that it’s the endgame: once minorities experience disembodiment online, there is
really no point in addressing the issues they might be facing offline. Once the digital
divide is bridged, other divides don’t matter to Wired.
Looking at the bodies represented in Wired allows us to uncover a vision of
cyberspace that is characterized by a discourse of disembodiment that is applied
differently to different types of bodies, and that is reflective of a white male utopia that is
projected onto the lives of other. Selective disembodiment allows us to see how the
discourse of disembodiment in cyberspace is a phantasy about the overcoming of
difference through the elimination of the need of recognizing different bodies. It is a
dream of universality built on the idea that technology can help everyone experience the
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world as a white male. Disembodiment, as we have seen, is cast as an opportunity for
minorities to be heard and recognized by leaving the diversities of their bodies behind.
They can only matter once they have disembodied themselves into cyberspace, and they
only matter as disembodied entities – finally able to partake in the white male fantasy of
cyberspace.
Selective disembodiment has social and political implications. This false utopia
clearly differentiates – along the most traditional lines – between bodies that matter and
bodies that don’t. Discourses of cyberspace, as Mosco (2004) shows, were never just
about technology, but also about a political and social vision of the future of the United
States and the world. In this case, it’s a vision of politics and society that allows underrepresented minorities to be heard only if they leave behind the diversities of their bodies.
While superficially inclusive – of course, anyone can be part of cyberspace! – this vision
downplays and curtails the agency of non-white, non-male, non-adult bodies.
The dreams of universality of Silicon Valley are thus based on the idea that
technology has the power to overcome the baggage of social divisions based on class,
gender, race, by freeing its users from material and bodily constraints, i.e. by allowing
them to live in the world as white men would. But as I have shown, this view of
disembodiment only helps to reinforce sexist, racist arrangements, while making them
seem more palatable, even progressive and emancipatory. As Barbrook and Cameron
(1996) argued: “this utopian fantasy of the West Coast depends upon its blindness
towards – and dependence on – the social and racial polarization of the society from
which it was born” (p. 62). Selective disembodiment thus allows Silicon Valley to
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conveniently forget about disparities of class, age, gender and race and ignore the role
that technology – in service of neoliberalism – plays in upholding them.

The Zuckerberg manifesto: Facebook as a political technology
With a note published on his personal profile on February 16, 2017, the founder
and CEO of Facebook, Mark Zuckerberg, addressed the Facebook community to discuss
how the company planned to tackle the challenges it encountered in the wake of the 2016
US Presidential Elections. This letter was meant to address the early (i.e. pre-Cambridge
Analytica11) criticism directed at Facebook, mainly concerning the spread of viral
deception (Jamieson, 2017) in the Brexit and 2016 US presidential campaigns. The
lengthy letter began with a very ambitious question: “are we building the world we all
want?” (Zuckerberg, 2017). The letter then made the case for a global community that
can attend to global issues like terrorism, climate change and pandemics, while affirming
Facebook’s role in the formation of this new constituency:
We may not have the power to create the world we want immediately, but
we can all start working on the long term today. In times like these, the
most important thing we at Facebook can do is develop the social
infrastructure to give people the power to build a global community that
works for all of us. (Zuckerberg, 2017)
Zuckerberg positioned Facebook as uniquely suited to (help) create a global
community that is supportive, safe, informed, civically-engaged and inclusive (for a
critique of his use of community, see Boellstorff, 2017). Each of these characteristics can
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We might be tempted to dismiss the relevance of Zuckerberg’s 2017 manifesto after the Cambridge
Analytica scandal and the attempts of the US, the EU and the UK to restrict Facebook’s power. However,
the 2017 document is emblematic of a moment in which the ambitions and visions of Facebook were not
yet seen as of concern to lawmakers. It is in this moment of “expansion” that such visions held a lot of
(unchallenged) power.
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be achieved, according to Zuckerberg, with a tweak to Facebook’s designs: tools for Page
administrators, the “Safety Check” feature, AI (a lot of AI), encryption, and so on.
Given the debates over truth, fakeness and journalism in which Zuckerberg’s
letter intervened, it is not surprising that most of the press attention to this statement
focused on the algorithmic solutions that Facebook vowed to implement in the domain of
news sharing (see LaFrance, 2017). But what is most striking about this document
concerns its last two points, dedicated to the issue of building civically-engaged and
inclusive communities. In these paragraphs, Zuckerberg’s letter is a political manifesto.
The part on civically-engaged community begins with the following propositions:
Our society will reflect our collective values only if we engage in the civic
process and participate in self-governance. There are two distinct types of
social infrastructure that must be built:
The first encourages engagement in existing political processes: voting,
engaging with issues and representatives, speaking out, and sometimes
organizing. Only through dramatically greater engagement can we ensure
these political processes reflect our values.
The second is establishing a new process for citizens worldwide to
participate in collective decision-making. Our world is more connected
than ever, and we face global problems that span national boundaries. As
the largest global community, Facebook can explore examples of how
community governance might work at scale. (Zuckerberg, 2017)
The first issue – encouraging people to engage in already existing processes – is
framed in terms of voter turnout, engagement with elected representatives at a national
and local level, and, in passing, protest and mobilization12. Besides claiming that
Facebook put in place the largest voter turnout effort in history, Zuckerberg also cast his

12

Given the importance of Facebook for contemporary mobilizations, the brief comment on protest is odd,
particularly because it talks about protest as something that happens relatively infrequently: “Sometimes
people must speak out and demonstrate for what they believe is right. From Tahrir Square to the Tea Party - our community organizes these demonstrations using our infrastructure for events and groups”
(Zuckerberg, 2017).
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social network site as “giving people a voice” (Zuckerberg, 2017), as the social
infrastructure that can support civic engagement.
However, it is with the discussion of the second issue – worldwide collective
decision-making – that Zuckerberg made the most explicitly political remarks. The
innovation to Facebook that he proposed is a response to the increased complexity of
content takedown procedures and the persistence of hate speech and harassment on the
platform. The solution he envisioned is to “combine creating a large-scale democratic
process to determine standards with AI to help enforce them” (Zuckerberg, 2017), i.e. ask
users to vote on the kind of content limitations they find appropriate for themselves, with
the caveat that “for those who don't make a decision, the default will be whatever the
majority of people in your region selected, like a referendum” (Zuckerberg, 2017). This
mix of personalized settings and majoritarian principles would be subordinated to local
laws when they demand content takedown or filtering. AI would do the magic and
effectively match individual/majority preferences with the content that gets displayed to
individual users’ Timelines.
Here Zuckerberg clearly borrowed the language of democratic politics
(“democratic process”, “referendum”, “collective decision-making”) and depicted
Facebook as a democracy of sorts (while still gesturing towards national laws that might
restrict content beyond the will of the majority of users, and possibly winking at
authoritarian and semi-authoritarian regimes). But he also positioned these developments
in the Facebook interface as a blueprint for a global polity. The key paragraph is the
following:
Overall, it is important that the governance of our community scales with
the complexity and demands of its people. We are committed to always
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doing better, even if that involves building a worldwide voting system to
give you more voice and control. Our hope is that this model provides
examples of how collective decision-making may work in other aspects of
the global community. (Zuckerberg, 2017)
This is an explicit call for political institutions to model themselves after a
website. With this paragraph, the letter distanced itself from a document like Barlow’s
(1996) Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace, introduced above, which asserted
the independence of the Internet from state powers due to the immateriality of
cyberspace. Here Zuckerberg is taking for granted that independence and relying on the
scale of Facebook as the determining factor that can place him outside, above and beyond
the jurisdiction of individual states. Politics can thus only learn from the scale of
Facebook and the solutions it is able to create “with” its users.
In the famous essay Do artifacts have politics? (Winner, 1986), Winner stated
that a technology can be political in two different ways: first, technology can become the
way in which a given community chooses to confront the issues it faces; secondly, that
certain technologies either require or are strongly compatible with particular kinds of
political relationships. Zuckerberg’s manifesto depicts Facebook as a political technology
in both of the ways identified by Winner (1986). On the one hand, Zuckerberg talked
about the many things that Facebook’s algorithms can fix: harassment, sensationalism
and political polarization, low voter turnout and low engagement with elected officials.
He pitched Facebook as the entity that can build the social infrastructure to address these
global challenges (Zuckerberg, 2017). On the other hand, in Zuckerberg’s manifesto
Facebook emerges as a political technology also in the second sense highlighted by
Winner (1986): because of its scale, the social network requires new settings – both
technological and political – which are not only intended to make Facebook work in a
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better way but should also serve as an example for political and institutional
arrangements on a global level. Zuckerberg is very explicit on this point, as can be seen
from the closing line in the key paragraph quoted above: “Our hope is that this model
provides examples of how collective decision-making may work in other aspects of the
global community” (Zuckerberg, 2017). He also wrote:
Building an inclusive global community requires establishing a new
process for citizens worldwide to participate in community governance. I
hope that we can explore examples of how collective decision-making
might work at scale. Facebook is not just technology or media, but a
community of people. (Zuckerberg, 2017)
Indeed, with this manifesto Zuckerberg positioned Facebook as a political
technology, which is intended to both mimic and engender governance processes. Over
and over in the document, Zuckerberg went back to the issue of scale: its scale is taken to
mean that it is doing something incredibly complex and that it is uniquely suited to
address global challenges. Zuckerberg’s assessment of the inability of nation states to
solve the problems of the world is particularly striking:
Today's threats are increasingly global, but the infrastructure to protect us
is not. Problems like terrorism, natural disasters, disease, refugee crises,
and climate change need coordinated responses from a worldwide vantage
point. No nation can solve them alone. A virus in one nation can quickly
spread to others. A conflict in one country can create a refugee crisis
across continents. Pollution in one place can affect the environment around
the world. Humanity's current systems are insufficient to address these
issues. (Zuckerberg, 2017)
Zuckerberg’s document assumes that it is indeed Facebook’s role to address the
global challenges of our time. No nation state can solve the world’s problems, but
Facebook can. In so doing, the document obliterates the role of nation states and other
supranational institutions in addressing crucial social and political issues, some of which
(like online harassment and filter bubbles) Facebook has contributed to create.
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Technocratic ambitions
Zuckerberg’s manifesto is a perfect illustration of the technocratic and populist
elements that characterize the dominant technological imaginary of Silicon Valley.
Zuckerberg is not alone in his portrayal of digital technologies as a substitute for political
decisions or in his invitation to model politics after technology: it has been a constant
refrain of Silicon Valley and techno-enthusiast commentators for (at least) the past
decade. This refrain is the other side of the second tenet of Silicon Valley that I
identified, i.e. technosolutionism; if technology is the arena for the resolution of political
issues, why can’t politics just become more like technology?
To speak of technocratic ambitions might seem out of line. After all, the word
“technocracy” invokes either images of global conspiracies or of the military-industrialcomplex we associate with the Cold War. And yet, we should take seriously the way in
which Silicon Valley has positioned its technologies (or to be more precise, the market
for technologies) as the avenue for the framing of social problems and for the imagining
of their solutions. Langdon Winner’s (1977, 1986) theorizations of technocracy,
technological politics, and sociotechnical orders can help us make sense of the
technocratic ambitions of Silicon Valley. In fact, while Winner took seriously the
question of technocracy, he sought to divorce its notion from the state-based vision that it
is associated with. In Autonomous technology (Winner, 1977), he argued that the
technological imperative can drive decisions even when power is dispersed (p. 261). In
The Whale and the Reactor (1986), he introduced the notion of “sociotechnical order” to
move us away from a state-centric focus. He thought of the development of
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sociotechnical orders not as some kind of conspiracy of the elites, but rather as the
idiosyncratic emergence of technologies that make specific political decisions. For
Winner (1986), sociotechnical orders are unplanned; they are not the product of a master
plan for world domination, but of a patchwork of discrete technological solutions to
problems faced by people and communities. Nevertheless, they are a “technical
constitution of society” and a “way of arranging people and things” (Winner, 1986, p.
47). While not intending to substitute political institutions, they are outside the reach of
democratic politics, chiefly because they influence the kinds of questions that can be
asked about justice, politics, and technology.
Winner (1986) identified five key characteristics of sociotechnical orders: 1)
centralization 2) gigantism 3) hierarchical authority 4) elimination of competing activities
and 5) power over politics. These five aspects are also present in the sociotechnical order
that Facebook, and Silicon Valley in general, aspire to create. First, while Winner (1986)
feared the centralization of technology in the hands of the state, today we can see how
Facebook, but also Google and Amazon, have a great deal of centralized power not only
over the data they collect, but also over the structure of the everyday activities performed
by millions and millions of people, like chatting, moving around and buying things. And
this control is exercised without any form of democratic input by the users of these
services. Second, scale is exactly the justification for Facebook’s overreach that
Zuckerberg puts forward in the manifesto. In explaining what Facebook wants to do to
keep the world safe, he says:
For some of these problems, the Facebook community is in a unique
position to help prevent harm, assist during a crisis, or come together to
rebuild afterwards. This is because of the amount of communication across
our network, our ability to quickly reach people worldwide in an
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emergency, and the vast scale of people's intrinsic goodness aggregated
across our community. (Zuckerberg, 2017)
It is scale that both enables and legitimizes Facebook to act in name of the global
community. But gigantism is not just a feature of Facebook: think about Google’s
mission “to organize the world’s information and make it universally accessible and
useful” (Google, n.d.) or Amazon’s goal to be “Earth’s most customer-centric company,
where customers can find and discover anything they might want to buy online”
(“Working at Amazon,” n.d.). Scale is central to the technocratic ambitions of Silicon
Valley. Third, Winner denounced the authoritarianism that emerged from the need of
managing complex technological systems. While anti-authoritarianism is one of the core
values of Silicon Valley, there is also tremendous inequality, in terms of the racial and
gender discrimination that is prevalent in tech spaces, but also of the digital labor (see
Andrejevic, 2013) that is required of users to make the wheels of the web 2.0 turn as they
should. Recent efforts to organize tech workers also speak to this point. While Silicon
Valley presents itself as an egalitarian and liberating entity, the reality is very different:
there is a disjuncture between the aspirations of the current sociotechnical order – notably
scale and centralization – and the technological imaginary that legitimizes it, with its
promise of ending all hierarchies and of the democratic nature of consumer technologies.
Fourth, Winner (1986) talked about the “tendency of large, centralized, hierarchically
arranged sociotechnical entities to crowd out and eliminate other varieties of human
activity” (Winner, 1986, p. 48). In contemporary tech lingo, this is the network effect: the
more people join a platform, the more valuable it becomes, and the more people want to
join. The network effect is why building alternative platforms can be so difficult, as the
history of failed social network sites, like the Diaspora project (Oremus, 2014), tells us.
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But the discussions about Facebook or Google “killing” traditional media outlets, as well
as centralizing a lot of advertising, should also be thought through Winner’s (1986)
description.
Last, Winner highlights “the various ways that large sociotechnical organizations
exercise power to control the social and political influences that ostensibly control them”
(Winner, 1986, p. 48). It would be hard to dispute the power that Facebook and other
Silicon Valley giants exercise over social and political institutions. Zuckerberg’s
manifesto does not even need to consider states or other social and political institutions –
they don’t matter, if confronted with the scale of Facebook. They can only learn from
what Facebook is trying to accomplish. This erases the role that the state plays in the
development of technology, as highlighted by Barbrook and Cameron (1996) and Mosco
(2004).
As showed by Zuckerberg’s manifesto, the sociotechnical order that Silicon
Valley aspires to build is global and independent from nation states. We are not talking
about declaring the independence of the online from nation states, like Barlow (1996) did
20 years ago: that independence is now taken for granted, both because of the scale of
these technological corporations, but also because of the hold of neoliberalism on our
ideas concerning the markets and the states. It is telling that Barlow’s (1996) declaration
talked about governments, states, borders, industries and sovereignty, while in
Zuckerberg’s manifesto states are defined by what they can’t do. This shows how the
technological imaginary of Silicon Valley has evolved: it has become more explicit in its
technocratic ambitions, possibly because of its increased dominance; while in the 1990s it
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could present itself as a rebellious, insurgent industry, in the 2010s it is an established
dominant market sector, capable of influencing political actors.

Populist justifications
As highlighted above, we might feel discomfort in thinking of Silicon Valley
through the lens of technocracy. However, if the idea of technocracy seems less plausible
today, it is not because technology has become less important, but because the state – at
the center of most political theory, and thus also of the idea of technocracy – has lost a lot
of its discursive importance. Granted, the material power of nation states is still here to
stay. But the neoliberal dogma has sought to undermine the power and the legitimacy of
nation states and political supranational entities (e.g. the European Union), while
elevating the market as the ultimate arena for the resolution of social problems (Touraine,
2001). Neoliberal globalization has challenged the primacy of democratic nation states
both at a material and a discursive level: not just by undermining the decisions that states
need to take, but also by depicting national, democratic politics as the obstacle to
progress, freedom and prosperity (Harvey, 2007).
Such transformation of the standing of the state vis-à-vis the market has taken
place while technologies – and the popular perception of them – were also changing
(Turner 2006). It is not only that technologies have become portable and mundane, their
portrayal and perception has also shifted: if today Facebook can articulate its technocratic
ambitions in such a clear way, it is also because such ambitions are not seen as carriers of
elite domination, but rather of techno-utopian visions of empowerment and
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egalitarianism, against political elites. To be fair, Winner (1986) had already remarked
that a certain optimism about technology would link it to freedom and liberation:
Over many decades technological optimists have been sustained by the
belief that whatever happened to be created in the sphere of
material/instrumental culture would certainly be compatible with freedom,
democracy, and social justice. This amounts to a conviction that all
technology – whatever its size, shape, or complexion – is inherently
liberating (Winner, 1986, p. 50).
But Silicon Valley goes a step beyond, asserting its ability to code its way out of
inequality and discrimination (as highlighted in my discussion of selective
disembodiment), because of its efficiency and global scale, in contrast to the relative
weakness and slowness of nation states. The complex discourse that legitimizes Silicon
Valley is both technocratic, with its belief in letting those who are technically proficient
lead, but also deeply populist in its justifications. As such, it can be embraced by political
actors of the left and the right and it can contribute to legitimizing the power of Silicon
Valley itself.
Scholars have already pointed out the existence of populist elements in the way
that digital technologies are portrayed and popularized. Mosco (2004) called it “an
individualistic populism suffused with elite ideals” (p. 112), which emerged from the
blending of countercultural and New Right libertarian ideals (Turner, 2006). The myth of
the frontier, so central to the early years of the web (Turner, 2006) is itself a populist
dream; Streeter showed how the introduction of the internet in the 1990s came as a
promise of rebellion and redemption to the white collar workers of the knowledge
economy:
It was the people who typed their own memos, reports, term papers, and
journal articles who sensed the importance of the internet first and then
watched the higher-ups struggle to catch up with them. Cyberspace, with
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its romantic hint of a rebellious self image, better captured the sense of
pleasure and open-ended possibility they felt in watching their secret
world trump the staid world of their superiors. (Streeter, 2005, p. 766)
In Zuckerberg’s manifesto, it is the fetish of the community that takes on the role
of populist subject, or rather, as cited above, it is “people’s intrinsic goodness aggregated
across our community” (Zuckerberg, 2017). The Facebook community, which
presumably includes the users, those who build, maintain and control the platform, and
those who profit from it, emerges as the new populist notion of “the people” – clearly
contributing to eroding the boundary between the elite of Silicon Valley and regular
users. The Facebook community, as argued above, is imagined in contrast to nation
states.
Mosco (2004) argued that the celebratory discourses surrounding technology –
what he called myths of cyberspace – concealed an underlying vision of market-driven,
individualized and anti-government politics. He attributed these discourses to American
libertarians à la Newt Gingrich. But I argue that today we can observe how the populist
discourses that legitimize the sociotechnical order of Silicon Valley have travelled way
beyond the American right. In fact, I suggest that they have been incorporated in the
political discourse of very different actors all around the world. Gerbaudo (2015) argued
that new European movement parties, like the Five Star Movement in Italy and Partido X
in Spain, have blended the supposedly democratic aspects of the web 2.0 technologies
they utilize with classic elements of populism:
emerging movements and parties in the popular wave utilise these social
media features as means to appeal to a heterogeneous mass of Internet
users and to address the ideal subject of the ‘generic Internet user’ in
opposition to economic and political elites. The product of this adaptation
is the rise of an interactive and participatory populism: a populism 2.0.
(Gerbaudo, 2015, p. 68)
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Similarly, Natale and Ballatore (2014) argued that the Italian Five Star Movement
has inserted “elements of digital utopia and web-centric discourses (…) into the
movement’s political message” (p. 105) and that “the construction of the web as a myth
has shaped the movement’s discourse and political practice” (p.105).
The populist tendencies of the dominant technological imaginary of Silicon
Valley thus not only legitimize its technocratic ambitions, but also provide legitimacy to
the political projects of different actors around the world. The populist justifications of
the dominant technological imaginary make it more difficult to question the power of
Silicon Valley: how could one even think of criticizing an industry that supports freedom
and democracy?

The politics of Silicon Valley: technocracy meets populism
The Zuckerberg manifesto makes explicit the meeting of technocratic ambitions
and populist justifications that fuels the dominant technological imaginary. On the one
hand, it is the belief that digital technologies are thought to be inherently free, democratic
and supportive of personal autonomy that is the key source of the populist justifications
that we have seen in the Zuckerberg manifesto. This aspect of Silicon Valley’s
technological imaginary is what sustains Zuckerberg’s use of the language of democratic
politics that I highlighted above, the way he speaks about Facebook as a community and
freely uses terms like “democratic process”, “referendum”, “collective decision-making”.
On the other hand, Zuckerberg’s manifesto also illustrates the blend of technosolutionism
and neoliberalism that characterizes the dominant technological imaginary; the open
letter shows how these ideas support Facebook’s technocratic ambitions of solving the
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world’s problems by either supplanting nation states or pushing governance bodies to
adopt Facebook’s mechanisms.
To summarize, the dominant technological imaginary of Silicon Valley is at the
same time technocratic and populist. It is technocratic because it sketches out the
contours of a global sociotechnical order that goes beyond states and governance bodies;
an order defined by the dominance of key technological players in an “open” market that
is the locus for the resolution of social problems. It is populist because it builds on the
anti-elite ethos of the Californian Ideology and provides a new definition of “the people”,
solely predicated on the access and use of digital technologies.
By examining its technocratic and populist tendencies, we can better point out
how this technological imaginary is political: it promotes specific visions of the
relationship between the market, the state, and society. And it is also far from being as
universal as it claims to be. While it envisions a global sociotechnical order, it builds that
order by affirming a set of ideas that worked in a specific place – Silicon Valley.
Deconstructing the biases of this technological imaginary is thus necessary in order to
question its power, especially when, as I have argued before, it is being taken up by
different political actors beyond the United States.

Conclusion: the limits of the dominant technological imaginary
In this chapter I have sketched out the main components of the current dominant
technological imaginary, which has been constructed and popularized by Silicon Valley
actors since the 1990s. In particular, I have highlighted the centrality of three key tenets:
the equation of digital technologies with freedom, democracy, and personal autonomy;
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the tendency towards technosolutionism; the connection to neoliberalism. I have argued
that, despite its dreams of universality, this imaginary is deeply American: it builds on the
longstanding fascination with technology in American history. But it is also deeply
American in the sense that what it promotes is grounded in the assumptions that
characterize a precise moment of American history – the 1990s of Silicon Valley, with
their convergence of right-wing libertarianism and countercultural sensibilities (see
Turner, 2006). I also suggested that it is crucial to pinpoint precisely all the ways in
which Silicon Valley’s technological imaginary is specific, bounded, and biased, because
it offers a path for deconstructing its universalist assumptions – and its power. I then
offered two illustrations that allow us to poke holes in the universalism of Silicon Valley.
First, I turned to the 1990s to investigate the origins of the dominant technological
imaginary in Wired magazine. I argued that Wired put forth a discourse that celebrated
digital technologies for their ability to do away with gender and race distinctions, by
allowing people to experience the world as the default white man. I called this discourse
“selective disembodiment”. I suggested that this inability to envision gender and racial
diversity has carried over in the dominant technological imaginary. This imaginary sees
itself as universal, but it is merely the projection of the experience of American white
man onto everybody else. Second, through an analysis of Mark Zuckerberg’s 2017
“Building Global Community” letter, I showed how this imaginary has its own politics, a
blend of technocratic ambitions and populist justifications.
This chapter makes it clear what is at stake when we are examining technological
imaginaries, especially the dominant ones: imaginaries are not just visions about specific
technologies, but about the kinds of social, political and economic relations that such
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technologies support and encourage. It is thus important to critically interrogate the
biases of the dominant technological imaginary of Silicon Valley given its dreams of
universality. It is particularly crucial to also deconstruct how the imaginary of Silicon
Valley has travelled around the world and has been incorporated in the political visions of
different political actors.

Over the past two years, Silicon Valley has come under increased scrutiny,
following the Facebook-Cambridge Analytica scandal (Cadwalladr & Graham-Harrison,
2018; Granville, 2019; Lapowsky, 2019). Facebook itself was the object of a
Congressional hearing in the United States (“Mark Zuckerberg testimony: Senators
question Facebook’s commitment to privacy,” 2018), while the European Union has used
both its new General Data Protection Regulation and antitrust norms to challenge the
business model of Silicon Valley’s giants, such as Facebook and Google (Scott, Cerulus,
& Overly, 2019; Scott, Van Dorpe, & Larger, 2018; “Why big tech should fear Europe,”
2019). Candidates to the 2020 U.S. Presidential elections are advancing plans to “break
up big tech” (Giles, 2019; Roose, 2019). Is this the beginning of the end of the dominant
technological imaginary of Silicon Valley? Maybe.
It might be the beginning of Facebook’s downfall, but this does not necessary
mean it is the end of the current dominant technological imaginary. While Silicon Valley
might be losing its power to shield itself from regulatory intervention, I argue that the key
tenets of its technological imaginary remain largely unchallenged. It is hard to regulate a
technological imaginary. Policy makers can impose limits on the market share enjoyed by
Silicon Valley companies, they can limit the amount of data that platforms can acquire,
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share, and sell; but they cannot really stop companies from proclaiming their platforms to
be bringing democracy and freedom. Who would want to do that? The dominant
technological imaginary is not about the specific technologies, it is about the relation of
those technologies to fundamental political processes. While the post-2016 U.S.
Presidential elections preoccupation with viral deception (Jamieson, 2017) was concerned
with the political leaning of digital media – did they intentionally favor Donald Trump?
Are they more of the same “liberal media”? –, this chapter shows that we should still be
concerned with the political biases of Silicon Valley. But these are biases that hit at a
fundamental level of politics and go beyond party affiliation.
To assess the “health” of the dominant technological imaginary of Silicon Valley,
we need not look further then to Mark Zuckerberg. With Facebook’s dominance being
openly contested and subject to regulatory pressures, Zuckerberg released another open
letter in March 2019 (Zuckerberg, 2019). While its tone is definitely less celebratory than
the document I analyzed in detail in this chapter, it nevertheless proposes to solve
people’s growing lack of confidence in Facebook through a technological fix: encryption.
The letter is all about reinforcing how encryption works and shifting the perception of
Facebook from a “public social network”, like Zuckerberg (2019) calls it, to the
facilitator of private conversations through Messenger and Whatsapp. But the idea that
Facebook can fix its shortcomings through a technological solution is itself a key idea of
the dominant technological imaginary. If the imaginary still offers a way out of the
troubles that Facebook encountered, we might need to wait to declare its downfall.
The rest of this dissertation further shows how the technological imaginary of
Silicon Valley, as well as its technologies, are still crucial to the mobilization of social
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movements around the world. As the next three chapters will demonstrate, the strongly
criticized Facebook is still a crucial avenue for activists to organize and communicate.
While Silicon Valley might have come under increased scrutiny, the power of its
technological imaginary and of its technologies is still very real.
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Chapter 2 – Appropriation: the symbolic power of mundane modernity in the
Hungarian internet tax protests
Introduction
In October 2014, the Hungarian government announced the introduction of an
“internet tax” that would apply to internet consumption on both mobile and landlines.13
This proposal was met with protests in the streets of Budapest – the largest mobilization
against the right-wing Fidesz government since its election in 2010, and (at the time) the
biggest demonstration in Hungary since 1989. Confronted with the size of the protest, the
Prime Minister, Viktor Orbán, decided to set aside the proposed legislation, which has
not been reintroduced since. This chapter examines the internet tax protests and their
lasting impact on Hungarian social movements by analyzing the technological imaginary
that was deployed during the protests.
As explained in the Introduction, this chapter is based on in-depth semi-structured
interviews with 9 key organizers of the Hungarian internet tax protests (7 men, 2
women). The interviews were conducted in person or via Skype in January and February
2017; the interviewees talked in English and their quotes were not edited for grammar or
syntax. In the last section of the chapter, I rely on interviews conducted with activists
from LUMe and the Philly Socialists, who were asked to reflect on the iconic protest
action – protesters lifting illuminated smartphones to the sky – that was used in the 2014
Umbrella Movement in Hong Kong, as well as in the Hungarian internet tax protests.

13

This chapter revises and expands my published work on the Hungarian internet tax protests (Ferrari,
2018b, 2019).
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The chapter theorizes the technological imaginary deployed in the Hungarian
internet tax protests as “mundane modernity”: an imaginary that grounds longstanding
tropes of Western modernity in the everyday practices of internet use. Interviewees, in
fact, associated the internet with equality and development, the future, and rationality; in
so doing, they reproduced discourses about the role of technology in Western modernity.
However, they also insisted on the mundanity of the internet – its importance for
everyday life. This technological imaginary is one of appropriation, in that mundane
modernity embraces both the technologies of Silicon Valley and its dominant
technological imaginary. This imaginary reinterprets the pillars of Silicon Valley’s
imaginary, by equating the internet with freedom (both political freedom and market
freedom) and with Western democracy. More than a simple repetition, mundane
modernity appropriates Silicon Valley’s imaginary to make it resonant in a postcommunist context, in which ideas of Western modernity, democracy, and freedom are
contentious. This imaginary of appropriation is, in fact, shaped by the Hungarian political
context and the revamping of the modernity-tradition cleavage under Orbán. But
mundane modernity is also shaped by an opposition to the technological imaginary of
Orbán’s political project – “illiberal democracy” (2014).
In the chapter I first describe the controversial internet tax proposal announced by
the Hungarian government in October 2014 and the three large Budapest-based protests
that opposed the tax. I then contextualize the internet tax within the Hungarian “illiberal
turn” (Kornai, 2015; Pap, 2018), the deterioration of civil liberties and the rule of law
progressively enacted by the right-wing governments of Viktor Orbán since 2010. I
describe the internet tax protests as an unusually successful example of the left-liberal
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urban social movements that have been contesting Orbán’s policies for the past ten years.
Furthermore, I provide some detail on the organization of the protests and explain how
the activists made sense of their success. I then provide my own explanation of this
success: that the internet tax protests were able to draw on a powerful technological
imaginary that turned dissatisfaction with the tax into a general contestation of the Orbán
government. In theorizing the technological imaginary of the internet tax protests, I
highlight how interviewees associated the internet with equality and development, the
future, and rationality, but also with mundanity, giving rise to an imaginary that I term
“mundane modernity”. This imaginary brings together the political aspirations of
Western modernity with the mundanity of internet practices. I also describe the fusion of
market freedom and political freedom that supports the imaginary of mundane modernity
and make the case for its relevance in a post-communist context. I then theorize mundane
modernity as an imaginary of appropriation, since it endorses the dominant technological
imaginary of Silicon Valley and its technologies. In this case, appropriation is shaped by
the Hungarian political context – chiefly the salience of the modernity vs. tradition
political cleavage – and by the protesters’ opposition to the technological imaginary of
“illiberal democracy”, which is represented by the tax.
In the last part of the chapter, I examine how the imaginary of mundane
modernity was performed during the protests: both with the iconic action of raising
smartphones to the sky and with the trashing of the Fidesz party headquarters with
obsolete electronic devices. The first action, with the smartphones, which was borrowed
from Hong Kong’s Umbrella Movement, was subsequently performed by other
movements, in Hungary and other Central Eastern European countries, even when
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protests did not have anything to do with the internet. The diffusion of this action clearly
points to how meaningful the imaginary of mundane modernity can be, at least in Central
Eastern Europe. In closing, however, I highlight the limits of mundane modernity by
discussing the iconic image of the protesters lifting their smartphones with activists from
LUMe and the Philly Socialists. Most of the Italian and American activists did not even
remember that image; they also rejected the idea that smartphones could be used as
political symbols. This further underscores the limits of mundane modernity as a
mobilizing imaginary and the necessity to study the meaning of technological imaginaries
within the political contexts in which they are deployed.

The Hungarian internet tax protests
In October 2014, the Orbán government clumsily announced that they were
contemplating a tax on internet usage on both mobile phones and landlines. This “internet
tax” would have applied to all internet consumption after a first untaxed gigabyte, with a
levy of 150 Hungarian forints (about $0.50) for each additional GB. As a first response
to the tax, a Facebook page was created: Százezren az internetadó ellen, literally
“100,000 against the Internet tax”, which became the informal organizing hub for the
demonstrations14. On October 26, 10,000 people marched in the center of Budapest
(“Hungary: Internet tax angers protesters,” 2014). The government responded by
announcing that the tax would be limited to a monthly cap of 700 forints ($2.40) for
individual users (Feher, 2014b).

14

As of June 2019, the page is still being used and has collected 198,422 likes.
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Unsatisfied by the government’s amendments, activists organized a second
demonstration for October 28, which gathered an estimated 100,000 protesters. It was the
largest protest since Hungary’s transition to democracy in 198915, and thus also the
biggest demonstration against Orbán’s government (Dunai, 2014). In stark contrast with
previous anti-government protests, that were predominantly concentrated in the capital,
Budapest, demonstrations against the internet tax also happened in smaller towns, such as
Pécs, Miskolc and Veszprem on October 26th (Feher, 2014a), and Debrecen, Györ, Pécs,
Szeged and Nyíregyháza on October 28th (“Bürgerbewegung oder Putschversuch? Die
Internetsteuer bringt Ungarn auf Trab,” 2014). These protests were not coordinated by
Budapest-based activists, but rather emerged spontaneously in the different towns. The
mobilization of the Hungarian countryside, usually considered the electoral stronghold of
Fidesz, undoubtedly contributed to making the internet tax a highly contentious issue for
the government.
The protests received a lot of domestic and international media coverage. While
the domestic coverage in pro-government media was predictably skewed against the
protests, the fact that the demonstrations were covered at all actually helped the activists
to break out of the left-liberal circles, as they explained in the interviews. The
international media coverage sought, on the one hand, to contextualize the protests within
Hungary’s authoritarian trajectory (Baker, 2014; Eder, 2014; Lyman, 2014a); on the other
hand, it tried to frame the protests as about “internet freedom”, likely because of the

15

The size of the October 28 demonstration was surpassed on April 12, 2017, with one of the
demonstrations organized against the ad-hoc law against Central European University and the anti-NGO
legislation, as recognized by the Twitter account representing the internet tax protests: “Largest protest in
Hungarian history – time to go mr orban #ceu” (NoNetTax_HU, 2017).
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struggle over net neutrality that was simultaneously unfolding in the United States and in
the European Union (Franceschi-Bicchierai, 2014).
The proposed internet tax was met with criticism by the European authorities.
Neelie Kroes, who at the time was serving as European Commissioner for Digital
Agenda, harshly criticized the tax on October 22nd, by tweeting: “Proposed internet tax in
#Hungary is a shame: a shame for users and a shame on the Hungarian government. I do
not support!” (Kroes, 2014). Kroes’ spokeperson, Ryan Heath, delivered an even stronger
statement on behalf of the Commission on October 28th, openly siding with the ongoing
protests (“Commission slams Hungary’s ‘internet tax,’” 2014). Heath said that Kroes
supported the protests against the tax and “was determined not to allow the tax to become
a precedent in Hungary, because it could become a problem for Europe’s wider economic
growth” (“Commission slams Hungary’s ‘internet tax,’” 2014). He also contextualized
the tax within the other measures introduced by the Orbán governments:
if you take it in the domestic Hungary context, it’s the latest of what a lot
of people would see as troubling actions. It’s part of a pattern and has to be
seen as part of that pattern of actions which have limited freedom or
sought to take rents without achieving a wider economic or social interest
(“Commission slams Hungary’s ‘internet tax,’” 2014).
The harshness of the EU Commission’s declarations should not surprise us, given
the long string of confrontations between the EU institutions and the Orbán government;
however, since the conflict with EU institutions has often been welcomed by Orbán, who
has sought to position himself as a defender of the Hungarian nation against foreign
intervention, we might question whether such a strong condemnation by the EU would
even have an effect on Orbán.
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While activists were getting ready to hold a third demonstration, on October 31st,
Orbán said in a radio interview that the tax proposal had been misunderstood by the
population and that it would not be introduced in its current form (“Hungary internet tax
cancelled after mass protests,” 2014). Orbán’s speech was somewhat puzzling: he said
that the tax proposal had been misunderstood by the population and that it would not be
introduced in its current form; yet, he also added that his government would not go
against the will of the people because they are “not communist”, appealing to his longstanding critique of the pre-1989 regime to cast his decision in a more positive light
(“Hungary internet tax cancelled after mass protests,” 2014). The organizers of the
protests saw this as an unequivocal victory against the government and celebrated it with
a third demonstration (Lyman, 2014b). The demonstration was supposed to be a
celebratory event, with music and speeches, in Kossuth Square, next to the Parliament
building. This celebration drew a much smaller crowd, of about 5000 people, but marked
an important moment – one of the few victories of Hungarian social justice activists
against the government of Viktor Orbán. After the protests of 2014 and Orbán’s radio
address, there have been no further attempts by the Hungarian government to tax internet
usage16.
Before the government backed out of the internet tax, the protests had begun to
move beyond the initial demand to not have the Internet taxed (see also Gagyi, 2014). As
a participant to the protests noted, slogans changed from “Free country! Free Internet!” to
“Orbán piss off! We want democracy! Europe, Europe! Russians go home! Filthy Fidesz,
corrupt Fidesz!” (Observer, personal communication). Opposition movements that had

16

The idea of taxing the internet, however, was taken up by different governments in the African
continent, such as Guinea and Benin, as described by Bergère (2019).
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been organizing – mostly unsuccessfully – for years, found in the internet tax an issue
they could use to gather support around a broader platform of opposition to the Orbán
government. It seemed paradoxical that the threat of a few dollars per month in extra
taxes would lead Hungarians to protest so massively against the government, while the
same government had already changed the Constitution (Human Rights Watch, 2013) and
curtailed the freedom of the media (Brouillette, 2012). The starting point of this chapter is
thus the puzzling success of the protests: what was so special about the internet tax that
could lead so many Hungarians to the streets?

Hungary’s illiberal turn
The last decade of Hungarian politics has been marked by the rise to power of
Prime Minister Viktor Orbán and his right-wing Fidesz party. Orbán was elected Prime
Minister in 2010 and then re-elected in 2014 and 2018. During his terms as Prime
Minister, due to the strong majorities enjoyed by Fidesz in the Parliament, he has pushed
forward a conservative agenda that he later described as “illiberal democracy” (Orbán,
2014). Orbán first explicitly deployed the label of “illiberal democracy” in a 2014 speech,
where he argued that his recent electoral success gave him a mandate to “break with
liberal principles and methods of social organization, and in general with the liberal
understanding of society” (Orbán, 2014). He continued:
a democracy does not necessarily have to be liberal. Just because a state
is not liberal, it can still be a democracy. And in fact we also had to and
did state that societies that are built on the state organization principle
of liberal democracy will probably be incapable of maintaining their
global competitiveness in the upcoming decades and will instead
probably be scaled down unless they are capable of changing
themselves significantly (Orbán, 2014).
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Orbán thus stated that liberal democracies are bound to fail over the next few
decades, while Hungary, having chosen to become an illiberal state, will regain
competitiveness on the world stage. Orbán also claimed that the reorganization of the
Hungarian state should be constructed around the idea of “national community”, which in
his view is, of course, an ethnonational community of Christian Magyars:
In other words, the Hungarian nation is not simply a group of
individuals but a community that must be organized, reinforced and in
fact constructed. And so in this sense the new state that we are
constructing in Hungary is an illiberal state, a nonliberal state. It does
not reject the fundamental principles of liberalism such as freedom, and
I could list a few more, but it does not make this ideology the central
element of state organization, but instead includes a different, special,
national approach (Orbán, 2014).

Talking about a “different, special, national approach” is for Orbán a way of
claiming a Hungarian specificity that can be deployed to resist the liberal principles (and
regulations) of the European Union.
This illiberal project relied on amending the Fundamental Law (i.e. the Hungarian
Constitution) to tilt the balance of powers in favor of the executive branch and weaken
the power and independence of the court system (Bozoki, 2015; Human Rights Watch,
2013), enacting sweeping changes to media policy that undermined independent media
(Brouillette, 2012; Pap, 2018, pp. 22–23), and increasing taxes while cutting budgets
related to healthcare, education, and pensions (Bozoki, 2015). The Fidesz government
also changed the electoral system in a way that provided an advantage to the party (Pap,
2018, pp. 24–25), leading some to call Hungarian elections “free and unfair” (Bozoki,
2015). In addition to the Media Laws, Orbán also relied on allied businessmen to
consolidate the market share of pro-government media in the country (Bienvenu, 2016;
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Dragomir, 2019; Fabók, Pethő, & Szabó, 2017; Kingsley, 2018). Further, Orbán has used
a rhetoric that creates “enemies” of the Hungarian nation on whom any shortcoming of
the government can be blamed (Csaky, 2017; Gőbl, 2018; Walker, 2018). These
scapegoats include the European Union, refugees, “liberal” NGOs, and any actor that can
be connected, directly or indirectly, to Hungarian-American billionaire George Soros,
including Central European University (Eotvos Karoly Policy Institute, Hungarian
Helsinki Committee, Hungarian Civil Liberties Union, & Mérték Media Monitor, 2014).
These sweeping changes were made possible by the fact that Fidesz (and its ally,
the KDNP, the Christian Democratic People's Party) won a majority of over 66% of
Parliamentary seats in the 2010 elections, giving Orbán the supermajority needed to alter
the Constitution. Since 2010, the three Fidesz governments, which have all enjoyed
parliamentary supermajorities, have amended the Constitution five times. The
constitutional changes have been the object of scrutiny and controversy between the
Hungarian government and the European institutions. However, as Pap (2018) argued,
the way in which Fidesz built the new constitutional regime, i.e. by mixing and matching
elements from different European constitutions, has made it difficult to discover “the
destructive features of the regime, let alone being able to raise specific, reasoned
criticism” (p. 4); while taken individually, each of the elements have a place in a liberal
order, their assemblage in what Scheppele (2013) called a “Frankenstate” threatens
individual freedom and the rule of law. Pap (2018) also defined the illiberal turn as
"defying rule of law principles, dismantling core institutional guarantees for government
control and adopting an ideologically biased constitution that cements these
developments"(p. 5). Wilkin (2018) similarly argued that the aim of the new
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constitutional regime created by Fidesz was that of creating “a permanent bias in support
of Fidesz so that if they were to lose an election their appointees would still be in
positions of power over whatever actions alternative governments might take” (p. 23). In
this “democratic backsliding”, the membership of Hungary in the European Union
contributes to both constraining and stabilizing the new illiberal state (Wilkin, 2018),
given that the country is still a net receiver of EU funds (European Union, n.d.).
The illiberal turn did not stop after the momentary defeat of the government on
the internet tax. If anything, over the past five years, Orbán’s illiberal democracy has
become a model for other right-wing and populist forces in the Central-Eastern European
region and in the rest of the world (Buzogány & Varga, 2018; Pappas, 2014). Since 2014,
the Orbán governments have continued to attack the media (Bienvenu, 2016) and civil
society (Dunai & Koranyi, 2014). In 2017, new legislation targeted Hungarian NGOs by
instituting more cumbersome reporting procedures and by requiring the disclosure of
foreign donations (Rankin, 2017). It has waged a prolonged battle with an unusual
enemy, Central European University (CEU), the American-Hungarian university based in
Budapest and founded by billionaire George Soros, forcing the institution out of the
country (Mudde, 2017; “Walled worlds: ‘Illiberal Democracy’ and the CEU Affair,”
2019). Both the legislation against CEU and against NGOs should be understood as
targeting Soros, who has been construed by the Hungarian government as a (negative)
symbol of (anti-Hungarian) cosmopolitanism. In 2018, the newly re-elected government
approved a controversial labor reform, dubbed “slave law” by its opponents, which
amended the labor code to allow companies to demand more overtime work hours from
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their employees and to delay the payment for said overtime (Graham-Harrison, 2019;
“Hungary president signs controversial ‘slave law,’” 2018; Karasz & Kingsley, 2018).
But the event that brought “illiberal democracy” to the attention of the world was
the refugee crisis of the mid 2010s, when the Hungarian government showed its
xenophobic tendencies in an even clearer way (Scheppele, 2015). Although brewing for
quite some time (Dessewffy & Nagy, 2016), the issue of migration came to prominence
in Hungary in the fall of 2015, when hundreds of thousands of refugees attempted to
enter the European Union through Hungary; while many ended up in camps across the
country, thousands were stranded in Budapest, around Keleti train station, where they
were denied access to the trains directed to Western Europe (Kallius, Monterescu, &
Rajaram, 2016). The violent rhetoric deployed against migrants constructed a nonChristian Other that threatened the Hungarian nation; at the same time, this rhetoric also
targeted the Roma and the homeless population (Kallius et al., 2016). Hungary opposed
the EU relocation scheme, the so called “migrant quotas”, which aimed to more fairly
distribute refugees among member states. In 2016, the government called for a farcical
national referendum on the “migrant quota”. The question of the referendum was worded
in a leading way: “Do you want the European Union to be entitled to prescribe the
mandatory settlement of non-Hungarian citizens in Hungary without the consent of the
National Assembly?” (Pállinger, 2019). The referendum ultimately did not reach its
necessary quorum and was declared invalid. However, the government has continued to
campaign on the issue of migration; in particular, it used a national consultation to ask
voters about an alleged “Soros plan” to encourage immigration towards Hungary and
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passed a “Stop Soros” bill, which criminalized a good deal of migration-related work or
volunteering (Zerofsky, 2019), while simultaneously attacking George Soros.
The internet tax itself should thus be contextualized in the larger turn towards
illiberal democracy that is at the heart of Fidesz’s politics. In this context of extremely
grave and repressive political decisions taken by the Fidesz government, an internet tax
of a few hundred forints seems like a trivial concern. And yet, it is around this topic that
one of the largest demonstrations in Hungarian history happened, and turned into a
general contestation of Fidesz. I suggest that this success has to do with the deployment
of a specific technological imaginary, which helped coalesce people’s dissatisfaction with
the government around a symbolic upholding of Western modernity.

Activists mobilize against illiberal democracy
The dominance of Fidesz in the post-2010 Hungarian political landscape is
heightened by the immense difficulties and popular delegitimation of the left-liberal
opposition parties, such as the Hungarian Socialist Party (Magyar Szocialista Párt or
MSZP) and the green-liberals of LMP (Lehet Más a Politika [Politics can be different]).
While an analysis of the shortcomings of the Hungarian opposition parties is beyond the
scope of this chapter, it is useful to point out that their lack of popular legitimacy has
opened the door for activist groups and various types of associations, including NGOs, to
play a crucial role in opposing Fidesz17. At the same time, the unreliability of the
opposition parties has also left social movements without institutional allies.

17

My research is concerned with anti-Fidesz mobilizations on the left, but the emergence of right wing
protest movements in Hungary is an important phenomenon, addressed for instance by Kaposi and Mátay
(2008). The biggest competitor for Fidesz has undoubtedly been Jobbik (Jobbik Magyarországért
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The internet tax protests should be examined within the broader civil society
opposition to the Fidesz government after it came to power in the 2010 elections. By the
time the internet tax was proposed, Hungary had seen the emergence of several protests,
largely concentrated in the capital, which were the expression of leftist and liberal
concerns surrounding the right-wing politics of Fidesz (for a general introduction, see
Glied, 2014; Jensen, 2015).
The two most successful social movements to emerge between 2012 and 2014
were One Million for the Freedom of the Press in Hungary (better known as Milla) and
Hallgatói Hálózat or HaHa (i.e. “student network”). They sponsored demonstrations that
criticized the Orbán government for its curtailing of media freedom and fundamental
rights, and for its educational reforms, respectively. Like the internet tax protests, Milla
also started as a Facebook-based mobilization and its use of digital media has been
crucial for creating new spaces of protest (Wilkin, Dencik, & Bognár, 2015); while it
focused on the issue of press freedom, it aimed to mobilize civil society against the
general illiberal direction in which Fidesz had begun to lead the country. The HaHa
student movement protested against the austerity cuts to public university funding, but its
contestation also became a critique of the Hungarian political system, which they
believed should be changed from the bottom-up (Zontea, 2015). Milla and HaHa are part
of the Hungarian civil society based, leftist-liberal opposition that is critical of the Fidesz
government, the far-right Jobbik party, but also of the opposition parties in Parliament,
notably the socialist MSZP18. While these movements, and a myriad other smaller

Mozgalom [Movement for a better Hungary]), a far-right, nationalist and Euroskeptic party (Karl, 2017;
Pirro & Róna, 2018).
18 Milla revised its stance on party politics when it joined the Együtt 2014 party coalition to compete in the
2014 general elections.
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protests, contested the Fidesz government, they never posed a significant challenge to its
dominance, as attested by the 45% of the national vote that the party gathered in the 2014
elections. Both Milla and HaHa are important points of reference for the internet tax
protests, whose organizers were all at least marginally involved in one or both
movements. The internet tax protests, however, were larger than the any of the protest
actions ever organized by either Milla or HaHa.
Anti- Orbán protests continued after the success of the internet tax protests. The
refugee crisis of 2015 brought new activist groups to the fore, such as Migszol (Kallius et
al., 2016) and Migration Aid (Dessewffy & Nagy, 2016; Kallius et al., 2016). The
government’s anti-migration propaganda was also the object of the culture jamming of
the Hungarian Two Tailed Dog Party (Magyar Kétfarkú Kutya Párt or MKKP), a “fake
party” (Ferrari, 2018a; Glied, 2014); while at the beginning, a decade ago, the party was
nothing more than an intricate joke aimed at satirizing politicians, with the deterioration
of the Hungarian situation it evolved into an oppositional group that fiercely criticizes
Orbán. During the refugee crisis of 2015, the Hungarian government put out billboards
throughout the country, which addressed migrants in Hungarian, warning them that they
should respect the Hungarian way of life (Sarhaddi Nelson, 2018). The Two-Tailed Dog
Party responded by crowdfunding a counter campaign, which produced billboards
designed exactly to look like government’s billboards, but making fun of the government.
The following year, when the Hungarian government promoted the aforementioned
“migrant quota” referendum and once again resorted to a national billboard campaign to
encourage voters to oppose the quotas, the MKKP reused the same culture jamming tactic
to invite Hungarians to invalidate their referendum ballots. Education also remained a
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controversial topic: starting in 2016 the Tanítanék (“I would teach) Movement brought
teachers and students to the streets to ask the government to reform the education system
(Pósfai, 2017; “Tanítanék demonstrators demand new minister, education portfolio,”
2017).
However, it was in 2017 that Hungary saw demonstrations as big as or bigger
than the internet tax protests of 2014. The protests were catalyzed by the simultaneous
introduction of legislation targeting NGOs and Central European University, as explained
above (Dunai, 2017a, 2017b; Gorondi, 2017; “Hungarians protest at government moves
to restrict NGOs,” 2017). These protests, which continued for weeks, saw the
mobilization of similar constituencies to those that participated in the internet tax
protests; some of the activists who were involved in the organization of the internet tax
protests also played a crucial role in the 2017 protests. In 2018, large protests broke out in
Budapest after the re-election of Viktor Orbán (Bienvenu & Santora, 2018; Roache,
2018). Later in the year, the introduction of the labor code reform recalled above, which
the opposition renamed “slave law”, gave rise to a prolonged contestation of the
government, which brought together left-liberal activists, opposition parties and trade
unions (Graham-Harrison, 2019; Karasz & Kingsley, 2018; Vadai, 2018). Despite the
continued mobilization of this activist opposition to Orbán, Fidesz was able to attract
more than 51% of the votes in the European Elections of 2019.

The organization of the protests
The first protest against the internet tax, which took place on October 26th, was
organized in less than a week. As mentioned, the initial organizing impetus was provided
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by the Facebook page “100,000 against the Internet tax” and the Facebook event it
created to invite Hungarians to take part in a demonstration against the tax. Both the page
and the event rapidly received a lot of social media attention and gathered likes and event
“attendees”. This unexpected high volume of attention led the creator of the Facebook
page and event to reach out to other activists of the Budapest civil society scene19. While
the creator of the page was very proficient in managing Facebook content, the other
activists had indispensable organizational and planning skills, an extensive network of
contacts and experience in organizing demonstrations. This allowed the freshly formed
group of activists – who knew each other (or at least knew of each other), due to the small
size of the activist scene in Budapest, where everyone seems to know everyone – to
mobilize rapidly and secure the necessary permits and equipment (e.g. amplification) for
the demonstration. These field preparations included negotiating with the police and
organizing field marshals to guarantee the security of the demonstrators. The organizers
jumped into planning mode without knowing what to expect, as Peter recalled:
we didn't have any plans, any strategic goals with what to do with this.
So we didn't have any lineup, okay, speakers, or any other kind of
performance. We had nothing. The only thing we had was a Facebook
page with an enormous amount of people attending. So that's where we
started (Peter).
The second demonstration, held on October 28th, was also organized quickly;
however, this time, the organizers had a better idea of what the demonstration would look
like. They also had more resources available, since they were able to raise funds both
online and during the first demonstration.

19

Due to the difficult situation of NGOs and civil society actors in the current Hungarian political context,
as added precaution I do not identify any of the organizations whose members were involved in organizing
the internet tax protests.
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While the external communication about the demonstration happened largely
through Facebook (on the “100,000 against the Internet tax” page) and Youtube (through
the channel “100,000 against the Internet tax”, available at
https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCW6N-NXIQ-BEloZWYMOV5Dw), activists met
face to face several times over the course of the protests, in spaces offered by various
NGOs, in addition to communicating via Facebook Messenger. The organizers also
maintained a Twitter account (@NoNetTax_HU)(no longer available); none of the
interviewees even mentioned the account, which appears to have played a minor role in
the mobilization, especially given the limited relevance of Twitter in Hungary20.
Who are the activists that organized the internet tax protests? They are Budapestbased, left-liberal and have college degrees. At the time of the protests, most of them
were in their late 20s and early 30s. Most of them had several years of experience in
political parties, social movements or non-governmental organizations. The Budapestbased activist scene is relatively tight-knit and people move almost seamlessly between
different causes and organizations. Eszter described the Hungarian activist community as:
“we are like, I don’t know, like 100 people or more… 300-400 sometimes and we are
activists here in Hungary, and we get involved in a lot of things like this”. Bálint laughed
as he told me that he got involved in the internet tax protests through the “same people”
who get him to join “every protest in Hungary”.
Despite the success of the internet tax protests, the organizers could not (or chose
not to) form a more stable social movement or activist organization. This is partially
explained by the fact that most of them were already involved in other activist
20

In their study of political polarization on Twitter, Matuszewski and Szabó (2019) reported that in 2017
less than 1% of Hungarian internet users were Twitter users. In 2014, Hungarian Twitter users were likely
to be even fewer.
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organizations of different kinds. Some interviewees pointed to the fact that the political
conditions did not seem suitable for the creation of a more permanent movement. Daniel
expressed his regret about the failure to establish a movement: “we did not put down the
basis of the movement, and actually those people involved in, which were at some point
more than 20 people, were not... an organized movement, but just people randomly
getting together”. Laszlo explained that it seemed difficult to bring other issues into the
internet tax protests. He reported having heated conversations with people who wanted to
use the internet tax protests to quickly build a more comprehensive political platform, to
which he replied that:
yes, we also want to have complete and coherent reform, but then we
have to build a movement and we have to, you know, come together.
So it's more work, it's not just, you know happening, in a second. And
this is also a part of political education, that you have to made the
people to understand that this is not the way how we achieve political
change... political, yes, transformation. You know, it's not... you
know... sorry, it's not just a coincidence that they call it "struggle"
(Laszlo).

Laszlo’s words highlight how Hungarian activists would need a sustained
structured mobilization to really push forth a platform of social change. But he did not
think that the internet tax protests could or should be that. Interviewees also reported
being pressured by other activists and by left-liberal media commentators, who insisted
that the protest organizers should get together to form a new political party. Daniel
dismissed those suggestions, but added that he felt “this empty space, which we did not
fill. It's not a party, but it's a movement. Which can lead to a party”.
Even if the activists did not create a more stable movement organization or a
party, the internet tax protests are considered one of the rare successes of the Hungarian
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opposition to Viktor Orbán. László explained that the protests are used in public
discussions to demonstrate that it is possible to score a success against Orbán. Eszter,
reported that the internet tax protests made it easier to mobilize Hungarians afterwards, as
it showed that protest could in fact take place in a largescale way and have a clear impact.

A successful single-issue protest?
The internet tax protests have been considered a success on many fronts. First,
they delivered a blow to the Fidesz government’s legislative aims and image. It was the
first time – and to date, the only time – that Orbán’s government was forced to respond to
popular mobilization. Second, the demonstrations were successful because of both the
number of people who took part in them and their heterogeneity. Interviewed activists
described how rare such mass participation is in Hungary, and also emphasized how
extremely rare it is to bring together such a diverse crowd, including individuals across
ideological divides, ages, and genders. This success can be measured, first of all, by the
fact that “by far this was the biggest political Facebook event like ever” (Adam), because
thousands of people clicked the “I’m going” button on the ad-hoc Facebook event page
that was created by Adam himself. Secondly, success is measured by the number of
people who showed up to the demonstrations: 10.000 on the first one, 100.000 on the
second one. The second protest, as mentioned above, was the biggest demonstration to
occur in Hungary after 1989. This surprised the activists, as Bálint said: “it was very a big
surprise for us, there were a lot of people in the first protest”. Daniel concurred:
“Nobody... so we did not experience such big crowd previously. I'm sure I did not; I think
most of the activists participating in the organization neither. Yeah... Of course it was
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great”. The activists communicated how rare such mass participation is in Hungary and
how it is even rarer to bring together the heterogeneous crowd that showed up in these
demonstrations. Eszter argued that “there were many young people in the streets, which
usually never happens, and also the supporters of Fidesz were against the internet tax.
This is why they stepped back”. The activists believe that the mobilization of different
constituencies, beyond the usual liberal-leftist opposition to Orbán, was a decisive factor
in the government’s defeat. Speaking specifically of the second demonstration, Daniel
said that “there were, you know, these far-right-ish protesters next to pretty Europeanlover protesters, next to the previous mayor of Budapest from the liberal party, next to the
American ambassador (…) Everybody was there”21.
It is the popularity of the Facebook event that interviewees saw as central to the
successful mobilization of a lot of different people. As Péter explained:
it provided a community feeling, that I don't have to be a weirdo
activist to participate in something, because it's something that normal
people do, too, now, because this is a thing that affects normal people,
too. So it's not about homelessness or LGBT or those… but it... Yeah,
the Facebook event, the number of attendees on the Facebook event
showed that this is not a fringe situation, but it's socially acceptable to
participate (Péter).

When speaking of the reasons behind the success of the internet tax protest, some
of the activists conceded that it was likely a combination of “some of the most important
aspects, if you want to mobilize people” (Petra) and pointed to the heterogeneity of the
motivations that might have led people to take to the streets. Nevertheless, they
overwhelmingly attributed the success of the protest to its single-issue focus: the internet
21

The presence of André Goodfriend, then chargé d’affaires at the United States Embassy in Budapest (the
“ambassador” figure mentioned by Daniel) became the object of controversy when it was denounced by the
Hungarian government’s spokesperson, Zoltan Kovacs (Lyman, 2014a).
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and the attempt to tax internet consumption. The activists chose to frame this protest as a
“single-issue project” (Lászlo), in order to mobilize more people, including those who
would not necessarily agree with broader leftist and liberal concerns or with extensive
criticism of Orbán’s government. In retrospect, they believe that this was the main reason
behind the success of the protests, as Adam explains:
It was our main goal, and we keep it for the whole thing, that we don’t
want a general protest against the government, because we rather want to
have a focus on the internet tax and give the people a victory over the
government. Like, even an autocratic government’s will can be defeated
by the people. And also it was good because many people who were not
necessarily in all things against the government they could connect in this
one case. So… And this, I think this was important that the whole thing
succeeded. (Adam)

The single-issue focus seemed particularly successful because the internet tax was
an exceptionally clear topic to talk about, as many activists suggested. Interviewees
claimed that it was evident to people why the tax was bad, and that they didn’t have to do
any sophisticated messaging to get the point across. As one organizer remarked: "this
situation was really not organized, or organized by us; it was organized by the
government, we just orchestrated it somehow” (Daniel). Tamás said that it was “a very,
very clear thing”, for which “you don’t have to talk about democracy or about such
complicated thoughts” (Tamás); it was an “easy message” (Daniel), “understandable for
everyone” (Petra). To explain how clear the topic of the internet tax seemed to be for the
Hungarian people, the activists often compared it with other contested decisions of the
government, like the wave of constitutional changes that started in 2011:
the... violation of the Supreme Court is a very very big thing, but how
many of the youth people can really understand the importance of that? I
don't want to be elitist, but I don't think than more than 10% can really
understand what is the big problem, what was the big problem with that.
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And this was why – I don't know – 600 people were taking part in the
demonstration against that. So this... this is a comfort zone, the Internet is
a comfort zone, not a very hard thing to understand why is it bad for you,
if you can't use the internet. So I think this was... this was the big
difference. (Bálint)
I argue that while the protests were visibly framed by the activists as just
addressing the internet tax, their success had nothing to do with the specifics of the
internet tax and everything to do with the other policies implemented by the Orbán
government: the other taxes, the cuts to public education and healthcare, the corruption
scandals, and so on. The anger that people expressed in the demonstrations had been
building up for a long time, and found an outlet in these internet tax demonstrations:
“many people get really angry and actually it was not just the internet tax, I mean, not
just because of the internet tax, but by 2014 we have reached a point when you know,
everybody had enough, that was the kind of the last drop” (Petra). Petra also added that
many people brought signs to the demonstrations that had nothing to do with the internet,
which suggests that “people didn't just come because of the internet tax, they came
because they had enough of the government”. Lászlo explained:
And that's what the internet tax was for the people: a very direct hit, and
because they already knew that this government is very oppressive
towards the people, this whole story, this whole abstract and foggy story
suddenly, you know, just concentrated in one dot, and that was the internet
tax and that it was... So then they had, you know, we have enough.
(Lászlo)
The issue of the internet tax was particularly suitable to coalesce a series of
grievances against the government into one mobilization that was formally just about the
internet, but opened the door for a general contestation of the government. This was
possible because the protests drew upon a specific technological imaginary, which
associated the internet with political concepts such as democracy, freedom and Western
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modernity. The protests were never just about the internet, because technological
imaginaries are not just about the technologies they refer to – they speak to the political
and social role of these technologies.

The mundane modernity of the internet
The technological imaginary of the internet tax protest activists can be
reconstructed through an analysis of the different reasons that led them to oppose the tax.
These reasons point to a technological imaginary that associates the internet with equality
and development, the future, rationality, and mundanity. According to this imaginary, the
internet is a powerful, but mundane manifestation of Western modernity. This imaginary
is based on classic tropes of Western modernity about the equalizing power of
technology, its role in progress and its connection to rationality, which become grounded
in the everyday practices of internet use. This imaginary thus accepts the core of Silicon
Valley’s dominant technological imaginary, as well as its technologies, and celebrates the
internet as a free and democratic space. It is an imaginary of appropriation: it reinterprets
the technological imaginary of Silicon Valley to make it legible within a post-communist
context, where the relationship between political freedom and economic freedom has
been a contentious issue for the past 20 years. Further, these Hungarian activists are using
this technological imaginary of mundane modernity to oppose Orbán’s illiberal
democracy; seen in this light, the internet tax can be conceptualized as the expression of
the technological imaginary of illiberal democracy. In this way, the opposition to the
internet tax becomes a metonymy for the opposition to illiberal democracy in general.
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In the following sections, I detail how the technological imaginary of the activists
of the internet tax protests is based on associating the internet with equality and
development, the future, rationality, and mundanity. I then theorize this imaginary as one
of “mundane modernity”. I suggest that this imaginary is particularly fruitful in a postcommunist context, because it promises a seamless coincidence between political
freedom and economic freedom – a promise that was also at the core of the transition
from communism to democracy and that has been unfulfilled so far. I then theorize the
imaginary of mundane modernity as one of “appropriation”, because it accepts Silicon
Valley’s technological imaginary and its technologies, while adapting them not only to a
post-communist context but to the specific Hungarian political situation, by pitching
mundane modernity as a response to Orbán’s illiberal democracy.

Equality and development

One of the main problems with the tax was, simply put, its economic impact. The
opposition to the tax went beyond the fact that “people don’t like taxes” (Daniel). The
amount of the tax itself would have been unsustainable for a lot of people: “this amount
of money would have meant a lot to many people (…) like many people would have been
cut from the internet, because they wouldn’t have been able to pay for it” (Petra). Eszter
addressed the burden placed both on poorer communities and on high volume users:
“everybody could feel on his own pocket that ‘I should pay money’. It was not a small
amount of money, it was... so many people couldn't pay it, in the countryside, for
example... but I couldn't pay it also, because I use a lot of internet…”. Adam called the
internet tax a flat tax, because of its low threshold and its lack of progressivity, and
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comments: “I think flat taxes are generally not just, because everyone pays the same
however income that person has… so like the poorest people also have to pay the
amount, which is like… means more for them than for a rich person”.
This reflection on the fact that the internet tax would exacerbate inequality was
contrasted by the activists with the idea that the internet could, under certain
circumstances, promote more equality in the country. Many activists spoke of the
digital divide between the city and the countryside, and the necessity to reduce that gap.
They suggested that the government should be concerned with increasing access and
usage of the internet, not to make it more costly for people to go online. Daniel explained
the connection between taxing the internet and literacy and inequality: “that's why [the
internet tax] is a bad thing: because... so the internet leads... might lead, or should lead, to
digital literacy which would lead to reducing the inequalities in the society, so that's why
– it’s a bad idea...”. Dávid also argued that taxing internet consumption is not the right
thing to do, “because internet is a kind of... it practically is something like water or
electricity, so why do you need an extra tax for that? I... uh... and probably for a
government it is better to... to... increase the usage of internet”.
Several activists argued that the internet is a public utility and that the state should
have a public internet service that is free or at least subsidized. Daniel said that “the
internet should be a public service” and that “it would be definitely cool to have it free”;
Eszter echoed him to say that “it's very sad that in Budapest we don't have free WiFi
everywhere”. Péter also argued that “the direction we should go is actually subsidize the
internet and to invest into making it more and more everywhere, to people and even to
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companies. Because that's something that, yeah, that would really work for the country”
(Péter).
Others clearly connected this issue back to the need to reduce inequality. Lászlo
argued that the question the government should ask is:
how can the state take more responsibility, and working together closer
with these companies, to provide internet for the people, if not for free, but
for a very very low price. And how can the state, you know, provide wifi
everywhere for example in the cities and especially in the villages. So
that's the problem. If you are living in a village and more than 40% of the
Hungarian people are living in villages, there are some villages with
internet access, but you have very very little chance to have fast speed
access to the internet. (Lászlo)
Similarly, Bálint explained how inequality in access to infrastructure is connected
to unequal access to information:
the good thing would be if everybody... okay, I don't know, it's a bit
irrealistic, not everybody, but more and more people could use the internet
for free, because I think this informational gap between the... between
somebody in the center of Budapest and somebody in the center of North
Hungary, is very very big. So... I think the right thing would be the
government would work on that, to have free internet access everywhere.
(Bálint)
It is important to note how, in talking about the divide between the capital and the
peripheral countryside, the activists reproduced a certain language that is common to
technologically deterministic views of information technologies and development. The
quotes from the interviews seem in line with what Burrell (2012) described as the
championing of “universal connectivity as an imperative for the progress of developing
countries” (p. 133), although they are applied to poorer rural areas within Hungary22.
These discourses are not alien to the dominant technological imaginary of Silicon Valley
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While the internet tax spurred some protest in the countryside, too, the political divide between the city
and the countryside has been a longstanding problem for the civil opposition to Fidesz (see Wilkin et al.,
2015).
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either, which, as highlighted in Chapter 1, often portrays the digital divide as the single
most pressing challenge that needs to be addressed in order to guarantee prosperity and
freedom.

Future
The Hungarian activists also believed that the internet tax went against the future.
Their notion of future is conflated, as it often is, with the idea of progress. Adam
suggested that “it’s just so backwards thinking to tax the internet”, and explained that
“this was in trend with how the government generally thinks about many modern things”
and that the “modern world has the internet as a tool for lots of things” (Adam). Bálint
reframed this, by saying that the internet tax is “a good symbol that Fidesz don’t know
anything about the youth”.
The criticism about the backwardness of the government extends to implicitly
criticize the ideal of “illiberal democracy” as a return to an authoritarian past. The
backwardness is not just political, it’s also economical: the interviewees conveyed the
sense that the government’s inability to appreciate technologies is blocking economic
development. Péter talks about the fact that investing in the IT-related sector would help
Hungary be less vulnerable to global economic changes, but argues that “the main
problem is that for some reason our government doesn’t have any day-dreaming about
technology” and that “if you have that kind of attitude for something that will define the
next decades, yeah, pretty much you’ve already lost”. Dávid compared the internet tax to
other controversial decisions of the government, like the mandatory closing of retail
stores on Sundays (Pállinger, 2019, p. 71; C. J. Williams, 2014), and argued that “the
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internet story and closing the shops are very very similar (…) both stories are against
more or less the economy. Making the life of the people harder”. For the interviewees,
the internet tax is thus another step away from the future. Péter’s words clearly
communicated the sense of frustration with the direction of the country:
Right now, we are working our way back to, I don't know, the middle of
the 20th century. I don't know if you've been to the countryside. It actually
looks like it's the 1950s and people live like it's the 1950s. And we had a
dictatorship in the 1950s under socialism! (…) Is that the future? (Péter)
No, the activists would argue, the future is the internet.

Rationality
Another theme that emerged from the interviews is the apparent stupidity of the
internet tax. Indeed, the tax proposal had some serious issues of feasibility that the
government was never able to address. But the activists communicated this by calling the
tax “stupid, absurd” (Adam) or “not really sane” (Daniel). They regarded the internet tax
as something that would go against rationality. Lászlo implied that the tax would never
have been proposed by anyone who had “some experience with reality”. The activists
conveyed the sense that it would be nonsensical to even think about taxing the internet.
Adam said it was “so visibly a stupid thing”, Tamás argued that it was “totally crazy”,
Daniel called it “nonsense” (several times), Bálint recalled that it “was so silly and so
unrealistic, that I can’t really imagine to be honest, how could it work”. Péter explained
more in detail: “So it was evident that it won't happen. In that way, because it just can’t.
(…) it wasn't a policy issue, it wasn't something coming from an ideological standpoint of
the government, it was just a bullshit screw-up”.
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The interviewees suggested that the internet tax was not “a very thoughtful idea”
(Bálint), a mistake, “a stupidity of the government” (Lászlo). After all, how could
someone rational even consider taxing the internet? The recurrence of terms that indicate
the nonsensical and stupid nature of the tax proposal reinforces the notion that taxing the
internet would mean going against rationality. This discourse is in line with teleological
discourses of technology that emphasize how technological progress is the manifestation
of rationality. In this particular context, however, technology as the symbol of rationality
took on an oppositional symbolic meaning.

Mundanity
The fourth theme that emerged from the interviews is that of the mundanity of the
internet, which the activists saw as a key component of the success of the protests. Eszter
contrasted the issue of the internet tax with other controversial decisions of the Hungarian
government, like the Media Laws or the amendment of the Constitution, that she found
not only less easily understood, but also less universal: “it was for everyone, I mean,
because they made many many things that are much worse than the internet tax, but the
other things are not affecting everyone in the country, but this one was affecting
everyone”. The demonstrations were successful because people could weigh the tax
against the importance of the internet for their daily life. In the interviews, the internet
emerged as something very personal, a space of personal freedom: a private sphere in
which the government should not be allowed to intervene. The internet, said Dávid, “is so
involved in our everyday life, that everything which relates… touches it… we act really
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sensitive on that”. Bálint also remarked that people “got furious because they felt they
can really lose their personal stuff”.
Eszter and Petra both associated the internet to people’s homes, in order to
express the deeply personal and everyday nature of the internet:
every part of the society, everybody understood what does it mean when
they put a tax on the internet, and well... at least they understood that they
need to pay more and they understood that it's something which would
really... like... how to say? which would really affect their personal life,
and their, you know... so something which would get into their bedroom,
let's say it this way. (Petra)
I think on one hand it was a big amount of money, but on the other hand, it
was like that they are... the government goes into your house. It's your
private thing that you use everyday. Of course, you use it for work, but it's
your private life, and I think in Hungary many people is addicted to
Facebook, but really… They live their lives there, communicating with
each other there, organizing events, everything on Facebook. And it was
about that, that they want to take away one thing from your life. (Eszter)
Notice here how “bedroom” and “house” signal a connection between the internet
and a sphere of life that should be considered private and protected from government
intervention.
Another aspect that emerged from this mundane and personal vision of the
internet is that it is conceived as a space in which everyone is free to access and consume
content. It is a freedom that is constructed around consumption, and not necessarily
expression: the freedom to access information, to watch movies, to use Facebook, to
share copyrighted material. Dávid even remarked how one torrenting site decided to take
a position on the internet tax by alerting its users about how much each download would
be taxed. Bálint further explained people’s concerns about the impact of the tax on their
downloading habits: “It's funny because we saw calculations about how [much] one
episode of Game of Thrones would cost. (…) There were some speculations about going
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to Slovakia and Austria and torrent things, and then come back”23. In her analysis of antiACTA discourse, Nowak (2016) also showed that piracy has become an everyday online
practice overlaid with an ethos of freedom. Being free to choose what to read or watch –
including pirating copyrighted material – is embedded in these visions of the internet as a
private and personal space in which people can do what they please. As Adam
summarized: “this is your space, you decide what you, what you read and don’t need to…
yeah, so like, you decide what you read. It’s personal”.

The mundanity of modernity
Three of the four themes identified in the interviews – future, equality and
development, rationality – are key concepts associated with Western modernity (Giddens
& Pierson, 1998; but also Taylor, 2004). Here they get equated with the internet, which is
seen as representing the future, the achievement of equality and development, and
rationality. Taxing the internet is wrong, because it goes against modernity. As Adam
summed up nicely: “it’s against modernity, it’s against common sense. Yeah, it’s against
common sense. And it’s socially unjust, and also even hard for jobs. You have lots of
reasons, I think I used this anti-modern comment, against common-sense, it’s like a
collection of arguments”. Although Adam was not talking about academic definitions of
modernity, his argument clearly illustrated how the internet is associated with rationality,
with the future, and with equality and development; the internet tax represented a threat
to these three important aspects of modernity. Yet this modernity is experienced through
mundane, everyday practices: checking Facebook, downloading pirated content, reading
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Budapest is about 50 km from Slovakia and 170 km from Austria.
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the news. Experienced through the mundanity of smartphones and torrenting websites,
modernity becomes a domesticated, everyday practice (see Appadurai, 1996). When the
internet is equated with it, modernity becomes something that we can hold in our hands.
Taylor (2004) argued that “the sanctification of ordinary life” (p. 102) was part of
the experience of modernity. Here, the mundane and ordinary aspects of the internet
reinforce the power of the idea of modernity. It is through this dual association of the
internet with both modernity and mundanity that the technological imaginary of the
internet tax protests can symbolically counter Orbán’s illiberal democracy: by using the
internet as a symbol of the modernity that the government is rejecting, but that is
mundane for the protesters.

The freedoms of mundane modernity
In talking about the internet tax protests, international media often explained this
mobilization as one about internet freedom. The interviewees overwhelmingly rejected
this frame and suggest that foreign media probably used it to make the Hungarian protests
legible in relation to the American and European debates on net neutrality that were
happening at that time. Tamás rejected the idea that internet freedom was at the center of
the protests: “I think in Hungary it's, you know, the 20th priority. Sorry, you know, when
you have so many problems in a country, you cannot say... it's also, of course, it's an
important part, but...”. And yet, freedom comes up again and again, both in the interviews
and in the slogans of the protests: “Free country, free internet” (“szabad ország, szabad
internet”) was one of the most popular.
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So, what is the freedom that was envisioned in the internet tax protests? I argue
that through the lens of mundane modernity, we can highlight the dual meaning of
freedom in the protests: on the one hand, the liberal political freedom of modernity, on
the other, the private consumer freedom of mundanity. Far from contradicting each other,
these two meanings of freedom reinforce the power of the imaginary of mundane
modernity, especially in the context of a post-socialist society, because of the specific
conditions of the transition, which promised the simultaneous achievement of liberal
democracy and market-driven prosperity (Offe & Adler, 1991); such promises have been
frustrated in many ways (Bohle & Greskovits, 2012), yet their legacy helps explain the
particular power of mundane modernity in the Hungarian case.
The way in which modernity is associated with the internet carries with it a notion
of freedom that is predicated on Western liberal democracy. In Hungary, this should be
interpreted in the context of the Communist regime and its legacy, but also of the more
recent turn to illiberal democracy proclaimed by Orbán. Petra explained both aspects.
Firstly, she says that by the time the government announced the internet tax,
Fidesz made it quite clear that they wanted to have an illiberal democracy.
They, you know, made strong friendship… with dictatorships and so...
they became an ally with Russia, and stuff. And you know, it is kind of
hard for the Hungarian people, since we had the Russian occupation, you
know, the Soviet occupation and stuff. And it was for many people also
kind of symbolic, that the internet meant freedom, and you know,
somehow a connection to the West. (Petra)

What emerged from Petra’s words is a powerful mainstream discourse that
connects the internet, democracy and Western liberalism. The internet tax protests drew
on this discourse, by turning the internet into a symbol of Western modernity and
freedom, which could stand in opposition to Orbán’s illiberal democracy.
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Furthermore, the association between mundanity and the internet carries a set of
additional meanings about the notion of freedom, which is understood in terms of the
freedom of individuals to consume content. Notice how Bálint defined it in relation to
media consumption:
[people] didn't want to lose the freedom of the internet. I think we don't,
we don't have to have theories more complex than that. This was the only
really important thing for them, to watch their series free, to watch their
football games for free, and... and this was threatened by the government...
(Bálint)

Péter echoed this notion of freedom: “People wanted their real actual existing
practical internet freedom to be able to use the internet in the next month and the month
after that, and the month after that” (Péter). The internet appears as a vast market of
content that consumers should be free to choose from.
If this tech-oriented overlaying of market freedom and political freedom sounds
familiar, it is because it features prominently in the dominant technological imaginary of
Silicon Valley, too. In line with neoliberal principles, Silicon Valley’s imaginary does not
distinguish between political and economic freedom: political freedom is imagined to be
achieved through the use of digital technologies available on the “free” market. In talking
about the myths of cyberspace, Mosco (2004) already argued that the discourses that
celebrated digital technologies in the 1990s also promoted market-driven notions of
citizenship and called for the deregulation of technological markets.
In the post-communist context, the conflation between political and market
freedom carries additional political relevance. A parallel to be drawn here is with the
circulation of samizdat under communism (e.g. Kind-Kovács & Labov, 2015), which
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took on the character of a political practice even when it involved entertainment content.
In line with Petra’s quotes, we might speculate that the legacy of the communist past is
present in the concern for a freedom that is based on personal and quotidian choices of
consumption, and not just in more abstract notions of democracy and political equality
(for a similar argument, see Deák, 2011). The political relevance of consumption is also
reinforced in Hungarian post-communist society by the cultural consequences of
neoliberal “shock therapy” that the country had to endure after the transition. According
to Wilkin (2018), the legacy of these neoliberal policies can be found in the emergence of
“a form of consumerism in which consumers are encouraged to define what is good
through personal gratification” (p. 21).
As I have shown, the technological imaginary of mundane modernity is
influenced by the political contradictions of the Hungarian socio-political context; it is
not only a response to the emergence of an illiberal state, but also to long term political
phenomena that have their origins in Communist times and in the transition to
democracy.

Appropriation: Silicon Valley in a post-communist country
The technological imaginary of mundane modernity constructed and deployed by
the Hungarian activists is an appropriation of the dominant technological imaginary of
Silicon Valley: the activists embraced both the key elements of Silicon Valley’s
imaginary and the digital technologies that emerge from that imaginary. In fact, mundane
modernity appropriates the three tenets of Silicon Valley’s imaginary: the equation of
digital technologies with freedom and democracy, technosolutionism, and the ancillary
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role of Silicon Valley in neoliberal capitalism. First, mundane modernity is based on the
equation between the internet and Western modernity; as explained above, this carries
with it an association of the internet with both market freedom and political freedom.
Second, with the imaginary of mundane modernity, the Hungarian activists also endorsed
a connection between the internet and democracy, which they deployed to protest against
Orbán. Petra explained this connection between democracy and the internet also in
historical perspective:
I think the internet symbolizes, you know, openness, and like all the
possibilities... (…) So it's... you know, it also symbolizes that the
internet is, somehow symbolizes freedom, the West, you know,
belonging to the West instead of the East. (…) but you know what I
mean, like symbolizing democracies, like versus dictatorships. (…)
Symbolizing progress. So... (Petra)

With her quote, Petra made explicit the association between the internet and
freedom, the West and democracy, which underpins the imaginary of mundane
modernity, but is also the unspoken foundation of Silicon Valley’s dominant
technological imaginary. Further, the promise of direct democracy through digital
technologies, one of the crucial dreams propagated by Silicon Valley, seems particularly
appealing for Hungarian activists, given the rampant corruption of the Hungarian posttransition democratic system. Third, mundane modernity sees the internet as a solution to
different socioeconomical problems, such as inequality and underdevelopment, as
articulated by the activists in the interviews. But mundane modernity also coalesces
aspirations about democracy and prosperity into a technosolutionist vision of technology,
expected to deliver what the state and the market could not deliver in the past 30 years.
Lastly, the imaginary of mundane modernity does not problematize how Silicon Valley’s
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visions of technology support and benefit from neoliberal capitalism. While the activists
express their desires for some forms of public welfare correctives, e.g. free public Wi-Fi
or public subsidies for internet consumption, there is a substantial normalization of
market-driven notions of technology; as explained above, this is evident in the conflation
of market freedom and political freedom that characterizes mundane modernity, as well
as the dominant technological imaginary of Silicon Valley.
The other component of this imaginary of appropriation is the fact that the
Hungarian activists adopt Silicon Valley technologies in their daily life and in their
organization of the protests. Further, they attribute at least part of the success of the
internet tax protests to their use of these technologies – Facebook in particular.
As evidenced by the choice of the term “appropriation”, mundane modernity does
not simply reproduce the dominant technological imaginary of Silicon Valley; mundane
modernity is an imaginary that reinterprets Silicon Valley’s ideas in a way that made
sense in the Hungarian context in 2014. In particular, this appropriation is shaped by both
the post-communist context and by the technological imaginary of Orban’s illiberal
democracy, which is exemplified by the internet tax itself.

Silicon Valley and the Hungarian political context
The imaginary of mundane modernity contextualizes Silicon Valley’s imaginary
in the Hungarian post-communist context. As highlighted above, the discourse of
mundane modernity casts the internet as capable of simultaneously delivering economic
development and political freedom. In this imaginary, the internet then becomes a
powerful solution to the unsolved contradictions of the transition, in that it is seen as
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offering that bundle of democracy-cum-prosperity that was promised in the transition, but
not quite achieved over the past 30 years. In framing the internet as a symbol of Western
modernity, the imaginary of mundane modernity touches upon longstanding – and now
contentious – dreams of “catching up with the West”, i.e. to resolve the contradictions of
the transition through fast economic development (Ágh, 2017, p. 34).
More crucially, the appropriation of Silicon Valley’s imaginary through that of
mundane modernity is shaped by the fundamental political cleavage of post-2010
Hungarian politics: modernity vs. tradition, pro-West vs. anti-West, pro-EU vs. anti-EU,
cosmopolitan vs. ethnonationalist, urban vs. rural. While this cleavage is not new to
Hungarian politics, which has seen a clash between democratic-liberal and authoritarian
forces throughout its history, as highlighted by Wilkin (2018), it is Viktor Orbán that
rearticulated this cleavage in post-communist Hungary and used it to turn Fidesz into the
central political force of Hungarian politics. He positioned himself and his party as
offering “anti-modernism and anti-cosmopolitanism / Europeanism as a viable alternative
to neo-liberal democracy and the market economy” (Pap, 2018, p. 2). It is to this cleavage
that Orbán returns when his policies are contested domestically or internationally; time
and time again he defended Fidesz’ decisions by pitching his government as the defender
of the Hungarian nation against the outside threat of an international power24 (Ágh, 2017,
p. 36), chiefly the European Union.
Orbán’s rearticulation of the modernity vs. tradition cleavage also makes it almost
impossible for other actors to articulate class-based grievances: since his illiberalism so
strongly attacks the institutions that have promoted neoliberal capitalism, e.g. the EU and
24

This framing is effective within a national political culture which remembers its past as a string of
defeats to the hands of international empires: the Ottomans, the Hapsburgs, Nazi Germany (but not
always!), and the Soviet Union.
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the IMF, on nationalist grounds, any attempt to criticize such institutions from a social
justice perspective risks being construed as support for Orbán himself. As Wilkin (2018)
argued, this leads to a situation in which no political forces are effectively opposing
neoliberal policies: Orbán’s government embraced many aspects of neoliberalism,
especially austerity politics, while the liberal-left political elites “attempt to circle the
square of subordinating the Hungarian economy and society to the dictates of global
finance while trying to stand up for some notion of social justice” (Wilkin, 2018, pp. 27–
28). This makes it difficult even for social movements to mobilize against neoliberalism;
it is no surprise that the internet tax activists are not interested in critiquing the
connection between capitalism and Silicon Valley. While they might dislike
neoliberalism, they dislike Orbán more.
In this context, the internet then becomes the cool and mundane face of Western
modernity, Western liberalism, and Western capitalism, that Hungarians can hope to
“catch up with”. Not the modernity of the IMF and the EU technocrats, but the “cool”
modernity of Silicon Valley, with its gadgets and its promise of prosperity and tech
development; not the bureaucratic democracy of the international institutions, but the
direct democratic ethos of Silicon Valley. Mundane modernity allows the left-liberal
activists to insert themselves in the cleavage articulated by Orbán, but not in a
subordinate position: to offer a cool version of the modernity they aspire to; a version of
modernity that cannot be readily criticized on ethnonationalist grounds, and that might
even be more powerful than international institutions. If, as Appadurai (1996, p. 9) wrote,
modernity is an elsewhere, then Silicon Valley is a better modern elsewhere to hang on
to, compared to Brussels.
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The internet tax protests thus appropriated the dominant technological imaginary
of Silicon Valley within a political context that sees a struggle over modernity and the
West as its core cleavage. Drawing on the imaginary of Silicon Valley allowed the
protesters to cling on to aspirations of modernity and Westernization through the
mundanity and “coolness” of technology, which cannot be readily subsumed in the
nationalist discourse of Orbán’s government.

Responding to the technological imaginary of illiberal democracy
As I have argued throughout this chapter, the imaginary of mundane modernity is
constructed and deployed by the Hungarian activists in opposition to Orbán’s illiberal
democracy. I contend that, for the activists, illiberal democracy carries with it a specific
technological imaginary, which is exemplified by the internet tax itself.
The activists criticize Orbán and his government for their inability to use and
understand the internet and digital technologies, something that they think explains
Fidesz’s general attitude towards modernity. The interviewees were often amused and
sometimes outraged when they told me that Orbán and other top Fidesz politicians are
really not familiar with new technologies. Bálint said he did not “think that a lot of Fidesz
politicians are really good with iPhones”. Daniel added that it is common knowledge that
Orbán does not really know how to use a computer. Adam explained that “the Prime
Minister personally does not really use new technologies” and that “he doesn’t really
understand modern technology”; to support his claim, he said that when Orbán is
photographed at his desk, such as in a famous Facebook profile photo, one can clearly see
that he does not have any electronic devices around him. When I asked him if Orbán’s
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presumed scarce knowledge of technology meant that he could not be a good politician,
he replied: “Okay, I don’t want to exclude the chance that he could be a good leader
without knowing it, but like… how [do] you avoid it? Completely… so much in your life,
to don’t really use these things”. Peter linked Orbán’s limited digital literacy to the
internet tax: “it was really obvious that Viktor Orbán had this idea. He heard about the
internet… he doesn't even really use a computer, on a daily basis”.
Dávid argued that Orbán’s lack of familiarity with digital technology means that
“Orbán’s government is a government who are not able to really understand the new
time, the new technologies”. Peter added that the government is not necessarily hostile
towards technology: “I don't think they hate it or they are negative about it. It's just
something that meh... who cares?”. Daniel recalled another time in which Orbán seemed
to ignore the importance of digital technologies:
there was once something Orban said: yeah, it's very good to have
"those little startups, investing in like future and modern technologies,
but we are building the society based on work here"… Which like, I
think somehow meant, yeah, it is not work what you are doing in socalled "high tech startups", just some bullshit, but we make work
(Daniel).

In retelling this anecdote, Daniel used his hands to make scary quotes when
paraphrasing Orbán’s sentence and when saying the words “high tech startups”, to further
underscore how he found Orbán’s position absurd. Notice how, in Orbán’s position, as
detailed by Daniel, there is a stark contrast between the future and modernity of digital
technologies, and traditional “work”, which we can imagine to be associated with how
Orbán would describe the traditional values of the Hungarian nation. This small episode
thus serves to illustrate how illiberal democracy has its own technological imaginary,
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which downplays the importance of digital technologies. While this technological
imaginary might not be explicitly or officially articulated by Orbán, it is picked up by the
Hungarian activists, who constructed mundane modernity in response to it.

Performing mundane modernity
As examined in the Introduction, when Jasanoff (2015) provided her definition of
“sociotechnical imaginaries”, she underlined the importance of investigating how these
imaginaries are publicly performed by different actors. The technological imaginary of
mundane modernity was performed by the internet tax protesters through two different
actions that gained prominence during the demonstrations: the recurrent use of
illuminated smartphones and the trashing of the headquarters of Fidesz.
One of the most recognizable actions of these protests, which can be seen in
Figure 1, is borrowed from the Umbrella movement in Hong Kong (see Lee, 2015):
protesters lifting their phones, with lit up screens, towards the sky.

149

Figure 1. Protesters lift their illuminated smartphones, as they march through central Budapest during the
first internet tax protest, October 26th 2014. Photo by Stefan Roch (used with permission). Protester’s faces
were blurred by the author to preserve their anonymity.

The Hungarian protesters did it several times, even though only two of the
interviewees mentioned it in the interviews. When asked about the origin of the action,
Eszter explained:
Actually, we saw a demonstration in China, I think it was in China,
where they used this – but not regarding the Internet. I don't remember
on what issue. And we thought that we should use this, because it
shows that... shows something, the people do something in the
demonstration, and it... I think this thing can present the future, the
internet... that it's connected, and so on... and also that we are together
(Eszter).

What Eszter was trying to convey with her explanation of this protest action is
that it helped illustrate the meaning of the internet, and its connection to the future (as
already examined in the chapter). The Hungarian protesters did not borrow the action
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from Hong Kong to stage an elaborate comparison between the Hungarian and Chinese
state. As Eszter’s quote shows, the organizers did not even remember what the topic of
the Hong Kong movements was. That action resonated, for the Hungarian activists, not so
much because it is borrowed from a pro-democracy demonstration, but because it
channels a complex set of aspirations about modernity into something as easily accessible
and mundane as a smartphone. The gesture embodied the symbolic power exerted by the
association between the internet, political freedom and Western modernity: it allowed the
Hungarian activists to visually perform the technological imaginary of mundane
modernity.
The second performance of the imaginary of mundane modernity took place in a
much more unplanned way, during one of the main incidents of the demonstrations. After
the end of the first demonstration, on October 26th, a small crowd of protesters headed for
the headquarters of Fidesz, Orbán’s party. Upon arrival, they started throwing old pieces
of IT equipment – modems, routers, keyboards, and even monitors – against the building.
The protesters also attempted to tear down the protective fence and break the windows.
No one was injured, and only the exterior of the building was damaged. The organizers
did not plan this action, but could not stop it, either.
What the organizers had wanted, was for people to have something to do during
the demonstration, instead of solely listening to speeches. Therefore, they asked
participants to bring their old electronic goods to the demonstration and planned to end
their demonstration outside the Fidesz headquarters. A video, prepared by the organizers
of the protests and distributed via YouTube, invited protesters to bring along their
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obsolete devices. One of the organizers was portrayed in the video with different types of
old electronic equipment, while he said:
In order to block this unjust tax, bring along ruined electronic devices.
A broken router, an overused keyboard, an old cell phone, a ruined
laptop, or damaged cables. Bring as much as you can, as much as you
can carry to succeed (Százezren az internetadó ellen, 2014)25.

While organizers encouraged people to show up with broken devices, they did not
really have a good plan for how to use them; it seems that they intended for people to
deposit these gadgets on the doorstep of Fidesz’s headquarters. However, given the
unexpectedly large size of the crowd, the organizers had to redirect the demonstration to
a larger square nearby (Heroes’ Square). After they proclaimed the end of the
demonstration, part of the crowd went to the Fidesz building anyway, computer parts in
hand.
But why did the activists decide to ask participants to bring old electronics? Some
of the activists said that they wanted to visually represent the internet in a way that would
look good in pictures. But others explained that the old computer parts were meant to be
something more than a cool photo-op: they helped convey the message that the internet
tax was an obsolete way of thinking about the internet. Adam said that they “asked the
people to bring you know, all the mouses [sic], bad computers, to place in front of the
Fidesz [building] as a symbolic gesture that their idea to tax the internet is very
outdated”; Dávid echoed him: “simply show them that... bringing the old things... how
they are thinking about the whole thing is such old”.

25

I thank Robert Vámos for this translation.
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This episode thus illustrates how the old devices came to represent the
technological imaginary of illiberal democracy. As Péter argued:
Somebody came up with it, and everybody just went with it, that okay,
what if we say that, bring some old IT equipment with you and let's make
a heap of garbage out of them, to show the government that this idea to try
to restrict the internet it's way behind us, it's... it's the mindset of the 1990s
and it belongs to the same garbage dump. (Péter)
The internet tax thus became a metonymy of the backward-looking attitude of
illiberal democracy: this is what the activists meant to communicate by asking people to
bring their obsolete electronics along. The fact that protesters started throwing the
technology against the Fidesz headquarters further underscores that the demonstrators
thought about the internet tax as a proxy of the government’s shortcomings, as Eszter
explains:
actually I think this protest was not only about the internet. But it was
about... it was also anti-government protest. Because otherwise they
wouldn't destroy the headquarters of Fidesz. And I think for some people it
was only about the internet, but for many people it was also about the
government. (Eszter)
The organizers’ decision to ask protesters to bring obsolete electronics and the
vandalism against the Fidesz headquarters both point to a performance of the imaginary
of mundane modernity in opposition to the illiberal democracy.

Mundane modernity travels
The performance of mundane modernity through the raising of illuminated
smartphones to the sky immediately became a defining image of the internet tax protests.
In Hungary, it became a symbol that reminded public opinion that it was possible to
defeat Viktor Orbán. The protest gesture subsequently transcended the internet tax to
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become an important symbol for all sorts of political protests in Hungary and in other
Central-Eastern European countries between 2014 and 2019, as mentioned in the
Introduction.
In spring 2017, Hungarian activists used the same action to protest against
government-sponsored legislation targeting actors deemed to be foreign-influenced and
hostile to Hungarian values. These organizations included civil society and activist
groups, and the law was especially targeted at Central European University, the higher
education institution founded by Hungarian-born billionaire George Soros (Rankin,
2017). Large mobilizations went on for weeks to protest the legislation against these
organizations. In one protest, activists concluded a rally in front of the Hungarian
Parliament at sundown and raised their phones to the sky, as can be seen in Figure 2.

Figure 2. Protesters lift their cell phones in front of the Hungarian Parliament while protesting against the
legislation targeting NGOs and Central European University on April 9 th, 2017. Photo by Martin Mölder
(used with permission).
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Journalists drew the link between these images and those from the internet tax
protests and argued that demonstrators were using this imagery to remind the government
of the successful protests of 2014 (Csekö, 2017).
The circulation of the images and use and re-use of this action continued
throughout 2017 and 2018. In May 2017, when Romania saw massive protests against the
loosening of anti-corruption legislation, the New York Times opened its coverage with a
photo of three protesters holding their cell phones, their faces illuminated by the glow of
the screens and the flashlight function (Gillet, 2017). In March 2018, the demonstrations
that led to the resignation of Slovakian Prime Minister Fico also adopted this same iconic
action (Santora, 2018). Again in Hungary, after the re-election of Orbán in April 2018,
protesters staged a huge demonstration. At dusk, in front of the Parliament building, they
once again took out their phones while they sang both the Hungarian and European
anthems (Murphy, 2018). Later in 2018, when massive protests sought to stop the
government from approving the labor code reform known as “slave law”, illuminated
phones were used once again (“Hungary president signs controversial ‘slave law,’” 2018;
Karasz & Kingsley, 2018; Vadai, 2018).
First in Hungary, then in Romania and Slovakia, protesters adopted the action of
collectively lighting up their cell phone screens, knowing that the image would be
featured and circulated in countless news reports and social media feeds. I argue that the
resonance of this performance of mundane modernity in the Central Eastern European
region, which is still shaped by its common Communist past and the legacy of the
transition, should be understood as a consequence of the complex role that the idea of
Western modernity plays in these countries. As explained in the Hungarian case,

155

mundane modernity is an attractive version of Western modernity; a cool modernity that
can be symbolized by something as benign and mundane as a smartphone. In this context
then, raising a smartphone towards the sky is an action that can be readily interpreted as a
political demand.

The limits of mundane modernity as a mobilizing discourse
During the internet tax protests, the imaginary of mundane modernity was used in
opposition to the threat of an illiberal order put forward by Viktor Orbán – and for that
purpose it was extremely successful. However, there are two important limits to the
imaginary of mundane modernity that should be considered: first, although this imaginary
resonated with many protests in Central Eastern Europe, it is certainly not equally
suitable for or meaningful to social movements in different contexts; second, in the
Hungarian case it failed to support the creation of a full-fledged social movement that
could advance a broader social justice platform beyond the withdrawal of the internet tax
proposal.
The first limitation of the imaginary of mundane modernity is a direct
consequence of its appropriation of Silicon Valley’s imaginary. It is hard to imagine how
activists that are concerned with the role of corporations or with how social network sites
provide an opportunity for governments to surveil movements could find much political
purchase within an imaginary of mundane modernity that appropriates Silicon Valley’s
ideas about the inherent free and democratic nature of digital technologies. During the
interviews with the Italian LUMe and the American Philly Socialists, I employed two
pictures as visual aids that allowed me to gauge whether the imaginary of mundane
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modernity resonated with these activists. The pictures are shown in Figures 1 and 2: they
are widely circulated media images that reproduce the use of illuminated cell phones as a
symbol in both the Umbrella Movement in Hong Kong and the Hungarian internet tax
protests.

Figure 3. Pro-democracy demonstrators hold up their mobile phones during a protest near the Hong Kong
government headquarters on Sept. 29, 2014. Photo by Dale de la Rey/AFP/Getty Images.

157

Figure 4. Hungarian protesters march across the Erzsebet Bridge in Budapest. October 28th, 2014. AP
Photo/MTI, Janos Marjai.

After showing the pictures to the interviewees, I asked them if they recalled
seeing the pictures and whether they could identify what was portrayed in the pictures.
We then discussed what they thought the illuminated phones represented and whether it
seemed like a symbol they could relate to. None of the LUMe activists could correctly
identify either picture; this might also be due to their young age – most of them would
have been in high school when the Umbrella Movement and the Hungarian internet tax
protests happened. Among the five Philly Socialists interviewees, only the two older
activists recalled seeing these pictures: Tyler (36) correctly identified the image of the
Hungarian protests, while Alexander (43) recognized the one from Hong Kong.
More interestingly, activists of both the Philly Socialists and LUMe had a hard
time pinpointing the meaning of the lit-up phones. A few remarked on how the lights
could substitute candles in a vigil (LUMe: Boris, Stefano; Philly Socialists: Lisa); many
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more read the phones as a way to signal one’s presence, like people used to do at concerts
with lighters (LUMe: Stefano, Jessica, Maria, Valeria; Philly Socialists: Donna). A
couple of interviewees suggested it might be a practical way to illuminate the event
(LUMe: Mario, Valeria). One interviewee (Stefano from LUMe) suggested that the
phones were a good representation in the case the demonstrations had to do with access
to technology (as it is, in a way, in the Hungarian case); another one (Paolo from LUMe)
tentatively argued that the action might stand to signal that “part of the mass is
conscious”. Lastly, Tyler and Alexander, the two activists who correctly identified one
picture or the other, both associated the action with the intent to show that the activists
rely on the smartphone as a tool – and particularly a tool that can allow them to document
the protests (and possibly their repression). Tyler described the meaning of this action as
follows:
I guess it's sort of like the phone as a means. I mean almost everyone
has a phone now, so there is a ready-made element where anybody can
participate. You have your phone with you. There's the element to
which phones can both like we can interact with the world through
them and also they reflect us and we view things through them (Tyler).

He then went on to suggest that the activists are also using the phones to convey
the sense that the world is watching: “It's sort of like we are watching and yeah, like sort
of we're not alone, I guess.” (Tyler).
It is only for two interviewees from the Philly Socialists, Lisa and Michael, that
this symbolic action speaks more directly to the idea of freedom: freedom of speech for
Michael, and “freedom, freedom of communication, media, communication” for Lisa.
Both of them find that this action would probably resonate in a US context, too. For other
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interviewees of both the Philly Socialists and LUMe, though, the action that spread from
Hong Kong to Hungary to the rest of Central Eastern Europe, is less meaningful. When I
discussed with them how this symbol was meant to convey a powerful association
between digital technologies and freedom, most of them resisted and questioned this
interpretation. Donna (Philly Socialists) said that “the lights are definitely strange”.
Alexander (Philly Socialists) even found it funny that smartphones could take on such a
connotation; in a doubtful tone, he added: “maybe people have positive feelings about
their smartphones?” (Alexander). The Italian activists were even more skeptical. Mario
commented that he found the action “certainly effective, it’s an immediate and powerful
symbol, but… I feel a bit of sadness when I think about the smartphone becoming a
symbol of freedom, when in many ways it can actually be a symbol of the opposite”.
Along similar lines, Jessica offered that “it’s a bit anxiety inducing to think that all these
people certainly have a Facebook profile, that they have access to the internet, that their
location is being logged” (Jessica). Valeria completely denied that this protest action
could have a legible political meaning:
I don’t know… I don’t think that through… I mean, I personally don’t
believe I have a voice through the smartphone. I certainly have access
to more information, but it would honestly never cross my mind to take
out my phone. If not to take a picture. I would never take out my phone
as a symbol of something, no (Valeria).

In Valeria’s perspective, the smartphone is not a suitable political symbol. Maria
also shared that view and compared the smartphone to a traditional symbol of the
communist Left: “I mean, a political symbol for me is like hammer and sickle. Something
that can last for a long time. I see a smartphone more tied to the here and now”. She then
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questioned whether the smartphone could function as a symbol for protests about other
topics: “Because already for migration issues it cannot be a symbol anymore. What
would it represent?” (Maria).
The reactions of the vast majority of the interviewees of both the Philly Socialists
and LUMe point to the limited resonance of the visual performance of mundane
modernity outside of a post-communist context. When the activists were made aware of
the types of demonstrations in which the images were taken, they often tempered their
discomfort with the symbolism of the action by allowing that it could make sense in the
specific context of Hong Kong or Hungary. But most of them could not see such action
happen in one of their demonstrations or in other protests in their respective countries.
This shows the limits of a technological imaginary of mundane modernity. The
assumptions about technology, modernity and freedom that made this imaginary a
powerful mobilizing discourse in Hungary and the smartphone a resonant political
symbol for other protests in the Central Eastern European region do not necessarily
translate to other political contexts.
The second limitation of the imaginary of mundane modernity can be observed in
the specific context of the Hungarian internet tax protests. Although useful for the shortlived internet tax protests, this imaginary was not enough to sustain the creation of a more
stable and sustainable activist infrastructure – a full-fledged social movement – in
opposition to Orbán’s government. While there are also specific political conditions that
made it difficult for the Hungarian activists to sustain a long-term mass movement, we
can also speculate that the discourses surrounding the internet that were used in the
protests were not as suitable to build a broad platform centered on social justice. While it
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is difficult to pinpoint why the creation of a broader movement was not possible, it seems
plausible to at least suggest that an imaginary that pitches technology as the solution to
the lack of economic development and equality and as a manifestation of rationality
might fall short as a catalyzer for a broad movement for social justice. In both Silicon
Valley’s imaginary and in the imaginary of mundane modernity, it is the internet – not
social mobilization – that is thought to bring about social change. And if that is the case,
the imaginary of mundane modernity is in itself unlikely to inspire the kind of
imagination that would be necessary to bring together a sustained large scale mobilization
in the Hungarian political context.

Conclusions
In this chapter I analyzed the technological imaginary that was constructed and
deployed during the Hungarian internet tax protests of 2014. In order to do that, I
described the internet tax and the three demonstrations that a group of Budapest-based
left-liberal activists were able to organize. I suggested that the internet tax should be read
as an element of Hungary’s turn to illiberal democracy that has been enacted and
theorized by Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, since his coming into power in 2010. I also
emphasized that the internet tax protests should be considered among other activist
mobilizations against Orbán: while the internet tax demonstrations might have been
organized by left-liberal activists, who had been involved with many other anti-Orbán
protests, they drew a much bigger and heterogeneous crowd. I then examined the success
of the protests. I attributed that success to the deployment of a technological imaginary
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that connected the internet to bigger political demands and turned the internet tax into a
proxy of the government’s policies.
Through interviews with the main organizers of the internet tax protests, I
explained how the internet came to be associated with both Western modernity and
mundanity. This technological imaginary, which I called mundane modernity,
appropriates the core ideas of the dominant technological imaginary of Silicon Valley, in
that it associates the digital with democracy and freedom and pitches technologies as the
way to solve sociopolitical issues. This imaginary of appropriation is meaningful within
the post-2010 Hungarian political context, which has seen the resurgence of the political
cleavage of modernity vs. tradition. The appropriation of Silicon Valley’s imaginary is
thus influenced by the heightened political relevance of Western modernity in the
contemporary Hungarian political scene. Yet, it is also shaped by the activists’ opposition
to Orbán’s illiberal democracy, which has its own technological imaginary, of which the
internet tax is an illustration.
The deployment of the imaginary of mundane modernity in the Hungarian
internet tax protests – and in other non-internet focused protests throughout the region –
also shows the mobilizing power of technological imaginaries, especially those that draw
on the dominant ideas that have been popularized by Silicon Valley over the past few
decades. The performance of the imaginary of mundane modernity through the symbolic
lifting of smartphones to the sky could be read as a political symbol because of the very
power of Silicon Valley’s imaginary and its appropriation in the post-communist context.
However, as I have shown in this chapter, the power of this imaginary has limits.
The Italian and American activists with whom I have discussed the protest action
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involving smartphones expressed their reservations about its political relevance. Turning
smartphones into a political symbol did not make sense to them. I thus argued that
mundane modernity is not an equally suitable imaginary for movements that, as LUMe
and the Philly Socialists, disagree with the premises of the dominant technological
imaginary of Silicon Valley.
I now turn to LUMe and the Philly Socialists, whose rejection of Silicon Valley’s
ideas requires the construction of technological imaginaries of negotiation.
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Chapter 3 – Negotiation: LUMe and the tools of the system
Introduction
In this chapter I examine the technological imaginary of the Metropolitan
University Laboratory (Laboratorio Universitario MEtropolitano, or LUMe26), a radical
leftist collective based in Milan, Italy. The collective is made of students and recent
graduates of the universities and art academies in Milan. They are a broadly inclusive
leftist group, which self-describes as “antisexist, antiracist, and antifascist”. Since its
founding in 2015, LUMe has occupied three different empty buildings, which they
opened to the public and used to host public events, such as concerts, theater
performances, and debates. LUMe is widely known in the Milanese activist scene for its
commitment to promoting grassroots culture.
This chapter is based on a combination of interviews and visual focus groups. In
particular, I rely on 8 semi-structured interviews conducted with LUMe activists (4 men
and 4 women) between 2018 and 2019. The interviews were conducted either in person
in Milan or via video chat software (either Skype or Facebook Messenger); their average
length was 78 minutes. I also conducted two visual focus groups, with 5 and 4
participants respectively. Interviews and visual focus groups were conducted in Italian;
they were audio-recorded and transcribed. Unless otherwise noted, all translations from
Italian are mine. In addition to the interviews and visual focus groups, I observed LUMe
in different occasions: two open assemblies (in December 2017 and December 2018), one

26

Although LUMe activists are not consistent in their capitalization practices, I reproduce the sequence of
uppercase and lowercase letters that they use in their logo.

165

organizational assembly (in June 2018) and a working group meeting (June 2018). I also
collected media coverage of LUMe and monitored as LUMe’s social media content.
I describe LUMe’s technological imaginary – in the words of the members of the
collective – as “fighting the system with the tools of the system”. It is an imaginary that
sees digital technologies as flawed, but indispensable for social change. In the terms
employed by this dissertation, it is an imaginary of negotiation: the Italian activists
criticize the key aspects of the dominant technological imaginary of Silicon Valley, yet
they rely on Silicon Valley’s technologies in their activism. To make sense of the
tensions that ensue, they draw on two resources: their occupied, offline spaces and the
idea of using digital technologies with “awareness” (consapevolezza). Their imaginary of
negotiation is shaped by the legacy of the Italian social centers; this legacy carries with it
an attention to the role of occupied spaces, which plays a key role in how LUMe activists
think about the digital. But there is also another element which shapes their negotiation:
the prominence of the technological imaginary of the Five Star Movement, one of the
main Italian political parties, now in government. Their imaginary, which re-elaborates
the technological imaginary of Silicon Valley, is predicated on a discourse of digital
utopianism, which has been used to justify nondemocratic practices within the party (see
Natale & Ballatore, 2014; Treré, 2018).
In the chapter I first describe LUMe’s history, since its foundation in 2015, and I
highlight how the three subsequent occupations have structured the life of the collective. I
then examine the politics of LUMe. I contextualize the collective’s politics within the
long history of Italian “social centers”, i.e. social movements that occupy buildings as
their primary political practice; I show how LUMe critically reinterprets this legacy. I
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then focus on two of the main issues that have guided LUMe’s political action: their
interest in using occupied spaces to foster grassroots culture that is accessible to all, and
their anti-racist mobilization. The chapter then describes the horizontal organizational
structures through which LUMe operates. Further, I account for LUMe’s technological
practices as they pertain to both external and internal communication; in particular, I
highlight the centrality of Facebook and Whatsapp in the life of the collective. In the rest
of the chapter, I theorize LUMe’s technological imaginary of “using the tools of the
system to fight the system”. I use the collective drawings prepared by the activists in the
visual focus groups, as well as the interviews, to highlight LUMe’s main critiques of the
internet: a) an anticapitalist critique of how corporate power operates online and b)
skepticism about the democraticness of the internet. However, despite this criticism, they
also believe that digital technologies are crucial for activism and that there is no
alternative to them. Their technological imaginary of negotiation thus considers digital
technologies simultaneously as flawed and indispensable. I describe how their
negotiation relies on “awareness” and on occupied spaces as resources that allow them to
make sense of their technological imaginary. Lastly, I argue that LUMe’s technological
imaginary is shaped by both the heritage of the Italian occupied social centers and by
LUMe’s rejection of the prominent technological imaginary expressed by the Five Star
Movement.

The Metropolitan University Laboratory
LUMe is based in Milan, Italy. LUMe was founded in April 2015 during the
occupation of an empty, privately-owned multi-story building located in vicolo Santa
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Caterina, next to the University of Milan (Università degli Studi di Milano, usually
known as Università Statale). The occupied building gave them a venue for concerts,
poetry readings, and theater performances, which led to the inclusion of students from the
numerous art schools and performance academies of Milan.
The occupation was spearheaded by an existing collective, called Collettivo
Dillinger, which was founded by a handful of activists who came from the same political
background: having created a left-wing political association for high school students in
Milan, called Rete Studenti. When this generation of activists arrived at the University of
Milan, they decided to continue their experience of organizing through the creation of a
collective – Dillinger. It is Dillinger that originally occupied the Santa Caterina building
(“Milano: Nasce Lume, Laboratorio Universitario Metropolitano,” 2015) and named it
LUMe, which subsequently became the name of the larger collective. In their
communiqué following the occupation, they reflected on the meaning of the occupation:
“We believe that the only way out of a crisis, that is first existential and of thought, and
then economic, lies in the exchange of critical ideas, in the encounter between thinking
bodies and minds” (Collettivo Dillinger, 2015). As I will show below, the importance of
occupying physical space is crucial to the politics of the collective.
The activists I have encountered and interviewed are all in their twenties, with
younger members as young as 21 and older members around 28-29 years old. This means
that generationally, these young activists have been greatly influenced by the
mobilization of the Anomalous Wave, the student movement that, between 2008 and
2009, opposed the educational policies of the Berlusconi IV government (see Barassi &
Treré, 2012); although not all of the LUMe activists were old enough to be part of the
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Wave, the founding members of the collective started to be politically active during that
time of heightened student activism.
In the following two years LUMe grew rapidly, taking advantage of the proximity
to the University of Milan. They cleaned, painted and renovated the occupied building,
opening it up to the public and providing a hub for music, performance and art. They
discovered that the Santa Caterina building also had access to a crypt and held all of their
concerts and performances there. LUMe activists turned the other floors (four in total)
into a bar, a relaxation room with couches, a rehearsal space, study spaces and several
other rooms which hosted LUMe’s sprawling projects. They often took advantage of the
adjacent parvis of the Church of San Nazaro in Brolo to hold concerts and film
screenings outdoors.
Over their first two years of existence, LUMe became an important hub for young artists
and students of the universities in Milan. The occupied space brought together “young
activists with experience as militants of social centers, students of the University of Milan
and beyond, artists, musicians” (“LUMe - Tre anni di viaggio nella metropoli,” 2018).
Their focus on art and culture as a form of political activism made them a unique
collective in the Milanese scene. During this time, LUMe grew to include between 80 and
100 activists; most of them had never been involved in activism before joining the
collective.
The Santa Caterina building had a peculiar history. Part of a cluster of buildings
constructed in the 16th century, it had historically been a osteria (popular restaurant); that
osteria was even mentioned in one of the most important Italian novels, The Betrothed,
authored by Alessandro Manzoni in 1827 (“LUMe - Tre anni di viaggio nella metropoli,”
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2018). LUMe later honored this literary legacy with a mural painting that depicts the
scene of The Betrothed in which the osteria is mentioned. The building is owned by a
real estate company which has been in the midst of legal trouble for years (Collettivo
Dillinger, 2015). It had been empty for ten years when LUMe occupied it.
They were evicted from the Santa Caterina building in the summer of 2017. The
eviction was a rather traumatic event for the collective. According to the activists,
contrary to usual police practice, LUMe was not alerted of the upcoming eviction
(“Sgomberato Lume. E il centro sociale organizza un concerto,” 2017). Police cleared out
the occupied space in the early morning. LUMe activists only found out because an
activist of an allied organization happened upon the eviction and informed them. The loss
of a physical space weighed on the collective. They promptly organized open assemblies
and movie screenings in the square adjacent to their no longer occupied building. They
promoted a petition to the Municipality of Milan, which gathered more than 2800
supporters on change.org (LUMe, 2017a). Throughout that summer, they met in activists’
apartments and in meeting spaces provided by other organizations. At that point, none of
the other collectives that are close to LUMe (in the so-called Area, which I describe
below) had an occupied space that they could offer as temporary base.
LUMe spent that summer of 2017 planning their comeback. In particular, on 23
September 2017 they organized the “cultural siege of Palazzo Marino” (Assedio culturale
a Palazzo Marino): a one-day event, with speeches, live music, theater performances, and
so on, organized around a march from the Santa Caterina building to the main seat of the
municipal government of Milan – Palazzo Marino. For this event, LUMe gathered the
support of a broad range of actors: other collectives in Milan and in Italy, local bands and
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artists, cultural organizations, theater ensembles. With the “cultural siege”, LUMe aimed
to highlight its contribution to the cultural life of the city and to the precarious life of the
Milanese youth, but also denounce the hypocrisy of being evicted to “preserve decorum”.
In one of their Facebook posts on the cultural siege, they explained that they were
mobilizing “against the idea of decorum, according to which it is preferable to leave a
historical building in the run-down conditions that the Santa Caterina building was in
[before their occupation], instead of bringing it to life and into the spotlight of the city’s
cultural scene” (LUMe, 2017c). At the end of the same post, they stated that they were
taking to the streets to “defend the right to a legitimate sociality, to a critical, independent
and self-organized culture” (LUMe, 2017c).
The cultural siege was organized under two slogans, which exemplify LUMe’s
communicative style, inspired by guerrilla marketing. The first was “LUMe non si
spegne”, literally “LUMe can’t be turned off”. This is a play on the fact that the group’s
acronym is pronounced like the archaic Italian word “lume”, which means light: the
slogan thus simultaneously means that a light cannot be turned off and that the collective
cannot be turned off. Furthermore, “lume” not only means light, but also forms the basis
of the Italian word for Englightenment, Illuminismo. Because of this association, the
group has relied on representations of “light” in its visual identity, too. Their logo is, in
fact, a traditional incandescent light bulb in which the internal filament is shaped like a
fist (a longtime symbol of the anticapitalist left) (see Figure 5).
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Figure 5. The logo of LUMe plays on the assonance of the acronym of the collective with an archaic Italian
word that means “light” (lume); the logo is a traditional incandescent light bulb in which the internal
filament is shaped like a fist (LUMe, 2017b).

The second slogan was also a wordplay on the Italian term for “heavy artillery” –
artiglieria pesante – to which LUMe added the letter “n”, turning it into artiglieria
pensante, “thinking artillery”. The slogan made its way to the t–shirts that LUMe
prepared for the occasion, which depicted a brain emerging from a post-nuclear explosion
mushroom cloud (see Figure 6).
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Figure 6. A t-shirt created by LUMe for the “cultural siege” of 2017. On top of the slogan “artiglieria
pensante” (i.e. thinking artillery, a wordplay on the Italian words for heavy artillery), a mushroom cloud
shaped like a brain (LUMe, 2017f).

In October 2017, LUMe conducted a brief occupation of a foreclosed cinema –
Cinema Orchidea – in the city center of Milan, re-opening it for the local population. Due
to the fear of being under police watch, LUMe announced it was “back” with a Facebook
event (LUMe, 2017h), but did not disclose what building it would occupy. Ahead of the
announcement, they prepared an entire line-up of events, including a debate on the
commons (Tavola Rotonda sui Beni Comuni) with external experts, open assemblies and
movie screenings (LUMe, 2017h). On October 18th, the day of the occupation, the
activists met at the Catholic University of Milan (Università Cattolica) and pretended to
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be celebrating someone’s graduation. One activist, Jessica, posed as the graduate, with
the customary laurels and flower bouquet, as well as the inevitable celebratory sparkling
wine; she led the group of 80 activists through the streets around the Catholic University.
Only a handful of activists knew of the destination. Once at the cinema, a first attempt to
enter the building from a nearby courtyard failed, forcing the activists to break a glass
panel to get in. In the following days, LUMe took advantage of the cinema to promote
free movie screenings, jazz concerts, and cultural and political debates.
The occupation of the movie theater was brief. The building, owned by the
Municipality of Milan, had been closed to the public since 2009; the municipal
government approved and financed its renovation in 2015, but at the time of LUMe’s
occupation (late 2017) the movie theater still had not undergone any repair work (LUMe,
2017g; Venni, 2017). The Municipality did not take LUMe’s occupation well and
immediately denounced the action to the police (Venni, 2017). LUMe, however, publicly
pledged it would leave the building as soon as the Municipality of Milan resumed the
renovation works on the movie theater (Vazzana, 2017). On October 25th, the municipal
government announced that the renovation of the Cinema Orchidea would start before the
end of 2017. LUMe declared victory: they announced they would leave the movie theater
on that same day (LUMe, 2017i). They stated that only their mobilization – their
“conflictual action” of occupying the cinema – induced the Municipality to act (LUMe,
2017i); and that they would leave the Cinema Orchidea “with pride, having woken up the
institutions from their torpor” (LUMe, 2017i). As of April 2019, unfortunately,
renovations still need to begin and the Cinema Orchidea is not open to the public (LUMe,
2019b).
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A week after leaving the Cinema Orchidea, on November 2, 2017, they occupied
a municipality-owned maintenance deposit (magazzino del verde), where they are
currently carrying out their activities. The deposit is part of the system of XVI Century
walls adjacent to Porta Venezia, one of the ancient gates to the city. LUMe states that the
deposit was built in 1789 to host the maintenance equipment needed for the upkeep of the
gardens that were built around the defensive walls, after they no longer functioned as
military defense (LUMe, 2017j). The last known use of the deposit, prior to LUMe’s
occupation, dated to the 1920s (LUMe, 2017j). The deposit is a vaulted space; it includes
a larger room, which activists use for concerts and performances, a long L-shaped
corridor with a side room used for storage, and a large entryway. While the new occupied
space has its own challenges – such as the damp and cold climate –, it has given LUMe
the possibility to resume its cultural and political activities; in the Facebook post where
they claimed responsibility for the occupation, they explained that they were continuing
their “denunciation of the abandonment of privately and publicly owned historical
buildings” (LUMe, 2017j). They claimed that they wanted to “make this space a home for
arts and culture, to push forward our horizontal and inclusive model, to give back to
citizens a place that has survived the unstoppable transformation of the city of Milan over
the past 250 years” (LUMe, 2017j).
LUMe hoped that their new location could foster a positive relationship with the
neighboring communities, even if far away from the University of Milan. Their
relationship with the neighborhood has been mostly untroubled. However, a group of
local residents complained to the police and the Municipality about the loudness of some
of the activities of LUMe, which typically take place in the evening (Mingoia, 2018a).

175

LUMe contended that the complaint did not originate from residents but was orchestrated
by a group of party members of Forza Italia – Berlusconi’s right-wing formation. While
they used media coverage to reassure the neighborhood that they aimed for a respectful
coexistence and to invite neighbors to take part in their activities (Mingoia, 2018b), they
penned a Facebook post to criticize the Forza Italia member that they held responsible for
this episode. They made fun of his attempts to rally the residents against LUMe and
defended their occupation, by underlining how they managed to reopen a space that had
been closed for a century: “Was it better beforehand? Abandoned for decades, with
hundreds of needles both inside and in the adjoining garden, that we removed to our risk?
With mice and human waste that we clean up every day?” (LUMe, 2018b).
Currently, LUMe is technically occupying a second space – a classroom within
the University of Milan. For decades, this small classroom had been a hub for student
organizations, clubs and the University’s student-run independent newspaper (LUMe,
2018a). It was closed by the university administration in 2015. In September 2018,
LUMe activists occupied the room to re-open it for the student population (LUMe,
2018d). In addition to being used by LUMe and other student groups, the room is open to
students who use it as a study hall.

The politics of LUMe
LUMe is a broadly inclusive leftist collective. But if you looked for a manifesto
or a ten-point plan that explains what political ideas LUMe stands for, you would be
disappointed. LUMe’s politics shine through their myriad events and colorful digital
posters, but it is hard to pin them down. On the old blog-website that the collective no
longer updates, which I will discuss in detail below, the page titled “Manifesto” has a
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single long quote from activist Primo Moroni, a key figure of the Milan-based radical
movements of the 1970s. His work with Libreria Calusca, an activist bookstore that
functioned as a hub for radical leftists and anarchists (Lucarelli, 2018; Ruggiero, 2000, p.
172), and his involvement in the early occupation movements (centri sociali) make
Moroni a forefather to today’s movements. The quote that LUMe chose to describe
themselves highlights the importance of developing spaces of resistance in the city:
Places are crucial, because there is a process of general subsumption of
life, the economy, and culture: everything is a commodity. But then
there are places where this logic is rejected. I think that this is a phase
in which those who have the capacities, the credibility, the subjectivity
to have places, in my opinion should not just enact a political project, at
least at this stage, but rather do something else that is strategic and
indispensable: to transform those places in research centers, or at least
devote part of their activity to education and research. If knowledge has
become a productive commodity, either in itself or by being enclosed in
the machine, in technology, or in information, which is its largest
extension, we need to make existential decisions; but if existential
decisions are not nurtured by a complex and sophisticated culture, i.e.
of continuous cultural production and self-production, that decision will
only produce existential malaise. Between existential revolt and the
self-production of the subject there is a strategic step, which is the
capacity to take control of different knowledge instruments that allow
us to decode, de-structure and blow up the schemas of the adversary:
otherwise nothing can come through without this primitive cultural
accumulation of knowledges (LUMe, n.d.).

The long quote emphasizes the necessity to create spaces that are able to resist the
commodification of life and to rescue knowledge from profit, by allowing people to
autonomously create culture, away from the logics of capital. As we will see below,
LUMe has taken up Moroni’s invitation and sees culture as a primary locus for political
contention.
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The absence of a manifesto beyond the quote from Moroni is indicative of the
loose articulation of the political stances of LUMe. But this is not considered a problem
by the activists. As Stefano explained: “we have a rather vague political identity and
everyone has their own opinions, but we have things we are fairly committed to, without
having to write it down in a manifesto”. Some of this reluctance to pinning down their
political values in a document certainly rests in their will to not adhere to any specific
leftist revolutionary theory. As Paolo said:

Well, let’s say that LUMe doesn’t have a real… we don’t fit within one
of the many, very many theories of the Left. So, you can’t really pin us
down and say that LUMe belongs to… I don’t know, the marxistleninist tradition. We don’t aim for the creation of a mass party. You
can’t say we are a libertarian space that aims for anarchy… We can say
that the largest majority of our comrades, and certainly of the comrades
that are in the political collective, but the group in general… we have a
communist orientation, if we can still call it that. I personally am really
into post-operaist theories, and it’s not just me (Paolo).
This effort towards inclusivity and a-theoretical praxis might also explain how
LUMe managed to attract so many members that had never previously been involved in
political activism, let alone an occupation. The other likely reason that brought LUMe to
not invest time and energy into drafting a political manifesto is the fact that occupying a
space frames their activism in the tradition of the “social centers” (centri sociali), as I
will explain in the next subsection. Identifying as a social center already implies a certain
set of political commitments. A few interviewees referred to the “obvious values” that
LUMe holds “as a social center”: being a social center carries a set of expectations
regarding political identity that are taken for granted in the Italian activist scene. This
means a general leftist orientation, “a Marxist reading of society” (Mario), an opposition
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to neoliberal capitalism and imperialism; it also implies a general opposition towards
right-wing populism – and thus the current Italian government that is based on an alliance
between the Northern League and the Five Star Movement. Yet it also entails a certain
disregard for the parties of the center-left, chiefly the Democratic Party, and its local
expressions, such as the coalition that governs the Municipality of Milan. Their identity
as “social center” also means valuing participatory mechanisms in their organizing.
These are the political orientations embraced by LUMe, which are implicit in
their calling themselves a “social center”, but are made explicit through the events and
mobilizations that the group promotes. When asked explicitly about the politics of
LUMe, activists rarely articulate these values, although they come to the fore in their
answers to other questions. The shorthand that most of the interviewees used to explain
the politics of LUMe to me, and which is included in all of their online materials as well
as public presentations, is that they identify as “antifascist, antiracist and antisexist”. This
translates into three visible threads running through their many events: promoting
antifascist mobilizations and cultural events, organizing around the issue of immigration,
and hosting feminist and queer artists and speakers. LUMe has been involved in the
organization of anti-fascist and anti-racist protests, directed against, among others, the
Northern League, i.e. the xenophobic right-wing populist party that governed the region
of Lombardy since 2013 and is now a major actor in the national government coalition
(elected in 2018). LUMe’s collective appears friendlier towards women and LGBTQ
individuals than what is typically the case for radical leftist collectives. This is also
reflected in their participation in Gay Pride parades in Milan and their organization of a
four-day festival, called “Body Politics: body self-determination”, thought of as a
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collective consciousness-raising moment directed at eliminating gender disparities. The
festival was held in March 2018, around International Women’s Day, and was organized
in collaboration with a radical feminist collective and the Milan branch of the national
feminist movement “Non una di meno” (“Not one woman less”).
In the rest of this section on the politics of LUMe, I explain the importance of
occupying buildings as a longstanding political tactic in the history of Italian radical
activism; I highlight how LUMe consciously draws on this legacy, while also trying to
distance itself from its problematic aspects. I then focus on two of the issues that have
defined LUMe’s political action: their commitment to grassroots, accessible culture as a
form of political struggle and their mobilization against racism.

Occupation as a tactic and an identity: LUMe as a social center
In an open assembly that took place shortly after the occupation of the
maintenance deposit in Porta Venezia, a participant not (yet) affiliated with LUMe, but
acquainted with one of the activists, reported a rumor: that LUMe maintains a list of
possible target buildings that the activists have scouted around the city. While the
activists declined to get into that particular discussion or confirm the rumor, the assembly
briefly discussed the problems involved in occupying buildings. Since occupation is not
only illegal but defined as a criminal act in the Italian penal code, activists can be
prosecuted. But LUMe activists also underscored that occupations are risky because they
require a lot of labor, not only for the initial act of entering into a building to claim it and
reopen it for public fruition, but also for necessary repairs and organizational work.
LUMe takes great pride in the labor that its activist put into de facto restoring both the
Santa Caterina building and its current occupied location. When I first visited LUMe for
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an open assembly in December 2017, the building had been occupied for a couple of
months. It was dark, incredibly damp and the heating was not really working. When I
conducted my first interviews in June 2018, the environment had completely changed:
the activists put in a wooden floor, a bar with functioning beer taps, a sink and a fridge.
They upgraded the heating system with a more complex set of pipes, they added couches
and a foosball table. The walls were now covered with the posters of their many events.
While LUMe’s assembly did not deny its dream of occupying more than one building at
the time, the reality is that multiple occupied sites would be incredibly hard to manage for
a large, but horizontally-run collective composed mainly by students and recent graduates
– most of whom at their first activist experience.
Occupations are direct confrontations with power. They are precarious and they
are risky, because occupying buildings is illegal. While there are different charges for the
occupation of public vs. private buildings – and public administrations might favor
tolerance over repression – occupying space remains a fraught practice. Yet it is also
incredibly widespread among Italian radical activists. And it is more than a tactic:
maintaining an occupied space is a source of collective identity, which entails certain
types of political beliefs and political practices. This collective identity is rooted in the
history of Italian occupied spaces, which activists can actively draw upon.
In fact, the occupation of privately and publicly owned buildings has been a
popular tactic for Italian social movements for the past 40 years (Genova, 2018; Mudu,
2018; Ruggiero, 2000). The occupation of buildings for political purposes emerged as a
tactic in the 1970s, when activists of the extra-parliamentary left occupied universities,
abandoned factories, run-down buildings and even churches (Edwards, 2009; Mudu,
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2004). Although sometimes referred to in the English language literature as “political
squats” (see Genova, 2018), in Italian these occupied spaces are called social centers
(centri sociali) or occupied self-managed social centers (centri sociali occupati
autogestiti, frequently referred to with the acronym CSOA). Unlike in other European
countries, today these occupied spaces are usually not destined to provide
accommodation to activists: they are occupied to host political, cultural and social events,
not for housing27. The core principle guiding the praxis of the social centers is that of
self-management (autogestione), which is based on a critique of representative
democracy, a rejection of hierarchy, and an embrace of horizontal organizational
practices (Montagna, 2006, p. 296).
The history of Italian social centers is challenging to periodize. Writing in 1992,
the activist, historian and archivist of Milanese social movements, Primo Moroni,
identified three generations of occupied social centers (Moroni, 1992). From the vantage
point of 2019 we can probably identify four generations of social centers – three are well
documented in the literature, but I argue for the necessity to recognize a fourth one, that
helps explain the contemporary moment.
First, the initial wave of occupations of the 1970s, which started before and fed
into the tumultuous events of 1977, was the consequence of the emergence of youth as a
political actor in the post-1968 context – a largely disenfranchised, impoverished and
precarious youth (Moroni, 1992). Occupying buildings was the response to the erosion of
traditional social spaces of aggregations – which for the Left were chiefly factories and
party-sponsored spaces – and to the need of creating autonomous spaces for the pre27

In the 1970s the squatting of empty apartments and houses was more commonly included in the
occupation tactics of the extra-parliamentary left, e.g. Lotta Continua (Gray, 2018). Live-in occupations
still exist today, but they are understood to be disjoined from the experience of the social centers.
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figurative experimentation of alternative lifestyles. A second generation of occupations
emerged in the 1980s, driven by the thriving punk scene and the attempt to escape the
spread of heroin, by providing social spaces that were not tied to heroin consumption.
The most important social center of this generation is Leoncavallo in Milan, not because
of its founding (it existed since the 1970s), but because in 1989 the police evicted it in a
heightened confrontation that generated a wave of solidarity throughout the country. This
solidarity translated into the occupation of more spaces, in conjunction with the rise of a
new student movement in Italian schools and universities – the Panther (La Pantera). A
third generation of social centers found strength in the extraordinary international
mobilization of the global justice movement. From the mid-1990s onward, after the
Zapatista uprising in the mountains of Chiapas, through the anti-Iraq war demonstrations
of the early 2000s, social centers were a crucial component of the broader antiglobalization movement. New occupations emerged everywhere in Italy. After this period
of growth and (relative) popularity of social centers, which actively created regional and
national networks of solidarity with each other, political and organizational divisions
began to weigh on this already fragmented and diverse movement (Casaglia, 2018, p.
490). This led to a perception of social centers as sectarian and self-righteous, more
interested in cultivating loyalty within an inner circle of long-time activists than
incubating inclusive mobilizations.
Some of these tendencies, however, have been mitigated in what I argue is a new
generation of social centers, which were born in the 2010s. These social centers were
established by newer generations of activists, for whom the financial crisis of 2008 and
the Anomalous Wave of student movements in Italy in 2008-2009 were key events. In
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Milan, this generation of social centers includes not only LUMe (b. 2015), but also
Macao (b. 2012) (Cossu, 2018; Murru & Cossu, 2015), ZAM (b. 2010) (Barassi, 2015),
CASC Lambrate (b. 2012) and CSOA Lambretta (b. 2012); similar experiences also
sprung up in other Italian cities, for instance Labas in Bologna (b. 2012). A catalyzing
event for this new wave of occupations that was specific to Milan was the urban
development process ahead of the 2015 Milan Expo (the Universal Exposition), which
gave movements in the city a chance to defend the commons (i.e. specifically green
spaces in the case of the Expo) and “raise awareness about neoliberal processes of
governance at work” (Casaglia, 2018, p. 492). This newer generation has critically
reinterpreted the legacy of the social center identity, while attempting to be more open,
i.e. less identitarian and more integrated with the neighborhoods in which the social
centers are situated. As is evident in the case of Macao (Murru & Cossu, 2015; Valli,
2015) and of LUMe, as I will explain in the following section, a core focus of this new
generation of social centers lies in the production of cultural events.
Throughout this 40-year history of diverse, fragmented and precarious
occupations, a few key values have been constant. Social centers have been
overwhelmingly urban expressions of the anticapitalist, antifascist Left28. Casaglia (2018)
argued that, starting in the 1970s, social centers “called for a bottom-up participation in
the transformation of power relations”, which was put into practice through selfmanagement and the “running [of] physical squatted space as a liberative and

28

Social centers have emerged in rural areas, too, but in these cases they faced significant difficulties due
to their geographical distance from centers of power and the characteristics of rural oriented social life
(Mudu, 2018). Neofascist activists, such as those of Casa Pound, have also occupied buildings – notably in
Rome – to carry out their political activities. These occupations however cannot be considered social
centers because of their political orientation and more hierarchical and leader-centered organizational
practices (Mudu, 2018).
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participative public place” (p. 483). As Mudu (2018) suggested, social centers have
engendered “an ‘enactment’ of physical spaces towards the production of a noncommodified sociality, free culture, and bottom-up self-managed services” (p. 451). In so
doing they have brought together an opposition to capitalism with prefigurative practices,
combining “radical struggle with grassroots initiatives for alternative models” (Casaglia,
2018, p. 483).
For LUMe, occupying run-down, unused buildings means actively turning them
into commons, liberating them from neglect, reopening them for public consumption and
filling them with politically meaningful cultural content. The idea of “commons” has
been central to the praxis of social centers of the past 10 years; at the same time, the idea
of fighting to preserve the commons has been seeping into mainstream public opinion
due to the successful national referendum of 2011, where Italians voted to stop the
privatization of the water service, under the slogan “Water as a commons” (Acqua Bene
Comune) (Mattei, 2013). Commons can be defined as “social systems at different scales
of action within which resources are shared and in which a community defines the terms
of the sharing, often through forms of horizontal social relations founded on participatory
and inclusive democracy” (De Angelis, 2014, p. 302). Although the idea of commons has
been important to political philosophers for a long time, recent contributions focus on the
way in which commons can be a response to capitalist enclosure that can be put in
practice through a process of “commoning”, i.e. through “social labor and the
corresponding forms of cooperation that are located within commons” (De Angelis, 2014,
p. 302). In short, talking about commons today is not necessarily talking about protecting
pre-existing commons – parks, waterways, nature –, but rather about sustaining the
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creation of commons which operate, as much as possible, outside of capitalist logics
(Casaglia, 2018). It is in this vein that Paolo, one of LUMe’s founders, defined LUMe as
“urban commons” (bene comune urbano). Boris also said that what has motivated him the
most to join LUMe was “the struggle and the will to bring run-down, abandoned and
closed spaces to life, and to make them what we would like them to be, commons”.
Jessica reminisced about the occupation of the Cinema Orchidea:
It was one of the best moments of my life. I never thought that at age
28, maybe 26 at the time… I would have occupied a movie theater. But
it was great. I did not feel I was engaged in vandalism, I felt like I was
doing the right thing and I don’t regret it, I will never regret it…
because that movie theater had been shut down for 10 years and we
went in and for that week me made it live again. (Jessica)

Over and over again, in both the interviews that I conducted and in their public
statements, LUMe activists echoed Jessica’s words: that their occupations of buildings
are really liberations, that are meant to open up and revitalize urban spaces. LUMe’s
approach received unexpected validation in one of the legal proceedings that LUMe’s
activists have been involved in (“Occupare? Non (sempre) è reato: gip ‘perdona’ studenti
di un centro sociale,” 2018; “‘Occupare non è reato se lo scopo è dimostrativo’, il gip di
Milano perdona due studenti di un centro sociale,” 2018). After the occupation of their
current location in 2017, two of the activists received criminal charges. In 2018, however,
the preliminary investigation judge (gip) turned down the public prosecutor’s (Procura)
request to proceed with a criminal trial, and instead redirected the case to an
administrative court for a regular, civil proceeding. The preliminary investigation judge’s
decision stated that “it is not a crime to occupy a building if the action has an exemplary
intent aimed at steering public authorities towards a more fruitful utilization of such
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spaces with objectives connected with the enjoyment of collectivity and citizenship”
(“‘Occupare non è reato se lo scopo è dimostrativo’, il gip di Milano perdona due studenti
di un centro sociale,” 2018). Commenting on this remarkable judicial decision, LUMe
activists wrote:
the symbolic value of these words, beyond the legal one, is evident: the
political nature of LUMe as urban commons, its accessibility, its public
and social function, and the work that, as a collective, we carry out in
the city of Milan is being recognized in its entirety. But we are anyway
still far away from the possibility of breaking out of current legal
structures, tied to exclusionary and exclusive concepts and
interpretations, to engender new legal-political practices and
conceptions that are oriented towards a social use of private property.
(LUMe, 2018e)
After asserting the value of occupation and commoning, and the need to rethink
the law around a more collective and social interpretation of private property, LUMe’s
Facebook post went on to highlight how social centers are at increased risk of repression
under the Northern League – Five Star Movement government. In its last part, LUMe’s
post invited activists to fight against “the rise of souverainiste fascisms, the complicity of
populists and the neoliberal centrist parties”, through “the strength and transparency of
the practices, the ideas, the communities, and the networks we will manage to build”
(LUMe, 2018e). In so doing, LUMe drew a direct line between the practice of creating
urban commons and the opposition to rising populist, fascist and neoliberal forces.
It is evident that the occupation of buildings and their transformation into
commons provides a strong collective identity to LUMe’s activists. The identity work
performed by the practice of occupation became even more evident to activists when they
were evicted from their first occupied space in 2017. As Mario recalled:
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It is important to have a space, it’s unthinkable to go on without one for
a long time. Even if LUMe, even if any collective, cannot be reduced to
the physical structure that hosts it in that given moment, that physical
structure nevertheless contributes to giving you an identity, to giving
you a certain… mindset, because when you know you have your social
center, you work on it, you have to manage it, etc etc, this beats the
time of your militancy. Assemblies and so on… (Mario)

Even though a social center, as a collective actor, can survive without a physical
occupied space, the practices of self-management that sustain an occupation give activists
an identity and a mindset, as Mario highlighted. The occupation gives LUMe a way of
thinking about their activism and situate it within the broader political context of the city
of Milan.
The embrace of occupation and commoning puts them in conversation with the
long legacy of social centers in Italy, which I sketched out above. As one of the activists
articulated:
even historically… it can’t be lost, this practice [occupation] has value,
if we lose it… I mean, we talked about it a lot, when we were about to
occupy again, we decided it’s a practice that can’t get lost and we need
to continue with it even if… even if maybe we would not pull it off.
(Valeria)

The activists are acutely aware of the legacy of the social centers and consciously
situate their occupations within that historical trajectory. However, as both a young social
center and as composed by young activists, LUMe has been critical in reflecting on what
that parts of that legacy they most wanted to embrace. Many interviewees explained that
LUMe tried to innovate what being a social center means: “we wanted to bring something
new by proposing activities that were not… how can I say it… not the classical
conception of activity that you have within social centers” (Paolo). This innovation of the
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“classic” social center was necessary because of the difficult political moment in which
LUMe came to exist. As Stefano chronicled:
I mean, it was the moment when, even from the media’s perspective,
the term “social center” and “social center-ers” (centro-socialisti) was
almost a plague. It was the backlash of the ‘black block’ paranoia, it
was happening again but around the social centers. It was partially
caused by the Expo, and it got worse over time, for political and partypolitical reasons. (Stefano)

The backlash that Stefano identified corresponds to a decrease in popularity and
an increase of infighting that older social centers went through after the mid-2000s, and
which ultimately gave a new generation of social centers the motivation to try to do
things differently. Jessica and Ilaria both highlighted that LUMe’s innovative take on the
identity of social centers is what initially drove them to join. Jessica explained: “You
know, one might think that social centers… that only certain types of people go there.
But what I always liked about LUMe is that you could find anyone there, really”. Ilaria
echoed her: “You know, LUMe was a hybrid between a classic social center and a
cultural center, more in line with what had always been my interests. That’s why I joined
and then I got super-politicized”. Stefano confirmed that one of LUMe’s aims was to “be
able to say that [LUMe] was a social center without creating panic in other people” and
that LUMe succeeded in this; Jessica concurred, explaining that LUMe’s ability to bring
different people together in a non-traditional social center “is what brought me to being
part of it without being ashamed, but rather to be very proud of it”.
Although LUMe might have a particularly innovative take on being an occupied
social center – no doubt fueled by its characteristic attention to culture –, they are not the
only expression of this new wave of social centers in Milan. For instance, LUMe is part
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of a loosely coordinated aggregation of movements and (newer) social centers in Milan,
known as “Area” or “Antagonistic Milanese Area” (Area Antagonistica Milanese). The
Area is composed by LUMe, CASC Lambrate, CSOA Lambretta, Rete Studenti (the
student collective through which many of LUMe’s older activists first got politically
engaged), ZIP and ZAM. The Area collectives regularly meet in open assemblies and
engage in joint mobilizations. They coalesce around an alternative website, called “Milan
in Movement” (Milano in Movimento, hereafter MiM), which provides information about
upcoming events, documents ongoing struggles and covers actions and demonstrations, in
the tradition of alternative media outlets such as Indymedia and the Italian
globalproject.info (“GlobalProject,” n.d.).

“Grassroots culture” for all
Besides the occupation of spaces, which, as highlighted above, is a political
project in its own, LUMe is known for its attention to arts and culture. First of all, in a
city like Milan, which has become unaffordable for many and which is known for
exploiting creative workers and artists, the fact that LUMe is offering a venue for artists
to perform (and get compensated) and for a broad public to watch live performances for a
small price (usually a suggested contribution of 2-3€) is in itself a highly political stance.
In contrast to other social centers, that see cultural and musical programming as a means
to economically support the occupation of a space, for LUMe jazz shows, theater
performances and movie screenings are a core part of their identity. These performances
include both members of LUMe, who perform in different capacities, and external,
invited artists.
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LUMe activists describe their approach as one centered on promoting “grassroots
culture” (cultura dal basso), self-organized cultural production that is of high quality but
also accessible to all, regardless of income. In practice, this means first of all that LUMe
takes great care in selecting who is performing there; that although they try to promote
emerging, young artists, this does not mean that anyone is allowed to perform at LUMe.
Secondly, all artists that perform at LUMe are compensated – with the exception of
LUMe activists themselves, who rarely are. Artists all receive the same compensation,
which is typically around 50€ per person, whether they are a “big name” or a recent
graduate of a performing arts school. Thirdly, as mentioned above, shows are open to the
public, without an entry ticket: the collective asks for a recommended donation of 2-3€.
This aspect of economic accessibility was crucial for LUMe to engage youth and
university students, who typically do not have much money. Paolo explained LUMe’s
approach in this way:

One of LUMe’s objectives is certainly that of promoting… like,
underground culture, a culture that is at the same time accessible and at
a certain level… like, that has interesting contents from a political and a
cultural point of view and thus… like, often people think that if a
concert doesn’t cost much… it’s clear, people tend to value a concert
also based on how much the ticket costs. Which is a dramatic thing.
And we want to turn this upside down. In the Santa Caterina building
we had a wonderful concert with a sax player from New York, and we
still asked for 2-3€, what we usually suggest. And we try to give a
compensation to the artists that perform, whether they are actors…
whether they are more established actors, and artists, or students… we
try to always give them the same amount, which is roughly 50€ per
musician. And at the same time, while we try to appropriately
compensate the bands, we also want to make sure everyone can have
access to it (Paolo).
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LUMe thus tries to bridge the need to keep quality performances affordable for its
predominantly young audience, while at the same time compensating the performers.
Because so many of LUMe’s activists are artists or aspiring artists themselves, this
attention to sustainable cultural programming has been crucial for the collective, which
has been able to create a loyal public for its events. As one member of the theater
collective recalled:
We managed to get the university [population] to come to the theater,
to come watch a show. People who would have never gone to the
theater if LUMe hadn’t been right there. At some point they were just
lingering outside of the space… and they were discussing what they
had just seen and comparing it to what they had seen the previous day.
And that is a wonderful thing. (…) There is value in that. (Maria)

This is also part of the meaning of “grassroots culture”: to engender a critical
engagement with cultural products. LUMe’s jazz programming pioneered their approach
to “grassroots culture” and served as a model for successive experiments. Jazz – never
the kind of music one could find in an occupied social center – rapidly became one of
LUMe’s distinctive features; their Wednesday evening jazz performances featured
established musicians, music students, and “jam sessions” that were open to all. The
choice of this genre was not accidental. LUMe considers it a product of higher quality –
“jazz is not techno, I mean, it has a different cultural value” (Mario).
But besides its complexity, jazz is also very elitist, in Milan and elsewhere, in that
it is associated to expensive venues: “listening to jazz has become a classist, elitist thing;
you can’t do it if you don’t have money in your pockets” (Stefano). Jazz was thus the
perfect arena to test out LUMe’s approach to inclusive “grassroots culture” and subvert
the taken-for-granted exclusionary dynamics of jazz performance in the city. Jazz
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concerts remain very popular at LUMe and have been a huge success in term of gathering
audiences, as well as recruiting new militants.
LUMe’s theater collective modelled itself on the success of the jazz group; it even
experimented with theater “jam sessions”, where different actors could try out scenes and
monologues, albeit previously rehearsed (unlike the typical jazz jam session). LUMe’s
theater group also took to heart the activists’ dream of not only programming cultural
events, but also producing them. They have produced several shows – including one that
was entirely written by LUMe’s no longer existing writing collective – which were
performed at LUMe and in other theaters and occupied spaces. Although the ratio of
LUMe’s cultural production to its cultural programming is small, the activists keep
dreaming of making LUMe a space that does not just host concerts or plays, but also the
place where collective cultural production can happen, on the basis of a common political
consciousness.
LUMe’s approach to cultural programming and production serves to show how
they put into practice their belief that art is political. Maria, an actress with the theater
collective, argued that “an artistic act is a political act because it is directed to a mass, a
number of people. Even ten people, even two people, but it transmits something, it sends
a message”; she continued to say that this message might be contradictory and
reinterpreted by its audience, “but it’s still a message. And this is political. This is doing
politics.” (Maria). Mario similarly stated that offering cultural products of high quality
has “a high political value in itself” when they are presented “with different modes,
without having profit as the only aim, but rather the quality of the cultural production
itself”. This belief in the political nature of art does not translate, however, into the
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illusion that any type of cultural product is in itself political. LUMe activists are critical
of contemporary artists that confuse provocation with politics; this is also what explains
their emphasis on the need to offer cultural events of high quality. This is the background
to Stefano’s words:
Culture in itself is not political. But it’s the strongest tool that our
generation has… because we’ve run out of tools. All the effective tools
are… full. They are overpopulated with content and it’s hard to use
them to transmit a message of any kind. I mean, you can create a
Facebook page, but you don’t create a Facebook page to say something,
you create a Facebook to keep people updated. (Stefano)

If social media are saturated, so are news outlets, which Stefano believes people
only seek out if they already know they will agree with their content. In contrast, he held
that culture is “the only way in which you can get to a piece of information without
knowing anything about it before. Like, you can go watch a show of which you don’t
know shit about and learn something new by the end of it” (Stefano). So, while for
Stefano culture is not necessarily already politics in itself, he argued that it is the best – or
the only remaining – avenue for social change: “the only spark of hope we have for the
future is cultural”.
LUMe’s political-cultural practice comes through in many of their projects and
events, as can be seen in two high profile ones, which received a lot of attention and
media coverage: the “cultural siege to Palazzo Marino” of September 2017, introduced
above, and the pirate projections of Netflix’s movie on police brutality in Italy, in
September 2018.
As mentioned above, after the eviction from the Santa Caterina building, LUMe
spent the summer of 2017 preparing for an event that would, in their mind, put pressure
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on the Municipal Government: the “cultural siege”. Their claims to the Municipality
centered precisely on the importance of art for the city of Milan and on the political
importance of creating sustainable cultural practices. In their introduction to the program
of the “cultural siege”, they stated: “Let’s use culture and art as weapons to fight against
what we can no longer bear and as chisels to shape, together, the city that we want”
(LUMe, 2017d). They elaborated more in depth on this topic in an open call for support,
which asked other social centers and artists to join LUMe for the “cultural siege”, and in
which they articulated two claims:
The first is centered on the necessity, more pressing than ever, to
practice and diffuse culture that can feed those who produce it and that
will at the same time remain accessible and approachable
independently of one’s income. (…) Culture for us is like bread: you
need a lot of it, and it shouldn’t cost much. And this is the second
claim, a more politically practical one: we will put pressure on the city
administration of Milan (but it could also be a broader claim) to
safeguard the commons and the spaces of self-organized sociality.
Experiences like ours deserve to be protected, and we will ask for it out
loud in that square. (LUMe, 2017e)

With that quote, and the entire call for support, LUMe put culture squarely at the
center of a broad platform for radical leftist politics.
The second event which serves to highlight LUMe’s praxis in relation to culture is
their decision to host a “pirate projection” of the movie “On my skin” (Sulla mia pelle),
produced by Netflix. The movie tells the horrific true story of Stefano Cucchi, an Italian
31-year old, who was arrested for drug possession in 2009 and subsequently died in
police custody. Cucchi’s story is well known to Italian activists, along those of other
young Italian men who have died due to police misconduct over the past 10 years, such
as Stefano Aldrovandi (Davies, 2014). The theatrical release of the movie, which was
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presented at the Venice Film Festival and was also available on Netflix, sparked a
number of “pirate projections”, unauthorized and free collective screenings of the movie
in squares and occupied spaces, which defied copyright laws and greatly angered the
producers of the movie (“Italian youths rally to free screenings of police violence film,”
2018). On September 13, 2018, LUMe organized a pirate screening in a square near their
occupied space, which drew over a thousand people, despite the technical difficulties
with the projection and the rain that interrupted the screening (Di Paolo, 2018; LUMe,
2018c; Torrisi, 2018; “Universitari proiettano il film su Cucchi,” 2018); a few days later,
they offered three more free screenings of the movie in the occupied space (LUMe,
2018c). Commenting on the screenings with Italian media, one activist from LUMe
argued that it is important for people “to not watch this movie by themselves”
(“Universitari proiettano il film su Cucchi,” 2018); another activist expanded on this idea:
“We are convinced that this story needs to reach as many people as possible and that
watching the movie together really makes a difference. It is only in this way that we can
raise consciousness about the abuse of paper by those in uniform and in general on the
living conditions within Italian prisons” (Di Paolo, 2018). Facebook removed the events
that promoted the clandestine screenings ahead of their scheduled date, including
LUMe’s. The activists responded, on Facebook, by confirming the screening and
explaining that the event had been flagged to Facebook by the movie’s distributor, Lucky
Red, for copyright violation, and because Netflix considers it illegal to screen its content
outside of one’s home. They continued:
The thing is, there were more than 15.000 participants in the
[Facebook] event and unfortunately no one’s home would have been
big enough to host you all. We of course have never believed in private
property and in copyright (we believe CC [Creative Commons] to be
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the only way to make and share art). For LUMe, the cinema will always
be a collective ritual (and in this case also a free one), and cities are the
perfect theater for every collective and rebellious practice. (LUMe,
2018b)
Even in this brief comment about the pirate screenings, LUMe reaffirmed its
belief in the political power of collective, grassroots, political practice and its approach to
providing access to culture – even if that means breaking the rules.

Against “state racism”
One of the difficult issues that LUMe has had to confront is that of immigration.
LUMe’s stance on this hot topic is an open acceptance and welcoming of refugees and
migrants and a strong opposition to how national and local governments have approached
the topic. The location of LUMe’s occupation has also forced this reckoning: Porta
Venezia, close to LUMe’s current occupied building, has been an informal gathering area
for migrants for years, and numerous NGOs operate in that area. While the issue of
immigration is definitely at the forefront of their anti-racist stances, LUMe’s praxis on
this topic has been the source of constant discussions within the collective. Although
LUMe aims to welcome and include any and all migrants in their activities, the reality
has been different; heated discussions emerge around the issue of how exactly LUMe
could include migrants in their activities. Some argue that LUMe should coordinate free
and informal Italian language classes. Others suggest opening LUMe during the day, to
host whatever activities are needed. Other still just suggest that migrants should be
involved in creative activities, e.g. around music. However, overall the collective feels
that it lacks the training and the manpower to successfully accomplish these things and
that it would be better if it supported these activities when spearheaded by other actors,
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chiefly NGOs. They fear that their voluntaristic approach could be taken for a tokenistic
engagement, meant to assuage their consciences rather than genuinely help.
They have directed some of their efforts to creating an association, called
FuoriLuogo, which brings together different student groups interested in raising
awareness to the situation of migrants in the city and the country. They held an inaugural
event in June 2018, with a photo exhibition at the University of Milan. Some of LUMe’s
activists spent time volunteering with the NGOs running the “20K” project in
Ventimiglia, Italy. Ventimiglia is the border town between Italy and France, where
migrants trying to reach France began coalescing after the French police started enforcing
border control (Giuffrida, 2018). Several NGOs operate there, and LUMe decided to take
part in the activities of 20K, which is a more grassroots effort to support people in transit
and monitor their treatment by the Italian and French authorities (Progetto 20k, 2017).
Photos taken by LUMe activists during their time with 20K form the basis of the photo
exhibition organized by FuoriLuogo in 2018.
LUMe’s stance on immigration also helps clarify their political opposition to both
the current Five Star Movement-League government, which campaigns on its repressive
immigration policies, and the Democratic Party, previously in power. Mario explained it
in these terms:
If on the one hand you have the fascist-Leaguist (fascioleghista)
outlook, “let’s help them in their home countries, they are stealing our
jobs”, on the other hand you have the do-gooder29 positions of the
Democratic Party, which to me are two sides of the same coin. Nothing
changes, because they are just instrumentalizing an issue that is
incredibly complex (…) just to create support for one side or the other.
(Mario)
For a good explanation of the charged nature of the expression “do-gooder” in the current Italian political
contexts, see Horowitz (2019).
29
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What Mario is hinting at, is the absence, even in the center-left, of a structural
analysis that can link the issue of migration to neoliberalism. This results in a substantial
equivalence, in LUMe’s eyes, between right-wing and center-left positions on the issue of
migration: what activists call “state racism” (razzismo di stato). This is coupled with
intense criticism of the former Minister of the Interior, Marco Minniti, from the
Democratic Party, who pushed forward controversial immigration reforms (Esposito,
2017). LUMe’s stance on the issue of immigration was visually represented in a large
sticker that the activists attached in several locations throughout the city, including a
Permanent Center for Repatriation (CPR), where undocumented migrants are detained
while waiting to be expelled (LUMe, 2018f). The sticker, pictured in Figure 7, clarifies
LUMe’s opposition to the migration policies of the last two governments, by depicting
Salvini and Minniti (current and former Ministers of the Interior) as two heads of the
same monster.

Figure 7. A sticker produced by LUMe in 2018 shows the former and current Ministers of the Interior,
Marco Minniti and Matteo Salvini, as two heads of the same monster. The sticker symbolizes LUMe’s
opposition to the migration policies of the last two governments. Photo by author.
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LUMe is frequently engaged in spearheading or supporting anti-racist and antiimmigration policy demonstrations and direct actions. In February 2019, before a citywide demonstration (“Decreto sicurezza, in migliaia in corteo a Milano: ‘Disobbediamo
alle leggi razziste,’” 2019), they symbolically occupied a Ministerial building in Milan, to
protest against the closure of ports enacted by the government (“Decreto Salvini, i centri
sociali occupano la sede milanese del ministero: Blitz di 20 minuti tra fumogeni e
striscioni,” 2019; “I centri sociali occupano la sede del ministero dei Trasporti a Milano,”
2019; “Milano, studenti e centri sociali occupano il Ministero dei Trasporti,” 2019). The
occupation was meant to be brief and symbolic: it only lasted 20 minutes, but gathered a
fair amount of media coverage, allowing the activists to draw attention to the large
demonstration that was scheduled for the following day. LUMe promoted this action with
the other collectives of the Milanese “Area”, as well as other social centers based in other
Italian cities, such as Labas and TPO (Bologna), Insurgencia (Naples), and the social
centers of the North East (Veneto region). This unusually large coalition show the
importance of the issue of migration for contemporary Italian radical collectives and
social centers.

Although not always explicitly articulated, LUME’s political commitments
emerge from the collective’s activities: they are critical of neoliberal capitalism, of rightwing populism, of the current 5SM-Lega government; but they are also decisively to the
left of mainstream center-left parties, especially Partito Democratico, which they
criticize and oppose at both the local (the mayor of Milan) and national level. Their
shorthand description as antisexist, antifascist and antiracist guides their mobilization and
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programming. Of particular note is their involvement in struggles against state racism
which have been intensifying due to the saliency of immigration in the current Italian
situation. What characterized LUMe from the beginning is their commitment to
supporting grassroots cultural production as a form of political engagement. They
approach art in a profoundly political way – not just to promote politically relevant
artistic content, but also to provide a collective, political way of doing culture together.
As highlighted in this section, LUMe’s inclusive leftist orientation builds upon the legacy
of Italian occupied social centers. This includes the use of horizontal organizational
structures, which I describe in the following section.

Horizontal organizational structures
LUMe is run horizontally and its structure is decentralized and multilayered. The
collective is made of different working groups (“tavoli”), which have changed during its
years of activity. At the moment, the active working groups are: politics (Collettivo
Politico), cinema and video (Lumeteca), theater (Lume Teatro), and art. There is also a
working group that is in charge of social media, which I will discuss in detail below.
The working groups meet regularly and enjoy a high degree of autonomy,
although they are held accountable by the larger collective during regular assemblies.
Some of the most structured working groups – now chiefly the cinema and theater
groups, previously also the music/jazz group – run their own programming in the
occupied building. The political collective is devoted to elaborating “ideological
reflections” for LUMe, as an “anticapitalist militant experience” and making sure that the
political ideas of LUMe are appropriately integrated in their artistic and cultural practice
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(LUMe, 2019a); it also maintains relations with other social centers in Milan and in Italy.
Recently, the political collective also started promoting days of self-education, typically
led by one the members, who teaches the other activists about a political topic and leads
the discussion. Lumeteca, the cinema and video working group, organizes film
screenings, which range from independent movies to award-winning titles (LUMe,
2019a); they also shoot footage of LUMe events and produce short videos, typically
meant for social media. The theater collective, open to current theater students, graduates
and amateur actors, is involved in both producing their own theater performances and in
bringing other theater shows to LUMe (LUMe, 2019a). The art collective – perhaps the
most unstable of the working groups – has been in charge of coordinating exhibitions to
be held at LUMe and to spearhead visual arts projects (LUMe, 2019a).
LUMe’s working group structure has adapted to the ebbs and flows of their
activity. In the past, LUMe also had a writing collective, which included aspiring writers
of fiction and poetry and even fostered a collaboration with the theater collective –
staging some of the working group’s writings. It also hosted a hip-hop working group.
Most notably, as highlighted above, LUMe had a music/jazz working (Lume Jazz). The
working group was in charge of the music programming of LUMe, which mostly
revolved around jazz performances, but also fostered musical partnerships between its
members. The working group founded Conserere, an improv orchestra that emerged out
of LUMe’s musicians but was open to all musicians in Milan. Although the working
group is no longer active in terms of making music together, some of its members are still
involved in the programming of LUMe’s concert, which fall under the label of LUMe
Jazz and/or LUMe Suono. Ad-hoc informal groups are also formed when the need arises.
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One of my interviewees, Boris, is proud of the work that he and others put into sprucing
up the occupied building; in explaining this renovation work, he half-jokingly called this
group of people “LUMe’s autonomous carpenter collective”.
In addition to the working groups, LUMe has different types of assemblies.
Usually held twice a month, the operational assembly (assemblea gestionale) is a
horizontally run, semi-open assembly, where activists of the different working groups
meet to make decisions about the day-to-day operations of the collective (and of the
occupied space). Boris described the operational assembly as a “sorting mechanism”, the
place where different proposals and idea can be sorted and made sense of, before they are
either taken back to the different working groups or presented to the plenary assembly.
Plenary assemblies are held every 2 or 3 months. They aim to be open to all the activists
of LUMe. They are devoted to discussing big picture topics and take general decisions
about the social center.
LUMe also holds monthly assemblies that are open to the public. The aim of these
is to offer potentially interested people a venue to get to know what LUMe is about, but
also provide a space for different individuals to pitch a project (a performance, an art
show, etc.) to LUMe. I attended such an assembly in December 2017, shortly after LUMe
had occupied its current location. In that meeting, around 50 people, including LUMe
activists and “external” individuals, met for 2 hours to discuss several potential proposals
for activity that LUMe could endorse and host. I also attended a smaller open assembly in
December 2018, which included a total of 15 people. During both assemblies, LUMe
activists briefly explained the history of the collective and the occupied space; they also
sketched out the organizational structures of LUMe. In both assemblies, interested
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individuals who wanted to get involved with LUMe or pitch an idea were heard and
directed towards the working group that best suited their needs.
LUMe’s use of technology should be understood within the horizontal political
practices that characterize the collective. In particular, two aspects of LUMe’s
organizational structure have a strong impact on how they use digital technologies: the
fluidity and autonomy of the working groups, which requires constant coordination, and
the commitment to assembly-based horizontal decision making, which limits the extent to
which decisions can be taken through digital means.

The technological practices of LUMe
External communication
For its external communication, LUMe is entirely dependent on commercial
social network sites: the collective is very active online through its Facebook
(https://www.facebook.com/pg/LUMe.occupato/), Twitter (@LUMe_occupato) and
Instagram (lume_occupato) accounts. Facebook is by far their most used social network
site. Through LUMe’s Facebook page, the activists create and post Facebook events for
the activities they organize, from demonstrations to concerts, they share and provide
commentary on media coverage of different issues, such as immigration policy, they
circulate pictures and videos of recent events, and distribute their own press releases. The
page thus functions as an information hub for all that concerns the collective. In addition
to the main LUMe page, individual working groups have their own Facebook pages,
through which they typically promote their events and share posts from the main LUMe
Facebook page.
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LUMe’s intense social media activity is managed by an ad-hoc working group
within the larger collective – “LUMe Social Media”. The working group is composed by
activists from different working groups and a handful of other activists who have graphic
design and video editing skills. The Social Media group is in charge of the collective’s
accounts on Instagram and Twitter, and most importantly, their Facebok page. The
intense day-to-day work of the Social Media group is organized around navigating the
known features of Facebook Pages, while still adhering to LUMe’s principles, chiefly the
necessity to produce quality content and to incorporate horizontal decision-making. The
activists are acutely aware of the existence of peaks and ebbs of attention on Facebook
and speak of the need to optimize when they post, to make sure that their public has the
highest chance of being exposed to their content. The marketing language that permeates
the backend of Facebook Pages’ is clearly visible in how the activists talk about this
issue. Mario, who is not a member of the social media group, understood the mechanics
of the process in the following way: “Posts are programmed in a rational and rationed
way. They go out at time X of day Y because that’s more suitable… these kinds of
methods allow you to maximize the efficacy of your communication”. Ilaria, who is part
of the social media group, confirmed Mario’s impression of their work. But she was also
quick to justify their actions: “I mean, we don’t sell anything, we don’t earn anything, so
it’s not about getting more clicks and more likes. It’s about the broadest possible
diffusion of information. For us it’s important that people read what we think and know
what we do”. But LUMe also uses other features of Facebook Pages in a more proactive
and political way. In particular, unlike individual Facebok profiles, Facebok Pages offer
the possibility to draft posts in advance and schedule their publication. This allows LUMe
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activists to not just time the publication of the posts, but also to collectively edit them
before they are published. Activists in the social media group think of this as a smallscale newsroom, in which they edit each other’s writing. As Paolo explained, it is “like a
small newsroom, in which there is a quality check, which I think is also informative, in
my opinion”; activists might suggest rewrites to each other, which Paolo finds to be
personally enriching. Further, he argued that because of this collective work on the
content, “there is better content that gets put out, because it does not come from a
personal process, but a collective one” (Paolo). This illustrates LUMe’s focus on
horizontal organizing and on producing high quality content in all aspects of their
activism.
The social media group enjoys a high degree of autonomy in their work. The
larger collective is usually not aware of what will be posted on LUMe’s social media. As
Stefano, who is not part of the social media group, claimed: “Most of the time, I don’t
know that will be put on the Facebook page. I know about the press releases, because we
talk about them [typically in the operational assembly]. But we don’t write an event
description together. We trust each other”. Reflecting on her experience in the social
media group, Ilaria clarified the boundaries of this autonomy:
I mean, if I decided to publish an endorsement of the Northern League
today, they would probably kick me out. But the basic idea for LUMe
social media was to pick people that we trust – that the entire collective
trusts –, to whom we can delegate this aspect of our communications…
(Ilaria)
The trust that the social media group enjoys comes through in all the interviews in
which the group is mentioned. When asked about problems that might have arisen in
LUMe’s use of social media, no activists point to tensions within the collective around
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what the social media group had posted. This is remarkable, given the great tensions
around this issue that scholars and activists have documented in the case of the Occupy
movements (Ferrari, 2016; Gerbaudo, 2012; Kavada, 2015; Mattoni, 2013; Terranova &
Donovan, 2013).
LUMe also has a blog-based website, which is no longer updated
(https://lumelaboratoriouniversitariometropolitano.wordpress.com). The website is at the
center of frequent discussions among LUMe activists. I stumbled into one such
discussions when I walked into an operational assembly in June 2018. The general sense
of the discussion was that LUMe collectively recognized the value of having a website
representing themselves and their activities, but that the effort needed to build and
maintain such a website was too high. Those advocating for investing labor and resources
in creating a new website argued along two lines. First, they strongly felt the urge to have
an archive that would document all the activities and accomplishments of LUMe: “we
will need a website when they come for us” was a very memorable sentence from one of
the activists. This refers to the need of being able to show the value of LUMe – as urban
commons – in the face of a new eviction or other attempt to shut down the occupation.
Second, the activists stated that having a website would allow them to communicate
beyond the constraints of the social network sites and fully express their creative practice
by accommodating flexible ways of displaying their video and audio materials. This
second argument was also worded in a strongly political way: “having your own website
is a political practice”, as one activist stated.
During the interviews, the activists echoed similar positions. The interviewees
that discussed the website with me all expressed some degree of regret for not having a
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functioning website. Two different, although not incompatible, visions of what the
website should be emerged from the interviews. On the one hand, there was the idea that
LUMe needs an archive that can preserve and showcase everything the social center has
done. As Ilaria argued, “more than a website to publicize our events, now we would need
a website to contain all the work we’ve done and still do. Sort of like a portfolio of
LUMe’s activities”. As it was made clear in the assembly, the idea of having an archive is
tied to the precarious nature of occupied spaces. Boris explained:
we would like to create an archive, a digital archive of everything
we’ve done, everything we’ve produced, because it’s needed… because
this space… any other thing, but this space is more sensitive… This
space exists because there is proof that someone did something in this
space, there is memory. (Boris)
In the activists’ eyes, an archive-website would function to show all that the
collective has accomplished and thus its value as a social center and urban commons.
On the other hand, some activists envision a different kind of website, more
focused on the production of written content, in the style of alternative media websites
like Indymedia. This was the original intention even with the existing LUMe website.
Stefano commented on the difficulty of setting up such a website: “today it’s difficult to
have a website… either you are an already established brand, or it’s difficult to make
your website stand out. The problem is that a website is an extremely large space”. It is
large, according to Stefano, in the sense that it needs to be populated by a lot of content if
it is to make any sense. And producing a lot of content requires effort.
Regardless of their vision of what LUMe’s website should be, activists all
converge on the feeling that producing and maintaining a website would take too much
effort, which at the moment they cannot spare. But the way in which the activists think
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about this effort has to do with their perception of their efficacy in using social media,
and Facebook in particular. In fact, they see the effort of creating a website as additional
labor, on top of maintaining their active Facebook profile. Paolo articulated this position:
I don’t know… for the way we are… I mean, the website is certainly
powerful, I mean, it gives you possibilities that Facebook does not give
you, because Facebook is more structured… it has those limits, it has
those features, you can communicate in those ways. While a website
gives you… building a website you can choose what to highlight, what
to put on top, what to put afterwards… But honestly since none of us
are IT professionals (un informatico), none of us have that much
time… because anyway the free time you have… already managing a
Facebook page is not that easy. (Paolo)

According to Paolo, while making a website for LUMe would be very powerful
and give the activists more freedom compared to Facebook, the collective does not have
the technical skills or the free time to take care of the website, on top of their existing
social media work. Thinking back to the early days of the original LUMe website, Ilaria
recalled that “after three months we stopped updating it, because we realized that for our
public Facebook had… Facebook did all that we needed. And no one had the
perseverance to manage a website well.” Valeria concurred, explaining that no one in the
Area grouping ever made their own website “maybe because we are just not able to. And
it seemed easier to optimize our use of platforms like Facebook and Instagram”.
Any plan to create a website for LUMe also has to confront the fact that the Area
already has its own functioning and (relatively) popular website – Milano in Movement
(MiM). As mentioned above, MiM, which self-identifies as part of the tradition of
countercultural alternative media in Milan, publishes articles and op-eds, covers events
and acts as an aggregator of information, mainly about LUMe and the other movements
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of the Area. LUMe activists read and like MiM. Valeria said that MiM “is very good,
because it’s comrades who write very good articles, they are reliable, you can count on
them”. Paolo described MiM as “the megaphone of all the initiatives organized by the
antagonistic Area”, which provides “total coverage on Facebook but also with articles,
before, during and after events”. While LUMe relies on MiM, the collective would not
want their website – or their external communication in general – to follow the same
blueprint. This is very evident in Stefano’s explanation:
[MiM] is extremely effective, it has a large audience, it’s been around
for many years, but (…) it has a niche audience. It was born as a
movement website, for movement people. And our idea of opening up
to the collectivity was exactly the opposite of confining ourselves in
this kind of dynamic… because then it ends up being the tool that the
counter-media of the movement use to lock themselves out of the
conversation. (Stefano)
So, while MiM is universally appreciated by LUMe activists, it also represents an
expression of the inward-looking, identitarian, movement-centric tendencies that the
collective has sought to distance itself from. LUMe relies on MiM but sees itself as doing
something fundamentally different from MiM with its outward-looking, Facebook-based
external communication. However, as will be highlighted below, their overreliance on
Facebook is the object of constant ambivalence.

Internal communication
From an internal, organizational perspective, LUMe relies heavily on both
Facebook and Whatsapp. Beyond LUMe’s Facebook page, the activists run a closed
Facebook group with a wide range of active members: approximately 70. The main
purpose of the group is to update all activists on what is happening with LUMe, so they
can be plugged into the life of the collective even when they are not able to come to the
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occupied space. For instance, this is where minutes from the assemblies are shared and
reminders about meetings and events are posted. Occasionally, the private group is also
where the collective might take time-sensitive, yet uncontroversial decisions:
it might happen on the Facebook group, that we want to pledge our
support to a demonstration and we had an assembly right the day
before, so instead of waiting for six more days to give our
support/sponsorship to the demonstration… if we know that the
demonstration… I mean, no part of the collective would object… we
use the Facebook group. (Paolo)

But besides these uncontroversial and extemporaneous decisions, the Facebook
group is not where important and potentially controversial decisions are made. It can,
however, be a space where political discussions happen, and conflicts arise.
On Whatsapp, LUMe has an organizational group chat, which is smaller than the
Facebook group, but highly active. Although the number of participants to this group chat
varies, interviewees place it at around 40. The group chat includes LUMe’s most active
members as well as those who have been involved with LUMe the longest. This is the
space where urgent information is being disseminated and questions that require a quick
answer are posed. This is also a space in which minor, day-to-day decisions are made,
especially those concerning the occupied space – where someone might ask the group
chat “is anyone at LUMe right now?”. The group chat is also used for more political
discussions and decisions that require immediate attention by LUMe – although the
tendency is to state the problem in the group chat and then try to resolve it through inperson meetings. The usefulness of the Whatsapp group was evident, for instance, when
their first occupation was evicted by the police: activists could be informed
instantaneously through the group chat. However, the sheer number of messages on this
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internal Whatsapp group can be daunting: “Sometimes when I am working, I look at my
phone and there are 150 messages” (Jessica). The abundance of messages and the
features of Whatsapp can sometimes create tensions, as I will detail below when
discussing LUMe’s criticism of digital media.
The working groups have also created their own Facebook private groups and
group chats on Whatsapp. Although I was only able to speak about these internal
communication channels with members of the theater group, it seems reasonable to state
that such channels mirror the division of information between Facebook and Whatsapp
that the larger collective established. Speaking of how this works in the theater collective,
Jessica explained “The Whatsapp group is for rapid communication, like what we had
today: ‘we are meeting at 6:30’. The Facebook group is for summarizing the season’s
programming (…) it’s more official”.
The last key piece in LUMe’s complex web of technological practices is the
existence of a shared Google Drive folder, which is linked through the private Facebook
group. The shared folder contains a messy archive of documents, leaflets, videos and
photos; most importantly, it hosts two shared documents, which are mentioned by many
interviewees: a calendar and a scheduling spreadsheet. The calendar is where LUMe’s
activists keep track of the many meetings and events that are happening, both in the
occupied space and elsewhere; activists need to take into account what is already
scheduled when planning another event or meeting. The scheduling spreadsheet is where
LUMe’s activists sign up to be at the occupied space to run the events, staff the bar,
restock the supplies, handle the cash register. Because the collective is involved in so
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many things, one of the main functions of the Facebook group is “to tag people to bug
them to sign up to volunteer” (Paolo).
Fighting the system with the tools of the system
You want people to receive a certain type of message. If you can
transmit it, even if through a channel that you may or may not consider
suitable, more or less dubious because of the many reasons we have
listed… but there are 10.000 more we just aren’t thinking about right
now… again, why shouldn’t you do it? Why shouldn’t you take
advantage of it? I mean… if you think Facebook is shit, I could
potentially tell you something like that if we meet in a pub, and while
we are drinking a beer you ask me what I think of Facebook, then I
could say: well, Facebook is shit. But in the end, there’s what I think of
it at a personal level, and there’s what I think about the opportunity to
use it. And again, the benefits, at least from our perspective, from
LUMe’s perspective, outweigh the risks too much to not use it.
Really… I don’t see why not (Mario).

This long quote is reproduced in its entirety because it details the core of LUMe’s
technological imaginary: the recognition that internet technologies are flawed, but also
indispensable for social change. This what the activists refer to as “using the system to
fuck the system” (Ilaria, Valeria). In the theoretical terms employed in this dissertation,
this imaginary can be classified as a “negotiation” of Silicon Valley’s dominant
technological imaginary: LUMe, in fact, rejects the core of Silicon Valley’s imaginary,
but nevertheless relies on Silicon Valley technologies. The negotiation emerges from the
fact that the technological imaginary of Silicon Valley, from which these technologies
emerge, has shaped them in a certain way. It is hard to turn the imaginary of Silicon
Valley on its head, while being beholden to technologies that promote that imaginary.
Negotiation thus implies the deployment of ideological and practical arrangements to
mitigate the dissonance between the technological imaginary of LUMe and the
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technological imaginary connected to the digital technologies of Silicon Valley.
Negotiation takes different shapes for different movements, based on their ideological
orientation, the political context in which they are situated, and the presence of other
prominent technological imaginaries deployed by political actors in the country. In the
case of LUMe, activists’ negotiation relies upon the importance of offline, occupied
spaces (in the tradition of social centers) and on the idea of using digital technologies in a
critical and informed way, with awareness; the idea of awareness is constructed in
response to the technological imaginary of the Five Star Movement (Natale & Ballatore,
2014; Treré, 2018).
As detailed above, LUMe uses corporate social media and messaging services –
Facebook, Instagram, and Whatsapp – extensively in both its internal and external
communication. Although I asked them about “digital technologies” or “the internet” in
general terms, the interviewees almost always talked about social network sites, chiefly
Facebook; their take on other internet-based services or digital technologies was always
relayed after talking about Facebook and by using Facebook as a benchmark. My
discussion of the findings thus follows the interviewee’s orientations and focuses heavily
on Facebook. Whether Facebook is an accurate stand-in for the rest of the internet is
debatable. Its importance in shaping how activists think about technology, however,
cannot be underestimated.
In this section, I first articulate LUMe’s technological imaginary through the
collective drawings produced by the activists in the course of the two visual focus groups
conducted in 2018-2019 and the individual interviews with the activists. This
technological imaginary hinges upon a Marxist critique of the power of corporations on
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the internet, as well as a distrust in the democraticness of the internet. This imaginary,
however, wrestles with these critiques because of the perceived unavoidability of digital
technologies: although they are problematic, they are indispensable for political activism
– there is no alternative to them. The section then explains how LUMe’s negotiation with
the dominant technological imaginary of Silicon Valley relies on the use of offline,
occupied spaces and on the notion of “awareness” (consapevolezza).

Mirrors and icebergs: LUMe’s collective drawings
I conducted two visual focus groups with 9 LUMe activists in 2018-2019. A full
explanation of the design of and rationale for the visual focus can be found in Appendix
B. The five participants of the first visual focus group produced a collective drawing that
depicts the internet as a distorting mirror, as can be seen in Figure 8. In their discussion,
they first considered the idea of the internet as a mirror of society, i.e. reflecting all that is
happening in society; for the activists, this mostly meant reflecting the struggle between
the powerless and the powerful. The idea of the mirror, in fact, emerged in conjunction
with their Marxist, dialectical reading of society, which generated a long discussion and
several intermediate individual drawings. However, for these activists the internet is not a
mirror that simply reflects what is going on in society, it also shapes it. While they cannot
exactly determine, and thus draw, how this shaping occurs, they acknowledge it by
representing the internet as a mirror that one might find in a funhouse: the distorting
mirror seen at the center of the drawing. On the lower right quarter, activists drew a
globe, to represent society as it is; on the upper left quarter, a globe made of numbers and
letters – to represent code – which stands in for the society that is being shaped by the

215

internet. The two globes are purposefully similar, but different, to account for the fact
that the internet is shaping reality in a distorted way. Maria explained: “it’s a mirror, not
of society as much… it’s an illusory mirror of society. It’s a distorter of society…
because that is never actually the society, but in some ways it works like a small world, a
small society”.

Figure 8. Collective drawing produced in the first visual focus group (November 8th, 2018). The internet is
represented as a distorting mirror that reflects and distorts society.

In theoretical terms, this drawing and the discussion that generated it, attempted to
grapple with the idea of the mutual shaping occurring between society and the internet.
The drawing highlights two complementary aspects of the activists’ technological
imaginary: the uneasy relationship between the reality of society and the reality of the
internet and the necessity of a dialectical reading of both society and the internet.
A similar concern with reality and the reality of the internet, as well as a Marxist
reading of the web, also emerged in the collective drawing created by the four
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participants in the second visual focus group, which can be seen in Figure 9. This
drawing represents the internet as an iceberg.

Figure 9. Collective drawing produced in the second visual focus group (January 7 th, 2019). The internet is
represented as an iceberg, composed of a visible part (benign activities) and an invisible part (problematic
processes). The state, represented as a submarine, observes the iceberg without intervening. Corporations,
represented as an oil platform, extract value (represented with currency symbols) out of the iceberg.

The upper part, visible above the water, is comprised of benign, everyday
activities: streaming, gaming, information seeking, the publication of multimedia content
and the consumption of porn. The invisible part contains more problematic processes,
that undergird the daily experience of the internet, but remain hidden. Such processes are:
control of information, information manipulation, privacy violation and data
commodification. On the right side of the iceberg, activists depicted the state as a
submarine. While the submarine sees both what is happening above and below the water,
it does not intervene. On the left side of the iceberg, corporations are represented as an oil
platform, which extracts value from the bottom of the iceberg (where the activists drew
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the monetary symbols of the U.S. Dollar, the Euro, and the British Pound). The
submarine and the oil platform are meant to represent how power operates on the
internet.
Activists discussed at length exactly what it means to consider processes of data
commodification and privacy violation or corporations’ extraction of value from the
internet as “hidden”. Some participants argued that the role of corporations is very
evident and that people should know what using online services means. Others, however,
underlined the difference between a surface knowledge of the existence of targeted ads
and the inability to read and decipher privacy policies and the political awareness of the
entity of the exploitation that is taking place. This is what ultimately resulted in the
drawing of the internet as an iceberg: as the metaphor goes, while we know there must be
something underneath the visible part of the iceberg, we might have trouble estimating its
entity.

The power of platforms
As mentioned above, the participants of both visual focus groups spent a
significant portion of their respective discussions trying to articulate their Marxist,
conflictual, dialectical reading of society, of the internet and of how power operates on
the internet. Activists tackled this theoretically complicated discussion through some
individual sketches, which represented different ways of thinking about capitalism and
power. For instance, in the first visual focus group Emanuele drew the internet as an
interregnum, which he represented graphically as the overlap of two rectangles, as can be
seen in Figure 10.
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Figure 10. Emanuele's drawing of the internet as an interregnum, an in-between entity between the
powerful and the powerless. First visual focus group (November 8th, 2018).

In his words, the internet-interregnum represents:
on the hand, the users, who are the ones that could actually make it a
space of freedom and democracy, and on the other, corporations and
states. I mean, it’s an interregnum in the sense that it’s a field of
struggle. If I had to imagine it, I would imagine it as something that sits
in-between two other things (Emanuele).
Emanuele then went on to clarify the image to explain the powerful and the
powerless as two parallel entities, which are both “touched” by the internet, which then
becomes the field where the contention between these groups is possible. Emanuele’s
drawing generated a long debate, within the first visual focus group, about whether the
internet should be considered a terrain of conflict or simply a tool of conflict. Here is an
excerpt from their discussion:

Vittorio: Well, I think we can say that we once had conflict in the
factories, which then moved to the city, and now it’s moving to the
internet. I mean, a really dialectical reading.
Paolo: well, I think this a bit hardcore as a statement…
Emanuele: yeah, I don’t know, this leaves me a bit…
Paolo: you can use the internet as a tool of conflict, but it can never be
your terrain of conflict.
Vittorio: actually, I think the internet is a terrain of conflict in itself.
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Paolo: well…
Vittorio: the conquest of the internet is a terrain of conflict.

The debate raised in this focus group touched upon several key questions that
arise in the literature that tackles issues of digital labor (Andrejevic, 2013; Cote & Pybus,
2007; Gill & Pratt, 2008; Lazzarato, 1996; Terranova, 2000). The activists, in fact, spent
time debating whether the internet operates as a factory (echoing the literature that
describes corporatized internet services as digital factories). They also could not agree on
what would be the means of production in the internet landscape. For instance, Emanuele
used Spotify as an example, and worked through the idea that users’ listening decisions
could be harvested by the platform to generate value. However, he was also quick to
admit that he did not really see this reading as fully satisfying:
Now, I don’t know how to explain it well, how to make a comparison
with accumulation or the fact that those who control the means of
production… I mean, all of Marx’s materialist reasoning. But you
could certainly come up with an analogy. Considering data as the
means of production, I mean considering that the machines of the
factory could become the data, with all the evident differences. But
then… I mean… I have to admit that I am finding it a bit difficult
(Emanuele).
Emanuele’s and everyone else’s attempts to put together a Marxist reading of the
internet speak to the complexity of identifying precisely how power operates on the
internet. Paolo initially proposed to draw
a worker who is modelling some clay, in which the internet is society,
so the internet is the one who is shaping the clay, but he’s actually not a
worker, he’s a puppet… while the one holding the reins… so those who
have the tools to build the internet and have people use it are the ones
who actually have the capacity to direct the puppet to create what they
want (Paolo).
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Paolo’s idea was never drawn, partially because of its complexity, partially
because the activists found it did not account for the multiple sources of power that
operate online. Maria proposed a revised version of the drawing, which can be seen in
Figure 11.

Figure 11. Maria's drawing of multiple puppeteers, to account for multiple sources of power operating on
the internet. First visual focus group (November 8th, 2018).

The drawing used the image of the puppeteer, but allows for the existence of
multiple hands – multiple puppeteers – and thus multiple sources of power. These
sketches were quickly abandoned because they did not fully encapsulate how the activists
see the internet. The main difficulty they found in articulating this Marxist perspective
lay in the time-old question of structure vs. agency. In fact, many of the objections they
raised to each other had to do with the agency of internet users and the necessity to
account for the possibility of creative and resistant uses of the internet. Graphically, this
was rendered in the drawing shown in Figure 12, which represents the interaction of
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different actors around a central circle, the internet. Which actors should be represented
in the corners varied in the course of the discussion; this representation was quickly
abandoned, too.

Figure 12. Paolo’s drawing of multiple actors, represented as vectors, interacting with the internet,
represented as the circle in the middle of the drawing. The actors represented in the drawing changed
during the discussion. First visual focus group (November 8th, 2018).

As explained in the previous section, the activists converged on the image of the
distorting mirror. This helped them settle their complicated theoretical discussions. The
key conversation that led to this agreement is the following:

Vittorio: [the internet] is a space to conquer. That we want to conquer.
Emanuele: In any case, it’s a space in which many actors are fighting
for…
Vittorio: Hegemony!
Paolo: where it’s easier to create counterpowers…
Vittorio: it’s a place of conflict, in that it simply is also the meeting
place of various subjectivities, where there can be a conflict of
thoughts. Or a clash of points of view, for instance election campaigns
fought on social media. That’s what it is, for me. But because for me
it’s mirroring society. It shapes it and mirrors it.
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This line of thought then coalesced in the drawing of the internet as a distorting
mirror, which was described in the previous paragraph: a drawing that attempts to
represent the mutual shaping occurring between society and the internet.
Activists in the second visual focus group wrestled with similar questions related
to power and the commodification of the data and labor of internet users. These processes
became a central component of their final drawings: commodification is a key element in
the hidden part of the iceberg, while the power of corporations and of the state are
represented as an oil platform and a submarine, respectively. The image of the oil
platform, used to convey the extractive processes with which corporations generate
revenue from internet activities, was brought up many times during the focus group. It
emerged in conjunction with another image – one that was never quite put on paper by
the activists: the “money machine” (una macchina da soldi), a machine that makes
money. At one point in the discussion, they thought that would be their entire drawing:
the internet as a money-making machine. Alessio described it as such: “We could make
an allegoric drawing of the corporation that takes data out of the Facebook world or of
the internet world and makes money of them. Like a money machine… But it’s a bit
challenging [to draw]”. Their discussion used different images but touched upon many of
the themes articulated by the first visual focus group – speaking to a common dialectical,
Marxist view of society and of the internet, that permeates LUMe as a collective.
Stefano’s heated remarks highlight this aspect:
Alright, yes, but I mean, for me the biggest problem of the information
on the internet is not that Salvini [leader of the Northern League]… that
Salvini yells or spreads populism on Instagram. For me it’s the fact
that, I mean, over the last five years it has become the biggest money
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machine of the world, out of nothing. Like a money factory out of
nothing, basically… making you work on… I mean, making you create
value on the internet, which you can’t actually benefit from. And all of
this through this “Okay, you are doing this, and I’m letting you do this,
because you are using my service, so you are lucky that I am allowing
you to do this”. That’s why I am saying that… the situation has gotten
out of hand (Stefano).
As Stefano eloquently argued, the power of corporations to control our online
interactions and to generate revenues out of them is a key problem for LUMe’s activists.
As he underlined, this power is reinforced by a certain discourse used by these
corporations, one which does not acknowledge the digital labor of users and seeks to
justify their exploitation of users’ labor through their provision of “free” services. As
highlighted when talking about the discussion that took place in the first visual focus
group, these issues have been central to the scholarship on digital labor (e.g. Andrejevic,
2013; Cote & Pybus, 2007; Dean, 2005). But this reference to the legitimizing discourse
of corporations is also a nudge to the strength of the dominant technological imaginary of
Silicon Valley and its promise of empowering and democratic technologies. LUMe
activists are deeply skeptical of this discourse.

The “reality” of the internet
In addition to explicating LUMe’s materialist focus on power, the two
representations of the internet that LUMe activists produced in the visual focus groups –
the distorting mirror and the iceberg – also show how the activists perceive a disconnect
between reality and the internet. Although this disconnect takes different shapes for the
interviewees, the activists all converge on the idea that something is flawed in the way
that the internet is talked about as a free and democratic space. LUMe activists are deeply
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skeptical of the idea that the internet can be thought of as democratic, for two main
reasons: on the one hand, because they know that structures of power and inequality exist
online, on the other, because they feel that information and relationships online are
filtered and distorted.
A question in the questionnaire distributed during the visual focus groups (see
Appendix B) asked activists whether they thought that the internet was a democratic
space. It generated intense discussion among interviewees and criticism of the wording of
the question itself. In general, activists felt that it was impossible to disagree or agree
with the statement and sought to qualify it. One of the respondents in the first visual
focus group added a comment next to his answer:
It is democratic in terms of the possibility of sharing and accessing
content, but its potentialities are threatened by the control over
information and by the fact that a ‘web democracy’ presupposes a
universal level of participation, something that seems utopic
(Anonymous).

This nudge towards the promise of a “web democracy” is to be taken as criticizing
the core of the technological imaginary of Silicon Valley: LUMe does not see digital
technologies as inherently freeing or democratic. It also shows how LUMe stands in stark
contrast with the “myth of the web” (Natale & Ballatore, 2014), on which the Five Star
Movement constructed its early following, and which pitched digitally mediated
participation as a form of direct democracy, intended to replace representative democratic
processes. This mythical view of the web, communicated through slogans such as “one
equals one” (uno vale uno), meant to underscore individual’s equality online, is very
much criticized by LUMe. As highlighted in the previous section, in the visual focus
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groups, LUMe activists discuss at length the presence of structures of power and
exploitation on the internet. It is this fundamental lack of real equality that drives their
critique of the democraticness of the internet. Emanuele explained it in these terms:
It’s true that we have the freedom to post messages, but if you, Maria,
write your political opinion on Facebook, it’s seen by your 600 friends.
If you are the Minister of the Interior, your message lands in a different
way and the possibility of accessing it is different. So we always have
to… I mean, again, it’s illusory to say that the internet is democratic. It
is, potentially. But in reality… (Emanuele)

Notice that Emanuele’s critique is framed as a take-down of the illusion of
democraticness, which is contrasted with a reality of power and inequality. Maria echoed
Emanuele, calling the internet “illusorily democratic”. Alessio, in the other visual focus
group, argued that whether people can experience a democratic internet depends on how
good they are at using digital technologies:
I mean, it depends on how well you can use the internet. Because you
can use it democratically, in the sense that it is open to everyone,
because everyone has… according to how well one can use the internet,
a possibility to express themselves. If you don’t know how to use it,
and you just see what the internet shows you, it’s not that democratic
(Alessio).

In so doing, Alessio cast digital literacy and savviness as a significant barrier to
the achievement of a truly democratic internet.
Furthermore, it’s LUMe’s daily experiences with the internet, and social
networking sites in particular, that push them to question the democraticness of the
internet. In particular, the activists lament how the internet seems to distort how
information is transmitted, and thus also distort human relations. Most of the examples
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that the interviewees gave me, in this respect, arise from their reliance on Facebook and
Whatsapp for their internal communication. Boris, for instance, talked about “filters” that
“virtual means of communication” introduce in conversations and political discussions;
he told me that “if we were arguing on Facebook about the government, you and I, we
would certainly express ourselves in a different way that we are doing now or in a café”.
Other interviewees also contrasted online modes of communication with offline, face-toface meetings. They spoke of the existence of filter bubbles (Ilaria) and echo chambers
(Paolo). Ilaria’s quotes are representative of this set of concerns. She argued: “You know,
social network sites really distort the mode in which you relate to others”. In particular
she talked about Whatsapp as an “anonymous and misunderstandable medium”, and
relayed that it
created very violent things. It was a bit dystopic to observe. I mean,
you realize that these are tools that… I don’t know how to define them,
but they are even a bit violent in certain ways, because they really bring
out the worst in people (Ilaria).

The negativity identified by Ilaria (“violence”, in her words) is felt by other
interviewees, too. Many of them, when telling me about their internal communication
channels, mention disagreements and misunderstandings that LUMe encountered in using
Whatsapp and Facebook; they typically explain them as problems that are created by how
these services are built. If for Mario, LUMe’s internal Whatsapp group chat can be
“confusing and messy”, this is not something that has to do with the activists themselves
but is rather “inherent to the Whatsapp group chat” as a digital space. Given these
concerns over the quality of information and interactions, it is easy to understand why
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LUMe activists would be highly critical of any attempt at depicting the internet as a
democratic space.
It is crucial to highlight that these concerns go hand in hand with their Marxist
reading of the internet, which I explained in the previous section. In fact, even their
concern over “fake news” – better termed viral deception (Jamieson, 2017) – is reshaped
in terms of the power of different actors to shape how people receive information online.
But far from being a concern over Russian interference or bots, activists see this problem
as one of power that is not necessarily confined to the internet. Interviewees in the second
visual focus group talked about this issue extensively. One of them, Giulio, explained
how we should not be worried about “fake news” as “totally invented items of news”, but
rather in terms of “half-truths” that are spread by political actors: “it’s the political game
itself, and how it’s being practiced, that leads, that has always led, even before the
internet, to creating news that are not necessarily false, but favorable to one’s political
side”. He argued that the public discourse around “fake news” has omitted this dimension
of power, favoring a discussion over hoaxes and erroneous information. Conversing with
him, Alessio clarified what Giulio was getting at: “What you mean is not really wholly
invented fake news, but how news can be influenced by the powers that be. And in case
too, the internet is elitist and not democratic”. Activists thus seem to read several
negative aspects of their online experience as consequences of the way power operates in
society and on the internet and to circle back to the idea of a democratic internet as an
illusion.

No alternatives
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Despite LUMe’s strong criticism of internet technologies, the collective uses
these technologies extensively, as detailed above. LUMe activists attribute their reliance
on social network sites, and Facebook in particular, to their power, reach, and ease of use.
Activists explained that “everyone has Facebook now” (Boris) and that “they reach more
people… simply because today it’s the easiest way to reach the most people” (Valeria).
Boris argued that social media “have a strong power because they can reach many
people, because they already have their own public, that maybe hates what movements
do. But it’s like they have them underneath their window, very close, it’s very easy to
connect then”: social media offer a general audience to movements, one that is not
necessarily already politicized. Several activists also pointed to the fact that it is easier for
a collective to be found on Facebook than by simply searching the web with a search
engine. Activists thus consider social media a great opportunity to get more people
interested in what they are doing. Jessica stated that “social media have great potential”
and that they are “a great tool”. Maria used a powerful metaphor to explain the key role
of social media: she defined social network sites as mass communication channels, as
“the new television”. The comparison between Facebook and the television is particularly
significant in the Italian context, where Berlusconi’s dominance in the TV landscape of
the 1990s-2000s was object of heightened contention. The metaphor helps to clarify how
LUMe can be both critical of Facebook (talking about it as a new form of television has a
negative connotation in this context) and dependent on it, for its mainstream appeal.
In summary, for LUMe social media are a powerful tool to connect with other
youth. As Boris schooled me, after my objections: “I wouldn’t demonize social network
sites in this way, though, because they nevertheless allowed us and still allow us to

229

become known and to let people know about our events and what we think” (Boris).
Ilaria was even more explicit in highlighting the political potential of mainstream social
media platforms:
I’m saying something obvious, but the great revolutions… I’m thinking
about the women’s revolution in general, the path forged by “Not one
woman less”, the Arab Springs, etc, the use of social media was
propulsive, absolutely. So I think we should ‘do politics’ through social
media. Actually, we should only do that. I mean, social media should
be a public square, meaning a space full of content, politics, and
culture. I couldn’t care less about what someone ate for lunch, honestly
(Ilaria).
The potential of social media is thus very clear for LUMe’s activists, who, like
Ilaria, wish that Facebook could be even more of a space for political debate. However,
while the interviewees are unanimous in underlining the positive aspects of social media
for their political activity, many of them also raise individual objections of different
kinds. Some have taken breaks from Facebook or created ad-hoc accounts to avoid data
collection. Boris deactivated his Facebook account for four years after discovering how
much of his free time he spent using the service; he now has a Facebook account,
activated prior to joining LUMe, which he reportedly uses mostly to find out about events
and interact with LUMe’s social media. Mario told me he has a Facebook account he
shares with a friend; although this shared account was born out of necessity, when Mario
did not have reliable internet access, he now seems to enjoy having an account that can
confound Facebook’s algorithms by being operated by different people: “I always found
funny the idea of messing up the algorithm” (Mario). Jessica spoke of the relief she felt
when her Facebook account was temporarily suspended. Some of the activists openly
spoke of their fear of the power of social media; they reported that fights which broke out
on social media had taken a toll on their personal lives. Maria and Ilaria relayed their
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impression that social network sites exacerbate loneliness. Maria experienced a moment
of estrangement with her family that was due to hidden political tensions that manifested
as a fight over Facebook posts and comments and Maria’s unfriending of her father on
the platform. Jessica talked of her fear of surveillance, of the fact that so much data is
being collected through this platform. She described herself as using social media “in a
terrible way”. By this she meant to convey that – even though she was aware of their
power and their problems – she could not stop feeling the need to rely on them. In her
own words:
And so, it frightens me that my information is out there in the open,
without me really knowing about it. Because… And anyway, the fact
that I know… it actually makes me feel worse, quote-unquote, because
anyway this awareness does not lead me to safeguarding myself
(Jessica).

Like Jessica, many LUMe activists express their frustration at social media.
Stefano even questioned their utility: “it’s a useful tool to hang in there, Facebook, but
not to create an impulse, I think. But then it is also a fundamental part of what we do…”
(Stefano). These objections, which arise from activists’ individual experiences of social
media, supplement the more purely political objections, which I describe in the previous
sections.
It is somewhat of a paradox to hear LUMe activists relay that they should use
Facebook “because everyone is there”, while they are themselves scared of social media
or not fully committed to using Facebook. Most of them also reported joining LUMe
because a friend introduced them to the collective or brought them to an event. But
despite not having themselves joined LUMe because of Facebook, they seem convinced

231

that this is the privileged avenue for getting to know about them. The belief in the
importance of Facebook is also reinforced by the sense that there would be no alternative
to Facebook.
Although they do not state this lack of alternatives explicitly, it emerges from
many of their arguments. Jessica, a bit embarrassed, told me she did not know how to
respond to a person potentially interested in LUMe who did not use Facebook: “I did not
know what to tell him”. But she also rationalized that something like this would happen
rarely: “one in every 1500 that come through” (Jessica). After talking about the difficulty
of the political moment, especially for social centers, Stefano bitterly commented: “the
internet is all we have” – and as explained above, “the internet” largely means Facebook
for these activists.
The belief in the power, reach and ease of social media generates this sense of a
lack of alternatives to these platforms. This leads activists to grapple with their individual
and political objections – to find ways to rationalize their use of these platforms because
of the lack of alternatives to them. I call this process negotiation.

Negotiating the tensions
LUMe’s technological imaginary breaches the inherent contradiction of believing
in the usefulness of digital technologies while rejecting many of their aspects: for LUMe,
digital technologies are simultaneously flawed and indispensable for social change. These
technologies are flawed for the reasons that LUMe activists articulate in the interviews
and visual focus groups: chiefly because they are embedded in a capitalist system of
power and because they distort interactions. Yet, they are also indispensable, because
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activists believe in their power, reach and ease of use: there are no alternatives to these
technologies, because they are held to be the most efficient way to get in touch with other
people. While this imaginary might appear simple, if not simplistic, in practice this
requires constant political discussion and fine tuning. In their own words, LUMe activists
rationalize this technological imaginary through variations of the sentence “using the
tools of the system against the system”. Valeria’s quote fully expresses LUMe’s
technological imaginary:

Our idea has always been to use the tools of the system against the system,
let’s say. We did not pass value judgments on the thing itself, we thought
about the fact that it was available to us and how we could exploit it to our
advantage. It was this. And we have mostly used Facebook, and I have to
say that it works. I mean, many people come to us because they saw
something on Facebook. And this shows you that it’s a tool that reaches
many many people. But I mean, we use it with reason and awareness. And
always in line with our principles (Valeria).
The internet, and Facebook in particular, are identified as being representative of
a capitalist system that provides tools that activists can turn against the system. Paolo
explicitly called internet technologies “the tools that capital gives you”, which he argued
“can be used to spread diametrically opposed content”. Ilaria illustrated how LUMe
navigates this:
We thought about using those tools – obviously in a critical manner,
meaning that we know we are… in the end, we are incoherent, in using
these media to then go and criticize the system. I mean, it’s a dog biting its
tail. We had a lot of scruples at the beginning. We had a political
discussion. And we agreed that our position was that of exploiting the
system to fight the system. Not to be hermits that keep out of social media,
that retire, that give up on communicating, and thus give up on creating
consensus, on a popular base for consensus. Because that’s what social
networks are today… Instead, we want to use them in a critical
way (Ilaria).
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Ilaria’s words capture the political work that LUMe puts into making digital
technologies work for their political ideology and objectives. This is why I argue that
LUMe’s technological imaginary can be classified as one of “negotiation”. LUMe rejects
the core of Silicon Valley’s dominant technological imaginary: they are critical of the
neoliberal underpinnings of digital technologies and they refuse to see the internet as
inherently freeing and democratic. Despite rejecting the system (in their terms) and the
imaginary (in mine) of capitalist Silicon Valley, they nevertheless rely on Facebook and
the other commercial digital platforms for their activism. The process is not frictionless;
it requires a constant negotiation: among themselves, and between themselves and these
technologies. The frictions they encounter are generated by the clash of two technological
imaginaries – LUMe’s and Silicon Valley’s – which come to the surface when LUMe
attempts to use digital media tools in accordance with their political principles, and not
Silicon Valley’s. Silicon Valley’s imaginary is encoded in its technologies; and by using
these technologies, LUMe activists have to negotiate with an imaginary they do not
endorse. This negotiation entails the use of both practical and ideological arrangements
that can temper the clash between LUMe’s and Silicon Valley’s technological
imaginaries and allow the activists to justify their use of digital technologies.
Negotiation can be politically challenging – both internally and externally. An
example of internal challenge can be found in LUMe’s internal discussions on the
appropriateness of employing “sponsored posts” on Facebook. These posts, that
Facebook calls “boosted”, look like regular posts in users’ News Feeds, but Pages
administrators need to pay for them to be displayed. The advantage of investing in a
boosted post, as opposed to an ad, lies in the placement of the content directly in users’
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timelines and its appearance as organic to the timeline. The use of boosted posts on
Facebook generated discussions among LUMe activists. Ilaria summarized this
contentious conversation:

When we were reflecting on this thing, the 10€ sponsorship… I mean, on
whether we should spend 10€ to sponsor a post, rather than spending 50€
to print out some flyers, through a website that is anyway an industrial
exploitation of an art form… that cuts forests down… I mean, it’s all a
contradiction. So in the end, the lesser evil has always been that of
investing on social media, and that’s what we do (Ilaria).
In Ilaria’s words you can clearly see the practical and ideological considerations
that go into LUMe’s negotiation. The choice of calling Facebook a “lesser evil”
encapsulates the difficulty of this process of negotiation, as well as the generally negative
outlook held by activists with respects to Silicon Valley.
Externally, LUMe activists sometimes feel challenged by militants of other social
centers, especially older ones, for their reliance on commercial social media. Ilaria
mentioned that creating an Instagram page was regarded as a bad look for a social center.
Mario recalled his meeting with an “old hacker militant” who vehemently objected to
LUMe’s use of social media, that he saw in stark contradiction with the tradition of social
centers and grassroots culture. Mario engaged with the hacker’s objections, but
concluded:
Yeah, that’s one way of seeing it. It is a very purist way of seeing it, I’m
not sure how to say this. It has its charm. But if you want to spread an
idea, you do it through whatever channel allows you to do it. You even do
it through Facebook (Mario).
Boris encountered similar objections, which he explained as follows:
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I mean, if you are against certain things and you fight… [you have] your
politics, your ideals, and if the company whose services you utilize
doesn’t respect them, you should… I mean, ethically, in your militancy, in
your political activity, in your contestation, you should boycott it, or
contest it. And that’s fine. But this leads you to certain problems (Boris).
Boris, as well as other activists, associate the ideological refusal to use social
media with older activists. The “certain problems” to which Boris refers are those that
LUMe identified with older generations of social centers, namely their perceived lack of
openness to nonactivist circles. Thus we can also read LUMe’s technological imaginary
of negotiation against the grain of their criticism of the inward-looking nature of older
social centers. LUMe’s reliance on social media thus becomes another way of
guaranteeing that their social center will be more open to newcomers and innovate the
tradition of occupied spaces.
LUMe activists draw on two resources in their negotiation of the technologies of
Silicon Valley: the experience of occupying (offline) spaces and the idea of “awareness”.

Occupied spaces as anchors
LUMe activists are anchoring their use of corporate social media platforms to
their occupied space. Although they are very open about the crucial role that Facebook
plays for them, they frequently contextualize it within their offline practices: their
assemblies, their horizontal decision-making process, their self-management of the
occupied space. Activists often repeat that, even if extensive conversation and exchange
of information happens in their internal Facebook group and WhatsApp group chat,
decisions can only be taken in an assembly. It is such a cardinal rule that almost all
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interviewees repeat it to me. The offline space – particularly the political space of
demonstrations or the occupied space itself – is where politics happens. Ilaria
encapsulated this idea, by arguing that LUMe’s use of social media cannot be divorced
from LUMe’s presence in offline political spaces:
I mean, to me Facebook is making an event, inviting people, and then
seeing them in real life (dal vivo) and “doing politics” in real life. To me
Facebook means posting an article on migrants dying in the
Mediterranean, so that people can develop some critical thoughts and then
come to demonstrate the following week. (…) For me Facebook is not the
only place where politics happen, absolutely not, otherwise it would be
terrible. (Ilaria)

Ilaria’s quote shows how LUMe rationalizes its use of Facebook as a prelude to
actual political engagement, not as a locus of political engagement in itself. Maria even
went a step further and suggested that LUMe’s spike in popularity on social media is tied
to the interim period between the eviction from the Santa Caterina building and the
occupation of the Cinema Orchidea, in summer 2017, when LUMe did not have a
physical space. She detailed:

LUMe’s first social media boom was after the eviction. The eviction
period, the new occupation, that’s the moment LUMe’s social media…
because not having a space, not having a place to gather, and the spaces
were usually secret… I mean, the spaces where we were meeting… it was
important to meet in a plenary assembly to decide on the occupations or…
mostly, the occupations. [Social media] were the only way to interact and
to interact with the outside. Since we didn’t have a space where people
could come and talk to us. And that’s when it boomed. (Maria)

Maria thus traced a link between LUMe’s peak use of social media for external
communication and the absence of a physical offline space. Ilaria made a similar
connection with respect to LUMe’s internal communication, comparing the last phase of
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the occupation of the Santa Caterina building – when they “spent so much time together,
all day, every day” – to the current occupied space, which is far less hospitable – and
activists can spend less time there. Ilaria thus remarked that the current occupation needs
online communication more than the Santa Caterina one did: “if we had the physical
space to spend time together… since we don’t, we use [online communication] more”
(Ilaria). Although this link does not emerge explicitly from other interviewees’ accounts,
it serves to further highlight the importance of offline, occupied spaces in LUMe’s
technological imaginary. The occupied space grounds LUMe’s negotiation of the
dominant technological imaginary of Silicon Valley: it puts the activists’ reliance on
digital media in perspective. It allows LUMe to understand their use of digital media as
subordinate to the self-management and enjoyment of the occupied space.
As previously explained, the occupation is part of LUMe’s political identity, and
it locates LUMe within a long history of Italian occupied social centers. Foregoing the
centrality of occupied space in favor of virtual – and corporate-run! – spaces would
seriously violate some of LUMe’s political principles. Stefano clarified the stakes:

The elimination of sociality, let’s say… that’s a plague you run the risk
of spreading yourself, if you begin to only do everything in a virtual
manner… then the space doesn’t exist anymore. It’s a different space,
but it lacks the main component of what you initially wanted to do – to
share a different model of culture. We never thought it would make
sense to build our own universe on the internet. It’s always been a tool
for us. I mean, it would go against everything we believe in, at all
levels. (Stefano)

According to Stefano, investing totally into online tools would not only be against
the collective’s beliefs, but could also jeopardize the occupied space, as well. The fear of
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contributing to the demise of occupation as a political tactic that Stefano spoke to might
also be at the core of older militants’ objections to LUMe’s use of social media.
However, for LUMe this concern is not grounds for the avoidance of social media;
offline occupied spaces are a way of anchoring their negotiation of digital media
platforms.

Awareness against capitalism and populism
The second resource that LUMe activists draw upon in their negotiation of Silicon
Valley’s technological imaginary is the notion of “consapevolezza”. Consapevolezza does
not have a satisfying direct translation into English: here I will translate it as
“awareness”, but in reality, it sits at the intersection of the words “awareness”,
“consciousness” and “literacy”. Awareness is crucial to how LUMe thinks of its use of
social media, and Facebook in particular:
We try to fill this container, this container that is given to us, with as much
content as possible. Because in the end, that’s how you make a difference.
While many only use this with a profit logic, only with a logic of banality
and… I mean, despite everything we know about demagogy, and populism,
and how much Facebook can be shit, you can try to fill it up with content.
Because it allows you to reach a wider audience than if you didn’t use it.
Then at that point you have to try… to “trick the system”, quote-unquote.
Because you are trying to transmit something of value on this platform that
would otherwise become the shitter of the internet. (…) That’s the mission.
Trying to make as meaningful as possible what you do on that platform. I
believe that’s the only way to use it with awareness (Mario).

Mario’s words show how LUMe believes that they can use Facebook in a selfaware manner, to insert political content into the discussion, to promote an engagement
with the news, and ultimately to criticize the system. This way of using Facebook is a
way to put meaning into this otherwise terrible platform, while allowing the collective to
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still be themselves, to still maintain their political identity. Other interviewees express
this idea as “using Facebook in line with our own principles” (Valeria) or using social
media “in a critical way” (Ilaria). When they speak about awareness in these terms, it
comprises both a certain level of digital literacy and an awareness of the role of
corporations online.
Some of these themes emerged in the visual focus groups, where activists talked
at length about how “awareness” changed one’s relationship to the internet, especially in
terms of experiencing a more democratic internet. As shown above, activists are skeptical
towards the idea of the internet being democratic also because they perceive that many
people lack the literacy and savviness – the awareness – that would (maybe) allow the
use of digital tools in a more democratic way. In the second visual focus group, Alessio
even proposed to represent the internet as a ship leaving the port, “where someone got
stranded, because someone always misses the ship”.
They, however, claim awareness for themselves: “we have this awareness I was
talking about. Some more than others, but in some way, we know how it works, we know
how it is” (Maria). Sometimes awareness becomes a generational trait, which LUMe
activists possess because of their generation’s familiarity with digital media. Ilaria said
that she wishes digital literacy was taught more, because she is worried of how both her
12-year old brother and her mother use social media. She added:
When the Zuckerberg scandal on the selling of information happened…
I mean, as a digital native, I know that everything I do on Facebook can
be used for ends I have no control over, but my mom doesn’t – she
clicks, she plays Candy Crush, and she doesn’t know that those clicks
help Putin win, right? So being aware of this is very important for me,
to be able to create educational systems that can give this literacy… at
this point, we can’t ignore that this exists (Ilaria).
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Awareness thus distinguishes the younger generation to which LUMe belongs,
according to Maria, Ilaria, and others. The interviewees often talk to me about their
parents, or other older people, to explain how they see their own self-aware use of
Facebook as different: savvier, more detached, more strategic. However, this contrast
between self-aware and unaware uses of social media also has a stronger political
connotation – not just a generational one. The lack of awareness that they perceive as
problematic – especially in terms of experiencing the internet in a democratic way – can
be tied directly to the Five Star Movement and their use of social media. In fact, in the
Italian popular imagination, supporters of the Five Star Movement are associated with a
lack of digital literacy (and sometimes of literacy as well), like the spreading of fake
news or the intense use of Facebook in a cringeworthy way, including bad grammar
errors and the extensive use of “caps lock” and exclamation marks (Boni & Ricci, 2015).
So even if LUMe activists are rarely explicit in connecting it to a critique of the Five Star
Movement, their idea of awareness is a response to the perceived poor use of the internet
among the 5SM’s supporters. This is what Valeria was referring to when she commented:
If you approach the internet without knowing what you are going into,
you run the risk of being maneuvered, rather than being the master of
your own self. Maybe you even think that your idea comes from that,
but… I don’t know, personally, I’d rather be informed, to find things
out from other channels as well (Valeria).

In Valeria’s mind, a lack of awareness in approaching the internet is dangerous
because it may lead people to be taken advantage of. In the second visual focus group,
Stefano made a similar point, but tied a lack of awareness to the belief in the
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democraticness of the internet, to highlight how it can make people vulnerable to political
exploitation:
There are generations who don’t have the same way of disentangling
online things that we have, who think that something they read on the
internet is way more authoritative. And then there’s the fact that the
internet has opened to… I mean, it’s cause and consequence of the
enormous opening towards populism that we have seen in recent years.
I mean, it’s true that it is not the primary engine of the phenomenon –
the fact that we have fake news online – but it comes full circle, with
the model that the internet chose, in terms of information (Stefano).

Stefano then went on to note that the ability to create and circulate false pieces of
information greatly aggravates this difficult situation. In making a connection between
social media and populism, Stefano is more explicit than others in critiquing the lack of
awareness of ample swaths of the Italian population – with the implication that this lack
of awareness makes them more exposed to populism.
By linking a lack of awareness to the illusory democraticness of the internet and
then to populism, Valeria and Stefano are criticizing the Five Star Movement and the
ideas about the digital that it has popularized. As Natale and Ballatore (2014) suggested,
the Five Star Movement’s technological imaginary is an adaptation of the Californian
Ideology (Barbrook & Cameron, 1996) for the Italian context. Beppe Grillo and the late
Gianroberto Casaleggio, the creators of the party, have used a powerful technoutopian
“myth of the web” (Natale & Ballatore, 2014) to differentiate themselves from other
Italian parties, seeking to cast the Five Star Movement as a revolutionary force that will
destroy old party structures, just like the internet has destroyed older technologies.
However, as Treré (2018) argued, the appeal to digital utopianism has only served to
authoritarian, top-down practices within the 5SM itself. Treré (2018) has convincingly
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termed the imaginary of the 5SM as “authoritarian sublime”, by which he described how
“the cyber-libertarian discourse of the 5SM, based on the myths of horizontality,
leaderlessness, and digital democracy, was used to conceal and legitimize political
practices associated with authoritarianism, populism, and strong leadership” (p. 124).
LUMe draws on the notion of awareness, as articulated in this section, to rescue
their social media practices from the danger of succumbing to both Silicon Valley’s and
the Five Star Movement’s technological imaginaries. By using this idea of awareness,
they can understand their social media presence as one that produces meaningful political
content, which allows them to “use the tools of the system to fight the system”. At the
same time, they are able to distance themselves from the presumed democraticness of the
internet, which they see as instrumental to contemporary forms of populism.

Conclusion
The technological imaginary shared by the young radical activists of LUMe fully
expresses their ambiguous relationship to digital technologies, and commercial social
media platforms in particular. For these activists, these technologies are unavoidable –
there is no credible alternative to them. Yet, these technologies are also deeply
problematic for LUMe. As this chapter shows, the activists in the collective wage a
strong critique of web technologies: they identify a strong connection between capitalist
structures and online processes, they reject the idea of a democratic internet reality, they
question how internet technologies mediate and distort human interaction. Their critique
hits at the core of Silicon Valley’s technological imaginary: it uncovers its connection
with neoliberal capitalism, it rejects its belief in an inherently liberating and democratic
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nature of internet technologies, and it refuses its technological solutionism. And yet, by
relying on the same technologies that were created within the dominant imaginary,
LUMe activists end up having to navigate how Silicon Valley’s imaginary manifests in
the affordances of those technologies. LUMe’s technological imaginary is thus one of
negotiation: activists are actively engaged in tweaking and justifying their use of Silicon
Valley’s technologies so that it can best match their beliefs and praxis. In the activists’
words, as highlighted above, this process comes to be described as “fighting the system
with the tools of the system”.
For LUMe, negotiation draws on two resources, which allow the activists to
reimagine and qualify their use of social media. First, the activists anchor their relation to
technology in the existence and self-management of offline occupied spaces; this allows
them to frame the internet as an important, but residual space for politics. LUMe’s
political action is thought to be facilitated by the use of social media, but social media are
not the locus for this political action: politics is what happens offline, in the occupied
space and in the streets. Second, LUMe holds on to the notion of consapevolezza,
translated here as awareness, as a resource that allows them to maintain their political
identity while using social media. Such awareness is to be understood as enabling a
critical use of social media that rejects the technological imaginaries of both Silicon
Valley and the Five Star Movement.
In this dissertation, I argue that how social movements’ technological imaginaries
respond to the dominant technological imaginary of Silicon Valley is shaped by their
political ideology, the political context in which they are situated, and the presence of
other prominent technological imaginaries. In the case of LUMe, negotiation is shaped by
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LUMe’s (implicit) Marxist orientation, their existence within a long historical trajectory
of political occupied spaces (the social centers) and the mainstream appeal of the
technological imaginary of the Five Star Movement. First, this chapter examined in detail
how LUMe activists apply a Marxist reading to the internet, which drives their criticism.
It is data commodification and the power of online corporations that interviewees identify
as the main problems of the internet. They do not, for instance, talk about internet
companies violating users’ privacy as a violation of civil liberties – they understand
surveillance within capitalist processes of exploitation. Their articulation of their
technological imaginary as being about “fighting the system” while using its tools is also
a clear reference to a Marxist understanding of social struggle. Second, the importance
that LUMe attributes to offline, occupied spaces, including as a resource through which it
can support its negotiation with the imaginary of Silicon Valley, shows the importance of
the tradition of the occupied social centers in guiding the activists’ relationship to
technology. LUMe activists are conscious of being part of a long tradition of occupying
spaces for political reasons. They are committed to the political occupation of spaces –
their use of social media is functional to the goal of sustaining their occupation, not
supplanting it. Yet, activists are also conscious that their choice of using Silicon Valley
technologies is also controversial, if seen through the lens of the typical countercultural
practices enacted by social centers. Activists often talked to me about being criticized for
this by older militants of other social centers. This political context – so peculiar to Italian
social movements – thus plays an important role in how LUMe situates itself in relation
to the dominant technological imaginary of Silicon Valley and its technologies. Third,
LUMe’s technological imaginary stands in opposition to Silicon Valley’s imaginary, but
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also to the imaginary of the Five Star Movement, the populist party that is part of a
government coalition with the right-wing populist League party. As highlighted in this
chapter, in their critique of democraticness and in their reliance on “awareness” as a key
for navigating in their use of social media, LUMe implicitly – and explicitly, at times –
rejects the 5SM’s imaginary of sublime (to keep with Treré’s characterization). Indeed, it
even seems that LUMe activists interpret Silicon Valley’s imaginary through the lens of
their experience with the Five Star Movement, thus reinforcing their rejection of both
imaginaries. Silicon Valley’s dominant imaginary is untenable, for LUMe, also because it
enables and justifies the kinds of authoritarian and populist practices that the 5SM has
been enacting and that Treré (2018) examined. The influence of LUMe’s Marxist
orientation, the legacy of occupied social centers and the prominence of the technological
imaginary of the Five Star Movement thus shape how LUMe’s negotiation of the
imaginary of Silicon Valley unfolds.

Negotiation is not unique to LUMe’s technological imaginary. In the next chapter,
I will analyze how a different movement – the Philly Socialists – articulates an imaginary
of negotiation that looks and feels different from the one put forward in this chapter. For
the Philly Socialists, negotiation is shaped by an appeal to the tradition of socialist
organizing and its agnostic use of the available mainstream media technologies and a
concern with the technological imaginary of contemporary leftist-liberal online activism.
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Chapter 4 – Negotiation: the Philly Socialists and the American “socialist moment”
Introduction
The Philly Socialists (PS) are a socialist organization committed to revolutionary
politics. They are based in the city of Philadelphia. They have a dues-paying membership
system and run a number of projects in different neighborhoods, which they think of as
“serve the people” work. Their membership is varied in terms of age, gender and race,
although the core organizers serving in leadership positions have mostly been white
and/or male. Although the Philly Socialists have been gaining traction in recent years,
within a general trend towards increased national visibility for American socialist
organizations, they have been active since 2011.
As explained in the Introduction, this chapter is based on research conducted
between 2018 and 2019. In particular, I conducted five semi-structured individual
interviews with Philly Socialists organizers; the average length of the interviews was 70
minutes. In addition to the interviews, I observed four public or semi-public meetings or
events, taking notes and collecting printed materials when available; I analyzed
documents published by the Philly Socialists, with particular attention to documents that
detailed their political positions and their organizational and technological practices; I
also observed and occasionally collected the content that the Philly Socialists created on
Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, and their own website.
In this chapter, I explain how the Philly Socialists articulate a technological
imaginary of negotiation, which I summarize as “organizing where people are”: while the
PS find digital media far from ideal, they regard them as good enough for recruiting
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people into the organization. It is a technological imaginary of negotiation because it
rejects the triumphalistic tones of Silicon Valley’s visions of technology, but it allows for
the use of the digital technologies produced by Silicon Valley. In particular, the Philly
Socialists contextualize their technological practices through the notion of “organizing”,
which allows them to downplay and justify their use of corporate digital technologies.
The imaginary of negotiation of the Philly Socialists is articulated differently from
LUMe’s negotiation; even if both groups end up choosing to use Silicon Valley’s
technologies, LUMe negotiates their technological practices in response to the tradition
of the Italian occupied social centers, as well as another salient technological imaginary
in the Italian landscape – that of the Five Star Movement. In contrast, the Philly
Socialists’ negotiation is shaped by an appeal to the heritage of socialist organizing and
an opposition to the technological imaginary of “activist networking” (that we might
better qualify as “lifestyle activism” or “slacktivism”).
I chronicle the history of the Philly Socialists from their founding in 2011 to their
recent involvement in the Occupy ICE protests that opposed Trump’s immigration
policies in 2018; I also detail the different “serve the people” projects that the PS have
promoted in the city of Philadelphia. I then examine the politics of the Philly Socialists,
which are a multi-tendency socialist organization oriented towards a revolutionary
approach, as opposed to the electoral process. I contextualize the PS’ politics within what
looks like a “socialist moment” in contemporary American politics, i.e. a period of
heightened attention to socialism and socialist organizations, likely spurred by
Democratic Senator Bernie Sanders’ participation in the Democratic Presidential
Primaries in 2016. Although this “socialist moment” has brought media coverage and
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interest to the Philly Socialists, the group is not necessarily thrilled with how the
mainstream conversation about socialism has been coopted by the electoral politics of the
Democratic Party. Partially in response to this socialist moment, the Philly Socialists
have been more forceful in articulating how their political approach is distinct from other
organizations; they do this through the notion of “base-building”, which explains their
commitment to “fighting the power and serving the people”, as opposed to running
candidates in elections. Base-building is also the keyword that characterizes the
formation of a new national organization that unites different local socialist
organizations: the Marxist Center. The effort to create the Marxist Center was
spearheaded by members of the PS, which remain very influential in the national
network. Further, I explain how the organizational structures of the Philly Socialists
blend the centralized structures typical of socialist groups with more decentralized
processes that are inspired by neo-anarchist movements.
I then examine the technological practices of the Philly Socialists, as they pertain
to external and internal communication. The organization’s practices are geared towards
the recruitment and retainment of members; while the PS tend to downplay their reliance
on corporate digital platforms, they utilize extensively both corporate social network sites
and other collaboration and campaigning tools, such as Slack and Nationbuilder. In the
last part of the chapter, I describe the technological imaginary of the Philly Socialists,
which I condense in the sentence “organizing where people are”, through which I
highlight how digital technologies are not ideal for the PS, but they are good enough for
recruiting people. The PS’ technological imaginary is one of negotiation, because the
organization rejects the dominant technological imaginary of Silicon Valley, while
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relying on its technologies. Their negotiation is based on a strategic use of the notion of
“organizing”, which allows them to frame their technological practices as one piece of a
more complex online and offline strategy. As such, their imaginary of negotiation is
shaped by a) the heritage of socialist organizing and its use of mainstream technologies
and b) the rejection of a technological imaginary, akin to “slacktivism”, that they see as
widespread in the American Left, and which they call “activist networking”.

The Philly Socialists
The Philly Socialists were founded in the Summer of 2011, right before the
beginning of the Occupy Wall Street movement in the United States, by a handful of
white male activists, who had recently relocated to Philadelphia and had prior
experiences in radical social movements, student organizing and anti-war demonstrations.
The PS can thus be considered as part of the wave of mobilization that brought young
Americans to the streets after the financial crisis of 2008 and after the subsequent loss of
trust in the Obama administration’s capacity to steer the country in a more progressive
direction. But while many of the movements of the post-recession period have long been
gone, eight years after their founding the Philly Socialists are still gaining new members
and implementing new projects. In January 2019, their dues-paying membership
amounted to 170 individuals; additionally, dozens more people participate in their
projects in the city, even if they do not hold formal membership.
Immediately after their founding, the Philly Socialists participated in the Occupy
Philadelphia movement, which set up an encampment near City Hall, in the heart of the
city, for two months, before being evicted in November 2011. A number of current
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members got to know the Philly Socialists through their participation in Occupy Philly.
Besides their participation in Occupy Philly, the first project that the founders of the
Philly Socialists put in place was that of offering General Educational Development
(GED) and English as Second Language (ESL) classes – a project that still continues
today. Additionally, they started their organizing work in North Philadelphia, where the
recession had left many lots vacant. Canvassing the neighborhood, the organizers found
that the residents were interested in having a community garden; they identified a piece
of land that had been abandoned due to tax delinquency and turned that into a garden.
Since then, the Philly Socialists have established several community gardens in
Philadelphia, which they maintain with the involvement of the neighborhoods.
After what one of the founders described as a “lull period” between 2012 and
2013, the Philly Socialists directed their efforts towards tenant organizing in the city in
2014-2015. Inspired by the Seattle Solidarity Network, the Philly Socialists started to
organize tenant fights against landlords in West Philadelphia. What began as support to
one resident’s struggle against a negligent landlord (Thompson, 2019), later became a
full-fledged organization, the Philadelphia Tenants Union (PTU), founded in 2016. The
PTU is now an independent organization, but their membership and, at times, leadership
overlap significantly with the Philly Socialists.
Between 2015 and 2016, in the long campaign leading up to the Presidential
Primaries and the Presidential Elections, the candidacy of Democratic Senator Bernie
Sanders got people more interested in “democratic socialism” and socialist organizations,
as one of the PS interviewees reported. While, as I will explain below, the Philly
Socialists do not support Sanders or other candidates for office, they benefitted from the
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national media attention to Sanders and his reclaiming of the label of “socialist”, albeit
within the confines of the Democratic Party. After the election of President Donald
Trump in 2016, the Philly Socialists saw another spike in the number of people who
showed up to their public events or showed interest in other ways. In particular, one of
the interviewees recalled that:
after Trump got elected, then there was a huge, huge mobilization
almost instantaneously on the night of the election or the weekend of.
We were planning to have a meeting already in advance, probably the
weekend after the election and we had to change venues because on
Facebook we found 300 people were going to show up, so we had to
rent a bigger space. We had this big mass meeting of several hundred
people. We were trying to plug in the energy into doing concrete work.
We had several mass meetings after that. (Tyler)

As Tyler explained, the Philly Socialists tried to channel the frustration (and
excitement) of the early anti-Trump protests into their different projects. The PS also took
part in the rallies of late January 2017, when thousands of people took to the streets to
protest against Trump, who was visiting a Republican Party retreat that was taking place
in a hotel in downtown Philadelphia (Hesse, 2017; Tesfaye, 2017).
Since 2017, the efforts of the Philly Socialists have gone into different directions.
On the one hand, the organization continues to expand and experiment with new projects.
One of the projects that the PS is currently incubating is that of a worker organizing
initiative, called Dignity, which PS leadership hope to turn into a permanent structure
similar to that of the Philadelphia Tenants Union. The organization also had a change in
leadership in 2018, which signaled the “retirement” of the PS founders from leadership
roles and the emergence of a more diverse cohort of leaders in the elected positions of the
organization. On the other hand, the Philly Socialists are also spearheading the creation
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of a socialist organization at the national level, intended to be a network of local
organizations that share the Philly Socialists’ values and political orientations to
organizing, chiefly the attention to base-building, as opposed to the electoral process. The
first national meeting that began to plan for a national network was held in Philadelphia
in Summer 2017. In December 2018, a second national meeting held in Colorado
officially founded the new organization, called the “Marxist Center”. The PS have taken
a leading role in the creation of this new entity, as shown by the fact that the organization
sent a delegation of 13 people to the conference in Colorado and several PS members led
workshops.
In Summer 2018, the Philly Socialists were one of the organizers of the Occupy
ICE protests in Philadelphia. These protests were part of a nationwide surge in activism
against the repressive immigration policies of the Trump administration and the targeting
of immigrants by ICE, the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement agency (Lang,
2018; Levin, 2018). Portland (OR) was one of the main centers of the protests. In
Philadelphia, organizers such as the Philly Socialists, the Philadelphia branch of
Democratic Socialists of America and Reclaim Philadelphia30 started occupying the area
in front of the ICE offices at 8th and Cherry St. on July 2nd. Despite the summer heat and
the rain, the protesters continuously occupied the site for four days, building an
encampment and collecting monetary and in-kind donations (Gammage & IrizarryAponte, 2018a; Orso & Feliciano Reyes, 2018). The protesters were forcefully evicted on
30

According to press releases distributed via Facebook, the original sponsoring coalition included:
Socialist Alternative, Philly Socialists, Party for Socialism and Liberation, Montgomery County Socialists,
Liberation Project, Philly DSA, Reclaim Philadelphia, Green Party of Philadelphia, International Marxist
Tendency, POWER, IWW Philly, Bucks County Socialists; however, 215 People's Alliance, Juntos, and
New Sanctuary Movement of Philadelphia also joined the coalition in different capacities (Philly Socialists
et al., 2018).
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July 5th, when the police used their issued bicycles to push away protesters, effectively
separating them from the tents and equipment (Feliciano Reyes, Orso, Palmer, & Tornoe,
2018) – an action that the protesters dubbed “bikedozing”. A second encampment was
created next to City Hall on July 6th (Sasko, 2018); the new encampment spurred a mass
meeting on July 10th, where activists attempted to create a more stable structure of
working groups. The occupation lasted for 22 days. In Philadelphia, the Occupy ICE
protests supplemented the nationwide demand to “abolish ICE” with two more local
claims: 1) a request to governor Tom Wolf to “shut down” the federal detention center in
Berks County, which holds parents and children who are awaiting immigration or asylum
decisions and 2) a request to mayor Jim Kenney to end PARS, e.g. a data-sharing
agreement which allowed ICE to access information about arrests in the city of
Philadelphia (Gammage, 2018; Gammage & Irizarry-Aponte, 2018a). The protests were
successful on the local level, in that mayor Kenney announced on July 27th that the city
would not renew its contract with PARS, which terminated on August 31st, 2019 (Allyn,
2018). The announcement put an end to the encampment outside City Hall (“‘Occupy
ICE’ activists vacate City Hall after Kenney won’t renew PARS agreement,” 2018). The
local success of Occupy ICE Philadelphia brought an increase of media attention to the
Philly Socialists, who were recognized as one of the main actors behind these protests
(Brey, 2018a, 2018b; Dixon, 2018; Orso & Feliciano Reyes, 2018; Wang, 2018).
Besides protests and direct action, the Philly Socialists work on many projects at
the same time: each of them is coordinated by a working group, typically composed by
dues-paying members, but open to non-members; the General Assembly and the Central
Committee oversee all of the activities and allocate a budget for them. When I attended
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an open “mass meeting” of the PS, directed at introducing the organization to potentially
interested individuals, in July 2018, PS members presented ten different projects that they
were running. First, the Philadelphia Tenants Union, “fighting slumlords through direct
action campaigns and working to expand tenants' rights in Philadelphia” (Philly
Socialists, 2018e). Second, the ESL classes, which are run by PS volunteers and directed
at immigrants. They are free and take place in two community spaces, one in South
Philadelphia and one in West Philadelphia. This project was presented as a vehicle for
solidarity between immigrants and non-immigrants in a Philly Socialists’ pamphlet
available at that meeting: “Philly Socialists have been providing free English classes for
the past six years, with the intention of beginning to build a foundation of trust and
mutual respect between these communities” (Philly Socialists, 2018b). Third, the worker
organizing project – Dignity. The pamphlet mentioned above describe the project as
such:
Socialists must be at the forefront of a revived labor movement.
[sentence in bold in original] Philly Socialists has launched a Workers’
Center to do just that. We are taking the fight straight to the bosses and
seeking to build a united anti-capitalist front between labor socialists
and radical working-class organizations. (Philly Socialists, 2018b)

Since Dignity is still a work-in-progress, the organizers did not share any other
details at that meeting. The fourth project presented in the July mass meeting was that of
the Philly Socialists’ own quarterly alternative magazine, The Philadelphia Partisan. The
Partisan is run by an editorial collective, whose members write under pseudonyms;
articles are authored by the editorial collective, Philly Socialists members and other
interested activists. The fifth project is the Cesar Iglesias Community Garden in North
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Philadelphia, which the Philly Socialists call their “land redistribution project” (Philly
Socialists, 2018e) and which “provides a community gathering space, fresh local food,
and shows both our allies and our enemies that land and resources can be put to use
productively by the people” (Philly Socialists, 2018b). Sixth, PS organizers introduced
their different student organizing efforts at Drexel University and Temple University
(now in decline). Over the past year, the PS’ student branches have expanded: the Drexel
Socialists launched a Student Tenants Union to organize the residents of student housing
and fight landlords in the gentrified areas of University City; and a small group of
students at the University of Pennsylvania also started organizing as “Penn Socialists”.
Seventh, given that the Occupy ICE protests in Philadelphia had just ended with a victory
by the organizers, the Philly Socialists talked about their participation in the coalition of
Philly leftist groups that led those protests. The eighth “project” highlighted in the
meeting is less of a project, and more of a working group: the “Design collective”, which
is responsible for designing print and digital materials, including posters, flyers for
events, banners, pamphlets, and t-shirts, and is always recruiting new members, with or
without design experience. The ninth project, still under development, is the creation of a
Domestic Violence Rapid Response Team, which emerged from the PS’ Dolphin Caucus,
i.e. the working group for non-cismen members. The mission of the Rapid Response
Team is that of “supporting the immediate needs for survivors of domestic and sexual
abuse, without police involvement” (Philly Socialists, 2018f). The last project presented
at the meeting is that of the Marxist Center, previously introduced.
In 2018-2019, the Philly Socialists also worked on other new activities: they
expanded their political education programs, which now include a reading club that gets
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together to discuss recent books on interest to the PS (so far, the reading group has read
the 2018 “Can the Working Class Change the World?” by David Yates); in 2019, the PS
have held their first two public events in Spanish, in January and March 2019. The PS
also launched their “Prison Organizing Project”, which has been coordinating drop-in
letter writing sessions, providing materials, postage, as well as advice, on how to write to
incarcerated people (Philly Socialists, 2019b). Additionally, the “Prison Organizing
Project” has been working on “outreach, coordinating support for court dates, and
connecting with other groups and networks” (Philly Socialists, 2018f). According to a
March 2019 newsletter (Philly Socialists, 2019a), a legal defense team and prisoner
solidarity project is also in the works.

The politics of the Philly Socialists
We are… we accept people who identify as anarchists, people who
identify as Trotskyists or Stalinists or what have you. We don't have
like a specific strongly held ideological core belief, but generally, the
organization moves in a revolutionary direction, the long-term stated
goal is a revolution and the tactics tend to downplay the importance of
elections and to focus more on direct action, mass action, right? Mass
struggles, protests and community organizing. Our approach to elected
officials tends to be more oppositional and antagonistic. (Tyler)

In this quote, Tyler clearly articulated the politics of the Philly Socialists. They
are a broadly inclusive socialist organization, which relies on protests, direct action, and
“serve the people” work. They are not interested in taking part in the electoral process at
the local, state or federal level – they prefer to think about their organizing work as
leading to a socialist revolution in the United States. The politics of the Philly Socialists
are presented in slightly different ways on their outreach materials; while not hiding their
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socialist and revolutionary orientation, they attempt to spell out its meaning in lay terms,
focusing on what they stand for as socialists. On their website, the “Who we are” page
states that “We are dedicated to building the base for socialist politics by organizing the
unorganized” (Philly Socialists, n.d.-e). Until recently, the “About” section on their
Facebook page declared, in both English and Spanish: “We are committed to creating a
just and sustainable future for ourselves and our planet. We fight to extend and deepen
democracy within our society — to transform our political and economic system into one
befitting of basic human dignity” (Philly Socialists, n.d.-b); it also stated that “Philly
Socialists is a working class political organization. / Philly Socialists es una organización
política de la clase obrera. Sí luchamos, ganamos [If we fight, we win] (Philly Socialists,
n.d.-b). In more detailed terms, under the humorous title “Join Us and Fight for a Just,
Sustainable, and Equitable Society (*cough* *cough* Socialism)”, they add:
Philly Socialists is a political organization committed to creating a just
and sustainable future for ourselves and our planet. As socialists, we
believe in freedom, democracy, and the right to basic human dignity.
Capitalism denies us all these. Only revolutionary change that ends
capitalism will win us the future we deserve. And only a massive,
organized force can get us there. (Philly Socialists, n.d.-b)

In their outward-facing materials, it is clear that the Philly Socialists are making
an effort to explain what socialism means in plain language, and how the PS might be
different from other socialist organizations. A small pamphlet distributed at an open
assembly in July 2018 devoted a third of its space to an explanation of the “values” of the
Philly Socialists (Philly Socialists, 2018b) in a (relatively) simple way. First, they
juxtaposed three “We are” – “socialists”, “building a political base”, “serving the people,
fighting the power” – and three “We are not” – “a political theory club”, “funded by
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grants”, “supporters of the two capitalist parties” (Philly Socialists, 2018b). Under the
first heading, “We are: Socialists”, the pamphlet echoed some aspects of what Tyler
reported in the quote above:
Socialists believe in democracy and the right to a decent human life.
The “right” to profit and private property should never impinge upon
our basic rights to human dignity. We all have different ideas about the
specifics of what socialism means or looks like. However, we are
bonded by the basic ideas and the tradition of socialist politics. (Philly
Socialists, 2018b)

In explaining what socialists believe in, the Philly Socialists aim to be inclusive of
different definitions of socialism. In many ways, their view of socialism is best
represented by the concept of “base-building” and their “serve the people” work (e.g.
their projects), which I examine later in this section. The three instances of “We are not”
articulated in the pamphlet are a direct way for the Philly Socialists to distinguish
themselves from orthodox, sectarian, socialist groups (“political theory club”), from nonprofit organizations (“funded by grants”) and from the Democratic Socialists of America
(DSA) (“supporters of the two capitalist parties”) (Philly Socialists, 2018b), which have
recently become more directly involved in the politics of the Democratic Party,
particularly after the Bernie Sanders presidential primary campaign in 2015-2016. It is as
important for the Philly Socialists to describe who they are as it is to describe who they
are not; this necessity to differentiate the PS from other groups is a recurrent theme of the
interviews, too. This might be especially crucial in this moment of unexpected media
attention to socialist organizations in the United States, which has led the PS to receive
more media coverage.
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The pamphlet mentioned above also states three values – science, human rights,
and democracy – which are enshrined in the Constitution of the Philly Socialists (Philly
Socialists, 2017). Curiously, while the Constitution does not mention the word
“socialism” or “socialist” at all, these “core values” are placed prominently in Article 1:
1. Science — Prove it
Science is our guiding methodology. We reject all dogma and
orthodoxy, seeking instead to encourage critical thinking among the
masses.
2. Human Rights — Everybody matters
The rights of the people are the supreme law. The fulfillment of
basic human rights is the responsibility of any legitimate
government.
3. Democracy — Everyone decides
Democracy is a fundamental desire of all people. Democracy is a
process and a set of institutions which rests on this foundation of
individual and collective rights and liberties. Disagreement is a
fundamental right, and a social good (Philly Socialists, 2017, art.
1).

According to the article, these values “inform and direct [their] actions, strategies
and goals” (Philly Socialists, 2017, art. 1). I do not have any empirical material that
would allow me to speculate on how these values came to be so prominent in the
Constitution of the Philly Socialists31. What seems evident is that they do not necessarily
appear as defining principles of a socialist approach – even a broadly inclusive one like
that of the Philly Socialists – and that they would not be out of place in the Constitution
of a progressive or even liberal political organization. This might be a tactical decision on
part the of the Philly Socialists, to avoid tying themselves too rigidly to a specific

31

These three values, with the exact wording, appear in all previous three versions of the Philly Socialists
Constitution, dated 2012, 2013 and 2014. They can be accessed through the (no longer updated) personal
website of a former member of the Philly Socialists (“Philly Socialists Resources,” n.d.).
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definition of socialism – which would then be difficult to amend, given that the
Constitution can only be amended through the Constitutional Congress, which requires a
quorum of 50% + 1 members and a 2/3 majority vote (Philly Socialists, 2017, art. 2c). It
might also be a way to shield the organization from trouble, given the problematic status
of “socialism” in American political culture for most of the 20th Century.
In the rest of the section, I will contextualize the Philly Socialists within what
mainstream commentators have called – sometimes with alarm – an American “socialist
moment”. Then, I will articulate the importance of the idea of base-building to the
politics of the Philly Socialists. Afterwards, I will focus on the efforts by the Philly
Socialists to spearhead the formation of a national organization of socialists, which is
now called the “Marxist Center”. Lastly, I will explain the intricate organizational
structure of the Philly Socialists, which blends traditional socialist centralization and neoanarchist horizontality.

A socialist moment in the United States
Is the United States living a socialist moment? The question has been
preoccupying mainstream media for the past couple of years. PBS Newshour asked: “Is
socialism having its moment in U.S. elections?” (Greenfield, 2019); a segment on NPR’s
program Fresh Air declared that “Socialism isn’t the scare word it once was” (Nunberg,
2019). The pages of The New York Times have also hosted discussions on the rise of
socialism in the American political landscape: in August 2018, an opinion column was
titled: “The New Socialists: Why the pitch from Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez and Bernie
Sanders resonates in 2018” (Robin, 2018); in May 2019, the Times’ website hosted a
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conversation with Bhaskar Sunkara, who is the editor of Jacobin, a quarterly socialist
magazine founded in 2010, under the title “The United States of Socialism?” (Douthat,
Goldberg, & Leonhardt, 2019). But the predominant frame that news media have used to
cover the “resurgence” of socialism is undoubtedly that of defining it in generational
terms: the emergence of “millennial socialism” in the US was announced, for instance, by
the Economist (“Millennial socialism: The resurgent left,” 2019), the Chicago Tribune
(Chapman, 2018), The US edition of the New Statesman (Jacobson, 2019; Ypi, 2019), the
Guardian, that declared that US millennials “fell in love with socialism” (McGreal,
2017), and the Nation (Mead, 2017).
In 2018, a Gallup poll32 showed that the percentage of Democrats and
Democratic-leaning independents who regarded socialism favorably was higher than the
percentage of those who regarded capitalism favorably (57% vs. 47%)(Newport, 2018).
According to the same poll, 51% of younger Americans, regardless of political affiliation,
had a favorable opinion of socialism, while only 45% had a positive opinion of capitalism
(Newport, 2018). Whether in a positive or negative way, Americans also seemed
interested in knowing more about socialism, as evidenced by their Google searches.
Google Trends data are useful to show the variation in the volume of Google searches
that contain a given keyword within a time period; the numbers attached to the data vary
between 0 and 100, with 100 representing the highest volume of searches that contain the
keyword within the time period, and all other values as a proportion of that maximum
value (Stocking & Matsa, 2017). As can be seen in Figure 13, Google searches that
32

The survey was conducted between July 30th and August 5th, 2018; a random sample of 1,505 adults
aged 18 and older, living in all 50 U.S. states and the District of Columbia was surveyed via telephone
(landline and cell phones) (Newport, 2018).
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include the term “socialism” and that originated within the United States over the last 15
years, seem to spike in three moments: October 2008 (95), February 2016 (100), and
February 2019 (79).

Figure 13. The graph shows the changes in the relative search volume for Google queries, originating in the
United States, that contain the word “socialism” and were performed between January 2004 and May 2019.
Data source: Google Trends (https://www.google.com/trends)

Each of these coincides with a moment in which “socialism” entered the
mainstream discussion. In October 2008, the late Republican Presidential candidate John
McCain defined then candidate Barack Obama’s policies as “socialist” in a radio
interview (“McCain, Palin hint that Obama’s policies are ‘socialist,’” 2008); this fed a
long-term obsession within right-wing communities about Obama being a socialist (or a
communist) (see Berlet, 2010). February 2016 saw the first four Democratic primaries of
the 2016 cycle, where Sen. Bernie Sanders performed fairly well, losing Iowa to Hillary
Clinton by a narrow margin and winning in New Hampshire. In February 2019, a couple
of events might account for the attention to the word “socialism”. First, the media gave
ample coverage of progressive new Members of Congress, including Congresswoman
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Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez (a former member of the Democratic Socialists of America
and Sanders campaign staffer) throughout January and February 2019; in a notable
interview on “Meet the Press”, Ocasio-Cortez was questioned by Chuck Todd about her
stance on Democratic socialism and capitalism (Full interview: Rep. Ocasio-Cortez on
the Democratic Party, Green New Deal, 2020 candidates [Video file], 2019). Second,
and in no small part due to the media frenzy surrounding Ocasio-Cortez, during the State
of the Union address, on February 5, 2019, President Trump talked about the rising
popularity of socialist ideas in the United States:
Here in the United States, we are alarmed by the new calls to adopt
socialism in our country. America was founded on liberty and
independence, and not government coercion, domination, and control.
We are born free and we will stay free. Tonight, we renew our resolve
that America will never be a socialist country. (Graham, 2019)

Trump’s remarks on the threat of socialism in the United States undoubtedly
contributed to the continued media coverage of socialist ideas and organizations. In
particular, given their connection to Sanders and Ocasio-Cortez, the Democratic
Socialists of America (DSA) have beneficiated from this intense media attention. The
DSA were founded in 1982; as of now, they are the largest socialist organization in the
United States: their membership has grown from 6,000 members in 2015 to more than
50,000 in 2019 (Henwood, 2019; Stein, 2017).
The national attention that “socialism” has received over the past four years, by
both mainstream media and the public, has repercussions on the local level, too.
Recently, the Philly Socialists have been experiencing a surge in membership, public
participation, and media coverage. Their dues-paying members went from 32 in 2014 to
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72 in August 2016 (Philly Socialists, 2018a), to 170 in January 2019. As highlighted
above, in the period immediately after the 2016 Presidential election, the PS saw an
increased level of participation in their public events and assemblies, including from
individuals who had never joined such events before. Lastly, particularly after the
Occupy ICE protests in Philadelphia, in Summer 2018, the Philly Socialists also received
a lot more media attention (Brey, 2018a, 2018b; Dixon, 2018; Orso & Feliciano Reyes,
2018; Wang, 2018). Several members were quoted – and even photographed – in the
Philadelphia Inquirer’s coverage of the protests (Gammage & Irizarry-Aponte, 2018a,
2018b; Orso & Feliciano Reyes, 2018); the Philadelphia Weekly put the Philly Socialists
on the cover of the magazine, with the title “A full-fledged Socialist Party in American
politics. Just a dream? These folks beg to differ” (Brey, 2018a).
While the Philly Socialists are pleased with both the opportunity to be featured in
the media and the growth in membership and participation, they are not necessarily happy
with how the national conversation about socialism has been going. In particular, given
that a lot of that conversation has been about the participation of socialist candidates –
whether Sanders or Ocasio-Cortez – to the electoral process and within the Democratic
Party, the Philly Socialists feel that the way in which people are talking about socialism
right now is not representative of what they think socialism is actually about. One of the
interviewees, Michael, reacted like this to my questions about this socialist moment in
mainstream media:
One day maybe somebody will write a chapter heading and they'll be
like, "From 2010 to..." or whenever Occupy began, 2012 to 2020. The
resurgence of the US left, American Socialist Moment. The
contemporary American Socialist moment. Maybe somebody will write
that heading. I think it's yet to be seen, because I think you can say
socialism as a word has gained resurgence, but if that just means [it
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was] whipped into the Democratic party, that's not a socialist moment.
Socialism means independent working-class power, at the end of the
day. That's like one of the... there are a few things that it means, and
that's one of them. And if we don't have an independent political base
ready to mobilize – and I don't mean a party at the end of like 2020 or
2030… I'm talking about just our own independent political power that
is not hung at the collar to the Democratic Party, [if we don’t have that]
then it's not a socialist moment. (Michael)

While Michael saw this contemporary moment as one that might mark the
resurgence of socialism, he was nevertheless suspicious about the way in which the
national conversation on democratic socialism had largely been one about Democratic
socialism, i.e. about co-opting socialist organizing in the electoral process. He concluded:
“I’m gonna wait. I don’t think Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez is my socialist moment. I don’t
think Bernie Sanders is my socialist moment. I think they could be the inklings of one,
but I’ll wait until 2020 and see what happens” (Michael). Michael’s stance was echoed
by other interviewees, who were skeptical of the way in which the label of socialism has
been co-opted by Democratic politics. On the one hand, as Tyler explained, it is a
positive improvement that socialism has entered the mainstream: “So when I first moved
here around ten years ago, the idea that any politician would say the word socialism in a
positive way, people would have thought that was crazy” (Tyler). Yet, on the other hand,
Tyler expressed his skepticism of the way in which Democratic officials and candidates,
even at the local level, have seized the label: “Now the thing is that a lot of Democrats
have seen that socialism as a term excites young people and is something that they can
kind of tactically and cautiously move toward appropriating it, depending on the level”
(Tyler).
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The Philly Socialists’ ambivalence about the “socialist moment” has guided the
organization towards articulating with more clarity exactly what being socialist means to
them through the notion of “base-building”, to which I now turn. At the same time, the
growing attention to socialism in the U.S. has also encouraged the PS to push for the
creation of a national organization of socialists that is oriented towards base-building, as
opposed to the electoral process (like the DSA) – the Marxist Center, which I examine
afterwards.

Base-building: “Come for the values, stay for the work”
The Philly Socialists put a lot of effort into planning and managing their “Serve
the people” projects: ESL classes, community gardens, tenant organizing, etc. This
attention to grassroots mobilization is theorized by members of the Philly Socialists with
the idea of “base-building”, which they frequently oppose to the electoral strategy (i.e.
trying to elect candidates through the electoral process). One of the interviewees, Lisa,
explained the core advantage of base-building over working to elect candidates:
A lot of people want to do... I find it the easy route... Of like doing
elections and stuff, which is good, people want to do elections that's
okay. But I don't think that should be your only focus. Historically, and
also just recently, real change comes from when you do a lot of the
base building kind of work. So that's the kind of work that I think we
should be focusing on, personally. Many people want to do elections
and stuff, but that's I feel is more democratic politics. Because there's
not a party... like for instance I am not a citizen. None of those parties, I
would be able to have any political... I wouldn't be able to vote. But
doing the kind of work that I'm doing, I am able to actually move the
politics to where I want them to be moved. So that's why the kind of
work that I like to focus. So I hope that we do that. (Lisa)
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Lisa’s quote is helpful to highlight two key aspects of the PS’ base-building
approach: first, the idea the “real change” comes from the direct, grassroots mobilization
of the working class; second, that base-building is the only approach that can actually aim
to include all of the working class, given the electoral disenfranchisement of numerous
marginalized groups. While Lisa pointed out the disenfranchisement of immigrants, other
groups are also excluded from the electoral process, including many Black voters and
formerly or currently incarcerated people. The contrast between the inclusive grassroots
work of base-building and the exclusionary nature of electoral politics in the United
States was also at the core of a chapter that members of the Philly Socialists contributed
to a collection of essays from activists and scholars of the socialist left, published by
Haymarket Books and Verso in 2019 (Corcione, Yeun, & Diliberto, 2019). In the chapter,
titled “Beyond the vote: Base-building for class independence in Philadelphia”, PS
activists pitched base-building as an alternative strategy to “electoralism” (Corcione et
al., 2019). After arguing that “pursuing an exclusive electoral strategy (…) means
abandoning class struggle outside of the electoral arena, as well as the possibility to
organize with a section of the working class which does not, or simply cannot, vote”,
they presented base-building as directed towards “rebuilding a direct [in italics in
original] connection between socialists and the rest of the working class to help foster the
working class’ political independence” (Corcione et al., 2019). Ultimately, for the PS
base-building aims to build power outside of the electoral system (and of the State) to
build a working-class movement capable of seizing power for itself:
We build power outside the electoral system by creating our own
institutions and programs. And it is through these, not primarily
through electoral efforts, that we build a mass for socialist politics. Our
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projects directly meet people’s material needs by “serving the people
and fighting the power” (Corcione et al., 2019).

While “serving the people” is accomplished through the numerous projects put in
place by the PS, “fighting the power” happens through direct action and advocacy. In the
chapter, as well as in one of the interviews (Tyler), the PS credited the Black Panther
Party for inspiring their dual power approach of “serving the people/fighting the power”
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(Corcione et al., 2019). To this day, the Philadelphia Tenants Union remains the best

example of the PS’ success in bridging direct action and political campaigning: while the
PTU promotes direct actions against landlords, such as eviction protections, they also put
pressure on elected officials to pass legislation that can help everyone in the city, such as
the recently approved “Good Cause” bill, protecting tenants in short-term leases against
arbitrary evictions (see Corcione et al., 2019).
But what does base-building look like in practice? In an article penned by a
member of the Philly Socialists, it looks like this: “door-knocking, one-on-one
conversations, serving the immediate needs of the masses, fighting the power of local
oppressors alongside them” (Horras, 2017b). The same activist also described basebuilding work, in a different article, as “organizing the unorganized” (Horras, 2017a). All
the projects promoted by the Philly Socialists operate under the umbrella of basebuilding; a large proportion of their outreach via Facebook and newsletters is devoted to
soliciting participation to the different projects. In an open meeting that I attended in July
2018, this focus on “Serve the people” work was described as being very fulfilling for the
members of the Philly Socialists; one of the members conveyed the importance of these
33

The phrase “Serve the people”, which was taken up by the Black Panther Party and other New Left
groups, comes from a 1948 speech by Mao Zedong (1967).
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projects through the slogan “Come for the values, stay for the work”. In that same
meeting, the many projects were presented both as concrete things that members can do
to get other people motivated and as “islands of the world to come when socialists seize
power”; even though the language of “prefigurative politics” is largely absent from the
PS’ theorization of base-building, the latter description is an effective rendering of the
prefigurative nature of their projects – at least in terms of creating immediate benefits for
the working class outside of the structures of capital.

The Marxist Center
The experience of the Philly Socialists has inspired other local grassroots socialist
organizations in the United States, which PS members keep in contact with. The efforts
of the PS on the national scene have been channeled into the incubation of a US-wide
socialist organization focused on base-building, as opposed to the electoral process like
the DSA. The Marxist Center now includes 20 affiliate organizations from throughout the
United States34. As I mentioned above, the Marxist Center held its first national meeting
– the “Conference on base-building” – in August 2017, in Philadelphia; it was officially
launched in December 2018 through a National Conference in Colorado Springs (CO).
During the three-day conference in 2018, socialists from across the country debated the
shape of the national organization. In particular, they discussed and approved the
“affiliation requirements”, i.e. the requirements that a group or an individual must meet in

34

Bucks County Socialists, Chicago Communists, Colorado Springs Socialists, Cooperation Northfield,
DSA Communist Caucus (Bay Area), Electric City Socialists, Louisville Socialists, Montgomery County
Socialists, Nebraska Left Coalition, New River Workers Power, Organization for a Free Society, Philly
Socialists, Red Bloom Collective, Rhode Island Socialists, Roanoke People’s Power Network, Silk City
Socialists, Tacoma Communists, United Communists of Lane County, Whatcom-Skagit Communists,
Wyoming Red Star Coalition (“Marxist Center affiliate organizations,” n.d.).
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order to enter the organization, the “points of unity”, i.e. their political manifesto, and a
resolution on the organizational structure and the website to be created (presented by a
member of the Philly Socialists)(“Marxist Center National Conference packet,” 2018).
The conference also included workshops, held by members of affiliate organizations, to
educate the attendees on fundraising, labor and tenant organizing, movement building,
cybersecurity, inclusivity, and political education efforts. Four of these seven workshops
were led or co-led by Philly Socialists members.
Although the Marxist Center is a multi-tendency organization characterized by
ideological pluralism (“The Marxist Center: Base-building toward dual power [podcast],”
2018), base-building is its core principle (Corcione et al., 2019). Base-building is the first
of the 10 “Points of Unity” that the Marxist Center adopted in December 2018, although
it is not called “base-building” explicitly: the network pledged to “Commit to building
institutions for the working class, using local organizing to unite the workers of the world
to execute the revolutionary overthrow of capitalism” (“Marxist Center points of unity”,
2018). However, base-building was referenced explicitly in the “affiliation
requirements”, which require organizations that wish to join the Marxist Center to be
“actively involved in organizing efforts which broadly align with a socialist base-building
strategy” (“Marxist Center affilitation requirements,” 2018, art. 2(C)). Base-building is
clearly pitched as an alternative to an electoral strategy, as the fourth point of unity
explains:
Reject the strategy of administering or reforming capitalism and
recognize that the capitalist state can never be made to serve the
interests of the working class as a whole. Work against the interests of
the capitalist state even if holding government office (“Marxist Center
points of unity”, 2018).
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Although there is no prohibition about running for office or supporting a
candidate, it is clear that the Marxist Center has no plan to actively engage in electoral
politics at the national level. Other contributions of affiliates of the Marxist Center make
it even clearer that their organization, “unlike the social democrats”, believes that “the
existing bourgeois state cannot be reformed or ‘transformed’, but must be smashed and
replaced by a truly democratic workers government” (Horras, 2018).
The Marxist Center has created an online publication – Regeneration Magazine –
which doubles as website for the organization. The website hosts information about the
national organization and articles contributed by affiliated members, several of which are
authored by members of the Philly Socialists.

“The most anarchist socialist organization”: organizational structures
Michael, one of the interviewees, described the Philly Socialists as the “most
anarchist socialist organization” he had ever encountered. What he meant was that the PS
operate with a relatively high degree of decentralization, while still maintaining the
typical leadership structure of a socialist group. Figure 14 provides an explanation of the
different elected positions within the Philly Socialists: the Central Committee (CC),
which currently includes 2 co-chairs, instead of one chair, and the arbiters.
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Figure 14. The chart details the elected positions within the Philly Socialists, according to the
2017 Constitution (Philly Socialists, 2017) and the interviews conducted with members of the
organization.

A 2018 restructuring turned the CC into a task-based leadership body where each
elected member has an assigned set of responsibilities, as can be seen in Figure 14; it also
added 3 rotating at-large members to the CC, who are randomly selected from the duesmembership to serve for a period of three months35. Within the CC, the chair – currently
two co-chairs – serves as the “chief strategic advisor of the organization” (Philly

35

I was not able to find a document detailing this restructuring of the CC, which was explained to me by
Lisa during the interview.
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Socialists, 2017, art. II(E)(2)). The membership also elects two arbiters, who serve
independently from the CC; they are “responsible for accepting formal complaints
(grievances) and handling appeals” and can be approached by any member “to help
resolve an interpersonal conflict” among members (Philly Socialists, 2017, pt. art. II(F)).
However, this codified structure of elected positions coexists with more
horizontal processes, influenced by neo-anarchist practices, which however remain
unsurprisingly unacknowledged. The General Assembly is run by facilitators, not by CC
members or the co-chairs. Working groups and caucuses – such as the Dolphin Caucus,
which welcomes members who are not cisgender, heterosexual men, and the Ability
Caucus, open to members with disabilities – also operate in a less hierarchical way (e.g.
they meet whenever they choose to meet and do not have elected leaders). Per the
Constitution, members can create autonomous groups and affinity groups (Philly
Socialists, 2017, art. 3(B)). After defining the PS as “the most anarchist socialist
organization I’ve ever been in”, Michael explained: “we believe in leadership and
hierarchy, and the hierarchy of responsibilities and commitments. But we also give a lot
of leeway to our projects”. Neither the interviews nor the publicly available documents
fully account for all of the different working groups and caucuses: it seems that it is
difficult even for the Philly Socialists’ members to clearly map out this intricate formalinformal structure. However, the coexistence of clear structures and more open processes
affords great flexibility to the organization, which can involve newer and older members
into the activities that are more suitable for them and experiment with new groups and
projects more freely. As Michael highlighted:
I mean, really the way that projects work in Philly Socialists is that
everything is really decentralized, so what is the case is usually if a
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committed member wants to start a project, we will off see funding for
them to start the project. And if the project is successful, we can expand
funding based upon results, and then those things are all determined by
our general assemblies and our congresses (Michael).

According to Michael, while the Philly Socialists retain a centralized leadership
structure, the work that goes on in the different projects is largely structured in a
decentralized way. Additionally, the different student branches (at Penn, Temple, and
Drexel), as well as the Philadelphia Tenants Union, operate as separate entities from the
Philly Socialists proper.
The approach outlined by Michael seems to orient the organization towards
focusing more on base-building work, and less on internal fights over organizational
issues. I argue that, even though they do not acknowledge it, the Philly Socialists blend
traditional socialist structures (such as Central Committee) with elements of neoanarchist horizontality, which are more familiar to younger generations of activists who
have been involved with the Occupy movement or other recent social justice movements.
The Philly Socialists adopt a transparent budgeting system, which they describe in
detail in a document prepared for the second conference of the Marxist Center in 2018
(Philly Socialists, 2018a). The Philly Socialists also have a member who serves as (paid)
chief administrative officer, overseeing the PS finances and the administrative tasks
connected to collecting dues, maintaining lists of dues payers and donors, and keeping
track of expenses. The budget is proposed by the Central Committee and approved by the
General Assembly. The income of the PS comes from two sources: 50% from dues and
50% from fundraisers (Philly Socialists, 2018a). The organization has used both
IndieGoGo (Philly Socialists, 2018c) and Chuffed (Philly Socialists, 2018a), two
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crowdfunding platforms, to solicit funding from supporters; in 2018, they raised almost
$25,000 through one single crowdfunder on Chuffed (Philly Socialists, 2018a).

The technological practices of the Philly Socialists

External communication
The Philly Socialists’ intricate organizational structure is mirrored in an equally
complex set of technological practices across multiple types of media. Their external
communication relies on corporate social media (Facebook, Twitter and Instagram), a
website (www.phillysocialists.org) and the Philadelphia Partisan, their self-produced
magazine and blog. They also use mailing lists, housed on Nationbuilder, and phone
banking. There are three actors that coordinate the external communication across these
different channels: a Director of Communications, who is one of the elected members of
the Central Committee and who coordinates a media team tasked specifically with
managing media relations; a social media team; and the editorial collective of the
Partisan.
The PS website hosts information about who the Philly Socialists are, how to join
the organization, and how to get involved in the projects; it includes links to various
social media pages and discussion groups of the PS, as well as a link that allows users to
pay membership dues or make a donation to the organization; it also hosts a copy of the
PS Constitution, their anti-bullying policy, and their sexual harassment policy. The main
purpose of the website, according to the interviewees, is to come up in Google searches:
“So our website is mainly for people who Google us. It's like, ‘Oh I want to know
socialists in Philly’. (…) If anybody is interested in socialists in Philadelphia, this is what
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they're going to find” (Lisa). Michael also admitted that the PS do not really have “a
comprehensive strategy” about the website; he explained that
our website's kind of like a small little island floating out in the void,
'cause we're like, "People will Google us and try to find out how to get
involved." We get probably a handful of sign ups every month through
the website, not a ton (Michael).

The website thus serves a very practical focus, as Michael pointed out – making
the Philly Socialists show up in Google searches – but it is not really important to the
work of the PS. Notice how the Philly Socialists talk about their functioning website in
very different terms than LUMe activists, who see creating and maintaining a website as
a political practice, although one they cannot commit to at the moment.
The bulk of the external communication of the Philly Socialists happens through
corporate social media; as can be seen in Table 5, the PS have accounts on the major
social networking sites.

Table 5. Accounts of the Philly Socialists on corporate social network sites.

Social Network Site

URL

Follower/Like count
(May 31st, 2019)

Facebook (Page)

www.facebook.com/PhillySocialists/

14,315

Instagram

https://www.instagram.com/phillysocialists/

2,284

Twitter

https://twitter.com/phillysocialist

2,579

The Facebook Page of the PS is by far the most active of the different profiles:
they use it to post memes, invite people to meetings and events, share and comment news
items. The Instagram profile is mainly used to visually document the activities of the
organization, including with the “Stories” function, through which the PS provide short
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videos of their events and their organizing work. The Twitter account is less active;
Michael commented on the fact that he would like to see it used more: “I think we should
be focusing more on Twitter, if we could, but we don’t have anybody who’s like a
Twitter monster”. The different social media accounts are managed by the Social Media
team; the interviewees explained that different members tend to “specialize” in one of the
platforms, but that there is overlap between the people who manage the different
accounts. Lisa reported that the Facebook account, in particular, has almost 20
administrators, given the amount of work that tending to that platform requires. Members
of the Social Media team are not bound to any particular rules when posting; as Lisa
explained: “it’s whatever you want to do”. In practice, this means that each of them
“specializes” in what they like the most, be it posting about upcoming events or sharing
memes. The Director of Communication is tasked with inviting people who might be
interested – and who are good at posting content – to join the Social Media team.
Lisa provided a description of how the different SNS platforms have slightly
different functions for the Philly Socialists:
Instagram is good for like just kind of putting our politics out there and
for reaching out, maybe reaching to have more of a relationship with
people. Because you have the stories and stuff, and people send you
questions, and you can answer in real time, and things like that. And
Twitter is more to put politics out there. But you can really do events
on either of those things. So that's like the big downside to... that's why
we're like didn't pay as much attention to Twitter and Instagram before,
and we focus a lot on Facebook because you can make events. But now
we're trying to branch out because you can share the links on Twitter
and you can share them on... So that's the difference (Lisa).
Although Twitter and Instagram are also considered important, as Lisa
underlined, it is Facebook that provides the most useful tools to the Philly Socialists,
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including the Event feature and the discussion groups, which I will examine when
describing the PS’ internal communication practices. However, despite the high volume
of content posted by the PS pages and their intensive use of Events, there does not seem
to be a specific Social Media strategy. As Michael argued:
we have like no strategy for social media, other than it should just be
not super controversial. It should not be... we should avoid... we should
have a professional demeanor with how we use our social media, and
specifically when we receive intake messages through our Facebook
page. But I guess what I would say is when I was in student organizing,
I had this whole thing about like, "Oh, you should have a strategy about
social media." And then Tyler was like, "Yeah, well your strategy’s
dumb, because basically I sit on the toilet at my work and I post
random things at the interval of one every two hours, or like one every
hour sometimes, and now we have like 10,000 likes" (Michael).

Although lamenting the lack of a more coherent social media strategy, Michael
also admitted that the PS must be doing something right, after all, given their many social
media followers. Most interviewees also commented on the increased relevance of
memes for the American Left and specifically mentioned memes as a way in which the
Facebook presence of the PS is being noticed. Andrew then went on to elaborate:
basically, it's like we just post so much that eventually it ends up
building our social media following. And basically, what we've realized
is... I think it's like, we definitely get returns from our social media, but
especially given the amount of effort we put in, which is like almost
nothing. I think a lot of people would think because we have 11,000
likes or something like that, that we would get a ton of returns from it
and we just don't, because the level of engagement that you get out of
people who are on social media is pretty low (Michael).

According to Michael, social networking sites are not a crucial arena for
recruiting or organizing, but they do offer the PS a low-effort way to be visible.
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The Philly Socialists started publishing The Philadelphia Partisan in 2017. Its
print version is a visually appealing, colorful 16-page stitched booklet, which the PS
distribute for free at their events and leave at cafés in Philadelphia. It is also possible to
subscribe through the Partisan’s Patreon36 account and receive a physical and/or digital
copy of the magazine. It is published quarterly. The Partisan also has its own website,
which publishes articles in-between the print issues, a Facebook Page (1023 likes) and a
Twitter account (636 followers). The magazine is expensive to produce – almost $2 per
copy, as reported by Michael – and requires the contribution of many PS members and
sympathizers. According to its website, the latest number of the Partisan, published in
March 2019, was put together by an editorial collective of 5 people (which seems to
mostly remain stable across issues), an arts director, a layout director, and with the
contributions of 15 people who wrote articles (“From the editors: Winter/Spring 2019,”
2019).
While publishing a newspaper or a magazine is a conventional tactic for a social
movement, and one that has been crucial to socialist organizing for a long time (see
Lenin, 1902), the Philly Socialists tried to make The Partisan different from other
publications of the socialist left. In presenting the magazine, they offered:
We are committed to quality journalism wrapped in a well-designed
magazine. Most importantly, we are committed to making sure the vast
majority of our physical copies are available for free. With over 40
distribution locations, we want to provide an independent socialist
voice that is focused on the issues relevant to Philadelphia (Philly
Socialists, 2018b).

36

Patreon is a crowdfunding platform that allows content creators to run a subscription content service. It
is popular with artists and writers.

280

The magazine is thus supposed to be accessible, both in terms of its free
availability and in the style in which it is written and designed. During the interview,
Michael spoke extensively about the Partisan and explained how the PS put a lot of work
in making it enjoyable, not a heavy read:
we try to write like around an eighth-grade level, and we try not to
write... we have like maybe one theory piece per issue, and that's
always been our goal. That's why we also write exclusively about
Philadelphia issues, we don't write about national issues. (…) I mean,
that's also like why it's free, why we focus on making sure it's well
designed. We wanted to make sure that people wanted to read the thing
they were picking up. I think we wouldn't wanna compromise on
quality... (…) I think that we're very much aware that people pass over
these kinds of things all the time, and we wanna make sure that... our
focus isn't to just document things for the sake of documenting it, to
document things for the far left, it's to document things for people who
otherwise have very little or tangential experience with the organized
left (Michael).

Michael’s quote provided an explanation of the aims of the Partisan: to be
appealing to people who would not otherwise be interested in a social movement
publication or in radical politics, to cover issues related to Philadelphia, and to do so
without the jargon that so often characterizes socialist publications – as Michael added,
“we're not trying to write a theory journal”. In terms of what is covered in the magazine,
Michael argued that the main focus of the Partisan lies in documenting the struggles that
are happening in Philadelphia: “We're trying to write a paper that can convince somebody
who's like out there in this world who doesn't know tremendously about what's going on,
that in fact there is a lot going on in terms of struggle” (Michael).
The Philly Socialists also use a mailing list service, Nationbuilder, to
communicate with members and with people who have come in contact with them. None

281

of the interviewees talked extensively about the mailing list, which they only mentioned
in passing, at best. After attending one of the open meetings of the Philly Socialists in
Summer 2018 and volunteering my contact information, I have received regular
newsletters with updates about the organization and their projects, usually weekly, on
Sunday night. The newsletters are written in an informal tone and include reminders for
upcoming assemblies and events, accompanied by social media links (usually to access
the Facebook Events of the gathering they are promoting). Nationbuilder is a nonpartisan
political engagement platform, which has been employed by parties and campaigns as
diverse as Donald Trump’s and Jill Stein’s 2016 campaigns, the UK Labour Party, the US
Republican State Leadership Committee and both the pro-Leave and pro-Remain
campaigns in the Brexit Referendum of 2016 (“Correcting myths about NationBuilder,”
n.d.; McKelvey & Piebiak, 2016). As McKelvey and Pieback explained, the appeal of
NationBuilder for election campaigns lies in its all-encompassing nature and seamless
integration of the key organizational aspects of a campaign: “email, website, voter
database, donations, volunteer coordination, and communications” (McKelvey & Piebiak,
2016, p. 902). Besides being on the receiving end of the PS newsletters, I do not have any
additional elements to assess how the Philly Socialists employ Nationbuilder, especially
given that they are not engaged in traditional election campaigning activities.
Lastly, the Philly Socialists also organize phone banking sessions, where
members reach out to other members and potentially interested individuals to invite them
to upcoming events and assemblies. After volunteering my contact information at a PS
event in Summer 2018, I received several phone calls (and voicemails) from PS
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organizers over the next few months; the calls were all directed towards inviting me to or
reminding me of an event or activity.
The multi-medium external communication practices of the Philly Socialists
should be understood within the group’s multi-step recruitment and retention strategies.
Lisa explained it in detail during the interview:
On a regular month, we have what will be like a recruitment kind of
like event. We will go table to a festival or do something. And then we
would do what's called a "Cadre Meeting," where we call those new
people that we get information from and then we invite them to an
event that is either on Facebook or something. And then after that we
invited to that event, then we have retention kind of thing which would
be a social. So that's how we usually do it. And then the social and
those events will be usually on Facebook and things because it's easy.
You have the map, they can easily find the map, they have all the
information on there. So, it's part of a whole plan thing. So, it works. It
works pretty good, I think (Lisa).

As can be seen in the quote, the recruitment process blends online and offline
components. PS organizers collect contact information at events where they set up a table
with information about the organization; they then follow up through phone calls with the
people who left their contact details, by inviting them to an upcoming event, which they
can typically also find advertised on Facebook. Besides the event – which would usually
be either connected to the different projects or an open assembly –, interested members
are also invited to a social event, such as a picnic, a potluck at an organizer’s house or a
concert in a bar or venue. In a document that contains organizing tips compiled by the
Philly Socialists, the organization outlined its recruitment and retention strategies (Philly
Socialists, 2018c). The tips include a detailed explanation of best practices for tabling;
among those is the advice to focus on collecting phone numbers over emails. In talking
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about retention, the Philly Socialists also noted: “phone calls to invite new recruits to
meetings and events has proven to be the most successful way to get people in the door
once they sign up/express interest” (Philly Socialists, 2018c, p. 6). Retention is obviously
not just about calling interested individuals, but rather involves creating a steady stream
of activities of different kinds that people can join to get involved with the organization:
a) “regular meetings, events, projects to keep people involved”; b) “political education
events to build a shared culture and understand the diversity of opinions and approaches
on the Left”; c) “socials to create strong ties within the organization” (Philly Socialists,
2018c, p. 6).
The extensive web of external communication practices of the Philly Socialists
should thus be framed in the context of this recruitment-retention process. Seen through
this lens, the PS’ extensive social media production is less about expressing how the
group feels about different political issues and more about drawing in as many potentially
interested people as possible. Michael articulated this with a metaphor:
I always think of social media as the dragnet, it's the big net that you
cast to bring in as many people to your circle as possible, and then the
job of an organizer is to be like a good fisherman of people, I guess like
Jesus. That would make you fisher of men. And it's like, go through
that dragnet and pick out... throw away the bad fish and some fish will
slip through, but make sure you catch the right fish (Michael).

Tabling at events and social media content serve the same aim, according to
Michael: helping the PS drag in as many people as possible; however, the organizing
work only begins once these people have been caught in the PS’s net and can then be
involved in the work of the organization. The highly structured nature of the recruitmentretainment process comes into play in the Philly Socialists’ technological imaginary: in
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fact, it is the crucial idea of “organizing”, predicated on a recruitment-retainment process,
that allows the group to imagine their use of internet technologies as only one aspect of
their political work.

Internal communication

The internal communication of the Philly Socialists is characterized by the same
multi-platform approach that applies to the group’s external communication. In
particular, the PS employ Facebook groups (some secret, some public), internal listservs
hosted on Google groups, Signal, Slack (in the case of the Penn Socialists and the
Partisan working group), and informal messaging through texting and Facebook
Messenger.
The Philly Socialists employ two types of Facebook groups: secret and closed
groups. A secret group can only be joined through an invitation extended by a current
member of the Facebook group and cannot be found through Facebook’s search function.
In contrast, Facebook users can see the name and description of a closed group, but its
members or the posts they share will not be visible; to join a closed group, a Facebook
user can click on the “Join group” button available on the Facebook group page. Group
admins (or group members, depending on the settings) need to approve new members in
both secret and closed groups. A summary of the different Facebook groups of the Philly
Socialists is available in Table 6.
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Table 6. Secret and closed Facebook groups managed by the Philly Socialists. Member count current as of
June 9th, 2019.

Type

Number of
members

URL

Discussion group

Secret

~700

-

Partisan group

Secret

unknown

-

Jobs, Housing and
Survival

Closed

178

https://www.facebook.com/group
s/1517376318385014/

Dolphin Caucus

Closed

83

https://www.facebook.com/group
s/146052499246149/?ref=br_rs

Political Education

Closed

142

https://www.facebook.com/group
s/794505984062684/

Non-White Caucus

Closed

35

https://www.facebook.com/group
s/2005584376367234/

Disability Discourse
and Outreach

Closed

39

https://www.facebook.com/group
s/261714284318859/

Design Collective

Closed

53

https://www.facebook.com/group
s/1925750687694697/

FREE ESL classes
organizing group

Closed

68

https://www.facebook.com/group
s/1509904035710537/

César Andreu Iglesias Closed
Community Garden

77

https://www.facebook.com/group
s/1342482062477839/

Social Event
Planning Collective

Closed

24

https://www.facebook.com/group
s/2019546581612777/

Arts and Culture
group

Closed

224

https://www.facebook.com/group
s/1324789917566202/

Labor Caucus

Closed

51

https://www.facebook.com/group
s/530172960510959/

Childcare collective

Closed

21

https://www.facebook.com/group
s/530172960510959/

Drexel Socialists

Closed

180

https://www.facebook.com/group
s/825102524270198/

Name
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Temple Socialists

Closed

113

https://www.facebook.com/group
s/templesocialists/

Penn Socialists

Closed

18

https://www.facebook.com/group
s/312342072903695/

The most important Facebook group for PS organizers is a secret one, called the
“Discussion group”. In the interview, Donna reported that this internal group includes
700 members and that it feels “more personal” than the Facebook Page of the Philly
Socialists, which is being utilized for external communication; Lisa also explained that it
is used to debate about all sorts of topics. Michael detailed the kinds of posts that get
shared in the discussion group: memes, reminders about events, articles, updates from
ongoing actions (such as the Occupy ICE protests) and “general calls for last minute
help”. On the PS website, the secret” nature of the group is explained as such:
“Unfortunately, the group is ‘secret’ to avoid a massive influx of requests and to make
sure that the group is mostly people who are interested in supporting our work” (Philly
Socialists, n.d.-c).
As can be seen from Table 6, the other Facebook groups have a more specific
target, either a specific project (e.g. the community garden or the Design collective) or a
specific group of organizers (e.g. the non-white caucus). In particular, Donna talked
about the importance of the Facebook group of the Dolphin Caucus, which, as described
above, offers a space to non-cis-men PS members; compared to the general PS discussion
group: “the non-men caucus group is even more, like another layer of more personal than
that. We have, like, sometimes playful discussions, and sometimes very serious ones”.
Another closed group which has been mentioned by the interviewees is called “Jobs,
Housing and Survival”. It is not only meant for PS members, but rather aimed at
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connecting “members, supporters, and volunteers of Philly Socialists with the things that
help us survive in this cruel capitalist world” (Philly Socialists, n.d.-d).
The other major channel for communication within the Philly Socialists is the
“strategy” listserv, hosted on Google Groups. On the website, the PS invite all members
to join the listserv:
the strategy listserv is exclusively for dues-paying members [bold in
original]. This is where members have internal discussions about
strategy. If major events are happening that are not public, we discuss
them on this listserv. Additionally, we discuss occasionally discuss
event planning and debate political decisions on this listserv. IT IS
CRUCIAL THAT ALL MEMBERS BE ON THIS LISTSERV!!
[bold and uppercase in original] (Philly Socialists, n.d.-c)

The “strategy listserv” is thus seen as a crucial way to spread information within
the PS, discuss what needs to be done (hence the “strategy” label) and remind people of
public and non-public events. The Philly Socialists also run a “theory” listserv, directed
primarily at discussing organizing theories and approaches to socialism.
The other platforms that the Philly Socialists utilize in their internal
communication are Slack, a cloud-based collaboration tool, and Signal, a privacyoriented encrypted messaging app. Slack is used by the Partisan working group and the
Penn Socialists organizing collective. Signal is used throughout the organization.
Interviewees have mentioned the use of Signal but have not discussed in depth. This
might be accounted by how widespread Signal has become within contemporary
organizing – LUMe activists report using it, too. Michael, in fact, told me that the PS
“obviously” use Signal; he did not add any more explanation of why that would be a
good platform. Lisa said that Signal is important for how the PS organize but did not add
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details. Signal is likely only one of the platforms that the PS organizers use to message
each other: different interviewees mentioned the role of one-to-one messaging/texting –
e.g. “texting and Facebook messaging people” (Michael) – as a crucial tool in their
internal communication.

Organizing where people are
The social media we have is just full and cluttered and it's really
distracting, and a lot of people don't wanna be on it, but they're like,
"We have to be on it," because this is the most effective way to do mass
communications and centralized communications. (Michael)

This quote from Michael expresses the core of the technological imaginary of the
Philly Socialists: the idea that socialists should organize where people are, even if this
means organizing on social media. As Michael showed in the first part of the quote,
digital technologies are far from being an ideal space for radical politics, but they are
good enough – for now – to recruit people into the socialist camp. A longer quote by
Michael further elaborated on the technological imaginary of the Philly Socialists:
some of the reasons why social media is so ineffective is it's geared
towards profit. It's not geared towards actually building social
relationships. There's no way that my Facebook newsfeed is geared
towards building social relationships, because I've turned that off
because it's full of garbage, it's full of ads, it's full of these posts that
have nothing to do with my life but the algorithm determined that
they'd bring me back and get me addicted again, back into social media
and stuff like that. I mean, yeah, I'm more than well aware that social
media is not designed for social relationships and not designed at all for
socialists. But until the day comes ... I mean I always say the
Communist party in China, they have their own little app. Until the day
comes where like Philly Socialists can do something like that, where
we can build our own apps and we can build our own social media
platforms… And until we have that kind of organizing capacity, and
those kind of resources, I have to work with what I have. Like I'm not
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gonna give up email because Google runs email. I'm not gonna give up
my cell service because the capitalists run cell service. That's just how I
feel, you gotta use the tools you got. (Michael)

In the first part of the quote, Michael described some of the problems of corporate
social media platform that he and other Philly Socialists members identified, chiefly their
being designed in a way that does not support genuine social relationships or in-depth
debate. He then explained that under the present conditions, since the PS do not have
either the resources or the capacity to build alternative technologies to support their
organizing, they should try to make social media work, because that’s all they have. In
the final part of the quote, he also added that these technologies should be used by groups
like the Philly Socialists even if they are run by corporations. The themes that emerge
from this quote are also echoed by other interviewees. In general, Philly Socialists
interviewees see digital technologies as a space that is not ideal for radical politics for
three main reasons: because of law enforcement surveillance, because of the toxic nature
of some of these online spaces, because digital technologies do not offer the same
possibility for interaction as offline spaces. Unlike in the case of LUMe, the Philly
Socialists are less forthcoming in criticizing digital technologies for being an expression
of neoliberal capitalism; when their pursue this line of critique, they usually present it in
the context of their concerns about surveillance.
As in the case of LUMe, the technological imaginary of the Philly Socialists is
one of negotiation. In fact, the PS organizers do not endorse the key principles of Silicon
Valley’s approach: they do not regard digital technologies as free and democratic, but
most importantly, they reject the technologically deterministic idea that social problems
can be solved through the development of (new) technologies. For the Philly Socialists, it
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is only slow and consistent organizing on the ground that can bring about the kind of
social change they are interested in – a socialist moment and (eventually) a socialist
society. However, while they do not espouse the visions of Silicon Valley, they still use
the digital technologies of Silicon Valley: not just corporate social media, but also
Google Groups, Slack, and NationBuilder, which, as McKelvey and Piebiak (2016)
argue, emerged out of the culture and venture capital of Silicon Valley (p. 903). They
frame their reliance on these corporate digital technologies within their approach to
organizing for base-building and appeal to the tradition of socialist movements and
parties: socialists have always used the most effective technologies available to them,
why would the Philly Socialists do any different? In the interviews, they tend to
downplay the importance of these technologies for their organizing work, but my analysis
of their technological practices clearly shows that they rely on these tools extensively.
Their downplaying of the meaning of these platforms should be understood as a way of
articulating what distinguishes their organizing from what they call “activist networking”
– which in academic terms we could liken to “lifestyle activism” (Johnson, Jones, &
Haenfler, 2012; Portwood-Stacer, 2013a): in contrast to these activists, whose use of
social media platforms is their chief political practice, the Philly Socialists see social
media as one of the tools that allows them to more effectively organize and build a base
for socialist politics, but not as a form of political engagement in itself. The Philly
Socialists’ negotiation is thus shaped by the tradition of socialist organizing (or at least
their interpretation of it) and their opposition to a prominent technological imaginary in
the American Left, that of “activist networking”.
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In this section, I describe the technological imaginary of the Philly Socialists,
showing how digital media are not an ideal space, but a good enough space, for now, for
socialist organizing. I first articulate the ways in which, according to the PS, the internet
is good for radical politics. I then examine the different reasons for which it is not such a
good space for radical politics; I detail how the PS interviewees criticize the internet for
being less conducive to human relations than the offline world, a space for surveillance, a
toxic environment, and (less prominently) in service of capitalism. Through these
critiques, I show that the Philly Socialists reject the dominant technological imaginary of
Silicon Valley, while using the technologies of Silicon Valley in their organizing. I then
explain how this imaginary of negotiation is shaped by the socialist tradition of
organizing and by the opposition to the technological imaginary of “activist networking”,
which is widespread in the American Left and harshly criticized by the Philly Socialists.

A good enough space for now…
In the interviews, Philly Socialists members argue that the internet can be a
relatively good space for socialist politics, in particular because it makes it easier to
spread information and to organize events, since people already use digital technologies
for other reasons. They are largely not enthusiastic about using corporate social media for
politics or in their personal life, but they highlight the useful features of these platforms.
While the interviewees also consider “the internet” more broadly, they tend to focus on
Facebook – as already highlighted in the case of LUMe activists. For instance, Michal
argued that “most socialist groups don't have independent, fleshed out, comprehensive
communication structures. And Facebook just offers that to us. So, we're just trying to...
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in the absence of having something built, this is like what we're gonna use...”; Facebook
thus functions as an all-encompassing platform that supports organizing. Donna echoed
Michael’s words and claimed: “I think that part of organizing is making connections and
getting information and spreading information. I think Facebook is one of the best tools
we have for it right now”. As in the case of LUMe, Facebook looms large in the Philly
Socialists’ technological imaginary.
Several interviewees praise the internet for its usefulness in making information
more accessible and organizing/recruitment more efficient. Tyler compared the internet
to earlier technologies:
Technology, overall, is much more helpful. I was very fortunate to have
mentors who came up in the movement in the '80s and '90s. At that
time, if you wanted somebody to come to a rally, you had to call them.
If they weren't around, they didn't have answering machines, so you
had to actually physically meet them. It was more difficult to move
people. (Tyler)

Although Tyler has no direct experience of pre-internet organizing, his sense is
that coordinating people was way harder without digital technologies. Lisa also argued
that the internet is “good for information sharing. Like, ‘Hey there's this really good
article about this book, about this thing, read it.’ And a lot of things I have learned, I have
learned through the internet”. Donna also explained that the internet increased their
access to political content – and political engagement itself:
I definitely feel like I have had more access to information and more
involvement in radical politics through the internet, especially like…
(…) like I'll literally just add random people who have good mutual
friends on Facebook. You know, people who I would've never met
before and I think it's also really helpful for those of us who have like
chronic medical conditions and yeah, confronting ableist ideas of
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organizing where you have to be like out all the time, while not all of
us can. So, I think it's been really helpful with that. (Donna)

In relaying their experience with digital technologies and radical politics, Donna
underlined the importance of the internet for people who have disabilities and chronic
conditions that limit their possibility of being physically present. According to Donna,
digital technologies thus help challenge the ableist assumptions about participation that
still shape politics. They further underscored this point by adding: “as someone who's
episodically both mentally and physically disabled, like, I think technology is honestly
one of the saving parts of community for me” (Donna). Alexander, who has been part of
several socialist and leftist organizations in addition to the Philly Socialists, also
contended that the internet has been empowering for radical politics:
There are people who are far away from anyone else that shares their
same concerns, far away geographically, so meeting face to face is
hard, or they have children, or they have physical disabilities, or they're
kind of like me, fairly introverted, so I'm not gonna go to social
meetings so much. (Alexander)

For Alexander, the internet can thus allow radical groups to be more inclusive for
those that, for different types of reasons, cannot always commit to physically
participating in events or assemblies.
According to the interviewees, the reason why digital technologies – and
Facebook in particular – are so effective for information dissemination and organizing is
that people already utilize them, independently of their interest in radical (or even
mainstream) politics. That “people are already there”, i.e. on social media, is a mantra
repeated by Philly Socialists interviewees, as well as by LUMe activists, as I explained in
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Chapter 3. Michael spelled it out in these terms: “you'd have to force people to uptake
these independent structures. And people are on Facebook, people are on Twitter, they
don't wanna switch”. Alexander concurred:
you should just be using Facebook. It's where everyone is. You go to
the people; you don't try and build your own platform. So, for me it's
always that, I use Facebook because it's what everybody else uses, and
you wanna get a message out, Facebook's really good for getting a
message out. (Alexander)

Because Facebook is where people are, socialists should be using Facebook to
recruit and spread information. The Philly Socialists seem to have taken this idea to heart,
given how much of their internal and external communication is channeled through
Facebook.
In sum, Facebook, social media, and the internet in general offer several
advantages to socialist organizers: “right now, those social media platforms seem like the
easiest best tools that we have” (Michael). Although they have very clear problems,
which make them less than ideal spaces, digital technologies are so useful and efficient
that organizers cannot afford not to use them. As Michael emphatically argued: “I don't
know if the correct question is, ‘Is [the internet] better or worse for the left?’ It's just like,
the left has to use it.”

… but not an ideal space
Although the Philly Socialists endorse the use of digital technologies by socialist
groups, they point out a few limitations of these online spaces. Lisa’s quote fully
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expressed how the Philly Socialists regard digital technologies as good enough, but not
ideal:
Yeah. I think it's a great space for radical politics. I think it gives
people a lot of access to different ideas that they didn't hear before, but
it also can be a little toxic. People can get a little... can try to debate
online. I personally don't think it's the best space for debates. (Lisa)

Lisa raised two of the limitations that the Philly Socialists ascribe to digital
technologies: the fact that they can be toxic and that they are not good spaces for debate,
unlike the offline. In this section, I discuss these two limitations, as well as the third
crucial one, which concerns the threat of online surveillance; I also highlight how, in
contrast to LUMe activists, the Philly Socialists do not explicitly articulate a critique of
digital technologies as functional to capitalism.

Toxic environment
The first critique of digital technologies that was raised by Philly Socialists
interviewees pertains to the perceived toxicity of digital spaces and to the meanness that
they experience in these spaces. Lisa articulated the kinds of toxic situations in which the
Philly Socialists find themselves in on social media:
Most of our followers ... a lot of them are very far left and if you post
the most... We had people who just don't like the memes, or they will
just complain. Sometimes we have a lot of right-wing people leave
really mean... people who have the opposite of the politics, or who are
too far into the politics and it's like, "Oh that's like not Marxist
enough," or something like that. But that's just silly, that's harmless.
But then there is people who are going through our stuff and they
would try to haze our members or people who comment on our things
because they have the opposite politics. (Lisa)
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As Lisa explained, the Philly Socialists have to navigate both “purist” attacks
from people who perceive them as not Marxist enough and harassment from right-wing
users. Donna, who is part of the social media team, also recounted how often they sees
hateful content when managing the PS Facebook page: “I think you always get the trolls,
you always get like Nazis coming in and like trying to say whatever bullshit or a lot of
transphobic people, they see”. They also explained how they decide whether to ban or
block individuals that are being offensive:
If they're just saying some like bullshit that's like still reactionary but
like kinda harmless, not directly like being transphobic or racist or
sexist, then I let them spout whatever bullshit. (…) But if someone gets
to the point of like what I would consider like hate speech towards
someone, I usually block them. (Donna)

That Donna, as reported in the quote, feels the need to draw the line between
“harmless reactionary content” and “hate speech” is in itself telling of the intensity of
problematic content that the PS encounter in online spaces. Michael said that social
media are “very toxic” and that “sometimes people are just mean. I don't know. And
social media creates social distance that allows you to be meaner”. Lisa also spoke of
how mean people can be online: “it's just like the worst of people comes out. They're just
really mean. They're like, ‘Look it feels like we are agreeing on this topic, but you're
being really mean right now, I don't understand why’”. Alexander concurred: “if you start
debating people you don't know, it goes downhill really quick”.
But it is not just individuals who disagree with the politics of the PS – from the
left or the right – that can be mean online, to use the PS’ terms. Digital media facilitate
meanness even among the PS members. As Alexander argued:
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if you start debating over something, Trotsky, Marx, Lenin, you know,
should we work with the unions or focus on something else? Then it
becomes a lot harder. So, having a discussion on proposals like what do
the Philly Socialists do can become pretty messy. Yeah. So, the other
thing, and I... So, it reinforces the gender dynamics in the organization,
and the dominance. Like men, I think us men have an even easier time
dominating online discussions than they do in person discussions, and
they dominate both, so... And also, people of color. (Alexander)

Alexander’s quote suggests that online spaces, especially when used to debate
strategy or political positions, can become unruly and end up replicating inequalities; in
particular, he found that women and people of color might even have a harder time to
break through in online discussions, since white men are very comfortable in online
spaces.
Although, as I argued in the previous subsection, the Philly Socialists see digital
technologies as efficient and useful in making political information and political
discussion more accessible, they also experience the online as a highly toxic
environment.

Life happens offline
The second limitation of the internet identified by the Philly Socialists lies in its
inability to generate the same kind of connections that can be fostered offline. The
organizers mostly talk about this in terms of the impossibility of truly debating ideas
online. For instance, Lisa, who talked about how mean and toxic people can be when
talking online, concluded: “I can have the same debates with people in real life and I feel
that it's more interesting, it's more engaging”. Similarly, Alexander argued that in social
movements “people… most of the decisions are made face to face. And that's when you
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can really get the debate and the discussion. People actually listen to each other face to
face, I think, a lot more”. He also added that, while it might be easier to discuss politics
online if one lives in a small town, even in a small place “you need to recruit people and
you need to have face to face conversations with them and learn from them. You don't
want to build a base online. It's just a waste of time” (Alexander).
Echoing Alexander, other interviewees remarked on how the internet cannot be
the only space where organizing happens, because the offline is still crucial. Michael, in
fact, explained:
The reality is that our lives are not lived on social media, our lives are
lived... an eviction occurs in real life, it doesn't occur on social media.
Like losing your job occurs in real life, sexual assault and sexual abuse,
that occurs in real life not in social media. And so, we need to be able
to... if all your organizing is online, then I do think that you will
inherently run into this issue of “how do I know that you'll show up in
the real life where my real problems are?” (Michael)

In his quote, Michael upheld a distinction between online activities and “real life”
offline, which is shared by other interviewees. In his explanation, organizing cannot be an
entirely online activity because the challenges that people face – evictions, joblessness,
sexual harassment – have a strong bodily and material component; because these
problems happen “offline”, organizing also needs to happen “offline”, so that people will
know that the Philly Socialists will be physically there for them. This quote reveals how
the Philly Socialists think of the internet as an inferior space compared to the offline
spaces of meetings and protest actions; it also highlights the assumptions about
embodiment and materiality that support the kind of ableist conceptions of political
activism that Donna, another Philly Socialists interviewee, criticized.
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The disjuncture between the online and the offline seems particularly salient to
the Philly Socialists; for instance, it plays a role in how they distinguish their political
practice as “organizing”, which has both an online and an offline component, from
“activist networking”, which they see as a purely digital form of engagement.

Surveillance
The third major critique waged against digital technologies by the Philly
Socialists brings to the fore their potential for surveillance. The Philly Socialists
interviewees mostly think of surveillance in terms of law enforcement surveillance (not
corporate surveillance): they worry about how using social media might expose them to
law enforcement agencies, how law enforcement agents might try to collect information
on them by posing as activists, and how the U.S. Government might have the capability
to detect and redirect traffic. Their worries are certainly driven by the Snowden
revelations (Lyon, 2014), but are also reinforced by the long history of surveillance and
infiltration of social movements by US government agencies (see Ferrari &
Remensperger, forthcoming).
Tyler talked about how people involved in social movements worry about being
surveilled: “there's a lot of security concerns, right? Concerns about being able to track
people. Being able to... the government being able to spy on them, which are legitimate”.
He also added that sometimes those who worry the most about surveillance are the least
likely to actually be a target of surveillance, but that does not make their concerns less
valid. Lisa reported how she and other prominent Philly Socialists organizers receive “a
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lot of fake friend requests from fake people” on Facebook; the profiles of these “fake
people” are usually easy to spot:
some kind of random person who has like 20 friends in common with
you. Like 15 out of their 20 friends are like your friends in common.
And they have a suspicious picture that is like a very hot girl or like
some really nicely taken picture, no other pictures... it's just obvious.
Like it's just very obvious to tell them. (Lisa)

Lisa showed no doubt that these fake friend requests were generated by cops,
using made up profiles to gain access to closed Facebook groups and to keep an eye on
activists whose profiles are not publicly accessible. She reported that she and everybody
she works with receive such requests. However, Lisa also argued that she is not
personally worried, although “people generally worry about surveillance”. She also
added:
Look, if they wanted to know what we're doing, they already know
what we're doing. We are like all over social media. So, if we going to
be using social media, which is a very public space, we just have to be
upfront with the things that we're doing. (Lisa)

In Lisa’s view, social media are so public that no one should have any expectation
that their information will not be seen and/or recorded; for an organization like the Philly
Socialists, this means being “upfront”, i.e. assume that whatever they say online is fully
public and thus also visible to law enforcement. Donna agreed with Lisa’s remarks:
“ultimately you should just, like, assume we are being surveilled and like, it's just about
not saying illegal shit or that when you're going to do illegal things but using it to make
connections”.
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Donna was the only interviewee to weave together Facebook’s data collection and
law enforcement surveillance. However, as can be seen in the quote below, they showed
resignation to Facebook’s policies:
I mean of course, like, you give your information to Zuck, the
Zuckerberg gods, but it's just like this looming figure that controls all
our data but I personally feel pretty able to say whatever the hell I want
via Facebook even though I'm sure my FBI agent isn't happy about it…
but yeah, I think technology is overall a good thing as long as you
know boundaries, like don't talk about illegal shit. I've had people
who've had like FBI agents show up at their work just saying some like,
what I would consider like a petty, not a real threat. He said he wanted
to punch Donald Trump in the face and the FBI showed up, which
sounds like something else was... yeah. I think as long as you know
boundaries and also know in cases like that what to do, it's ultimately a
good thing (Donna).

In that long quote, Donna showed how they thinks of Mark Zuckerberg as an
entity in control of all the data of Facebook users, but that they still feels like their
freedom of speech is somewhat guaranteed on the platform, as long as they accepts
specific boundaries, e.g. what they can and cannot say. This is striking, particularly
because during the interview Donna also explained how they had been unjustly banned
by Facebook for a few days. However, the most salient element that emerges in the quote,
is how Donna has internalized both the need to adhere to Facebook’s content policies and
the presence of law enforcement monitoring and surveillance on the platform, which lead
them to feel free to speak their mind, while actually self-censoring themselves. The joke
about making their assigned FBI agent unhappy, coupled with the story about their friend
being investigated for a Facebook message about President Trump, point towards the
crucial role that surveillance plays in how Donna – and the Philly Socialists in general –
think about digital technologies.
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A minimized Marxist critique
One of the most surprising elements of how the Philly Socialists think of
technology from a political standpoint is the scarce presence of a political-economic
critique of digital media. In other words, in contrast to LUMe activists, the PS
interviewees rarely connect their critique of internet technologies to the corporate,
capitalist nature of these platforms. When some of these concerns about the connection
between digital platforms and capitalism emerge, they are usually subsumed by the
preoccupation with surveillance. See, for instance, how Tyler approached the topic:
The other part of how the internet works is it's channeled through and
controlled by big corporations, which doesn't usually have the effect of
the government directly stepping in and censoring us. Although, maybe
someday, but more that maybe they hold the keys and can. They have
that ability. There's the ability to trace back everything that's happening
and identify people, which could be problematic down the road. They
have the, more importantly, the ability to kind of direct or redirect
traffic. (Tyler)

Here Tyler was interested in how big tech corporations control and channel
content on the internet, and how that can be used for monitoring and surveillance of
political activities. That internet technologies are powered by processes of data extraction
and commodification is not part of the criticism that Tyler waged. In another moment in
the interview, Tyler went back to explain how the internet has become very centralized.
He said:
As time has gone on, as anything under capitalism, things become more
consolidated. Now you have issues where the vast majority of traffic
gets funneled through a couple of websites and that gives enormous
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power to these, the owners of those websites, whereas before maybe
traffic had been more spread out. (Tyler)

Once again, Tyler is concerned with the power of tech corporations only insofar
as it allows for a concentration of traffic and attention, but he did not question the
connection between digital media and capitalism per se.
The scarce presence of a Marxist, political-economic critique of digital
technologies does not necessarily mean that the Philly Socialists ignore this aspect. The
fact that only a limited number of interviews could be conducted with PS organizers
might also contribute to downplaying this line of critique, which might be very salient for
other PS members that I was not able to reach. However, when I asked Michael directly
about whether there had been any ideological opposition to social media within the Philly
Socialists, along an anti-capitalist line, he replied that these are not the kind of
discussions about digital technologies that the PS are having. He then explained:
I don't think we think about it at the level of... we're not thinking, I
don't think most… any of us are thinking about it at the level of, these
are the tools of capital and therefore we shouldn't use them. It's kind of
like... I mean, is it a little... is it wrong? I feel like a little bit, there are a
lot of tools of capital that we need to use, because the tools of capital
are really effective. The tools of capital are used really effectively to
oppress us and to control us, and it goes back to the thing of you don't
have... it's not about whether or not you like it or not, it's what does it
take to compete and beat the capitalists? And I'm in this game to win,
and I'm willing to use whatever tools I need to win. (Michael)

According to Michael, the Philly Socialists are not really interested in discussing
how digital media are part of a capitalist system and thus how utilizing them might be
inconsistent with their ideological beliefs. For Michael, the fact that digital media are
“tools of capital” means that they are effective and that they must be used to compete
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with the capitalists. In contrast to LUMe activists, whose imaginary of “using the tools of
the system to fight the system” is at the center of prolonged discussions in the collective,
the Philly Socialists appear unconflicted about the necessity to use “the tools of capital”.
Tyler even dismissed this conundrum by saying that it is not a concern for socialists, but
only for the anarchist Left:
There is like a… more on the anarchist left, there is more of a Luddite
element that some people, but not all of them certainly, share. That's
not really been a big part of the socialist movement more broadly or
communists don't really share that. (Tyler)

By calling these concerns “Luddite”, which is a label that holds a traditionally
negative connotation among socialists, Tyler downplayed the relevance of a refusal to use
technology for anti-capitalist reasons, rather than seriously considering it as a possibility.
Thus, while the Philly Socialists are aware that digital technologies have negative sides,
they do not even entertain the idea that it might be “wrong” to use these tools; in
particular, they do not extend their Marxist critique to the internet, and they do not appear
to be thinking about the capitalist underpinnings of digital technologies in a particularly
negative way.

Negotiation: using technology for organizing, not activism
The technological imaginary of the Philly Socialists is one of negotiation. They
do not subscribe to the principles that underpin the dominant technological imaginary of
Silicon Valley; as highlighted in the previous section, when they talk about digital media,
there is no specific condemnation of Silicon Valley’s imaginary, but there is also no
endorsement of it. In particular, it is evident that for the Philly Socialists digital
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technologies are not a space of freedom or liberation, as evidence by the threat of
surveillance and the toxicity, and they are not the solution to any social or political
problems. As argued above, while the PS do not articulate a particularly strong critique of
the relationship between capitalism and Silicon Valley, they nevertheless identify digital
technologies as being tools of capital. Despite disagreeing with the dominant
technological imaginary of Silicon Valley in its three key aspects, the Philly Socialists
still employ the digital technologies that emerged from Silicon Valley in their organizing
work.
Michael can help us make sense of how this imaginary of negotiation unfolds:
it's kind of like we're in competition with the ruling class, and if the
ruling class is using this tool and that tool is productive then we have to
be at the same level as them in terms of being able to compete with
them. So, somebody can come up to me and say, "Oh, yeah but it was
so much easier or better to organize before there was all this chatter
from social media," and I'd be like, "Yeah, sure. Tough." Well guess
what, whether or not it was better or worse or things are easier or
harder, if we wanna compete, we have to be on the internet. That's just
it. The idea that you wouldn't be organizing on Facebook or you
wouldn't be... like some people wouldn't be on Twitter or stuff like that,
it's silly. It's ultra-left, or it's not even ultra-left, it's just nonsensical. So,
I don't think things are... I don't know if I would think of the internet as
a good tool, I would just think of it as a necessary tool. (Michael)

Michael’s quote detailed how the Philly Socialists negotiate their technological
practices, based on Facebook, Twitter, and other digital media, and their dislike of these
platforms. He dismissed the idea of not using corporate social media as “ultra-left” and/or
simply nonsensical. He contextualized the use of these platforms in the political
competition between socialist organizers and the ruling class: if the ruling class relies on
Silicon Valley’s technologies, why shouldn’t the socialists do the same?
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Throughout the interviews, it became evident that the way in which the Philly
Socialists rationalize “using social media despite the fact that we don’t like them”, to use
Michael’s words, is through downplaying their importance in the life of the organization
and contextualizing their use within their multi-platform organizing strategy. Notice how
Lisa explained how Facebook is only a small part of the PS’ organizing process:
Yeah [Facebook is] definitely very useful, but it doesn't yield the same
kind of results in real life. Because you could have 10,000 followers,
but those 10,000 people are not going to show up to your event. So,
you still have to do the social media kind of thing to kind of bring
attention to the things that you're doing, but also... Because people
come through social media, but we also do a lot of tabling, we do a lot
of phone calls, we do a lot of emails, and we always encouraging
people to follow us or by share stuff. We use the social media together
with the recruitment kind of like strategies. It's not on itself, otherwise
we'd just be like a meme page because we wouldn't... So, if we didn't
have an event to invite people on the Facebook, those 10,000 followers
would be kind of useless. (Lisa)

In Lisa’s words we can trace a way of thinking about Facebook and other digital
media as a component in a recruitment and organizing process that takes place online, but
most importantly offline. Lisa also underlined how only relying on Facebook for their
political activity would be like being a “meme page”; her choice of words was hardly
coincidental, given the large amount of Facebook pages that are broadly affiliated with
progressive and radical ideas and which share political memes. The Philly Socialists
generally like leftist memes and share quite a few on their own Facebook page, but Lisa
made it clear that there is a difference between posting political content on Facebook and
actually organizing. Michael supported her point of view, by saying:
people have this tendency to just post on our Facebook group for help,
and it's like that's not how organizing works. Organizing works when
you... you have to reach out to those people who are on the fringe and
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pull them in, and that's a lot of the work that you're doing, and that
requires meeting people in person. Going past the social media wall
and building an organic connection with them. (Michael)

In line with Lisa’s quote, Michael explained how, however tempting it might be
to consider posting on Facebook as a form of organizing, the work of building
connections is what really matters – and that work needs to happen outside of social
media. Thinking of digital media as one piece of more elaborate strategies for organizing
and base-building allows the Philly Socialists to negotiate their relationship to the digital
technologies of Silicon Valley: they use their commitment to the notion of organizing as
a resource for making sense of how they rely on social media, even if they don’t like
them.
The notion of “organizing” is crucial to the Philly Socialists’ negotiation of
Silicon Valley’s technological imaginary and Silicon Valley’s technologies. Their
imaginary, which I have theorized as “organizing where people are”, is shaped by their
relationship to the heritage of socialist organizing and their rejection of another
technological imaginary, common in the American Left, which they call “activist
networking”. In this long quote, Tyler explained how both the history of socialist
organizing (or how the PS imagine this history) and the salience of “activist networking”
influence how the organization thinks about technology:
Every revolutionary movement takes advantage of the technologies
they have. If you read about the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks back in
the day they would smuggle in printing presses and they would set
them up. Then being able to get their political... to articulate their
politics was a really important component of what they did. They used
the technology that was most accessible to them and most efficient.
However, obviously, 100 years technology has changed so the groups
some still they try to sell their newspapers and that's not really, we
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think, the most effective approach. We're definitely in favor of using
technology, but also there's a tendency sometimes among activists to
see it as a cure all, especially during the Occupy period. Well, if we just
get everybody on these forums then we can do whatever. Probably
somewhat similar to how Five Star became a big thing. Occupy was
like, there were a lot of people who were techno-utopians. It was like if
we can direct democracy online… and then every… It's not really... it
sort of misses a key component of sociality or social interaction, which
is that people need to have bodily presence and face-to-face
communication is still really important. Yeah, we've kind of avoided
that. (Tyler)

At the beginning of the quote, Tyler compared the Philly Socialists’ technological
practices to those of the revolutionary socialist movements of the early 20th century; in
this comparison, social media are for the Philly Socialists what the printing press was to
the Communist revolutionaries in 1917 – the most accessible and most efficient
technology available. Tyler thus appealed to the tradition of socialist organizing to
explain how the PS conceptualize digital technologies. Further, Tyler also contrasted the
PS’s approach to the “techno-utopian” impulses of other contemporary social
movements, including the Occupy Wall Street Movement and the Italian Five Star
Movement (which Tyler had asked me about during the interview). In Tyler’s view, these
movements have focused exclusively on online activism, assuming that digital
technologies could supplant more tiresome offline processes of organizing. The Philly
Socialists, as Tyler concluded, have avoided this overreliance on the digital. Occupy Wall
Street is not a casual reference. In fact, Occupy can be considered emblematic of the
category of contemporary Leftist political engagement that the Philly Socialists call –
with a negative connotation – “activist networking”. A member of the Philly Socialists,
who authored an article that makes the case for the base-building approach, characterized
“activist networking” as such:
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Activist networking is what might be called lifestyle activism, in the
sense of individuals who form their identity around being an activist
and derive the majority of their social life from activism. These are the
type of people who do not engage with, are not comfortable around and
are not friends with non-activists or non-theory types, and whose
weekly and monthly schedules are a busybody itinerary of meetings,
discussion groups, protests, and conferences. (Horras, 2017a, para. 9)

Activist networking, as defined by Horras (2017a), is more concerned with giving
a social identity to individual activists, then it is with organizing for social change (or
revolution). This is also why the Philly Socialists do not call themselves activists or their
activities activism37. Although the article that discussed “activist networking” does not
mention digital media as a crucial component of this political tendency, I argue that
“activist networking” carries a specific technological imaginary that the Philly Socialists
recognize as opposed to theirs. An infographic, posted by the Philly Socialists Facebook
page in July 2018 and showed in Figure 15, contrasted “cool kids” with “organizers”
(with the implicit endorsement of the category of organizers, of course); the image
generally conveyed the point that “cool kids” are activists interested in cultivating their
own individual identity and popularity, while “organizers” do the tough work of building
grassroots power (Philly Socialists, 2018d). One of the dimensions on which the two
categories are compared is that of the use of technologies: while “cool kids” “get people
to follow them on social media”, organizers “get people to show up IRL [in real life]”
(Philly Socialists, 2018d).

37

I follow their self-characterization and do not refer to them as “activists” in this chapter. However, for
the sake of brevity, I do refer to the Philly Socialists with the term “activivists”, when I consider them
together with LUMe and the Hungarian internet tax protests.
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Figure 15. “Cool kids vs. organizers” (Philly Socialists, 2018d). Infographic posted by the Philly Socialists’
Facebook page, July 28th, 2018. Author unknown.
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The infographic thus reproduces a distinction between online activism as
slacktivism and offline “real” organizing, which also resurfaces in how the Philly
Socialists talk about organizing and digital media. Closely echoing the infographic, Tyler
argued: “there is kind of a culture of media celebrity that bleeds over into activism
somewhat and that can be a problem”. He then expanded on the relationship between
digital media and “activist networking”:
[the internet] helps to contribute to a culture where people aren't
necessarily politically active, or they're out on the street or they're out
in their communities but instead they're tweeting from home or they
build a personal brand or reputation as an individual. Like, “I'm an
individual activist”… but they're not really representing a community.
They don't have any real loyalties or accountability to any community.
(Tyler)

Tyler’s harsh assessment directly linked a certain narcissistic political activism –
which corresponds to “activist networking”, even if he did not call it that in the interview
– to digital technologies; in line with the infographic examined above (Philly Socialists,
2018d), Tyler argued that this type of “activist networking” privileges online
participation to on-the-ground organizing. “Activist networking” thus has a very specific
technological imaginary attached to it; in how the Philly Socialists characterize it, this
imaginary is not opposed to Silicon Valley’s: while oriented towards social justice, it sees
digital technologies as the primary vehicle for political engagement, as conducive to
democracy and as offering solutions to social issues.
It is through the notion of “organizing” for base-building that the Philly Socialists
negotiate their technological imaginary; this allows them to discursively downplay their
technological reliance on corporate social media and framing it as choosing to be where
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people are. Their technological imaginary conceptualizes their use of technologies as
supporting organizing and base-building, not merely activism. This imaginary of
negotiation is thus constructed in opposition to the technological imaginary of “activist
networking”, which they see as unfortunately widespread in the contemporary American
Left; yet, it is also shaped by a certain appeal to the tradition of socialist organizing, from
which the Philly Socialists take away the imperative of making use of mainstream media
technologies.

Conclusion
In this chapter I offered an analysis of the technological imaginary of the Philly
Socialists, a socialist organization in Philadelphia. In explaining the politics of this group,
I emphasized their commitment to the strategy of “base-bulding”, i.e. to build working
class power through direct action and “serve the people” work. I also showed how their
technological practices involve the use of multiple digital technologies for both internal
and external communication; these technologies also include corporate social network
sites and organizational platforms such as Slack and Nationbuilder. Facebook, in
particular, plays an important role in both how the Philly Socialists communicate and
organize, and in how they think about technology in their work.
In their technological imaginary, which I have labeled “organizing where people
are”, the Philly Socialists downplay their reliance on corporate digital platforms by
framing it as just a small piece in their elaborate recruitment and organizing strategy; they
justify their use of these digital technologies by identifying all of their technological
practices as “organizing” and insisting on the importance of offline political practices. In
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their strategic use of the notion of “organizing”, they show how their technological
imaginary is shaped by the lessons they drew from the long history of socialist
organizing, i.e. the need to use whatever available mainstream media technology to
disseminate socialist ideas to the masses; they even explicitly compare what corporate
social media is for them to what the printing press was for the Russian Revolution of
1917. In drawing on the keyword “organizing”, the Philly Socialists also seek to
distinguish their technological imaginary from that connected to “activist networking”,
which is their way of defining some strands of American Leftist activism that could be
more accurately described as “lifestyle activism” (Johnson et al., 2012; Portwood-Stacer,
2013a) and/or “slacktivism” (Gladwell, 2010). The PS thus justify their use of corporate
digital media by deploying their idea of online-offline “organizing” in contrast to the
purely digital and somewhat narcissistic characterization of “activist networking”.

Taken together, Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 illustrate how negotiation can work
differently for different social movements, based on their political ideology, the political
context they inhabit, and the kinds of technological imaginaries that are salient in that
given environment. LUMe and the Philly Socialists develop two imaginaries of
negotiation that feel different from each other, even if they are both underpinned by the
use of the same corporate digital technologies, chiefly Facebook. However, while both
groups might be using the same technologies, these technologies hold different meanings
for them. For LUMe, Facebook and other digital media are the tools of system, which the
activists feel they need to use in order to take down the system. For the Philly Socialists,
the same technologies appear like the most recent tools in a long history of socialist
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organizing that has traditionally used any technology at its disposal. In this chapter, I
have also highlighted how LUMe and the Philly Socialists differ in how salient the
political-economic critique of internet technologies is for them: while for LUMe activists
this is a crucial part of their technological imaginary of negotiation, for the Philly
Socialists this does not appear even a meaningful discussion.
One aspect that emerges forcefully in the technological imaginaries of both
LUMe and the Philly Socialists is the importance of the offline for thinking about digital
technologies. In both cases, offline interaction – political discussion, demonstrations,
recruitment, face-to-face conversations – plays a crucial role in how the activists assess
the possibilities and limitations of digital technologies; thinking about their offline
political spaces allows the interviewees to criticize Silicon Valley’s dominant
technological imaginary, especially in its promise of democracy and liberation through
the digital. While the scholarship has insisted on dismantling the distinction between the
online and offline, for instance talking about “hybridity” (Chadwick, 2013; but also
Treré, 2018), the distinction is still very real for LUMe and the Philly Socialists. While
they live fully hybrid lives, in which they can be constantly involved in digital
communication while attending to offline activities, they still perceive the online as
something separate from the reality of the offline. The upholding of the offline as an
important component of contemporary activism is yet another aspect of the relationship
between social movements and technology that can only be uncovered through an
investigation of the technological imaginaries, and not merely an analysis of the
technological practices of these movements.
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Chapter 5 – Conclusion
Appropriation, Negotiation, Challenge
In this dissertation I brought together scholarly literature from media and
communication, science and technology studies and social movement studies to propose a
new theoretical framework for analyzing the relationship between social movements,
technologies, and social change. Through the notion of “technological imaginaries”,
defined as sets of practice-based beliefs, individual and collective, implicit and explicit,
about the role of technology in social life and social change, I argued for the need to
investigate not only how technologies are being used by social movements, but also how
they are being envisioned politically. I characterized technological imaginaries as being
political, having material consequences, being constructed by both practices and
discourses, being held by ordinary people, not corresponding to social imaginaries as
envisioned by Taylor (2004), and as being visions of both the past and the future. While
social movements are not the only actors that construct and deploy technological
imaginaries, using this theoretical framework allows us to make sense of the growing
body of literature about activism and digital technologies and to highlight the political
tensions that arise when technologies are used to challenge power holders. By focusing
on the ways in which social movements make sense of technology in relation to social
change, my dissertation addresses a gap in the literature on social movements and digital
technologies.
I argued that technological imaginaries are plural and conflicting in society.
However, it should be possible to identify one specific technological imaginary that is
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dominant at a specific point in time, in one or more geographic locations. In Chapter 1, I
described the current dominant technological imaginary, developed and popularized by
the Silicon Valley technology sector, since the 1990s. I highlighted how three tenets form
the core of this imaginary: digital technologies are believed to be inherently supportive of
democracy, freedom, and personal autonomy; the development of technologies is thought
to be the avenue for the resolution of sociopolitical problems; the imaginary is embedded
into and supportive of neoliberalism. I argued that this technological imaginary has
dreams of universality, but it is, in fact, bounded, biased and specific: it perpetuates the
biases that characterize the white American men that dominate(d) Silicon Valley. In
Chapter 1 I thus offered two illustrations of the biases that we can identify in the
dominant technological imaginary. First, I showed how the early enthusiasm about
digitally-enabled disembodiment, as it emerged from the pages of Wired magazine in the
1990s, downplayed the role of race and gender disparities. This enthusiasm was based on
a discourse I termed “selective disembodiment”, which postulated that white women and
people of color could access “cyberspace” to effectively leave their gendered and raced
bodies behind: cyberspace could allow them to experience life as the “default” white
male. I contended that, while seemingly emancipatory and inclusive, this idea of
“selective disembodiment” allowed Silicon Valley to ignore issues of race and gender, by
just assuming that access to technology would take care of any and all disparities. These
early discourses about disembodiment have percolated into the current dominant
technological imaginary; they legitimate the – still current – visions of the internet as a
free and equalizing space, transcending differences of race, age, gender, and geographic
location. Second, I suggested that the dominant technological imaginary brings together
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technocratic ambitions and populist justifications; I showed how they can be traced in an
open letter published by Facebook’s founder and CEO, Mark Zuckerberg, in 2017. I drew
on Winner (1977, 1986) to sketch the contours of the Facebook technocracy envisioned
by Zuckerberg, based on the idea that politics should model itself on how Facebook
operates. I explained how these technocratic ambitions are justified through populist
ideas; in this document, the “Facebook community” becomes a stand in for the populist
notion of the “people”. Far from being politically neutral, the dominant technological
imaginary envisions a specific relationship between people, Silicon Valley, and the state:
while on the one hand, it pitches market-driven technological development as the only
way to solve people’s problems, it casts states and representative politics as unfit to
govern the complexities of the world, while justifying its power through its efficiency,
scale, and democratic ethos. Taken together, these two illustrations showed that the
dominant technological imaginary is not universal at all: it is grounded in the politics of
the Silicon Valley of the 1990s and it promotes a white, male-centric, American view of
technology.
I then turned to the crucial questions animating this research: how do
contemporary leftist social movements make sense of the dominant technological
imaginary of Silicon Valley? What are their own technological imaginaries? And how do
these imaginaries have an impact on their technological and organizational practices? I
offered a typology of social movements’ technological imaginaries, based on whether
they accept or reject the dominant technological imaginary of Silicon Valley and whether
they use or refuse the digital technologies of Silicon Valley. With the category of
“appropriation”, I identified technological imaginaries which embrace the key tenets of

318

Silicon Valley’s imaginary and envision the use of digital technologies for activism.
Through the label of “negotiation”, I described cases in which social movements
construct a technological imaginary which at the same time rejects the dominant
technological imaginary of Silicon Valley but accepts the use of the technologies that
have been conceived within that imaginary. Finally, I called “challenge” the type of
technological imaginary which envisions a rejection of both the imaginary and the
technologies of Silicon Valley.
In Chapter 2, I reconstructed the technological imaginary of the Hungarian
internet tax protests of 2014. I argued that the ways in which the interviewees talked
about the internet reproduced classic tropes of Western modernity, which connect
technology to equality and development, rationality, and the future; I explained how these
ideas about modernity were strengthened by the mundanity of the internet. I thus
theorized the imaginary developed and deployed by the Hungarian activists as “mundane
modernity”. I suggested that mundane modernity is an imaginary of “appropriation”,
because it embraces the key aspects of the dominant technological imaginary of Silicon
Valley and envisions the use of Silicon Valley technologies. I argue that this imaginary of
appropriation reinterprets Silicon Valley’s imaginary for a post-communist context, such
as that of Hungary, in which the modernity vs. tradition cleavage has recently been
rediscovered; further, the fusion of political freedom and market freedom that
characterize Silicon Valley are appealing in a country where the transition was promised
to simultaneously deliver democracy and prosperity (and ended up not fully achieving
either). In this context, the left-liberal Hungarian activists used the technological
imaginary of mundane modernity to legitimize their opposition not only to the internet
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tax but to the Orbán government in general. I then argued that this imaginary of
appropriation is constructed to respond to the peculiarities of the current Hungarian
political context – the return of political cleavages, such as modernity vs. tradition, proWest vs. anti-West, cosmopolitan vs. ethnonationalist – and to the technological
imaginary of illiberal democracy, which is represented by the internet tax itself. I then
analyzed how the imaginary of mundane modernity was performed during the protests:
one the one hand, through the illuminated mobile phones that protesters lifted in the air
(an action that originated in the Hong Kong Umbrella Movement); on the other, through
the trashing of the headquarter of Orbán’s party, when protesters used old electronic
devices to “attack” the building. To further underscore the resonance of mundane
modernity in post-communist societies, I showed how the most visible symbol of the
internet tax protests, the raising of illuminated phones to the sky, was used by other
demonstrations in the region, even if they had nothing with the internet. However, I
concluded by arguing that mundane modernity (and appropriation in general) has its
limits: interviewees from my two other case studies in Italy and the United States did not
really relate to the imaginary of mundane modernity. While some of them thought it
would make sense in the Hungarian context, they overwhelmingly rejected the idea that
smartphones could be taken as a symbol of freedom. Further, mundane modernity did not
support the Hungarian activists in creating a full-fledged social movement.
In Chapter 3 and 4 I explored how social movements construct technological
imaginaries of negotiation. Both LUMe and the Philly Socialists reject the core tenets of
the dominant technological imaginary of Silicon Valley; at the same time, the
technologies of Silicon Valley power their daily activist work. Both movements are thus
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engaged in a negotiation: they try to make their technological practices fit with their
politics, not the politics of Silicon Valley. How this negotiation happens, however, varies
between the two movements.
In LUMe’s technological imaginary, digital technologies are seen as both flawed
and indispensable for social change: these technologies are “tools of the system”, but they
can and should be used to take down the system itself. The Italian activists fiercely
criticize digital technologies: they associate them with capitalist power structures, they
refuse to see them as democratic spaces, and they question their impact on human
interaction. In so doing, they reject Silicon Valley’s ideas about the democratic nature of
technology, its technosolutionism, and its seamless integration with neoliberalism.
However, they employ these technologies for their perceived efficiency and reach: they
believe them to be unavoidable. To make sense of the contradictions generated by their
technological imaginary, they rely on two different resources, which support their
negotiation: first, they anchor their technological practices in their physically occupied
spaces, which are thought of as the primary locus of democratic decision making and
sociality; second, they deploy the notion of self-awareness (consapevolezza) to justify
how their use of corporate social media is different from both the use envisioned by
Silicon Valley and by the Five Star Movement. Their negotiation is influenced by
LUMe’s vague, but meaningful, Marxist orientation, which leads them to question how
corporate power operates online; by their collocation among the Italian social centers,
which emphasize the importance of physically occupied political spaces; and by their
resistance to the peculiar technological imaginary of the Five Star Movement, which
Treré (2018) conceptualized as authoritarian sublime.
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In contrast, the technological imaginary of the Philly Socialists can be
summarized as “organizing where people are”: the PS organizers find digital technologies
to be less than ideal, but good enough for recruiting people to the socialist cause. The PS
offer three major critiques of digital technologies: they enable law enforcement
surveillance, they are toxic, and they are not as supportive of interaction as offline spaces.
The Philly Socialists thus also reject the tenets of the dominant technological imaginary
of Silicon Valley; in particular, they eschew technosolutionist approaches and, as their
three aforementioned critiques suggest, they refuse to think of digital media as spaces of
democracy and freedom. At the same time, they use a wide range of corporate digital
technologies – from Facebook to Slack. Their technological imaginary of negotiation is
predicated on a discursive downplaying of the role of corporate digital media in the life
of the organization: while organizers use these tools a lot, they prefer to think of them as
just a small component of their multi-platform, offline-online organizing process. It is
thus the notion of “organizing” that the PS rely on to negotiate the meaning of their use
of Silicon Valley technologies. In using the notion of “organizing”, the Philly Socialists
show that their negotiation is shaped by two factors: first, the lessons they draw from the
long history of socialist organizing, namely that socialists have always used whatever
mainstream technology was available to them; second, their rejection of the technological
imaginary of “activist networking”, which they see as prevalent in the American Left and
which they characterize as individualistic and narcissistic.
Looking at the technological imaginaries of LUMe and the Philly Socialists can
help us highlight how their negotiation is shaped by different political factors: their
ideology, the political context, and the prominence of other technological imaginaries
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(besides Silicon Valley’s). To summarize, I argued that LUMe’s technological imaginary
of negotiation is influenced by their Marxist, anti-capitalist orientation (ideology), by
their collocation within the long history of Italian occupied social centers (political
context), and by their strong opposition to the technological imaginary of “authoritarian
sublime” (Treré, 2018) of the Five Star Movement (other prominent technological
imaginaries). In the case of the Philly Socialists, the most important factors that shape
negotiation are the heritage of socialist organizing (which is both ideology and political
context) and the PS’ critique of the technological imaginary of “activist networking”,
which they see as dominant in the American Left (other prominent technological
imaginaries). Thus, while imaginaries of negotiation are similar responses to Silicon
Valley, based on the rejection of its technological imaginary and the use of its
technologies, they look and feel very different. My analysis has highlighted how
ideologies, political contexts and other technological imaginaries can thus play a crucial
role in determining how the technological imaginaries of social movements interpret and
respond to Silicon Valley’s dominant imaginary. While the dissertation offers examples
of different imaginaries of negotiation, we can stipulate that these factors will also
account for differences in imaginaries of appropriation and of challenge (which I will
discuss in this concluding chapter).
Considered together, the technological imaginaries of the social movements
examined in this dissertation provide a strong contrast to the dreams of universality of
Silicon Valley. In fact, we can identify the existence of multiple, situated and political
internets: far from being universal in their meaning and in their applications, digital
technologies are seen in different ways by different social movements. Even in the
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Hungarian case, where activists appropriated the dominant technological imaginary, their
imaginary of mundane modernity reinterpreted digital technologies in a political way,
which made sense in the streets of Budapest and not necessarily in the corporate
boardrooms of Silicon Valley. By looking at the political ways in which these social
movements imagine technology and the role it plays in their social justice work, we can
push back against Silicon Valley’s presumed universality. Thinking about the
multiplicity, the situatedness and the politics of these internets can help us further
question and resist the power of the dominant technological imaginary.
However, the case studies examined in this dissertation also point to the great
power and reach of the dominant technological imaginary of Silicon Valley. In fact, even
LUMe and the Philly Socialists, who reject the visions of Silicon Valley, end up facing
the dominant technological imaginary as it manifests through the digital technologies that
they employ. As LUMe activists argued, they are in a complicated ambiguous position:
they use the tools of a system they would ultimately want to dismantle; the Philly
Socialists similarly acknowledged that they are using the same technologies that the
ruling class is also employing. On the one hand, this means that while they are opposing
the imaginary of Silicon Valley, they are nevertheless accepting to be part of the online
economy of clicks, targeted advertising and data commodification that sustains the
business model of Silicon Valley. As some of the activists conceded, while their clicks
might be directed at attacking the system, the system is anyway benefitting from them.
On the other hand, in their negotiation the activists also end up having to rely on
platforms that were not designed to support social justice efforts, but rather further the
technological imaginary (and the business model of Silicon Valley). For instance, both
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the Philly Socialists and LUMe have to put labor into monitoring or moderating the
comments that their posts receive on Facebook. The fact that the activists need to perform
this kind of labor is due to the affordances of Facebook, which in turn reflect (among
other things) one of the core tenets of Silicon Valley’s imaginary: that digital spaces are
inherently free and democratic. Yet they are not free and democratic in the way that
LUMe and the Philly Socialists think of free and democratic spaces. The peculiarity of
the imaginaries of negotiation is that they are still confronted with the dominance of
Silicon Valley’s idea, because of the way in which these ideas are encoded in digital
media. It is difficult to escape from the power of Silicon Valley’s imaginary, even when
you reject it.
While the cases examined in this dissertation do not include movements that have
chosen to eschew corporate digital media, theoretically we should be able to identify
technological imaginaries that reject both the ideas and the technologies of Silicon
Valley. I now briefly examine the literature available on these cases, which I theorize as
“challenge”.

Challenge: resisting Silicon Valley’s technologies
The third type of response to Silicon Valley’s dominant technological imaginary
that I have theorized in this dissertation is that of “challenge”: the simultaneous rejection
of the imaginary and the technologies of Silicon Valley. This type of technological
imaginary seems more difficult to find among contemporary social movements, given
how much activists have come to rely on corporate digital media. However, when
discussing the contradictions of negotiation with the activists of both LUMe and the
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Philly Socialists, some of them mentioned the possibility of challenge. In the case of
LUMe, challenge was represented by older activists of other social centers, who refused
to use Facebook in their activism. In the case of the Philly Socialists, the imaginary was
evoked in one of the first projects that the organization tried to set up (and did not
manage to finalize): the creation of a “free socialist internet”, a non-commercial mesh
network, to be built and maintained by the PS, that would provide internet access to
people outside of corporate Internet Service Providers (ISPs). Yet these inklings of
“challenge” seemed unfeasible, for different reasons, to both LUMe and the PS: LUMe
activists dismissed the anti-Facebook stances of older activists as “inward-looking” and
the PS recognized the technical difficulty of creating their own mesh network and
abandoned the project.
If we look at the literature, however, we can begin to identify attempts to reject
Silicon Valley technologies that might qualify as “challenge”, in that – we can speculate
– they are motivated by a rejection of the technological imaginary of Silicon Valley.
Imaginaries of challenge can further be divided into two subgroups: in the first one,
challenge entails abstaining from the use of Silicon Valley’s technologies; in the second,
challenge takes the form of the imagination and creation of technologies that are
alternative to Silicon Valley’s.
The first category, challenge as refusal, has recently become the object of
academic interest (Fish, 2017; Hesselberth, 2018; Kaun & Treré, 2018). While the topic
of technology non-use has been more widely considered as an individual action
(Hesselberth, 2018; Portwood-Stacer, 2013b), Kaun and Treré (2018) have recently
sought to investigate what they call “disconnection”, e.g. the choice not to use certain
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platforms or technologies, as a political practice that can be adopted by social
movements. While they develop a typology of both individual and collective types of
disconnection, only one of their categories – “digital disconnection as resistance” (Kaun
& Treré, 2018, p. 11) – captures the spirit of what I theorize as challenge: complete or
partial disconnection from specific “platforms or digital media formats” (Kaun & Treré,
2018, p. 12). The collective and intentional dimensions of challenge as refusal are crucial.
While there has been a proliferation of discourses of disconnection, individualized
practices of refusal often eschew a political dimension (see Portwood-Stacer, 2013b) or
reinforce neoliberal notions of connectivity (see Hesselberth, 2018). Challenge as refusal
is not concerned with individuals’ choices to deactivate Facebook (Portwood-Stacer,
2013b), but with social movements deciding to totally or partially collectively refuse
corporate social media because they do not fit with their political stances. In addition to
being collective, this practice of refusal also needs to be intentional: as Portwood-Stacer
(2013b) highlighted, not using a technology because it is not available or too expensive
does not count as refusal. So, what does challenge as refusal look like? Kaun and Treré
(2018) offer the example of radical Swedish leftist groups (Andersson, 2016). Other
movements similarly engaged in challenge as refusal must exist, but it is difficult to point
out other examples; as Hesselberth (2018) highlighted, this is certainly a bias of academic
research due to the difficulty of locating these groups. A historical example of a
movement deploying technological imaginary of challenge as refusal, although clearly
not concerned with Silicon Valley, was that of the Luddites; contrary to how Luddites are
popularly remembered (see Portwood-Stacer, 2013b), their opposition to technology was
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not to the machines per se, but to the “change in the social relations of production”
(Hobsbawm, 1952) that were engendered by those machines.
The second category, challenge as alternative, includes social movements’
attempts at imagining and building alternative technologies. Gehl (2015) positioned
social movements’ development of alternative social media platforms in the tradition of
social movements’ alternative media (see Atton, 2002; Downing, 2008). He presented
different cases of activist alternative social media, such as Diaspora and rstat.us, which,
he argued, “not only [allow] for users to share content and connect with one another but
also [deny] the commercialization of speech, [allow] users more access to shape the
underlying technical infrastructure, and radically [experiment] with surveillance regimes”
(Gehl, 2015, p. 2). Presenting activist alternative technologies such as Ushahidi,
Crabgrass and Hub, Hirsch (2011) suggested that these projects “allow organizations to
create communication channels that function independently of commercial offerings” (p.
147) and that they “embody a distinct set of values, meaning that they are shaped by a
different set of concerns (or at least, a different weighting among competing concerns)
than their commercial counterparts” (p. 136). Activist alternative ISPs, such as Riseup
and Autistici/Inventati in Italy have also been examined in the literature (Barassi & Treré,
2012; Milan, 2013). Other movements have also experimented with the creation of
alternative technologies, even though they still relied on corporate social media, for
instance the Occupy movement (Captain, 2011; Roos, 2011; Valentine, 2012) and the
French Nuit Debout (Russell, 2018).
Challenge, as both refusal and alternative, should thus be understood as the third
type of response to the dominant technological imaginary of Silicon Valley. It presents
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evident challenges: building alternative activist technologies requires resources, such as
expertise, funding, and time, that are not always available to activists; choosing to
disconnect from corporate social media might also risk alienating some potential
members or supporters. These difficulties might account for the seemingly low popularity
of imaginaries of challenge among contemporary social movements. However, a more
thorough investigation of how activists come to construct imaginaries of challenge is a
much needed further step in the analysis of the technological imaginaries of social
movements.

Implications for the literature
By bringing together the literature on media history, media and social movements,
and STS-inspired approaches to technology, my dissertation provides a more
comprehensive framework for the analysis of the relationship between technology and
social movements. In doing so, it makes theoretical and methodological contributions that
can help us better understand digital technologies, social movements, and media and
communication.
I argue that with the concept of technological imaginary and the theoretical
framework that I developed around it, we can better account for how digital technologies
are already being imagined and experienced as political by social movements around the
world. In fact, even if activists do not think about their “technological imaginaries” under
this label, the empirical analysis I provided shows that they do critically reflect, either
individually or collectively, about the politics of the technologies they use. By accounting
for these reflexive processes through the framework laid out in this work, we can
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investigate this undertheorized “political” aspect of the relationship between technologies
and social movements.
My dissertation thus contributes to the literature on digital technologies by
arguing for a discursive approach to technology that can account for the ways in which
technologies are discursively envisioned, especially in relation to social change.
Furthermore, I also directly intervene in the literature on media and social movements, by
offering a comprehensive approach that can help us systematize the abundant recent
literature in this subfield. My notion of “technological imaginaries” integrates both
practices and discourses, allowing us to take into account how the characteristics of the
political environments in which movements are situated can have an impact on how they
envision and experience technology, thus contributing to the small, but growing, body of
literature on imaginaries (inter alia Barassi, 2015; Treré, 2018).
My approach to the study of social movements relies on Melucci’s (1989)
constructivist theorization of movements as processes, which emphasizes the importance
of movements’ collective identity formation. What I contribute to the Melucci-inspired
research on social movements, media, and collective identity is the necessity to think
about how technological imaginaries are part of these processes of collective identity
formation. Melucci (1989) held that such processes are meant to construct an action
system which includes the definition of means, goals and environments (p. 27). I argue
that technologies should be considered part of this definitional process and thus offer the
framework of technological imaginaries as a way to integrate the study of technology into
Melucci’s constructivist approach to social movements. Technological imaginaries could
be a fourth axis in Melucci’s action system, in addition to means, goals, and environment
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– all elements that movements need to collectively define in order to sustain their
collective action. Considering technological imaginaries alongside means, goals, and the
definition of the external environment allows us to theorize movements’ relationship to
technology as one of the dimensions that characterize how collective action unfolds for a
given social movement.
My project also provides a methodological contribution by charting a qualitative
empirical trajectory for the study of technological imaginaries. First, my dissertation
shows that the work of reconstructing the political meaning of technology for social
movements cannot be undertaken without engaging activists directly: none of the insights
provided by this dissertation could have been reached by simply collecting the content
that the activists of the Hungarian internet tax protests, LUMe or the Philly Socialists
post on social media. While looking at social media data can help answer some questions
about social movements’ use of digital technologies, it cannot account for the nuances
that emerge through the qualitative investigation of movements’ technological
imaginaries. My dissertation also shows that empirical qualitative methods can and
should be employed to study how movements discursively envision technologies. While
textual analysis has been the prevalent method for the study of imaginaries (see Jasanoff,
2015; Mansell, 2012), my dissertation shows how semi-structured interviews and creative
methods, such as the visual focus groups, can be used to productively investigate social
movements’ technological imaginaries. In particular, my dissertation offers the visual
focus groups as a useful methodological innovation that can support activists’ reflexive
engagement with technology. However, this method could also be used more broadly,
whenever researchers need to investigate a complex set of ideas that research participants
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might have trouble articulating; I could envision visual focus groups as a productive
method for research in Sociology and Political Science, for instance engaging participants
in drawing “democracy”, “the electoral process”, or “inequality”. Further, in Appendix B,
I also show how visual focus groups could also be used not just to support a critical
reflection on the current state of technology (or democracy or inequality), but also to
encourage the imagination of how technology should be; this particular version of the
visual focus groups could thus also be applied in activist and policy settings.
Lastly, there are two further contributions that my dissertation offers to the
literature on media and communication more broadly. First, my empirical analysis of
movements in Italy, Hungary and the United States shows how much Facebook and the
other platforms acquired by Facebook, i.e. Whatsapp and Instagram, are crucial to
contemporary activism. While these movements all use a multiplicity of digital media, in
addition to other offline media practices, Facebook is central to the way they
communicate and organize. But it is also key to how they think about the internet. It is
not accidental that so many of the quotes that I presented in the chapters talk about
interviewees’ experiences with Facebook. Thus, even though the internet goes beyond
Facebook, this platform does not only almost monopolize activists’ attention when it
comes to posting and interacting with others, but also when it comes to thinking about
what the internet means for them. What does it mean when one platform so powerfully
shapes how activists think about technology? It is time we start thinking of Facebook as
holding a monopoly not only on our online communication, but also on our imagination;
we thus need more critical and engaged studies that investigate what Facebook means for
people and how it shapes the way they think about social and political processes. Even if,
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as I commented in Chapter 1, the power of Facebook is being challenged and undermined
in the wake of the Cambridge Analytica scandal, its monopolistic position can have longlasting repercussions on how we think about the role of technology in social change.
Second, the case studies of LUMe and the Philly Socialists highlight the
importance of the distinction between the online and the offline. Despite living fully
connected, “hybrid” lives, activists draw a line between what happens offline and what
happens online, between the politics of the online and the politics of the offline. In the
cases examined in this project, this does not just mean that activists turn to analog media
for their activism (although they do, especially the Philly Socialists), but also that
physical political spaces – occupied buildings, assemblies, demonstrations – still matter a
great deal. For LUMe, occupied spaces are a communicative space in which activists are
free to lay their own ground rules, where interaction is less filtered and political decisions
can be taken; for the Philly Socialists, the offline is where “life happens”, where the
contradictions and injustices of capitalism are felt. Besides reaffirming the continuing
importance of the offline, the technological imaginaries of these social movements
highlight the necessity to think about what is not digital in order to be able to define and
experience what is digital. In fact, in articulating their critiques of technology, LUMe and
the Philly Socialists often implicitly or explicitly compare digital technologies to the
offline. What I am suggesting is not to reaffirm a dichotomy between online and offline
that downplays the role of the online, but to nuance our understanding of what it means to
lead fully connected lives and to highlight the political salience of the distinction between
the online and the offline.
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Failures of the imagination
“Maybe today no one amongst us really has a revolutionary approach to social media”
(Ilaria, LUMe)
Ilaria’s sentence came towards the end of a long interview, during which the 24year old talked at length about the ways in which LUMe activists discuss what the digital
technologies “of the system” mean to them. Unbeknownst to Ilaria, her sentence captured
some of the thoughts that kept coming to me as I worked on this dissertation. What does
it mean when social movements do not have a revolutionary approach to technology?
What would a revolutionary approach to social media look like? And do movements need
a revolutionary approach to technology to have a politically revolutionary approach?
Ilaria could not really tell me what a revolutionary approach to technology would
look like. And I could not tell her that either. But it is time for academics and activists to
ask themselves what technologies can do for social justice. It seems that the idea that
technologies are not neutral is finally becoming more mainstream, for academics and
even for the general public. But now we need to take a step further. We need to start
asking if the technologies we use are supporting or hindering our visions of social
change. We need to start asking how we can imagine technologies as supporting social
movements’ fights with power and their struggles for social justice. If corporate digital
technologies are reinforcing the power of the capitalist system, of white supremacy, of
the patriarchy, we need to start unambiguously envisioning technologies that can support
those who are already working to dismantle those powers. This might also mean
envisioning technologies that obfuscate or sabotage the technologies of power.
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Yet, imagining different technologies in service of different futures has been
really difficult. Searching for the technological imaginaries of contemporary leftist social
movements has left me with the sense that the imagination of these movements has been
encountering severe limitations, both when it comes to imagining the role of technologies
and when it comes to imagining different futures, beyond neoliberal capitalism.
Imagining different technological and social futures seems difficult, or perhaps pointless,
for the movements that have emerged in the last decade, in the long tail of the global
financial crisis of 2008. Certainly there must be movements out there that are envisioning
radically different futures. But they are still marginal – and their marginality cannot
entirely be a result of the biases of academic research or media coverage. With all its
political limitations, the global justice movement of the early 2000s unambiguously
claimed that another world was possible and that a global mobilization could chart the
way towards a more globally just future. The movements of the post-financial crisis
wave, the Arab Spring, the Indignados, Occupy Wall Street, the European anti-austerity
movements, Black Lives Matter, the Women’s movement in the United States… they
have all, for now, failed to imagine a future that is alternative to neoliberalism. This is not
to say that they haven’t been important – they have been and they still are very important.
But they have not engaged with the need to imagine alternatives; it is no coincidence that
most of their slogans and keywords have been about asserting their existence as a
neglected constituency and announcing their resistance. They have mostly responded to
these failures of the imagination by carving out spaces of critique, resistance and selforganization that criticize neoliberalism from the margins. Critique, resistance and selforganization are meaningful processes and activists should continue to focus on them.
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But we also need social movements to begin envisioning a way out of neoliberalism that
is not a global dystopian authoritarian regime. We need social movements to draw on
spaces of critique, resistance and self-organization to start explicitly imagining different
technologies, different societies, and different futures. Because imagining them will be
the first step in the long journey towards making them a reality.
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APPENDICES
Appendix A – Interview guides
Hungarian internet tax protests

1) Organization of the demonstrations
a. How did the interviewee get involved with the internet tax protests?
b. How were the protests organized?
c. What organizations and groups were involved in the organizing?
d. What kinds of decisions did the organizers need to make?
e. Can interviewee recall some of the specific actions that were organized?
f. Can interviewee recall some of the slogans?
g. Does interviewee think that the protests were adequately covered and
portrayed by mass media?
h. Interviewee’s personal experiences in the protests and the organization of the
protests

2) Specific discussion of the content of the tax proposal
a. Can interviewee explain the tax proposal?
b. What does interviewee think about the tax proposal?
c. What does interviewee think would have happened if the tax had been
approved?
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3) Hungarian political context
a. What does interviewee think about the political climate in Hungary?
b. What is interviewee’s view of the Orban government?
c. What does interviewee think are the most pressing problems in Hungary?

4) Political/social involvement of the interviewee
a. some demographics
b. has interviewee been socially/politically active before the internet tax
protests?
c. has interviewee been active since the internet tax protests?
d. What kinds of causes does the interviewee care about?

5) Interviewee’s views about technology (internet in particular)
a. What kinds of internet technologies does interviewee use?
b. How does interviewee relate to internet technologies?
c. Does interviewee remember when he/she first used the internet?
d. Is the internet important to the interviewee? Why?
e. What does internet freedom mean to the interviewee?

6) Interviewee’s views about the role of technology in social movements (Hungary and
other countries)
a. How does interviewee view the role of the internet in Hungarian civil society?
b. How does interviewee view the role of the internet in Hungarian social
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movements?
c. How does interviewee relate to other social movements in the world?

Philly Socialists

7) Political engagement of the interviewee
a. How did the interviewee get involved with the activist group?
b. Has interviewee been socially/politically active before joining the group?
c. What kinds of causes does the interviewee care about?
d. How does he participate in the activist group? Does interviewee have any
role?
8) Interviewee’s views about technology (internet in particular)
a. What kinds of internet technologies does interviewee use?
b. How does interviewee relate to internet technologies?
c. Does interviewee remember when he/she/they first used the internet?
d. Is the internet important to the interviewee? Why?
e. Can interviewee think of any time in which he/she/they was “creeped out” or
“weirded out” by technology?
f. Has interviewee had some negative encounters with technology?

9) Interviewee’s views about technology and politics?
a. What does interviewee think about using the internet for political/activist
aims?
b. Has the activist group had positive experiences with digital technologies?
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c. Has the activist group had negative experiences with digital technologies?
d. Does interviewee know where Figures 16 and 17 (see below) are from?
i. If yes, discuss how he/she/they encountered them
ii. If not, ask what he/she/they thinks the pictures mean

Figure 16. See Figure 3. Caption not shown to interviewee.
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Figure 17. See Figure 4. Caption not shown to interviewees.
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LUMe
1) Impegno politico
a. Come ti sei avvicinato/a a LUMe?
b. Ti eri già impegnato/a nel mondo politico prima di avvicinarti a LUMe?
c. Quali sono le tematiche per cui ti impegni politicamente?
d. A quali attività di LUMe partecipi? Ti occupi di qualcosa in particolare?

2) Opinioni sulle nuove tecnologie
a. Quali tipi di nuove tecnologie utilizzi?
b. Come ti relazioni alle nuove tecnologie?
c. Ti ricordi quando e come hai iniziato a usare internet?
d. Per te internet è importante? Perché?
e. Ti viene in mente una qualche occasione in cui, mentre utilizzati internet,
qualcosa è andato storto? O qualcosa ti ha infastidito?
f. Hai avuto qualche esperienza negativa con la tecnologia?

3) Opinioni su politica e tecnologia
a. Secondo te, come si può usare internet per fare politica?
b. LUMe ha avuto delle esperienze positive con le tecnologie di internet?
c. LUMe ha avuto delle esperienze negative con le tecnologie di internet?
d. Riconosci qualcuna di queste foto? (Figure 16 and 17)
i. Se sì, parlare di come ha incontrato le foto
ii. Se no, chiedere che cosa pensa che le foto significhino
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Appendix B – Visual focus groups

Rationale
In searching for a methodological approach that could help us uncover the
unspoken assumptions about the relationship between technology, politics and social
change, I developed an innovative research: the visual focus group38. The visual focus
group incorporates a collective drawing task within the traditional structure of a focus
group. Such drawing task is meant to engender productive conversations between
researcher and participants about the intangible assumptions surrounding technology.
Crucially, it is not the visual input that should be necessarily at the core of the analysis,
but rather the reflections and conversations that emerge around that visual representation.
The visual focus group builds on graphic elicitation methods and mental mapping
techniques, which have been developed within the disciplines of psychology, education,
critical geography and health (e.g. Copeland & Agosto, 2012; Jackson Foster,
Deafenbaugh, & Miller, 2018; Jung, 2014; Umoquit, Tso, Burchett, & Dobrow, 2011;
Wilson & Milne, 2016). In these disciplines, graphic elicitation is usually employed in
the context of individual, in-depth interviews (for a group version, see Jackson Foster et
al., 2018). Gieseking (2013) used mental mapping, a method meant to elicit the
production, on part of the research participant, of a “representation of an individual or
group’s cognitive map, hand sketched and/or computer-assisted” (p. 712). In using
mental mapping in the course of interviews, Gieseking (2013) allowed people to create
and revise their maps and explain what they represent; they functioned both as
38

I am particularly grateful to Jessa Lingel for introducing me to graphic elicitation methods and
supporting the methodological development of the visual focus groups in my research.
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independent sources of data, but also as prompts that help the interviewees remember
events. Gieseking’s (2013) work on mapping opens an avenue for experimentation that
allows participation and critical reflection on part of the researched, even if maps are not
necessarily the most appropriate way of approaching the study of technological
imaginaries. The use of creative tasks seems a particularly suitable way of investigating
things we are not really good at communicating with words and that “may include
elements considered preverbal, affect-laden, metaphoric, and/or relational” (Katsiaficas,
Futch, Fine, & Sirin, 2011, p. 123). In fact, Bagnoli (2009) argued that “a creative task
may encourage thinking in non-standard ways, avoiding the clichés and ‘ready made’
answers which could be easily replied” (p. 566). Recently, mapping techniques have also
been employed to map the media practices of activists, especially in terms of their
reliance on different types of media in their daily activist work (Ceccobelli & Mattoni,
2018).
Such a creative approach thus seems ideal to support activists’ reflexive
engagement with their own unspoken attitudes towards technology39. While the examples
of graphic elicitation techniques examined here all take place within the context of
individual interviews, my methodological innovation rests on the use of the creative tasks
within a group context. To my knowledge, this has not been implemented before. The
advantage of embedding the creative task within a group setting is that of eliciting a
collective conversation among participants as to how best approach the task itself, as well
as to invite participants to compare their own individual approaches and reflect on their
practices within their activist community. In the case of the visual focus groups
39

Mansell (2012) used drawings to support her examination of the social imaginaries of the “information
society”. The drawings, however, were not contributed by research subjects, but designed as figures for the
book.

344

conducted for this dissertation with the activists of LUMe, this attempt at a collective, yet
reflexive and detailed-oriented discussion was highly successful. The collective
discussions provided a number of intermediate drawing attempts, both individual and
collective, as well as an in-depth discussion of activists’ attitudes and beliefs towards
technology. The level of detail in the discussion was remarkable; it provided the
opportunity for an in-depth analysis of activists’ imaginaries and even touched upon
fundamental debates in the scholarly literature in lay terms, including discussions of
structure vs. agency, the applicability of Marxist theories to the internet, the relationship
between power and truth. Such discussions were supported by sketches made by the
interviewees, which were discussed within the group. Both groups successfully
converged on a final drawing within the timeframe of the focus group. Their final
drawings, as well as their discussions and preliminary sketches, are examined in Chapter
3.

Design of the visual focus groups
The visual focus groups include three stages. In the first stage, after participants
have given their informed consent, they are asked to anonymously fill out a
questionnaire, which can be seen at the end of this Appendix (in both English and
Italian). The questionnaire contains a few demographic questions, a “technology diet”
component, and five Likert-scale items. The purpose of the “technology diet” component
is to encourage respondents to reflect on their daily interaction with digital technologies:
how much time they spend online, what kinds of websites and social network sites they
use and for what reason, what sort of devices they employ. As can be seen in Table 7, the
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five close-ended questions at the end are meant to get activists to think about how they
feel about the internet in relation to politics. However, the way in which these questions
have been purposefully devised – with responses ranging from “strongly disagree” to
“strongly agree” – is supposed to provoke a reaction in the respondents, since it is hard to
provide a straightforward answer to any of these questions. In both focus groups, as
intended, activists questioned these items. Some reported that they felt they should pick
“neutral” as an answer. Others asked if they could write comments next to their answers
and then proceeded to do so. Most participants questioned the wording of the questions
and the limited choices, and sought to qualify their answers with “it depends”, “but what
if?”, etc.

Table 7. Close-ended questions posed in the anonymous questionnaire distributed in the visual focus
groups. Respondents were asked to choose an item on a 5-item Likert scale, ranging from "strongly
disagree” to “strongly agree”.

I am concerned about how much control corporations and other private actors have over
my personal information/what I say online.
I am concerned about how much control the government has over my personal
information/what I say online.
The internet was better a few years ago.
The internet works in a democratic way.
The internet is a space of freedom.

These “trick” questions thus accomplished their purpose: steering participants
towards discussing how complicated digital technologies are and how they might hold
multiple and contradictory opinions about them. Stage 2 of the visual focus group
capitalized on participants’ reflexivity, asking them to discuss the limitations of the
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survey. In the two focus groups, this discussion stage touched on many themes that would
then resurface in the third stage of the session, the collective drawing.
Phase 3, the collective drawing stage, took the bulk of the time of the focus group.
Participants were given drawing supplies and asked to collectively draw what they
thought the internet was like. They were not given any additional instructions, but they
were reminded that the only requirement for the drawing was that, in the end, they should
all agree with it: it should be representative of what they thought as a group. They were
supplied with pencils, pens, markers, scrap paper and a big piece of paper (70 x 100 cm).
In both visual focus groups, activists started discussing and self-organized to find
common ground. Before a collective drawing could be agreed upon, activists worked on
individual drawings, both as doodles that would support their thinking and their
argument, and as mock-ups of the drawings they thought were emerging from the group
discussions. In both visual focus groups, a preparatory collective drawing was first agreed
upon, and then transferred to the big piece of paper that they were given.

Pilot focus groups
I conducted a pilot focus group with a convenience sample of six Italian activists
in January 2018. The pilot was successful: it stimulated a long and intense conversation
and provided a number of insights on how to better structure and organize the focus
groups for the dissertation research. The participants were able to converge on a shared
drawing of the internet, displayed in Figure 18; while drawing, they considered a number
of possible options and had to speak about detailed and difficult issues that they were
facing in trying to represent the internet.
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Figure 18. Final drawing. Pilot visual focus group, 6 participants (5 male, 1 female), age 32-40, January
22nd, 2018. The internet is drawn as a rectangular field (red border), where individuals (in circles with green
borders) interact. The internet is shaped by four forces (at the corners): (counterclockwise from the lower
right corner) emotions, capital, politics, and media. There are also individuals “outside” of the internet (in
circles with light blue borders), who communicate with individuals who are within the rectangle. On top of
the rectangle, there is a struggle of power, between “the interests of the many” and “the interest of the few”,
which influences what goes on inside the internet.

For instance, the focus group participants took a long time before deciding how
they could accurately draw one of the aspects of the internet they most wanted to
communicate: the fact that “powers” of different kind can shape what happens online.
The representation they converged on is at the top of the drawing; there are two flags: one
says “interests of the many”, the other “interests of the few”. There is a “vs.” between the
flags, that indicates that this is a confrontation between the “interests of the many” and
the “interests of the few”, which then influences how the internet works (there is an arrow
that links this confrontation to the internet, represented within a red border). Although the
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interviewees ultimately were not satisfied with how they drew these “powers”, the
conversation they had was fascinating, because it addressed both the existence of
economic, political and cultural powers that influence the internet, but also the inability
of exactly pinning down how these powers work.
I conducted a second focus group, with a convenience sample of undergraduate
students at the University of Pennsylvania, in Summer 2018. Students participated to
receive extra credit.

Figure 19. Final drawing. Pilot visual focus group, 10 participants (5 male, 5 female), age 19-29, August
1st, 2018. The internet is drawn as a box. There is a door that opens the box, which represents “the Web”;
because it is elevated from the ground, there is a ladder that allows access to the door. To the side, there is a
tap, which is leaking a liquid, labeled “information”. There is a trap door on top of the box. A puppet,
representing “Uncle Sam”, is on top of a pole, which allows it to look through the trap door, into the box.
There is also a cowboy, outside of the box; it was added because the participants wanted to make fun of the
myth of the frontier.

As can be seen in Figure 19, the key idea that this visual focus group worked with
is the idea of the internet as a black box; this idea did not satisfy them, so they opted for
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drawing it as a blank box, to which many things can be ascribed. However, they
represented the access to this internet box as distant from the ground, to stress the fact
that there are barriers to entry; they added a ladder to show the way in. Similarly to the
other pilot visual focus group, these participants also struggled with representing power:
they settled for drawing a puppet of Uncle Sam to represent the United States
government; the puppet can see what is happening inside the internet-box through a trap
door.
While describing all the insights yielded by the pilot visual focus groups is
beyond the scope of this Appendix, it is important to note that the pilots showed that the
method appears to support engaged, in-depth and political discussions about the internet;
it was intelligible and meaningful both for older Italian activists and younger U.S.-based
students. While the method was designed explicitly to engage social movements in
discussing their relationship to the internet, the pilot with the students of the University of
Pennsylvania showed that it can also be deployed for non-activist audiences.

Using “prescriptive” visual focus groups to imagine better technologies
During the course of this dissertation, I have employed the visual focus group
method as a “diagnostic” tool, i.e. to examine how activists think about the contemporary
internet and to assess what their critiques of it might be. While working on this project,
however, I understood that the visual focus groups could also be used as a “prescriptive”
tool: to allow people to imagine better, different internets. In addition to academic
research, the prescriptive version of the visual focus group could also be used by the tech
policy and advocacy world to generate ideas on how to improve technology or its
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regulation. In particular, the visual focus group seems suited to encourage discussions
among different stakeholders, across different levels of technological and policy
expertise, and even across language competencies. The act of drawing facilitates an indepth conversation and reduces the use of jargon (which is difficult to draw!).
I ran a workshop that employed the prescriptive version of the visual focus groups
at the Internet Freedom Festival (IFF) in Valencia, Spain, in April 2019. The IFF draws
participants from different constituencies: tech developers and programmers, policy
advocates, activists, and academics, from all over the world. It was a particularly suitable
venue for trying out the visual focus group as a tool for imagining technology. The
session, called “Imagined internets: a hands-on discussion on how we want the internet to
be”, attracted 22 participants. The workshop was composed of two drawing tasks and a
wrap-up discussion; participants received a handout that explained the structure of the
workshop and the drawing tasks and included my contact information. First, participants
were asked to draw (on an A4-sized piece of paper, with markers and/or pencils) what
they thought the internet was like at the moment. After everyone completed this task, I
asked participants to volunteer to share what they drew; a few reported back to the group.
Second, the participants were asked to form 5 small groups with people they had not
previously met; in these small groups, they were tasked to draw together what they would
like the internet to be in the (near) future. They were instructed to discuss with their
group members how they could imagine, together, an internet that brings together all
their ideas and hopes. After the drawings were completed, each group showed their work
to the rest of the workshop participants and explained the thinking behind it. Third, I
solicited feedback from the participants. Those who spoke reported enjoying the drawing
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tasks. They said that this method encouraged them to see the different ways in which
people look at the internet and to push away from merely focusing on the technical
aspects of the internet; they also reported that having to choose what to draw was an
effective way to highlight people’s different priorities, in a more fruitful way compared to
compiling a written list. Participants also offered suggestions to improve the tool, chiefly
by ensuring that people included in the different groups come from different backgrounds
and/or represent different stakeholders and by providing more structure to the discussion
in the groups.
In accordance with the policies of the Internet Freedom Festival, the visual focus
group held there was not recorded or photographed, although there was a participant who
acted as a note taker, as encouraged by the Festival itself. Although the drawings created
in this session were never intended to be part of the analysis of this dissertation, I
explained to the participants that I would have been interested in collecting and analyzing
their drawings in the future. Participants were asked to opt into being part of my research
by handing in their individual and group drawings and indicating (on the back of the
paper) their age and their “constituency”, e.g. activist, programmer, policy, etc., as a way
of indicating their consent. I received 20 individual drawings and 5 group drawings.
While a comprehensive analysis of their drawing is beyond the scope of this Appendix,
Figures 20-22 provide a few examples of individual and group drawings. Given that the
group discussions and the groups’ presentations of their drawings were not recorded,
what can be inferred from the drawings is limited. However, the most important element
that emerges by comparing the individual drawings is that while some individual
drawings, like that in Figure 20, depict the internet in very technical terms, all of the
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group drawings are instead focused on imagining better internets based on people’s
experiences of the technology, as can be seen in Figure 21a-b and 22a-b.

Figure 20. Individual drawing, developer, 29 years old. "Prescriptive" visual focus group, April 6 th, 2019,
Internet Freedom Festival.
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Figure 21a. Individual drawing, designer, 35 years old. Figure 21b. Individual drawing, researcher, 31 years
old. "Prescriptive" visual focus group, April 6 th, 2019, Internet Freedom Festival.
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Figure 22a. Group drawing. Figure 22b. Group drawing. "Prescriptive" visual focus group, April 6 th, 2019,
Internet Freedom Festival.

In other words, this version of the visual focus group seems successful in steering
conversations on a terrain where different kinds of experiences can be integrated, and
technical expertise is not necessarily the backbone of the discussions. This type of
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workshop thus seems useful to get different stakeholders to take others’ perspectives and
knowledges into account.
I also held a pilot “prescriptive” focus group prior to the IFF, drawing participants
among graduate students at the Annenberg School for Communication. Predictably, both
the individual and group drawings produced in this pilot focus group reflect an
engagement with the internet that is based in academic research, as well as personal
experience, as can be seen in Figures 23 and 24a-b-c.

Figure 23. Individual drawing, female graduate student, 26 years old. Pilot "prescriptive" visual focus
group, March 26th, 2019, Annenberg School for Communication.
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Figure 24a. Individual drawing, female graduate student, 29 years old. Figure 24b. Individual drawing,
female graduate student, 32 years old. Figure 24b. Individual drawing, female graduate student, 28 years
old. Pilot "prescriptive" visual focus group, March 26th, 2019, Annenberg School for Communication.
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In addition to providing me a way to experiment with the structure of this version
of the focus group before the IFF, it also allowed me to think about how it could be used
for research purposes. To use it for academic research, the “prescriptive” focus group
would need some technical and conceptual adjustments. From a technical standpoint, the
challenge lies in being able to record the conversations happening in the different groups
at the same time; this could be accomplished by either assigning a (confederate) note
taker to each group or by providing microphones and recording devices to each group.
Both of these technical adjustments have the potential to alter the discussion in the groups
but would certainly provide a way to keep track of the group conversations and thus
make sense of the final drawings. On a more conceptual level, an academic use of this
version of the visual focus group should pay more careful attention to how the groups are
formed. One solution would be to ask participants themselves to create the groups, by
matching individual drawings that seem to point to the same issues. This would
encourage more coherent group discussions and also involve the participants in a handson analysis of others’ drawings. Given the homogeneity of the participants, I created the
groups in the pilot visual focus group according to the similarity of their drawings, but
this could be a task that is built in the design of the workshop. However, depending on
the type of participants that are involved in the visual focus group, it might still be more
productive to structure the small groups to be as diverse as possible – whatever that
means for the population considered – in order to maximize the chance of including
different perspectives on what the internet should be.
In sum, the “prescriptive” version of the visual focus groups seems well suited for
both academic research and advocacy. In particular, it seems to create a more even
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playing field compared to usual discussions about technology in advocacy spaces, which
tend to privilege strictly technical or legal perspectives; through the visual focus group,
personal experiences, rights-based perspectives and activist positions can all be integrated
in the discussion of how a better internet would look like.

Limitations and ethical considerations
The visual focus groups present the limitations that characterize focus groups in
general and those that pertain to the use of drawing as an elicitation method. First, focus
groups are always at risk of being co-opted by one or more dominant participants, who
might speak more frequently – or more at length – compared to other participants or
otherwise attempt to dominate the conversation. This can be mitigated by an attentive and
inclusive facilitation put in place by the moderator of the focus groups. Having been the
moderator in all of the visual focus groups I have organized, I can however attest that the
task is not easy: sometimes it is difficult to counterbalance the dynamics that already
exist within the activist groups that we are working with; sometimes it is tempting to let
dominant speakers speak at length if they are speaking eloquently and can give us “good
quotes”. Having examined the transcripts of the focus groups I conducted with LUMe
activists, I do not believe that the conversations in either group were dominated by
specific individuals, even though specific individuals might have spoken for longer
periods of time. The dominance of certain participants might however be exacerbated in
the “prescriptive” version of the visual focus group, in which participants discuss in
groups that do not have an assigned moderator and in which the researcher does not
intervene directly. It might thus be helpful to provide additional guidance to structure the
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conversation in a way that is inclusive of all voices. Additionally, participants could be
given the option to write down their reflections on the process at the end of the focus
group, providing them with the space to comment on the power dynamics within the
group40; while this would not modify the existing group drawing, it could still help the
analysis by providing new elements.
The nature of the drawing task creates two additional limitations. First, some
participants might be intimidated by the drawing task and/or concerned that their drawing
skills might not be good enough, as Jackson Foster and et al. also highlight (2018). While
this aspect can be mitigated by emphasizing the fact that the quality of the drawing does
not really matter for the research (I often told participants that their drawings were not
meant for a museum), of greater concern is the fact that the ability to draw might be
considered gendered: women might be seen as more capable of drawing or more willing
to draw. In both of the visual focus groups conducted with LUMe activists, the women
ended up doing the majority of the final drawing itself, even if men provided intermediate
sketches. While in these two focus groups the division of drawing labor did not
necessarily have an impact on the discussion, the way in which drawing seems to be
gendered is a drawback of this method that should be considered. Secondly, as many
research practices of the academy, drawing is a task that might be difficult for
participants with different types of disabilities. While being able to draw is not a
necessary precondition to participating in the diagnostic version of the visual focus
groups (someone else in the group could draw), a possible corrective in the prescriptive
version (which includes individual drawing) would be to offer a facilitator to participants

40

I am indebted to María Celeste Wagner for this helpful suggestion.

360

that might need someone to draw for them or with them. However, I have not attempted
this and cannot yet comment on how it would work in practice.
There are two ethical recommendations that I would like to offer to anyone who
might think of using the visual focus groups in the future. Firstly, the structure of the
visual focus groups can provide a good deal of privacy to the participants, who can
choose what to disclose. It is thus important that, in documenting the creation of the
drawings, researchers focus on acquiring pictures of the drawings, but not of the
participants; furthermore, drawings should not be associated to the names of the
individuals that created them. In this dissertation and in my documentation of the visual
focus groups, in general, I have not photographed the participants, only the drawings or
the process (i.e. I have pictures of arms and hands that draw, but not of participants’ faces
or other identifiable features). Secondly, to better reflect the ethos of the visual focus
groups, it is important that drawings, whether individual or collective, are not analyzed
without accounting for the context that generated them. Just like quotes from an
interview, they need to be presented and analyzed within the context in which
interviewees offered them; the drawings mean certain things to the interviewees, and they
should not be artificially twisted to support researchers’ chosen narratives. In Chapter 3, I
presented LUMe’s final drawings by embedding them in the discussions that generated
them. In this Appendix, I have offered a brief contextualization of the meaning of the
collective drawings produced by the pilot focus groups conducted with Italian activists
and Penn undergraduates; I have displayed the drawings collected in the prescriptive
visual focus groups, but I have not attempted to account for their meaning, given that I
have not recorded the discussions that generated them. Drawings are not self-explanatory:
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I thus recommend that drawings collected in the visual focus groups be presented
alongside participant quotes or a summary of the discussion that accompanied the
drawing.

362

FOCUS GROUP – QUESTIONNAIRE
(English version)

Year of birth __________
Gender

__________________

What is the highest degree or level of school you have completed?
________________________________
Where would you place your political orientation on a scale from 1 to 7, where 1 =
extreme right and 7 = extreme left? _______________
Through which devices do you usually access the internet? (Select all that apply)
 Smartphone
 Other type of cell phone
 Desktop computer
 Laptop computer
 Tablet
 Smart watch
 Mp3 player
 Smart TV
 Other: ______________________
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Answer the following questions as best as you can. You can also answer “I don’t know”
or “I don’t recall”.
How much time do you spend online every day? ________________________________
When did you use the internet for the first time? _________________________________
When did you start to use the internet regularly? ________________________________
What are the 3 things for which you use the internet the most?

Which social network sites do you use? (Check all that apply)
















Facebook
Twitter
Instagram
Youtube
YikYak
Snapchat
Line
Whatsapp
Tumblr
Signal
Google+
Pinterest
Viber
Telegram
Other: ___________________

Besides social networking sites, what are the 5 websites you visit the most?
_______________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________
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_______________________________________________________________

Select the most appropriate answer.

I am concerned about how much control corporations and other private actors have over
my personal information/what I say online.
1 – strongly disagree
2 - disagreee
3 – neither agree or disagree
4 - agree
5 – strongly agree

I am concerned about how much control the government has over my personal
information/what I say online.
1 – strongly disagree
2 - disagreee
3 – neither agree or disagree
4 - agree
5 – strongly agree

The internet was better a few years ago.
1 – strongly disagree
2 - disagreee
3 – neither agree or disagree
4 - agree
5 – strongly agree
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The internet works in a democratic way.
1 – strongly disagree
2 - disagreee
3 – neither agree or disagree
4 - agree
5 – strongly agree

The internet is a space of freedom.
1 – strongly disagree
2 - disagreee
3 – neither agree or disagree
4 - agree
5 – strongly agree
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QUESTIONARIO FOCUS GROUP
(Italian version)

Qual è il tuo anno di nascita?

__________

Qual è la tua identità di genere?

__________________

Qual è il titolo di studio più alto che hai conseguito:
_______________________________
Su una scala da 1 a 7, dove 1= estrema destra e 7=estrema sinistra, come definiresti la tua
collocazione politica? ________

Con quali dispositivi accedi regolarmente a internet? (Indicare tutti quelli utilizzati)

Smartphone
Altro tipo di telefono cellulare
Computer fisso
Computer portatile
Tablet
Smart watch
Lettore mp3
Smart TV
Altro: _________________________
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Rispondi a queste domande come meglio ti ricordi. Puoi anche scrivere “non lo so” o
“non ricordo”.

Quanto stai su internet in media ogni giorno? ___________________________________
Quando hai usato internet per la prima volta? ___________________________________
Quando hai cominciato a usare internet regolarmente? ____________________________
Quali sono le 3 cose per cui usi di più internet?

Quali social network usi abitualmente? (indicali tutti)
 Facebook

 Pinterest

 Twitter

 Viber

 Instagram

 Telegram

 Youtube

 Altri:

 YikYak

___________________________

 Snapchat

___________________________

 Line
 Whatsapp
 Tumblr
 Signal
 Google+
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A parte i social network che hai indicato sopra, quali sono i 5 siti che visiti più spesso?
1.

_______________________________________________________________

2. _______________________________________________________________
3.

_______________________________________________________________

4.

_______________________________________________________________

5.

_______________________________________________________________

Indica quando sei in accordo o in disaccordo con le seguenti affermazioni:

Sono preoccupato/a per il controllo che le multinazionali e altri soggetti privati hanno
sulle mie informazioni personali e/o quello che dico in rete.
1 - molto in disaccordo
2 - in disaccordo
3 - neutrale
4 - d’accordo
5 - molto d’accordo

Sono preoccupato/a per il controllo che lo Stato ha sulle mie informazioni personali e/o
quello che dico in rete.
1 - molto in disaccordo
2 - in disaccordo
3 - neutrale
4 - d’accordo
5 - molto d’accordo
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Internet era meglio qualche anno fa.
1 - molto in disaccordo
2 - in disaccordo
3 - neutrale
4 - d’accordo
5 - molto d’accordo

Internet funziona in maniera democratica.
1 - molto in disaccordo
2 - in disaccordo
3 - neutrale
4 - d’accordo
5 - molto d’accordo

Internet è uno spazio di libertà.
1 - molto in disaccordo
2 - in disaccordo
3 - neutrale
4 - d’accordo
5 - molto d’accordo
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